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ABSTRACT
This dissertation moves beyond traditional assessments of legal compliance. It offers a
more complete understanding of how international law functions upon the use of force
and during the conduct of hostilities. The dissertation consists of four case studies – each
presented and published as standalone articles – that provide fuller descriptions of
international law’s efficacy within fraught international contexts. By moving beyond the
common evaluative standard of compliance, this dissertation presents a pluralistic
conception of international law’s function and purpose.
Accordingly, the first case study presents an account of the way that international
humanitarian law is used to manage “prolonged occupation.” The second case study
shows how the traditional language of legal legitimacy is being supplemented by states
that now complement claims of legal compliance with assertions of investigative
willingness. The third case study engages with the notion of lawfare and suggests that this
term as become a means of limiting access to international justice. The fourth and final
case study provides a communicative theory that describes the microprocesses that states
employ when they use international law to argue and to advance military and diplomatic
objectives.
Collectively, these case studies understand international law as a multifunctional tool.
They provide accounts of how international law functions, how it compels, how it
facilitates, and how it is altered. Through a series of rhetorical moves the state identifies
the forms of international law with which they adhere, it devalues or deflects certain
obligations by accentuating others, it establishes and develops conceptions of
international law with which it wishes to further, and it presents the resulting
engagements as illustrative of a commitment to the international legal process and global
order. This dissertation asks not whether states comply with international law but how
they comply.
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BEYOND THE HABITUAL: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT UPON THE USE OF
FORCE AND DURING THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES
DAVID HUGHES
1. Situating the Dissertation through Commonality
The inaugural volume of the European Journal of International Law featured an
exchange between James Crawford and Francis Boyle. Two leading international lawyers
debated the merits of Palestinian statehood.1 They offered contrasting views in response
to the legal questions that followed from the 1988 Algiers Declaration in which the
Palestinian Liberation Organization proclaimed an independent state. 2 Ostensibly,
Crawford and Boyle queried the extent to which Palestinian statehood merited legal
recognition. The two scholars drew upon legal sources, recalled historical documents and
events, cited precedent, and offered doctrinal analysis. These methods of legal inquiry are
familiar practices, common tools wielded by international lawyers. Yet the exchange
between Crawford and Boyle exposed the exceptional character of the statehood debate’s
unavoidable context – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Crawford’s response to Boyle’s endorsement of Palestinian statehood appealed to a larger
notion that surpassed the particularities of any identified legal question. This concerned
the use and purpose of international law itself. Crawford observed:
It seems to be difficult for most international lawyers to write in an impartial
and balanced way about the Palestine issue. Most of the literature, some of it
by respected figures, is violently partisan. Still, such a level of partisanship in
legal discourse is disturbing…And the obstinate fact remains that the actors,
most of the time, continue to use the language of law in making and assessing
these claims…That the language of law is used implies that these claims can be
assessed, on the basis of values which extend beyond allegiances to a
particular, country, block, or religion.3
The exchange continued, returning to legal considerations of statehood, yet the broader
questions – regarding the role of law within fraught international contexts – are of
enduring significance. Often, when international lawyers confront a legal question or
evaluate a contested scenario, they seek to provide an answer. They assess legal
compliance.4 Has the state acted in a way that constitutes a violation of international law?

See, Francis A. Boyle, “The Creation of the State of Palestine” (1990) 1 Eur. J. Int’l L. 301. See also, James
Crawford, “The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?” (1990) 1 Eur. J. Int’l L. 307
[Crawford Too Much Too Soon].
2 The Palestinian Declaration of Independence, Algiers, 15 November 1988, reprinted in: Yehuda Lukacs,
ed, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record 1967-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992) at 411.
3 Crawford Too Much Too Soon, supra note 1 at 307.
4 For example, Sean D. Murphy, “Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq” (2003-2004) 92 Geo. L. J. 173.
1
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Do the actions or contentions of the state conform with some legal interpretation and can
thus be assumed permissible?
Entrenched conflict provides countless scenarios that demand legal scrutiny. War, the use
of armed force, and military occupation are governed by specific legal regimes. Regulated
through intricate frameworks as defined in the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello (or the
laws governing the use of force and international humanitarian law), states and other
international actors are compelled to comply with a series of rules. These rules seek to
administer the situations and circumstances that follow the breakdown of law’s “normal”
function. International lawyers assess the compliance of states with these specialized legal
regimes. An inherent assumption runs through this process. As James Crawford
suggested above, there is a belief that international law will serve as a neutral arbiter, that
it presents particular (desirable) values against which state behaviour may be assessed
through an (ideally) apolitical process that produces a determination of right or wrong;
of compliance or of violation.
This dissertation moves beyond traditional assessments of legal compliance. It offers a
more complete understanding of how international law functions upon the use of force
and during the conduct of hostilities. The dissertation consists of four case studies that
each provide a fuller description of international law’s function within fraught
international contexts. By moving beyond traditional assessments of compliance, I
present a pluralistic conception of international law’s function and purpose. This
understands international law as a multifunctional tool. It provides a means to formalize
and codify moral norms. It regulates inter-state relations and defines the duties and
obligations that structure the state’s relationship with the individual. Also, international
law provides a discourse through which states, other international actors, and individuals
may all argue and assert competing claims. As noted by James Crawford and Martti
Koskenniemi, international law presents as a “language of government in certain
contexts, as a bundle of techniques, and as a framework within which
several…constructivist projects are articulated.” 5
The case studies – presented through the four articles within this dissertation – provide
accounts of these techniques and of these articulations. The first, Moving from
Management to Termination, tells of the reinterpretation of legal provisions for
purportedly benevolent reasons but with unintended, and intended, consequences that
have resulted in a seemingly permanent temporary occupation.6 The state, bestowed the
status of an occupying power under international law, seeks to employ law to manage its
occupation of foreign territory. This has facilitated the state’s efforts to distract from or
defer questions about the legality and form of its imposed control and policies within the
occupied territory. The second case study, titled Investigation as Legitimization,
identifies an emerging practice in which states employ the language of individual
James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi, “Introduction” in James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi, eds,
The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 2.
6 See, David Hughes, “Moving from Management to Termination: A Case Study of Prolonged Occupation”
(2018) 43(3) Brook. J. Int. L. 1.
5
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accountability, under international criminal law, to demonstrate collective legitimacy. 7
Through the use of “informal complementarity,” the state showcases a willingness to
investigate military undertakings to avoid unwanted international scrutiny. In the third
case study, What Does Lawfare Mean?, actors work to define and privilege international
law’s acceptable users.8 By imposing normative value on particular uses of law, they
discount an array of legal engagements by, primarily, non-state actors. The fourth case
study, titled How States Persuade, describes the ways, the practices and techniques, in
which international law becomes a means to an end.9 An understanding of these processes
shows how international law remains a contested practice and how state actors engage in
rhetorical techniques to further particular accounts of what they contend to be the content
of international law.
Collectively, this dissertation and the case studies within suggest that when one looks
beyond assessments of compliance, when one moves past anticipated assertions of
legitimacy and legal conformity, a process of prioritization and preferencing occurs.
Within the described contexts, states engage with certain aspects of international law –
through interpretation and argument – to neglect other features of legal dictate. States
select and accentuate the international law with which they comply. They endeavour to
establish or secure the forms of international law that they desire. And they emphasize
the resulting processes in pursuit of identifiable diplomatic and military objectives. 10 The
case studies within this dissertation tell these stories and describe these processes.
Individually and collectively, they provide a more complete understanding of how
international law functions, how it compels, how it facilitates, and how it is altered, within
fraught international contexts.
2. Moving Beyond Compliance
The case studies within this dissertation each move beyond assessments of legal
compliance. They interrogate how states engage with international law to assert, define,
and demonstrate adherence to the requirements of international law and in advancement
of particular objectives. International legal theorists have long fixated on compliance.
Theories of compliance provide answers to the enduring question of why states, absent
an obvious source of coercion, adhere to legal obligations that may not serve their
immediate interests. A wealth of literature ponders the cause of seemingly adherent state
behaviour. While the resulting accounts differ significantly, they generally ground their
inquiries in Louis Henkin’s oft-quoted aphorism, that “almost all nations observe almost
all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the
time.”11

David Hughes, “Investigation as Legitimization: The Development, Use, and Misuse of Informal
Complementarity” (2018) 19(1) Melb. J. Int. L. 84.
8 David Hughes, “What Does Lawfare Mean?” 40 Ford. Int. L.J. 1.
9 David Hughes, “How States Persuade” 50 Geo. J. Int. L. (forthcoming).
10 A special thanks to Frédéric Mégret for his helpful articulation of this focus.
11 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign
Relations, 1979) at 47.
7
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The compliance question carries undeniable importance. As Harold Koh suggests, “if we
cannot predict when nation-states will carry out their international legal obligations
respecting trade retaliation, environmental protection, human rights, global security, and
supranatural organizations, how can we count on multilateralism to replace the bipolar
politics as the engine of the post-Cold War order?”12 As the Twentieth Century
proliferation of treaty-based international law began to touch nearly all aspects of
international society and relations, realist scholars like Kenneth Waltz deemphasized the
significance of the emerging legal regimes. 13
In response to realist dismissals, compliance theories explain international law’s
relevancy by providing a more purposeful account of why law compels states to alter or
structure their behaviour. The resulting accounts differ. An influential series of theories
suggest that state compliance is the result of international law’s normative pull.
Accordingly, Thomas Franck contends that compliance is based on the perception by the
obliging state that a particular rule or legal provision is in itself fair and legitimate. 14 The
“managerial approach,” offered by Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, suggests
that the propensity of states to fulfill their international commitments stems from the
legal principles generated through treaty regimes. For Chayes and Chayes, compliance is
grounded in the states desire to ensure efficiency, to promote its interests, and to adhere
to international norms.15 Building on the work of both Franck and Chayes and Chayes,
Harold Koh asserts that compliance is best ensured through a transnational legal process
that allows for the interpretation and domestic internalization of international norms.16
Institutionalist scholars seek to explain the influence of international institutions on state
behaviour. Steeped in the language of regimes, institutionalist theory views the selfinterested state as the principal international actor. Robert Keohane insists that states
behave as rational utility-maximizers that view international regimes as devices to
facilitate agreements that further the interests of states.17 Thus, compliance is a means of
securing benefit. Also building on the notion of self-interest, Andrew Guzman claims that
the question of compliance must be understood as a two-stage game. First, states
negotiate over the content of law and the required level of commitment. Second, the state
decides whether it will comply with international obligations by assessing the potential of

Harold H. Koh, “Why do Nations Obey International Law?” (1996-1997) 106 Yale L. Rev. 2599 at 2600.
For realists like Waltz, legal compliance and state engagement with international institutions was an
unimportant biproduct of powerful state interests. International law was not understood as possessing the
ability to alter state behaviour or interest. See, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). See also, Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War” (2000) 25
International Security 26.
14 See, Thomas M. Franck, “Legitimacy in the International System” (1988) 82 Am. J. Int. L. 705.
15 See, Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International
Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
16 See, Koh, supra note 12.
17 Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes” (1982) 36 Int. Org. 335. See also, Robert O.
Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics” (1997) 38 Harv. Int. L. J. 489.
12
13
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direct sanctions and the degree of reputational loss that is likely to be incurred should the
state dismiss its commitments.18
Liberal theory emphasizes the role of the individual actor within the international sphere.
Where similar approaches, like Koh’s transnational legal process, accentuate law’s
normative pull, liberal theory holds that states are the sum of many parts. These
constitutive parts must be considered independently and collectively to “fully understand
state action on the world stage.” 19 Anne-Marie Slaughter contends that individuals and
groups engaging with transnational civil society are essential to the international system.
States interact with these actors in a process of representation and regulation.
Compliance results from this interactive process when governments exhibit the
preferences of these domestic forces.20
International law now exists in what Thomas Franck has termed a “post-ontological
phase.”21 It is intellectually assured, a “mature” and “established” legal system against
which international lawyers and scholars can (and have) move beyond iterations of
relevancy to embrace a holistic or pluralistic account of international law’s function,
purpose, and efficacy. The case studies within this dissertation situate within a postrealist environment that emphasizes the role of rhetoric in the conduct of international
affairs.22 Each of the case studies tells an independent story with unifying themes about
how states engage with international law.
Compliance remains a desirable normative pursuit. However, situating international legal
inquiries around a binary understanding of compliance-violation unnecessarily limits
conceptions of international law. It constricts understandings of the means by which, and
the purposes for which, states employ international law in pursuit of foreign policy
objectives.23 A complete understanding of international law’s relevancy and effectiveness
must do more than attribute significance to the fact that states pay rhetorical homage to
legal dictate as they articulate and justify their policies.
War, conflict, and the consequences of a state’s decision to use force are often portrayed
through countless instances of legal violations. This is understandable. War is
devastating. International law provides a vocabulary to condemn the mounting death tolls
and wanton destruction. Also, however, international law provides a means to justify the
use of force. David Kennedy has termed this “legally conditioning the battlefield.” 24
See, Andrew T. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law” (2002) 90 Calif. L. Rev.
1826.
19 See, Oona A. Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” (2002) 111 Yale L. J. 1935 at
1952.
20 See, Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law in a World of Liberal States” (1995) 6 Eur. J. Int’l. L. 508.
21 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) at
6.
22 See generally, Francis A. Beer & Robert Hariman, eds, Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in
International Relations (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1996).
23 See generally, Lisa Martin, “Against Compliance” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, eds,
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 591.
24 David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 8.
18
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Through a discursive process, the humanitarian vocabulary of international law is
mobilized by militaries as a strategic asset. Such an understanding of international legal
engagement is frequently evidenced in accompaniment of the decision to use force and
during the conduct of hostilities. Kennedy explains that “if law can increase friction by
persuading relevant audiences of a campaign’s illegitimacy, it can also grease the wheels
of combat. Law is a strategic partner for military commanders when it increases the
perception of outsiders that what the military is doing is legitimate.” 25
Claims of legitimacy almost always accompany military action. The norm prohibiting the
use of force – as articulated within Article 2(4) of the UN Charter – is so entrenched that
states must justify their conduct through an established international legal vocabulary.
As Dino Kritsiotis explains, the embrace of legal argument has become “one of the staple
features of state practice on the use of force, so that when states use force against other
states, they also use international law to define and defend, argue and counter-argue,
explain and rationalise their actions.”26 This dissertation embraces the view that
international law provides an argumentative platform. The case studies, however, attempt
to go further then similar conceptions of law’s role within the international sphere. They
do not suggest that the described legal interactions evidence a discursive process in which
two sides debate the correct answer, the true meaning, or the proper interpretation of a
legal prescription. Each of the case studies evidences how states engage in a process
through which the state prioritizes the legal obligations that it wishes to comply with,
deemphasizes those that it wishes to disregard, and endeavours to accentuate a particular
vision of law, often through informal means, that allows the state to function within the
international sphere. The following case studies, written as independent articles, each
describe variants of this argumentative process.
3. Introducing the Case Studies
This dissertation consists of four case studies. Each case study is presented as a
standalone piece. They offer independent contentions and self-contained descriptions
regarding the employment of legal argument by those states that take the decision to use
force and partake in the conduct of hostilities. Yet, as described throughout, several
strands run through and conjoin the case studies that constitute this dissertation.
Collectively, they tell of the value in moving beyond strict considerations of legal
conformity and of understanding state engagement with international law, upon the use
of force, as a process of prioritization in which the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello are
each divided, emphasized and deemphasized, in a continual process that seeks to
influence, adapt, and apply the law in pursuit of military and diplomatic objectives. Each
case study, their independent features and their common traits, will now be described.
3.1. Moving from Management to Termination

Ibid, at 41.
Dino Kritsiotis, “When States Use Armed Force” in Christian Reus-Smit, ed, The Politics of International
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 45 at 47.
25

26
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The first article, titled Moving from Management to Termination describes and assesses
the application of the law of occupation in a prolonged scenario that is uncontemplated
by the applicable legal framework.27 In 2017, the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian
territories reached a half-century in duration. The occasion reignited a conversation
amongst legal scholars. A flurry of new publications questioned the efficacy of occupation
law. They asked whether it had become an anachronism. Across Israel and the Palestinian
territories, those that directly invoke the law of occupation sought a more effective means
of adapting the law to meet the exigencies created by fifty years of imposed control. The
accompanying debates recalled questions concerning the legal treatment of prolonged
occupation.
Built around a detailed case study of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, I argue that as
commonly interpreted, international law does not regulate – but instead – facilitates
prolonged occupation. Referencing various historical moments, I describe when and how
international law has been employed to entrench an occupying power’s control. These
legal engagements are justified as responses to the particular challenges produced by
prolonged occupation. Such uses of international law, the article argues, are based on a
common interpretative approach. This understands occupation as a fact or nonnormative phenomenon. As a result, international law is unable to alter occupation.
Instead, it may only manage it. The state emphasizes certain aspects of the occupation
framework to facilitate its control of, and to embed its presence within, the occupied
territory. It neglects those features of the framework that question, or disallow, the form
of control that the state now imposes.
Identifying the motive of management as a causal factor, I argue that common responses
to prolonged occupation – by occupying powers, other states, and international
organizations – may be necessary but when taken within the occupation framework’s
traditional, non-normative confines they risk perpetuating occupation. They entrench a
legal framework that is understood to neglect duration and curtail the inherent
requirement of temporality. This interpretation of the occupation framework becomes
susceptible to manipulation. In response, the article proposes a novel interpretative
approach. This shifts the focus of the occupation framework. It emphasizes a conception
of occupation as temporary and facilitates efforts to end occupation. By recognizing that
prolonged occupation constitutes an altered form of control, and grounding responses to
this means of control in established legal principles, this amended normative approach
identifies a legal basis under which an occupying power will be required to enable the
termination of prolonged occupation. This reasserts the law of occupation’s relevancy and
efficacy. It better aligns the purpose and functions of occupation law with diplomatic
objectives and international norms. And it shifts the discourse that accompanies
prolonged occupation from management to termination.

27

Hughes, Moving from Management to Termination, supra note 6.
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3.2. Investigation as Legitimization
The second article is methodologically similar. It describes how a state employs the
language of international criminal law to confer the legitimacy of its actions upon the use
of force. Titled, Investigation as Legitimisation, this article introduces the idea of
informal complementarity.28 The Rome Statute employs complementarity to determine
whether the International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction to prosecute
international crimes. Informal complementarity, as it is coined within this article, is
employed by states. It occurs independently (or pre-emptively) of an ICC investigation.
Appeals to informal complementarity speak fluidly of individual criminal proceedings
and state-level investigations or inquiries. When a state appeals to informal
complementarity, it is not immediately concerned with individual criminal liability or the
admissibility of a particular case. Instead, informal complementarity serves to deny the
state’s own (non-criminal) responsibility. The state may offer examples of investigations,
criminal proceedings, and efforts to ensure against impunity. These actions are displayed
as evidence of legal compliance. Collectively, they are required and necessary but may
also be duplicitous.
Despite the formal distinction between individual criminal liability and state
responsibility, appeals to informal complementarity constitute an emergent vocabulary.
It increasingly features within the lexicon of states that engage in the use of force. This
article identifies appeals to informal complementarity as an alternative or supplementary
means of asserting legitimacy. Traditionally, when states employ force, they couple the
initiation of hostilities with legal justifications that are designed to demonstrate the
legitimacy of the state’s actions. Within armed conflict, states are supplementing
traditional appeals to international law and assertions of legal fidelity with claims of post
hoc legal accountability. The traditional refrain of ‘we respect and adhere to the law’ is
increasingly coupled with the novel chorus of ‘we investigate the law’.
This article begins by distinguishing the conventional conception of complementarity
from its informal usage. It provides a detailed case study of Israel’s wars in Gaza to trace
the development and use of informal complementarity. Through an analysis of Israel’s
employment of international law (pre-and post Gaza operations), this article
demonstrates that, following a succession of wars, the post-conflict discourse has moved
from assertions of legal compliance exclusively to include pronouncements of
investigative willingness. Framed around the metaphor of the proleptic show trial, the
article introduces four broad phases of legal engagement that collectively constitute both
an appeal to informal complementarity and an emergent means of asserting legitimacy.
3.3. What Does Lawfare Mean?
The forms of legal engagements described in these first two case studies may come under
the ill-defined rubric of “lawfare.” The third article departs from the substantive and casedriven approach assumed in Moving from Management to Termination and
Investigation as Legitimization and considers the broader framing of these forms of
28

David Hughes, Investigation as Legitimization, supra note 7.
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strategic legal usage. It engages, critically, with the notion of lawfare by suggesting that
its common application strays from its initial descriptive purpose. It serves as a means to
preference who may employ international law.
Titled, What Does Lawfare Mean? this article differentiates various usages of this
increasingly common nomenclature. 29 Since its introduction into public, political, and
legal discourses, the term lawfare has captured the attention of both scholars and
practitioners of international law. Initially, the term was used to describe the novel ways
by which international law was being applied to achieve traditional military objectives. It
has since transformed into a blanket term of competing meanings. Lawfare has been
understood as the imposition or manipulation of international legal standards in order to
confine military operations. Employing the precepts of international law to shame
powerful countries has been described as lawfare. The use of human shields by non-state
actors engaged in asymmetrical warfare has been held to constitute an act of lawfare.
Lawfare has been used to label and decry the efforts of lawyers and organizations
representing foreign nationals at the Guantánamo Bay detainment camp in Cuba. And the
term lawfare has described the strategic use of international law by states for the purpose
of achieving a particular, often military, objective.
Despite the term’s ubiquity there is no consensus as to lawfare’s definition. Although
lawfare has received wide treatment within academic literature, the majority of these
discussions attempt to provide such a definition or evaluate the term’s normative
underpinnings. This article recognizes that such a consensus definition will remain
elusive and that this singular focus largely fails to explore the implications of lawfare’s
most common uses. This article reframes the debate surrounding lawfare by moving
beyond the definitional question and asking instead what the implications of lawfare’s
usages for both the understanding and practice of international law are? Such
consideration has been almost wholly absent from the legal literature. Built around seven
prominent quotations that claim to either define lawfare or describe what the speaker
deems an act of lawfare, this article argues that when one observes contemporary
applications of the term lawfare and the associating debates about the legitimate function
of international law, it becomes evident that most often applications of lawfare serve to
decry a particular use of international law by a particular actor. Here, lawfare becomes
a means of prioritizing certain forms of international legal engagements while
deemphasizing others. When framing the lawfare debate or articulating a response to
accusations of lawfare that are intended to delegitimize such specific uses of international
law, this paper argues that it is prudent to understand the application of the lawfare label
not as a general means of attacking or dismantling legal norms (as many critics do) but
as a particular strategy intended to limit the emerging notion of access to international
justice.

29

David Hughes, Lawfare, supra note 8.

10

3.4. How States Persuade
The final paper addresses the microprocesses of legal argument and considers how states
employ persuasion to prioritize those features of international law that they desire and to
disregard those facets that they deem disruptive. It follows a similar descriptive, casestudy driven approach as with the first two articles. And it is greatly informed by these
first two studies. It is intended as the culmination of this work and of my consideration of
how international law is employed by states in conflict situations. As with the previous
case studies, this article wishes to further identify and understand law’s function. It offers
a framework to conceptualize the nature of particular forms of legal argument. Titled,
How States Persuade, this article acknowledges that states are increasingly responding
to the perception of new threats and the altering nature of warfare by coupling military
action with sophisticated legal appeals.30 This has shifted the discourse accompanying
war beyond assertions of legal conformity. Commonly, the use of force is paired with
appeals that attempt to persuade that inventive legal arguments constitute acceptable
interpretations or applications of international law.
Law is portrayed as a medium for debate. Within this debate, persuasion becomes a
means to encourage legal fidelity. Persuasion is inexorably linked with questions of
compliance. Yet this is only one side of the practice. Persuasion is a two-faceted discourse.
It is both a means to ensure compliance and a method to define how international law
should be understood. Efforts to alter the behaviour of a “non-compliant” state through
cogent communication are often met with or pre-empted by legal argument put forth as
ripostes by the state.
Built around a series of case studies in which states offer legal arguments in support of
actions that, prima facie, extend beyond the limits of legal permissibility, persuasion is
understood differently than it is commonly represented. The state becomes not only the
“engine and the target” of compliance but a participant actively engaged in defining
compliance’s meaning. The article begins by asking: why do states persuade? It suggests
that the non-compliant state may employ persuasive legal argument to supplement a lie
(e.g. we did not do what you claim that we did). The state may appeal to persuasion in
support of a particular legal interpretation (e.g. what you say happened but it is not illegal
or the law is unclear). Or the state may invoke persuasive argument to generate legitimacy
(e.g. military action is a necessary response to an emerging threat). The resulting
arguments are directed toward either broad audiences (e.g. the international community;
domestic constituencies) or narrow audiences (e.g. specific interpretative or epistemic
communities).
Finally, the article asks: how do states persuade? I present a communicative framework.
First, the state constructs a Habermasian-like “common lifeworld.” Second, the state
establishes itself as a general norm-acceptor. Third, the state demonstrates its authority
to interpret the law. Fourth, it establishes a standard of compliance based on the
“acceptable legal argument.” And fifth, the state draws upon precedent and
30
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commonalities to apply law to fact. Nowhere is this argumentative structure more
apparent than in relation to the use of force. Grounded in a series of case studies, the
paper concludes by tracing the argumentative offerings posited by Russia following the
annexation of Crimea; by the United States and the United Kingdom as they developed
the “unwilling or unable” standard as applied in justification of the use of force against a
non-state armed group; and by Israel following the 2014 Gaza war. By acknowledging this
underexplored role of persuasion – as employed by states to lie, to interpret, or to
legitimize – the article provides a communicative framework and a platform to better
understand how international law becomes a means of both facilitating and restraining
the use of force by states.
4. Defending the Choices within the Dissertation
The case studies within this dissertation explore how particular states engage with
particular bodies of international law. The first two case studies – Moving from
Management to Termination and Investigation as Legitimization – emphasize Israeli
engagements with both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. This limited focus was
deliberate. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict contains countless instances in which
international law and international legal argument are afforded primacy. From widely
endorsed UN resolutions to the activist’s placard, international law has long served as a
significant feature of both the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians as well as
the international community’s response to it. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
remarked: “there is no conflict in the world today whose solution is so clear, so widely
agreed upon, and so necessary to world peace as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”31
Annan’s address to the Arab League referenced a litany of UN resolutions that provide the
legal basis for the commonly endorsed two-state solution. The late Secretary General, as
with so many others, believed that progress vested, in some part, in that vast body of law
that has incrementally developed throughout the second-half of the Twentieth Century.32
By moving beyond commonplace assessments of compliance to explore the
multifunctional uses of international law that Israel has employed throughout its conflict
with the Palestinians, observers are well-placed to see that what the Secretary General
described as the promise of international law is but one aspect of its function.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long-provided the backdrop to many inventive legal
contentions. The conflict has served as a testing place for uncertain legal assertions.
Accordingly, the engaged actors – both Israeli and Palestinian – have implemented
numerous policies and undertaken various actions that are correctly identified as legal
violations. Yet, the conflict has produced an environment in which legal argument is
common place and taken seriously. It provides a fertile space for the study of international
law’s function, development, uses, and misuses.
UNSG, Press Release, Leading their People back from the Brink is Duty of Israeli, Palestinian Leaders,
UN Doc. SG/SM/8177 (27 March 2002).
32 See, Susan M. Akram, et.al., “Introduction” in Susan M. Akram, et. al., eds, International Law and the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A rights-based approach to Middle East Peace (New York: Routledge Press,
2011) at 2.
31

12

I began considering these broader forms of legal engagement while working in the East
Jerusalem neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah. Here, I met the Al Kurd family shortly after
they had been evicted from their home. Umm Kamal, the family matriarch, moved to
Sheikh Jarrah with her husband as refugees in 1956. His family came from Jaffa, the
biblical port city famously associated with tales of Solomon and Jonah. Her family were
from Talbeyieh, a sloping, leafy neighbourhood in Jerusalem’s western sector. To the Al
Kurds, like a great number of Israelis and Palestinians involuntarily embroiled within the
contemporary conflict over this ancient city, Jerusalem is simply home. Yet, on 8
November 2008, following a protracted legal battle, their family became the first to be
evicted from their property in the contested East Jerusalem neighbourhood.
Umm Kamal’s grandson, Mohammad Al Kurd, was fourteen when he told me that he
wanted to become a human rights lawyer so that he could use the law to return his family
to their home. Their story attracted international attention. World leaders – former
President Jimmy Carter, Catherine Ashton, then the EU’s High Representative for
Foreign Affairs, political and parliamentary delegations – visited the protest tent that was
established on the street near their home. A social movement emerged. Palestinians,
Israelis, and international activists attended weekly protests. NGOs and international
organizations penned legal briefs and reports, distributed press releases, and filed
complaints with UN bodies. I wrote many of these. All appealed to international law for a
solution. But international law also facilitated the Al Kurds’ dispossession.
The focus on international law’s employment within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict tells
of the particular means that a state may employ to prioritize certain forms of international
law and to neglect alternative legal dictates. The focus on Israeli legal engagements – most
prominently within the first two case studies – is guided by the rich examples that this
conflict has produced about how international law can facilitate; how it can legitimize;
how it can preference; and how it can persuade. Accordingly, much (though by no means
all) of what follows, the case studies and the fact patterns, is informed by the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. This, however, is not a dissertation about Israel and Palestine. It is
about international humanitarian law, the use of force, international criminal law, the
ways that legal engagements are framed, and the means by which actors employ law to
argue and to advance agendas. It is about some of the lesser acknowledged ways that
international law can affect and can evolve within conflict situations. It is, at the most
basic level, a study about how international law works.
There is a temptation when one writes about international humanitarian law or the use
of force to fixate on either Israel or the United States. Many of the reasons for this are
clear. Both Israel and the United States employ the use of force more frequently than most
states. Throughout their histories Israel and the United States have been involved in
various conflicts that attracted immense legal, media, and scholarly attention. Often,
within these conflicts, their actions and legal justifications are highly controversial and
result in polarizing debates. The controversial nature of these actions encourage inventive
(and at times dubious) legal arguments. To the credit of both states, they often (though
not always) provide detailed legal articulations in justification of their actions. This
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provides a bounty of primary materials that may be interrogated and subjected to
scholarly pursuits. The focus of the initial case studies is influenced by these realities.
The final study, however, attempts to move beyond the predictable subjects that recur
within these legal fields. How States Persuade introduces numerous examples of how
various nations – Russia, the United Kingdom, India, Germany, Australia, and others –
have engaged with international law in an effort to posit more generalizable claims.
While I do not present this dissertation as a series of case studies about Israel, the United
States, or any particular nation, it is very much a project about how states engage with
international law. Historically, states have been deemed the primary subject and sole
actor within the international sphere. This is, of course, no longer so. The state-centric
approach presented within this dissertation and through these case studies does not
endorse a limited, or realist, view of international standing. Non-state actors assume
significant roles within the international sphere. The statist approach forwarded within
these case studies does not discount the significance of these groups, individuals, and
organizations. They are highly active within conflicts – as belligerents, mediators,
monitors, and as assessors. Non-state actors contribute to the formulation of
international law as well as to important efforts to ensure its implementation. 33 Yet it
remains states that retain the capacity to employ the most serious and sustained forms of
force. They are the most likely to provide intricate legal rationales in accompaniment of
such uses of force. These realities inform the scope and focus of the following articles.
Collectively, the dissertation presents claims about how law functions within fraught
international scenarios. This focus necessarily limits the forms of international law that
are considered. Thus, this becomes a dissertation about specific bodies of international
law. The case studies within focus primarily on the law governing the use of force and on
international humanitarian law. They touch more briefly on international criminal law
and allude to international human rights law. Other dissertations and further research
may be undertaken about how different fields of international law function within diverse
scenarios. Some findings will likely be comparable. Some claims will be generalizable.
Others will diverge.
The bodies of law and the contexts within which they are applied reflect the overarching
commitment to theoretical pluralism that runs through the case studies. The choices and
focuses presented throughout this dissertation result from my belief that international
legal engagements are variable. The reasons why and how a state may engage with
international law will likely alter between state and by body of law. The reasons for which
a state may adhere to a bilateral trade agreement, a human rights commitment, of
whether it may support a formalist or an expansionist reading of the self-defence
See generally, Raffaele Marchetti & Nathalie Tocci, “Conflict society: understanding the role of civil
society in conflict” (2009) 21 Glob. Change, Peace & Sec. 201. See also, Shany Payes, Palestinian NGOs in
Israel: The Politics of Civil Society (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2005); Richard Rogers & Anat BenDavid, “The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process and transnational issue networks: the complicated place of
the Israeli NGO” (2008) 10 New Media & Soc. 497.
33
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exception in the UN Charter, when or whether it may join an international regime like the
International Criminal Court will diverge. Accordingly, understandings of international
law are more effectively advanced when they move beyond efforts to provide unified
theories. The temptation to provide such an account is clear and while I do embrace the
foundational contention that almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law, it is those exceptions where compliance appears elusive that motivate
these case studies and that benefit from exclusive focus.
5. Conclusion
It is commonly assumed that the dictates of international law are abandoned upon the
commencement of hostilities. Cicero declared inter arma enim silent leges (in war law is
silent).34 Since the mid-Nineteenth Century, intricate legal frameworks have developed
that regulate both the grounds upon which force is permissible and the means by which
it may be employed. But where war’s inevitabilities are tallied and articulated as legal
violations, there remains an accompanying sense that instances of international law’s
disregard evidence its irrelevance. Andrew Guzman, for example, notes that compliance
mostly occurs, “in situations with many repeated interactions, each with relatively small
stakes…the topics that have traditionally held center stage in international law – the laws
of war, neutrality, arms control, and so on – are precisely those in which international law
is least likely to be relevant.”35
Observations of legal abandonment brought Hersch Lauterpacht to famously pronounce
that “if international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is,
perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law.”36 This
dissertation resists dismissals of international law’s relevancy. Each of the case studies
are situated within armed conflicts, they address instances where states couple the use of
force with intricate legal arguments. They each advance a multivariant vision of
international law. While a compelling story can be told about the ways that international
law functions as a constraint and provides protection during armed conflict, these case
studies describe other features of international legal engagement. They disassociate
assessments of compliance from the notion of relevancy.
Recalling David Kennedy’s contention that international law can increase perceptions of
legitimacy each case study explores the ways that states move beyond habitual assertions
of compliance and claims of legitimacy to prioritize particular legal engagements. The
resulting international legal discourses – as evidenced throughout the following articles
– are not contests that seek to establish whether an action or policy conforms with
international law. They are, instead, a series of rhetorical moves that allow the state to
identify the forms of international law with which they adhere, to devalue or deflect
certain obligations by accentuating others, to establish and develop the conceptions of
M Tulli Ciceronis, “Pro T Annio Milone: Oratio ad Iudices” in F.H. Colson, ed, Cicero pro Milone (New
York: MacMillan Press, 1893) 1 at 5.
35 See, Guzman, supra note 18 at 1828.
36 Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Problem of the Review of the Law of War” (1952) 29 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L 360 at
382.
34
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international law that they wish to further, and to present the resulting engagements as
illustrative of a commitment to the international legal process and global order. The
question that each of the following case studies asks is not whether states comply with
international law but how they comply.
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MOVING FROM MANAGEMENT TO TERMINATION: A CASE STUDY OF PROLONGED
OCCUPATION
DAVID HUGHES*

In 2017, the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories reached a half-century in
duration. This reignited a conversation amongst legal scholars. In articles and books,
lawyers questioned the efficacy of occupation law. They asked whether it had become
an anachronism. Across Israel and the Palestinian territories, those that directly
invoke the law of occupation sought a more effective means of adapting the law to meet
the exigencies of a fifty-year-old occupation. The accompanying debates recalled
questions concerning the legal treatment of prolonged occupation. This article seeks
to fundamentally alter the recurring discourse.
Built around a detailed case study of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, this article
argues that as commonly interpreted, international law does not regulate – but instead
– facilitates prolonged occupation. Referencing various historical moments, the article
describes when and how international law has been employed to entrench an
occupying power’s control. These legal engagements are justified as responses to the
exigencies of prolonged occupation. Such uses of international law, the article argues,
are based on a common interpretative approach. This approach understands
occupation as a fact or non-normative phenomenon. As a result, international law is
unable to alter occupation. Instead, it may only manage it.
Identifying the motive of management as a causal factor, this article argues that
common responses to prolonged occupation may be necessary, but when taken within
the occupation framework’s traditional, non-normative confines, they risk
perpetuating occupation. They entrench a legal framework that is understood to
neglect duration and curtail the inherent requirement of temporality. This
interpretation of the occupation framework becomes susceptible to manipulation. In
response, the article proposes a novel interpretative approach. This shifts the focus of
the occupation framework. It emphasizes a conception of occupation as temporary and
facilitates efforts to end the occupation. By recognizing that prolonged occupation
constitutes an altered form of control, and grounding responses to this means of
control in established legal principles, this amended normative approach identifies a
legal basis under which an occupying power will be required to enable the conclusion
of prolonged occupation. This reasserts the law of occupation’s relevancy and
efficacy. It better aligns the purpose and function of occupation law with diplomatic
objectives and international norms. And it shifts the discourse that accompanies
prolonged occupation from management to termination.
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“There are currently about 2.75 million Palestinians living under military
occupation in the West Bank, most of them in Areas A and B – 40 percent of the West
Bank – where they have limited autonomy. They are restricted in their daily
movements by a web of checkpoints and unable to travel into or out of the West Bank
without a permit from the Israelis. So if there is only one state, you would have
millions of Palestinians permanently living in segregated enclaves in the middle of
the West Bank, with no real political rights, separate legal, education and
transportation systems, vast income disparities, under a permanent military
occupation that deprives them of the most basic freedoms. Separate and unequal is
what you would have. And nobody can explain how that works. Would an Israeli
accept living that way? Would an American accept living that way? Will the world
accept it?”
-- John Kerry, 28 December 20161
INTRODUCTION
Route 5 begins at the Mediterranean coast, north of Tel Aviv, and journeys east through the
Sharon Plain and toward the Jordan Valley. The scenery rapidly transforms from the affluent
villas and dense apartment blocks of Ramat HaSharon and Petah Tikva to the arid, rolling hills
that mark entry into the West Bank. The road is well-traveled by many who live in the growing
communities outside of Israel’s commercial and economic core and who use the highway for
direct access into and from the city.
Continue east, twelve miles past the Green Line, and one arrives in Ariel. This large Israeli
settlement is located in the heart of the West Bank. To many, the appeal of Ariel echoes that of
the North American suburb. Its residents typically prioritize space and affordability above
increasingly expensive urban lifestyles. The ostensible normality of daily life in Ariel is
convoluted. Despite its proximity to Tel Aviv, Ariel was developed on occupied territory. It has
since grown into one of the largest Israeli settlements in the West Bank. 2 Most often, its residents
do not evoke the image of the nationalist settler, whose ideological commitment to a Greater
Israel is unwavering. Yet, its presence, beyond the Green Line, places Ariel near the geographic
and symbolic center of the land Palestinians claim for a future state, which some Israeli leaders

* Michigan Grotius Fellow, The University of Michigan Law School. I would like to sincerely thank Steven Ratner,
Yahli Shereshevsky, Michael Lynk, Teresa Tan Hsien-Li, and the participants at Cornell University’s Land Institute
Workshop for their beneficial reviews, comments, and suggestions. A special note of thanks is extended to the
editorial team at the Brooklyn Journal of International Law for their careful review of this work. Mistakes are my
own.
1
Speech by John Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Middle East Peace (Dec. 28, 2016), available at
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/12/266119.htm.
2
GERSHON SHAFIR, A HALF CENTURY OF OCCUPATION: ISRAEL, PALESTINE, AND THE WORLD’S MOST INTRACTABLE
CONFLICT 1, 188–90 (2017).
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view as integral to their own, and which the international community recognizes as under
belligerent occupation.3
Accordingly, in Ariel and throughout Israel’s many West Bank settlements, the mundanities of
daily life and local affairs can arouse global interest and ignite regional tension. Yet, Ariel
remains a city, otherwise conventional. An Israeli can work, buy a home, attend university, and
enjoy the comforts of a suburban life. While its legal status as a settlement, in violation of
international law, has negligible influence on the daily routines of its residents, it is a primary
facet of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is a space that embodies a prolonged occupation, where
legal narratives unfold and bear witness to competing uses of international law.
Settlements like Ariel present a paradox. Their existence, and the normality of daily life within,
repudiates the very legal framework that is intended to govern the conflict and enable its
resolution. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank has now surpassed its fiftieth year.4 As the
conflict’s landscape becomes increasingly legalized, agreement as to how international law may
effectively govern prolonged occupation eludes consensus. Traditionally, occupation is
understood as a neutral phenomenon. Military control of foreign territory operationalizes the
occupation framework—that is, the various legal instruments that regulate occupation. 5 The
framework’s application is commonly understood as a counteraction to the factual recognition of
foreign control.6 As prominently interpreted, international law’s relationship with occupation is
devoid of normative content.7
Eyal Benvenisti explains that the drafters of the legal framework regulating occupation “took
pains to emphasize that the regime of occupation is a de facto regime that conveys to the
occupant only circumscribed rights and obligations for the limited duration of the occupation.” 8
The resulting legal treatment is premised upon the assumption that foreign control is temporary. 9
Although occupation was envisioned in brief intervals and regulated accordingly, the legal
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 446, ¶ 3 (Mar. 22, 1979). See also G.A. Res. 32/20, ¶ 1 (Nov. 25 1977) (affirming that Israel’s
presence within the West Bank constitutes a belligerent occupation). See also Grant T. Harris, Human Rights, Israel,
and the Political Realities of Occupation, 41 ISR. L. REV. 87, 94–95 (2008).
4
The occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip (as well as other territories) began in June
1967. See generally IDITH ZERTAL & AKIVA ELDAR, LORDS OF THE LAND: THE WAR OVER ISRAEL’S SETTLEMENTS
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, 1967–2007 (2007) [hereinafter ZERTAL & ELDAR].
5
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 539 T.S.
631 [hereinafter Hague Convention (IV)]. The term occupation framework includes treaty-based provisions,
primarily the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as the various interpretations that have
evolved around these. See also Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied With Occupation: Critical Examinations of the
Historical Development of the Law of Occupation, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 51 (2012) (For an overview of the
occupation framework’s historical development) [hereinafter Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied With Occupation].
6
See Prosecutor v. Naletilic, IT-98-34-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 211 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003). See also Marco Sassòli, The Concept of Belligerent Occupation, in THE 1949 GENEVA
CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 1390, 1393 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & Marco Sassòli eds., 2015).
7
AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE WALL: RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 3–4 (2017)
[hereinafter GROSS, WRITING ON THE WALL].
8
See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 15–16 (2d ed. 2012) (Benvenisti
notes that, “as part of the jus in bello, the lawfulness of the occupation regime or its authorities did not depend on
the jus ad bellum issues that led to the invasion and the occupation.”).
9
Nehal Bhuta, The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 721, 726 (2005).
3
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framework does not set firm durational requirements. Instead, it protects the inalienability of
sovereignty. It strictly regulates the occupying power’s ability to alter the territory’s legal or
political status. Thus, the legal framework is structurally conservationist.10
Prolonged occupation presents myriad challenges. These emanate from the occupation’s
extended duration. They derive from the structural inability of the occupation framework to
provide more than temporary consideration to a population that faces extended subjugation. The
framework’s ephemeral conception of occupation is ill-suited to regulate the enduring needs of a
population bereft of self-governance. This incompatibility between international law’s
conservationist orientation and the reality of prolonged occupation has long provoked questions
regarding the appropriateness of the legal framework.11 Throughout the West Bank, a legal
regime that is understood as exceptional and temporal continues to regulate an occupation that
has now exceeded a half-century in duration. International law is persistently employed to
govern a fait accompli—evidenced by the prevailing normality of life in the settlements—whose
continuation is partially facilitated by appeals to international law.
As an occupation’s length increases, year-by-year, its challenges become further embedded and
the associated framework further exposed. Most commonly, responses to these challenges are
grounded within an interpretative approach that favors a factual or non-normative understanding
of occupation.12 This prominent reading recognizes a temporary conception of occupation, but
accepts that the framework’s application is not disrupted by duration. Although international
humanitarian law (IHL) envisions occupation as a temporary state, both in accordance with its
historical origins and as a requisite means of preserving sovereignty, the prominent interpretative
approach accentuates the legal framework’s absence of a durational limitation. The resulting deemphasis of the framework’s innate temporality projects a conception of IHL that is constrained
in its treatment of prolonged occupation. Temporariness, when juxtaposed with the framework’s
lax durational requirements, becomes intangible. It becomes a concept devoid of meaning or
precision. 13
Occupation is undesirable. Factually conceived and legally acknowledged, occupation is
regulated because it is an inherent characteristic of war. Yet when an occupation becomes
prolonged, it is less likely to serve a necessary military need. The means and character of the
occupation alters. The interests of the occupying power depart from the purpose of the
occupation framework. Commonly, however, the legal treatment of occupation does not respond
to the altered form of foreign control. It continues to regulate a situation that threatens
permanence through a legal framework that provides provisional respite. As prominently
Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 195, 199 (2005).
See generally Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84
AM. J. INT’L L. 44, 47 (1990) [hereinafter Roberts, Prolonged Occupation].
12
See, e.g., U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 28–29 (2004) [hereinafter
U.K. Military Manual]. See also Kristen E. Boon, The Future of the Law of Occupation, 46 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 107,
116 (2008).
13
The Hague Regulations did not consider the likelihood of a prolonged occupation and operated under the
assumption that a peace treaty between the occupying power and the occupied government would be expedited. See
BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 144–45.
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interpreted, it fails to articulate a clear legal basis as to why occupation, despite its undesirability,
must be terminated.
Prolonged occupation should not be exclusively defined by an occupation’s duration. The
principle of temporality is not only contingent upon the passage of time. It is also illustrative of
the conditions that exist and the form that the occupation has assumed. An occupation will
become prolonged when it shifts from a regulated phase that preserves sovereignty and ensures
uninterrupted humanitarian consideration to a form of foreign control that threatens to become
permanent. By adopting a non-normative interpretation of occupation and fixating on the
challenges that stem from an occupation’s duration, the legal framework engages with the daily
administration of the occupation but neglects the fundamental purposes of this legal regime.
This article explores international law’s efficacy. Attempts to remedy the challenges emanating
from the occupation framework’s inapposite relationship with prolonged occupation result from
an interpretative choice. This is between the prominent, non-normative reading of the occupation
framework, which responds to the challenges caused by a prolonged occupation’s duration, and a
normative approach that wishes to engage with the causes of this altered form of foreign control.
Corresponding efforts may be both benevolent and necessary. Yet, when grounded within the
prominent interpretative approach, responses to prolonged occupation are limited. In accordance
with this interpretative approach, the user seeks to better employ the law. The prominent
interpretation purports to more effectively regulate the occupying power’s ability to respond to
the challenges of prolonged occupation. Additionally, however, these efforts provide the
occupying power with an opportunity to justify initiatives that entrench its control. Ostensibly,
these are presented as compensating for the occupation framework’s incomplete conception of
occupation.
The following pages trace and engage with debates concerning the legal regulation of prolonged
occupation. They query how the prominent, non-normative interpretation of the occupation
framework influences or enables responses to the challenges posed by prolonged occupation.
Though these challenges evoke a diverse array of responses, this article identifies a
commonality. Collectively, responses premised upon a non-normative interpretation of the
occupation framework are limited by an understanding of international law that only allows
efforts promoting the better management of occupation. Whether the ‘manager’ is attempting to
externally address the challenges presented by prolonged occupation or internally operate within
the framework’s confines, this management approach is motivated by an unconstrained notion of
occupation. It neglects the occupying power’s intentions. Ignoring the new form of control that
the prolonged occupation establishes, the user seeks to better engage with various provisions of
the legal framework to mitigate the results, but not the cause, of prolonged occupation.
What is characterized here as the management approach is derived from a non-normative
interpretation of the occupation framework. It refers to the diverse and preferred methods of
regulating prolonged occupation. Commonly, the management approach is prioritized by state
actors, courts, and international lawyers. It accompanies a shift from a formal occupation,
premised in necessity and based on temporality, to a quasi-permanent administrative
relationship. Various actors, each with distinct motivations, apply the management approach in
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several forms. An occupying power or an international actor may appeal to this approach to
justify a benevolent policy intended to serve the occupied population.14 The occupying power
may also appeal to the management approach to legitimize measures that fortify its control of, or
interests in, the occupied territory. This approach, however, derives from an interpretation of the
legal framework that accentuates occupation’s factual character and lax temporal requirements.
Upon an interpretation that accepts the framework’s application, and neglects a holistic
conception of temporality, management becomes either the only or the preferred method of
addressing prolonged occupation.
This article begins from the assumption that in 1967, following war between Israel and
neighboring Arab states, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and
the Golan Heights came under Israeli control.15 These events triggered the application of the
occupation framework. The following sections, however, do not directly address the occupation
or legal status of the Gaza Strip. This omission is not a commentary on Gaza’s postdisengagement status. Neither, is it an assertion that there is a legal or political distinction
between Gaza and the West Bank.16 The focus of this article is on the legal framework governing
instances of prolonged occupation. Gaza cannot be ignored within the context of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. But to understand the implications and inadequacies of the occupation
framework for the purpose of governing prolonged occupation, this article limits its observations
to the West Bank. It is here that the Israeli presence is greatest and most entrenched. 17 Extensive
settlement developments mark the West Bank and continue to expand. 18 Again, this does not
suggest that Gaza holds a separate territorial status, but instead recognizes that the issues
regarding the current occupation of Gaza are less concerned with the particular challenges
presented by prolonged occupation.
The following considers how international law is employed in response to and in furtherance of
prolonged occupation. Part I provides a brief overview of the occupation framework. It reviews
the well-established challenges that manifest during prolonged occupation. This begins with the
pioneering work of Adam Roberts and describes how, due to the occupation framework’s
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conservationist structure, prolonged occupation is understood to require particular forms of
administration.
Part II traces the implications of these responses. It queries how the prominent, non-normative
interpretation influences the regulation of prolonged occupation. This section demonstrates that
widespread appeals to the occupation framework, as traditionally conceived, facilitate continued
recourse to the management approach. Set within the West Bank, this section assesses state
engagements, juridical interventions, and scholarly debates. Though the desire to better manage a
prolonged occupation may be compelling, this section demonstrates how perpetual management
threatens to entrench occupation and forsake the requirement of temporality.
Part III considers alternative interpretations of the occupation framework. These reject the
prominent, non-normative readings that permeate much of the discourse. They increasingly
feature within debates regarding the effective legal treatment of prolonged occupation and raise
important questions regarding the legal status of this form of occupation.
Finally, Part IV offers a third interpretative approach. Drawing upon identified sources of
international law, this article proposes a novel, normative interpretation of the occupation
framework. This accentuates the requirement of temporality. Conceived holistically, this
interpretation considers not only the length of an occupation, but also the form that an occupation
has assumed. Engagements with the framework, responses to the challenges presented by
prolonged occupation, may pivot from a limiting interpretative approach that professes neutrality
and emphasizes durational neglect. This will nurture attempts to end, not simply manage or
better endure, prolonged occupation. The proposed interpretative approach will require an
occupying power to satisfy a good faith obligation to refrain from actions that facilitate or
perpetuate occupation. Once an occupation can no longer be justified as a temporary necessity
that preserves sovereignty and provides humanitarian consideration, it abandons its legal purpose
and must terminate. The proposed interpretative approach is more consistent with the spirit of
IHL. It better matches the ethos of the occupation framework. And it will better align the purpose
of the occupation framework with diplomatic and state-building initiatives that are grounded in
the principle of self-determination.
Identifying the motive of management as a causal factor, this article argues that common
responses to prolonged occupation may be necessary, but when taken within the occupation
framework’s traditional, non-normative confines, they risk perpetuating occupation. They
entrench a legal framework that is understood to neglect duration and curtail the requirement of
temporality. This interpretation of the occupation framework becomes susceptible to
manipulation. The proposed approach, offered here, shifts the interpretative focus of the
occupation framework. It emphasizes a temporary conception of occupation and facilitates
efforts to end the occupation. This is not a complete theory or reimagining of the law of
occupation. Instead, this article offers an alternative point of departure and seeks to shift the
discourse that accompanies prolonged occupation from management to termination.
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I. THE OCCUPATION FRAMEWORK AND THE CHALLENGES OF PROLONGED OCCUPATION
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations denotes when territory becomes occupied. 19 It supports the
widely-assumed position that since the 1967 War, the West Bank and other territory captured by
Israel, was or remains under occupation. The article states that “[t]erritory is considered occupied
when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to
the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.”20 Accordingly, as
prominently interpreted, international law conceives of occupation as a neutral phenomenon.
With scant consideration for the jus ad bellum, the legal framework accepts the existence of an
occupation. 21 The occupying power may be waging a war of aggression or it may be the victim
of aggression. Although the jus ad bellum distinguishes between these origins and attaches the
label of illegality to the former, the legal framework is commonly interpreted to accept the
existence of occupation. Regardless of cause or duration, occupation is viewed as a neutral, nonnormative, fact.22
War’s inevitability prompts occupation’s regulation. The occupation framework is founded upon
the principle of the inalienability of sovereignty. 23 Its early development and codification was
influenced by a nineteenth century European desire to preserve sovereign prerogative. 24
International law became a placeholder. Upon the factual existence of an occupation, the
occupation framework preserves the status quo ante bellum. 25 Regardless of cause, it operates to
manage the spatial problem that results from the suspension of sovereignty and the imposition of
foreign control.26 Article 43 of the Hague Regulations compels the occupying power to, “restore
and ensure, as far as possible, public order and civil life, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country.” 27
The Hague Regulations, however, conveyed minimal regard for the interests of the occupied
population. They sought to preserve state prerogatives, protect property rights, and deny
sovereignty by conquest.28 Despite its selective Eurocentric origins, the occupation framework’s
subsequent development corresponded with international law’s growing humanitarian
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overtures.29 Alongside the Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva Convention would form the
core of IHL. Historically, upon the imposition of foreign control, territory was either subsumed
or neglected.30 Resigned to war, the occupation framework acknowledges that foreign control
often accompanies or succeeds hostilities. 31 The occupation framework intends to protect
sovereign interests from annexation and safeguard the local population from disregard. 32 The
Fourth Geneva Convention expanded upon the Hague formulation.33 Article 64 prescribes, that
while subject to notable exceptions, “[t]he penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in
force. . . .”34 This is understood to expand upon Article 43’s preservationist character. It shifts
emphasis from political to humanitarian interests and provides the occupying power with a
further, yet still limited, duty to proactively regulate the territory. 35
The occupation framework was now informed by humanitarian intentions. Yet, as codified by
Articles 43 and 64, the legal framework’s primary purpose continued to ensure that an occupying
power may not acquire sovereignty. With limited exceptions, the legal and political foundations
of the occupied territory would be preserved. 36 Collectively, these provisions establish the
conservationist principle.37 The legal framework, however, maintained a nineteenth century
conception of occupation. Within, “occupations were of relatively short duration, during which
occupants, by and large, retained existing legislation as much as possible.”38
Although occupation is clearly understood to be a temporary regime, international law is largely
silent on questions of duration. The prominent interpretative approach seizes upon this. A
meeting of legal experts, convened by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
agreed that IHL did not impose formal limits on the length of an occupation. Based upon a nonnormative reading—focused exclusively on duration and neglecting the altered form of control
that accompanies prolonged occupation—the expert panel accentuated the framework’s failure to
denote a temporal limitation. The group stated that, “nothing under IHL would prevent
occupying powers from embarking on a long-term occupation and that occupation law would
continue to provide the legal framework applicable in such circumstances.” 39
The framework’s efforts to regulate the tripartite relationship between local inhabitants, the
displaced sovereign government, and the occupying power developed alongside the presumption
29
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that the triggering conflict would be of limited duration.40 Promptly, upon the establishment of
peace, normality would revert.41 In accordance, an occupation was understood to end in one of
two ways: (1) either the fortunes of war are altered and the occupying power loses military
control of the territory it formally held, or (2) the occupation is brought to an end through a
negotiated agreement.42 Often, however, both historical and contemporary occupations failed to
match the paradigmatic vision that informed the legal framework.43
As a result, protection gaps and structural discrepancies emerged. In as early as 1949, the
inconsistencies between observed manifestations of occupation and the newly formulated
occupation framework’s ability to effectively govern prolonged occupation were considered.
The crux of the critique provided by Doris Appel Graber was direct. Graber plainly asserted that
the existing legal treatment appeared fragmented. The legal framework had developed within and
was influenced by a non-analogous historical period of relative peace. This was not suited to
govern the complexity of contemporary occupations. 44
The conservationist principle prohibits an occupying power from imposing enduring or
fundamental changes. Yet as any society evolves, effective regulation requires political,
economic, social, and legal development. Often, these needs appeared in tension with the
occupation framework’s preservationist character. Adam Roberts’s defining work on prolonged
occupation advances this notion. Roberts demonstrated that an inherent inconsistency existed
between the legal framework’s treatment of occupation as constituting a provisional state and
contemporary manifestations of occupation.45 In response to this apparent incompatibility,
Roberts asked, “To what extent are international legal rules formally applicable, and practically
relevant, to a prolonged military occupation?” 46 Writing over a quarter-century ago, Roberts
argued that this question had assumed prominence due to the exceptional duration of Israel’s
presence within the territory that came under its control in 1967. 47
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The point at which an occupation becomes prolonged will, as Adam Roberts observed, remain a
contentious issue.48 Commentators have proposed durational limits. An occupation is declared
prolonged when it exceeds a predetermined timescale. 49 This determination, however, is not
suited to a fixed chronological limit. It must be cognizant of the form of control that an
occupation has assumed. An occupation becomes prolonged when it no longer adheres to the
principle of temporality. Temporality is understood holistically. It is informed by an occupation’s
duration but also its condition.
This article suggests that an occupation becomes prolonged when it constitutes a form of control
that threatens to become permanent. A prolonged occupation is a quasi-permanent administrative
relationship that constitutes something other than a temporarily imposed humanitarian
arrangement. This is more of a competence and observational-based trigger than one focused on
the precise temporal scope of an occupation. This proposed understanding recognizes that the
hallmark of a prolonged occupation is apparent when the factual accounting of the occupation
threatens the regulatory ability of international law. This risks an occupation becoming indefinite
and eventually irreversible.
Many of the challenges presented by prolonged occupation are widely understood. Roberts
explained that the law of occupation is often interpreted to provide the occupying power with a
large measure of authority. Although this may be justifiable in times of direct hostilities, Roberts
believed this arrangement was not sustainable. It accentuated the likelihood, as the occupation’s
duration increased, that the legal framework’s conservationist orientation would hinder the socioeconomic development of the occupied territory.50 Roberts argued that if the existing framework
was not adapted to recognize the characteristics and challenges posed by prolonged occupation,
the framework itself could leave a society politically and economically underdeveloped. 51
According to Roberts, responses to these challenges cannot be indefinitely neglected due to the
conservationist nature of the occupation framework. Roberts, however, notes that providing an
occupying power with additional latitude carries risk. The danger, said Roberts, “in making such
a suggestion is that it may seem to imply the further suggestion that those parts of the law of war
that deal with military occupations may not be fully applicable, and that departures from the law
may be permissible.”52
Resulting engagements with prolonged occupation are commonly structured by the prominent,
interpretive approach. These legal engagements attempt to better utilize the legal framework.
Efforts by states, courts, and scholars to address the challenges created by prolonged occupation
are grounded within a factual notion of occupation. They avoid normative assessments. Instead,
48
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they accept that regardless of the occupation’s duration, a traditionally-interpreted occupation
framework continues to govern prolonged occupation. To address the myriad challenges posed
by this form of occupation, competing interests must be effectively managed.
The critiques and premise offered by Roberts continue to provide a point of departure for
subsequent responses. Although Roberts acknowledged the challenges posed by prolonged
occupation—identifying the tension of addressing these challenges through a legal regime built
upon the conservationist principle—subsequent responses have maintained fidelity to the
prominent interpretation of the occupation framework. The ensuing debate fixates on the extent
to which, and the means by which, an occupying power should or should not be accorded
additional latitude to manage the intrinsic challenges presented by prolonged occupation. 53
Christine Chinkin explains that the “inherent dilemma” within this debate is that the prolonged
nature of the occupation may be invoked both in favor of and in opposition to increasing the
allowances that an occupying power receives.54 Certainly, there are instances where broadening
the occupying power’s discretion will appear prudent. If the necessity of prolonged occupation
inevitably breeds inherent challenges, if over time the failure to respond to demographic shifts
and economic stagnation threatens the interests of the occupied population, the provision of
expansive latitude will exhibit moral pull. Equally, however, one can envision numerous
scenarios in which such latitude would convey a disproportionate focus on the rights of the
occupying power.
Chinkin neatly captures the confines of the discourse that surrounds prolonged occupation. The
identified dilemma, however, is premised on the prominent interpretative approach. This
common legal framing responds exclusively to managerial challenges that result from the
occupation’s duration. Fixation on these governance challenges purport to ensure the occupied
population’s long-term needs. These will demand attention. Yet, an exclusive managerial
approach neglects the causes and consequences of the altered form of control embodied by
prolonged occupation. Upon this interpretative approach, the challenges presented by prolonged
occupation may only be managed. Management is facilitated and improved by either increasing
or limiting the occupying power’s control of the seized territory. Upon this prominent
interpretative approach, the elicited replies regularly elect management as the necessary, or only,
response.
This singular view of prolonged occupation allows duration to become either a guise or a
justification for quasi-permanent control. Israel’s occupation of the West Bank provides
numerous examples of an occupying power both appealing to and employing this approach to
justify a novel form of regulation. Adhering to a non-normative reading of the occupation
framework that links prolonged occupation to duration – not conditions – confines the forms of
legal engagement that an actor may take when responding to the challenges posed by prolonged
occupation. It allows an occupying power to justify initiatives that purport to remedy these
53
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challenges. Such an approach—the reliance upon continual management to alleviate the effects
of prolonged occupation—risks further entrenching or perpetuating occupation within the West
Bank and beyond.
II. THE PROMINENT INTERPRETATIVE APPROACH: THE FACILITATION AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE PERPETUAL MANAGEMENT OF PROLONGED OCCUPATION
Immediately following the 1967 War, legal considerations were overshadowed by the dawn of a
new regional reality. Soon, however, international law became a prominent feature of Israel’s
newfound control of the territory it assumed upon victory. 55 This began gradually and proceeded
haphazardly. Days after the cessation of hostilities, Israel pledged to apply the occupation
framework. It emphasized its commitment to the well-being of the local Palestinian populace. 56
Israel, however, shifted from its initial pronouncement and began questioning the West Bank’s
legal status. Weeks after the war had ended, Yaakov-Shimshon Shapira, then Minister of Justice,
addressed the Knesset. Shapira argued that Israel should not assume the status of an occupying
power within the recently “liberated territory.”57 Israel then passed an ordinance permitting its
government to extend Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration “to any area of Eretz Israel
(Palestine)” that it deemed necessary. 58
The ordinance was swiftly invoked.59 It extended Israeli jurisdiction into East Jerusalem but was
not applied within the West Bank.60 Official references to the Fourth Geneva Convention were
removed.61 The following year, Israel formally abandoned the term West Bank, reverting to the
region’s historical Hebrew names, Judea and Samaria. Despite these changes, Israel refrained
from formally extending jurisdiction to or claiming sovereignty of the West Bank. It did,
however, continue to question the territory’s legal status.62 As Israel moved away from its initial
commitment to the occupation framework, the notion of settling the West Bank entered the
public discourse.63
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Despite Israel’s evolving position, the international community remained steadfast. The Security
Council called upon the involved governments to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions. 64
Israel was condemned during successive emergency sessions of the General Assembly. These
denunciations ranged in tenor and called upon Israel to remove its military from the territories it
now held.65 In response to the growing international consensus, Israel refuted the premise that its
presence within the West Bank constituted an occupation. Israeli officials adopted an amended
version of the “missing reversioner thesis” developed by Yehuda Blum. 66 This drew upon the
notion of terra nullius. Though it avoided such framing by name, Blum’s thesis emphasized the
perceived sovereign void that existed within the West Bank. 67 An altered, and partially
moderated, version of the approach initially articulated by Blum gained further credence when
presented as official policy by Meir Shamgar, then the Attorney General and later the President
of the Israeli Supreme Court. Writing within his official capacity in the inaugural volume of the
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights following a symposium at Tel Aviv University, Shamgar
concluded that:
the Israeli Government tried therefore to distinguish between theoretical juridical and
political problems on the one hand, and the observance of the humanitarian
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the other hand. Accordingly, the
Government of Israel distinguished between the legal problem of the applicability to
the territories, and decided to act de facto, in accordance with the humanitarian
provisions of the Convention.68
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank moved swiftly from acknowledgement to indeterminacy.
Shlomo Gazit, who upon conclusion of the war was appointed as Coordinator of Activities in the
Territories, was tasked with overseeing Israel’s administration of the West Bank.69 Gazit
explained that the occupation’s architects ensured that “the establishment of military government
64
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in occupied territory be seen as a temporary phenomenon.” 70 Privately, however, Israeli officials
acknowledged that their presence within the territories would likely endure. Moshe Dayan,
Israel’s Defense Minister, instructed Gazit to prepare for an “extended stay.” 71
A factual conception of occupation facilitated Israel’s prolonged presence. Meir Shamgar, then a
Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, offered a traditional reading of the occupation framework.
This forwarded a singular notion of temporality. It accentuated the absence of a durational
limitation and remained silent on the form of control that an unconstrained occupation would
assume. Shamgar wrote that “according to International Law the exercise of the right of military
administration over the territory and its inhabitants had no time-limit, because it reflected a
factual situation and pending an alternative political or military solution this system of
government could, from the legal point of view, continue indefinitely.” 72 This common
interpretative approach became the foundation of Israel’s subsequent legal engagements with the
occupation framework.73
Writing in 1990, Adam Roberts correctly predicted Israel’s continued occupation of the
Palestinian territories. 74 The entrenchment of Israel’s presence throughout the West Bank
accentuated questions concerning the occupation framework’s appropriateness. As Israel
continued to govern the West Bank and establish its presence through the construction of
settlements and their associated infrastructure, it would increasingly appeal to the occupation
framework and management approach. As with the scholarly and juridical deliberations that
acknowledged the occupation framework’s inadequacies, Israel purported that many of its legal
engagements were in response to the challenges presented by this particular form of occupation.
Imposed policies were justified in response to the occupation’s duration. Grounded within a nonnormative conception of occupation, these responses managed the results, and neglected the
causes, of prolonged occupation. Collectively, they contributed to the quasi-permanent form of
control that the occupation would assume.
A. The Challenge of Economic Development
On May 30, 1967, King Hussein of Jordan and Egyptian President Abdel Nasser signed a joint
defense agreement.75 Regional tensions escalated. Nasser declared that “our basic objective will
be the destruction of Israel.”76 A little more than a week later, Israel would gain control of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Combat forces gave way to military government units who
expeditiously established an administrative structure.77 Duties were divided between the Israel
70
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Defense Forces (IDF) and Israel’s Government. Security and near-term economic needs came
under the purview of military command. Political considerations and long-term economic
matters would be addressed by ministerial committees.78 The Military Government declared that
its primary objective was to oversee the resumption of normality. Corresponding efforts were
largely guided by economic objectives.79
Under the direction of Moshe Dayan, Israel implemented policies intended to foster economic
integration with the assumed territories. The resulting governance structure claimed to provide
for the “legitimate needs of local inhabitants and the security requirements of Israel itself.” 80
Ostensibly, this was consistent with the obligations imposed by the occupation framework.
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations requires an occupying power to restore and ensure public
order and civil life throughout the occupied territory. 81 The precise meaning of the provision and
the extent of the obligations that it imposes are, however, unclear. 82 Yet despite interpretative
discord, it is widely assumed that Article 43 compels the occupying power to, inter alia, “restore
order and normal economic life in the occupied territory.” 83
Israel’s earliest interventions appear consistent with the provision. The Military Government
worked to liberalize trade, manage produce surpluses, protect the agricultural sector, and provide
development loans. 84 The passage of time would, however, witness the evolving needs of the
occupied population. It would bring shifting priorities amongst the occupying power. The
conventional application of the occupation framework appeared insufficient to pacify the
involved interests. The uncertainty conveyed by the occupation framework, observations of its
selective application, and its conservationist orientation prompted Adam Roberts to ask whether
the framework unnecessarily confined economic development.85 During prolonged occupation,
the desire for economic stewardship—in response to market changes, anticipated societal needs,
technological advancements, and demographic shifts—creates tension with the occupation
framework’s conservationist stance.86 To resolve this discordancy, to begin responding to the
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challenge of economic development within prolonged occupation, Israel referenced the
occupation’s duration to justify “more effective” means of management.87
Since 1967, the West Bank has been governed as an economic union with Israel. 88 The guiding
policy of economic integration was presented as a benevolent necessity. Israel proclaimed that
“[t]he Six Day War abolished to all intent and purposes the ‘Green Line’ that in the past
demarcated the Israeli sector from the administered territories. Naturally and unavoidably, these
areas are becoming dependent upon Israel for all their economic and service needs.”89 A
fundamental economic transformation followed. Various sectors, including agriculture, trade,
taxation, and natural resources, came under Israeli control. Initially, the imposed single market
generated economic gains within the occupied territories. 90 Though the successful development
of the West Bank was understood as a mutual benefit, integration aligned with Israel’s
(exclusive) economic interests.91
Many of Israel’s economic interventions were challenged. Their legality was repeatedly
questioned.92 In reply, Israel referenced the need to respond to the particular quandaries evoked
by the occupation’s duration. Corresponding appeals to the management approach were
grounded in a non-normative reading of the occupation framework. In 1972, a labor dispute
occurred between hospital employees and a charitable association in Bethlehem. In response, the
Military Government initiated settlement proceedings, amended preexisting legislation, and
imposed mandatory arbitration. The petitioner claimed these actions were beyond the
competence of an occupying power. It claimed that the imposed measures contravened the
occupation framework’s conservationist ethos.93
In the Christian Society case, Israel’s High Court of Justice considered the aforementioned
claims. In response, it offered a broad interpretation of Article 43. 94 Following five years of
occupation, the Court drew upon Israel’s elongated presence within the territories. It identified
and responded to the resulting challenges. The occupying power was deemed responsible for
ensuring the, “whole social, commercial and economic life of the community.” 95 The Court
concluded that Israel must acknowledge changing conditions. It must attend to the resulting
87

See generally KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66.
See Raja Khalidi & Sahar Taghdisi-Rad, The Economic Dimensions of Prolonged Occupation: Continuity and
Change in Israeli Policy Towards the Palestinian Economy, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/2009/2 (Aug. 2009).
89
See Ministry of Defence, Coordinator of Government Operations in the Administered Territories, The
Administered Territories 1967/1971 — Data on Civilian Activities in Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip and
Northern Sinai (Isr.), cited in BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 224.
90
Id. at 241–42. See also Hisham Awartani, Israel’s Economic Policies in the Occupied Territories: A Case for
International Supervision, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: TWO
DECADES OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP 399, 401–02 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992).
91
Id. See also GORDON, supra note 84 at 70.
92
See generally Osama A. Hamed & Radwan A. Shaban, One-Sided Customs and Monetary Union: The Case of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip under Israeli Occupation, in THE ECONOMICS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE 117 (Stanley
Fischer, Dani Rodrik & Elias Tuma eds., 1993).
93
KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 58–59.
94
See HCJ 337/71 Christian Society for the Holy Places v. Minister of Defense 26(1) PD 574 (1971) (Isr.) (An
English summary of the decision is available at, Court Decisions, Christian Society for the Holy Places v. Minister
of Defense, 2 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 354 (1972)) [hereinafter Christian Society].
95
Id.
88

33

challenges. The Court obliged Israel to adopt measures needed to ensure “civil life.” 96 This broad
reading of Article 43 was justified by reference to the prolonged nature of the occupation. As an
occupation’s duration increases, the Court held, “[l]ife does not stand still, and no administration,
whether an occupation administration or another, can fulfil its duties with respect to the
population if it refrains from legislating and from adapting the legal situation to the exigencies of
modern times.”97
Soon after, a Palestinian utilities provider challenged a Military Government decision appointing
an Israeli company to provide electricity to the Hebron area.98 Prior to the order, a municipal
generator supplied the city. Demand, however, increased following the development of Kiryat
Arba, the early Israeli settlement located in the hills outside of Hebron. The former Palestinian
provider argued that the military order was incompatible with a conservationist reading of
Article 43.99 The petition was dismissed. The High Court of Justice reaffirmed its expansive
understanding of the occupation framework. It held that the military order was intended to ensure
basic needs. The Court invoked the local population’s economic welfare and ruled that the
military commander did not violate the conservationist approach by ensuring the provision of
electricity. 100
Israel continued to cultivate an expansive interpretation of Article 43. This was based on a dual
affirmation. The occupation framework would remain applicable regardless of the occupation’s
duration, but due to the occupation’s duration, particular management was required. The Court
affirmed that economic initiatives that altered the status quo ante were permissible when
benevolent.101 These early decisions legitimized foundational aspects of the occupation that
purported to better manage the economic and social needs of the local population. 102
The economic union that guided many of Israel’s early policies vis-à-vis the West Bank was
justified in accordance with Article 43. 103 Such economic management was deemed necessary to
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“ensure a return to orderly life and prevent the effective observance of the duty regarding the
assurance of la vie publique.”104 These decisions entrenched an expansive understanding of
Article 43.105 They provided the occupying power with broad discretion to impose economic
policies. Ostensibly, these policies were intended to better manage prolonged occupation. They
were premised upon an interpretation of the occupation framework that accepts occupation as
fact and the framework’s uninterrupted relevancy.
In Yesh Din v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria et al., the High Court directly
referenced the prolonged nature of the occupation. The case addressed Israel’s operation of
several quarries within the West Bank. 106 The Court considered and applied Article 55 of the
Hague Regulations and, correspondingly, the rules of usufruct.107 It promoted a “broad and
dynamic” reading of the obligations bestowed upon an occupying power within a prolonged
occupation. 108 Article 55 implies that an occupying power may derive benefit from the territory’s
natural resources. It is widely understood, however, that an occupying power is prohibited from
imposing changes to production levels and that any changes must not be to the detriment of the
local population. 109
Although the Court held that Israel’s operation of the quarries was consistent with the rules of
usufruct, it nevertheless pivoted to Article 43. 110 It noted that Israel’s operation of the quarries
served the welfare of the local population. 111 The Court’s decision was premised on the
prominent interpretation of the framework. It endorsed the framework while coupling its
application with the view that management initiatives were required to benefit the local
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population. The High Court acknowledged that this management approach became necessary due
to the occupation’s duration:
the traditional occupation laws require adjustment to the prolonged duration of the
occupation, to the continuity of normal life in the Area and to the sustainability of
economic relations between the two authorities—the occupier and the occupied. . . .
This kind of conception supports the adoption of a wide and dynamic view of the
duties of the military commander in the Area, which impose upon him, inter alia, the
responsibility to ensure the development and growth of the Area in numerous and
various fields, including the fields of economic infrastructure and its development.112
This hints at the notion of a benevolent occupier. The risks of Israel’s economic management
would, however, become apparent. Following an initial period of growth, the Palestinian
economy began a sustained decline. 113 Israel derived benefit from its economic control of the
West Bank. It gained access to a large, affordable, labor pool. 114 This increased economic
prosperity within Israel. 115 At the same time, however, Shlomo Gazit explains that “the Israeli
authorities and the military government did little to develop the local economic
infrastructure.”116
Israel’s economic approach to the West Bank continued to shift. 117 The policy of pacification
through increased prosperity was replaced by initiatives that fortified Israel’s control of the
territory.118 Customs arrangements heavily favored Israeli goods, which benefited from
unfettered access to the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian imports were restricted.119 Imposed
policies increasingly prioritized Israel’s economic objectives. By the mid-2000s, the Palestinian
economy teetered. Its GDP had plummeted. Following the Second Intifada, unemployment
soared. The World Bank estimated that nearly 70 percent of the Palestinian population now lived
in poverty. 120
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Israel’s economic management was condemned. 121 In the late 1980s, the General Assembly
urged the international community to provide economic assistance to the Palestinians. 122 Despite
acknowledging that economic aid was not a substitute for a “genuine and just solution to the
question of Palestine,” the General Assembly recognized the continued relevance of the
occupation framework.123 It too opted in favor of better management. The international
community pressed Israel to better ensure Palestine’s economic needs. 124 The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development favored working within the international community to
“encourage Israel to allow wide-ranging economic policy reform and liberalization in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including the right to economic policy formulation and
management by the Palestinian people.” 125
The economic challenges that resulted from the prolonged nature of the occupation have spurred
continuous debate. While evoking diverse perspectives and encouraging an array of policy
proposals, these debates rarely question the occupation framework’s continued relevance.
Instead, they assume a non-normative conception of occupation. They seek to provide a more
effective means of managing the resulting situation. Despite Israel’s increasingly entrenched
presence throughout the West Bank, notwithstanding the precariousness of the Palestinians’
economic conditions, variants of the management approach remain the favored means of
addressing the exigencies of prolonged occupation. Within scholarly debates, proposals often
contest what Christine Chinkin identified as the “inherent dilemma” of determining the extent to
which an occupying power should receive additional latitude. The prominent debates recognize
that the occupation framework’s conservationist design impedes economic adaptability. All
agree that this requires specific management.126 Despite the benevolent intentions that
accompany these deliberations, they largely neglect the possibility that perpetual management
often contributes to perpetual occupation.
B. The Challenge of Legislative Competence and Long-term Planning
The consequences of Israel’s territorial acquisition consumed its political and legal
establishments in debate. Government officials contemplated their newly imposed duties and
rights. Meir Shamgar, then the IDF’s Military Advocate General, told a Knesset Committee:
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Our aim is to minimize legislation on pure security and administrative matters, based
on Article 64 of the Geneva Conventions, help restore life to its previous course
through our actions and enable a smooth operation of civil courts as soon as possible.
All of this while maintaining the principle of ensuring the interests of military control
over the areas.127
Immediately following the 1967 War, Israel announced its first military orders. Existing law, in
force prior to June 1967, would be retained unless it contravened a subsequent military
directive.128 This pronouncement accorded with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. The order
empowered the Military Commander to issue legislative decrees deemed necessary to administer
the assumed territory. During the following months and then years, military officials issued a
vast network of orders.129 Though these orders formally maintained much of the preexisting
legislative structure, they developed the occupation’s legal foundation.130
The preferred use of administrative actions—the lessening of legislative initiatives—embraces a
conservationist interpretation of the occupation framework. The occupying power’s legislative
competence to introduce, annul, or amend laws within the controlled territory is delineated in
both the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention.131 Traditionally, the occupying
power’s ability to legislate is read restrictively. 132 As with the economic development debate,
however, this raises various questions. These query the efficacy of the occupation framework.
When applied to prolonged occupation, they ask whether the framework frustrates the
implementation of necessary legislative initiatives. They consider whether it impairs the
imposition of policies intended to affect long-term change.133
Eyal Benvenisti explains that historically, “the occupant was not expected, during the anticipated
short period of occupation, to have pressing interests in changing the law to regulate the
activities of the population except for what was necessary for the safety of its forces.” 134 By the
First World War, however, this restrictive reading of Article 43 was deemed untenable.
Occupying powers became increasingly proactive. They desired flexibility. 135 Article 64 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention provided broader exceptions to the framework’s legislative
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limitations.136 While this increased the occupier’s ability to impose legislation or policy designed
to create long-term change, the occupation framework maintained its conservationist purpose. 137
The nature of occupation evolved throughout the latter-half of the twentieth century. Initiatives
imposed by occupiers were increasingly framed as responses to the exigencies of prolonged (or
transformative) occupations. 138 The occupation framework’s traditional laissez-faire approach to
governance was presented as implausible. 139 Morris Greenspan argued that human existence
requires organic growth. It is impossible for a state to mark time indefinitely. Pragmatically,
Greenspan noted the need for adaptive management, arguing that, “political decisions must be
taken, policies have to be formulated and carried out.”140
Increasingly, legislative initiatives were understood as a necessary means of responding to social,
economic, and political changes. 141 These changes are unavoidable, the inevitable by-products of
the passage of time. They produce challenges and legal systems adapt accordingly. Initiatives
and policies are introduced to meet evolving needs. Within a prolonged occupation, however,
these unavoidable developments risk neglect. Proponents favored ensuring that the occupying
power was not constrained by a conservationist reading of the framework. The longer an
occupation lasts, Dinstein explains, “the more compelling the need to weigh the merits of a
whole gamut of novel legislative measures designed to ensure the societal needs in the occupied
territory do not remain too long in a legal limbo.”142
The Likud Party’s electoral ascendency in 1977 heralded the expansion of the settlement
project.143 Israel began imposing legislation and enacting policy designed to have permanent or
long-term influence on the affected territory. 144 A large transportation network was developed to
modernize roadways within the West Bank. This would link various settlements to Jerusalem. 145
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The initiative was challenged in Ja’amait Ascan v Commander of the IDF in Judea and Samaria.146
The petitioners, whose land would be expropriated to enable construction, argued that the
planning initiative primarily served Israeli interests and that the project’s permanence was
inconsistent with a temporary notion of occupation.147
Israel refuted these claims. It asserted that the project benefited local residents and cited the
existing infrastructure’s inability to serve the growing population. 148 Israel referenced Article 43.
It argued that due to the occupation’s duration, it could not be required to preserve a distant
status quo. A military government was obliged to further the local population’s interests. 149
Long-term planning initiatives were framed as requirements. To ensure effective management,
the occupier was to anticipate local needs and respond accordingly. 150
In Ja’amait Ascan, the High Court of Justice endorsed Israel’s appeal to the management
approach. In response to the requirements of prolonged occupation, the Court favored an
interventionist response. Citing Morris Greenspan’s call for increased legislative competence, it
held that:
the power of the military government extends to taking all necessary measures to
ensure growth, change and development. The conclusion that follows is that a
military government may develop industry, trade, agriculture, education, health and
welfare and other such matters which are related to good governance and are
required in order to ensure the changing needs of the population in an area under
belligerent occupation.151
The Court explored the policy’s motives. 152 Ultimately, it accepted the Government’s claim that
the proposed changes were made necessary by the passage of time. It accepted that they would
serve local interests and were thus compliant with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. 153
Israeli initiatives, ostensibly intended to respond to the challenges of prolonged occupation, were
deemed legitimate if they benefited the local population. They were required to refrain from
altering the basic institutions of the occupied territory. 154 Article 43 was reinterpreted by the
Court to better respond to prolonged occupation. Despite the conservationist principle’s
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historical origins, the Court held that contemporary manifestations of occupation should now
guide the framework’s application. Article 43 must distinguish between short and long-term
occupations. Its application would consider the passage of time. It would respond to altering
conditions when establishing the requirements of civil life and public order. The High Court held
that the military government, “may require long-term investments that will effect changes that
will remain after the occupation ends.”155
This need to impose change and address the inevitable results of prolonged occupation guided
the Court’s subsequent oversight. It justified the Military Government’s desire to move beyond a
conservationist conception of the occupation framework.156 Unconfined and with extensive
discretion, it directed Israeli efforts purporting to better manage prolonged occupation. This
facilitated the imposition of legislation and policy that would impose long-term changes. Despite
the benevolent façade of the Court’s expansive interpretation of Article 43, David Kretzmer
notes, “that there is no lack of evidence to show that [the resulting initiatives were] carried out as
part of a general plan for the West Bank that was based on the planner’s perception of Israeli
interests.”157
Settlement growth was accompanied by massive infrastructure investments. The transportation
network, established in accordance with the Ja’amait Ascan decision, expanded. Approximately
1660 kilometers of roadways now link settlements to urban centers in Israel. 158 As of 2005, the
formal boundaries of Israel’s settlements constituted a mere 3 percent of the West Bank. The
associated infrastructure, however, extended Israel’s physical presence to over 40 percent of the
territory.159
This creates significant impediments for the Palestinian population. Beyond linking the
settlements to Israel, the road network that stretches throughout the West Bank impedes
Palestinian movement. Due to a closure regime that employs checkpoints, road blocks, and
access permits, Palestinian entry to the roads is limited. The physical presence of the roads often
separate Palestinian communities into enclaves. 160 This strengthens Israel’s control of the
territory and impacts the quotidian experience of much of the West Bank’s Palestinian
population.161
Israel’s engagements with Article 43 are grounded within a traditional interpretation of the
occupation framework. They build upon the prevalent supposition that prolonged occupation
justifies legislative management. The challenges posed by prolonged occupation require longKRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 69. See also Ja’amait Ascan, supra note 146, ¶¶ 21–22.
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term solutions, attuned to the evolving needs of the local population. Israel contends that if the
imposed initiatives provide for the local population, they are consistent with the legal
framework.162 This interpretative approach acknowledges, but does not question, the nature of
the occupation. Formally, it professes to preserve sovereignty and ensure local needs.
The High Court of Justice, however, has interpreted “local population” to include Israeli citizens
who live within the West Bank’s many settlements.163 This builds upon the Court’s early
judgment in the Christian Society case. Here, the Court understood Article 43 as compelling
intervention into a range of sectors. Expansive legislative management was justified in response
to the exigencies of prolonged occupation. 164 In Electric Company for the District of Jerusalem
v. Minister of Defense, however, the Court included the residents of Kiryat Arba within its
considerations. The occupying power was compelled to consider and ensure the needs of Kiryat
Arba’s residents alongside the requirements of the Palestinian population.165 Eyal Benvenisti
recalled how the Court’s decision provided the occupying power with the necessary legislative
competence to develop the settlement enterprise.166 This facilitated the movement of the
occupant’s population from Israel to the territories. It permanently tilted the calculus that
evaluated imposed measures to favor the West Bank’s Israeli population.167
Proposals to alter the legislative competence of the occupying power vary. Commonly though,
contestations adhere to a non-normative reading of the occupation framework. They accept, in
some cases as axiomatic, that the challenges created by the occupation’s duration must be
managed. 168 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) have reached similar conclusions.
In Demopoulos v. Turkey, the ECtHR addressed the admissibility of a property claim brought by
a group of Greek-Cypriots. In response to a 1974 coup, led by the Cypriot National Guard and
pro-unification supporters of Greece’s military junta, Turkey assumed control of the northernthird of Cyprus. Upon establishment in 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)
was widely recognized as an occupying power, a proxy for Turkish control of the territory it had
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assumed. 169 The TRNC introduced a pilot-judgment procedure to address property claims by
individuals displaced from Northern Cyprus. 170 This raised questions regarding the TRNC’s
legislative competence.171 The ECtHR was asked to decide on the admissibility of the applicant’s
petition.172
The Court’s judgment was grounded in international human rights law and the ECtHR’s
admissibility requirements. IHL scarcely featured within the decision. 173 Yet the ECtHR
acknowledged the influence of the occupation’s duration. When rendering its decision, the Court
prioritized the need to ensure the uninterrupted provision of individual rights by effectively
managing the status quo.174 Acknowledging the complexities posed by duration, the Court held,
“This reality, as well as the passage of time and the continuing evolution of the broader political
dispute must inform the Court’s interpretation and application of the Convention which cannot, if
it is to be coherent and meaningful, be either static or blind to concrete factual circumstances.” 175
The ECtHR drew upon the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia.176 South Africa assumed control of Namibia
during the First World War. This continued under the Mandate system until the League of
Nations was superseded by the United Nations. 177 South Africa resisted the imposition of a
trusteeship agreement and began a period of de facto administration. 178 The ICJ’s Namibia
Opinion facilitated the establishment of the international community’s preferred management
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approach. Famously, it obliged the mandatory power to ensure the daily administration of the
controlled territory through the creation or maintenance of basic services. The ICJ held:
In general, the non-recognition of South Africa's administration of the Territory
should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages derived from
international co-operation. In particular, while official acts performed by the
Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the
termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended
to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages,
the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the
Territory. 179
The Court’s reasoning is inherently pragmatic. It seeks to preserve Namibian self-determination.
Yet by instilling the notion that the illegitimacy of foreign administration must not compromise
the provision of local services, it has contributed to the entrenchment of the management
approach.180
Neither the ECtHR or the ICJ engaged deeply with the legal framework. Their decisions,
however, provide credence to the notion that the occupation framework must only interpret
occupation as a fact. Yet both Courts read this framework to address the challenges spurred by
an occupation’s duration. They provide weight to the belief that despite the acknowledged
illegitimacy of the occupation regimes, the fact of occupation must be managed. In response, the
conservationist principle is amended to meet the challenges of prolonged occupation.
C. The Challenge of Security and Ensuring Public Order and Safety
Following two decades of occupation, a banal event triggered the First Intifada. An Israeli truck
collided with a Palestinian passenger van near the Jabalia Camp at the northern point of the Gaza
Strip. Four Palestinians were killed. Many Gazans believed the incident was in retaliation, a
response to the stabbing of an Israeli citizen days earlier. 181 Mass demonstrations—in Jabalia,
throughout Gaza, and then across the West Bank—harnessed decades of Palestinian discontent
and frustrated nationalist ambition. Israel’s engagements with the occupation framework shifted
in response. Policies, professedly benevolent and ostensibly intended to manage the occupation,
were no longer justified by appealing to local interests. Increasingly, Israel recalled the
occupation framework’s security provisions to validate its actions and policies within the West
Bank.182
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This justificatory transition reflects IHL’s dual purposes. 183 The occupation framework’s myriad
humanitarian assurances are coupled with numerous security-based exceptions.184 Several
military manuals cite security as the most relevant justification for the annulment or introduction
of legislation within an occupied territory.185 An occupying power receives broad discretion. 186
Under Article 27(4) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the occupier is entrusted with, “such
measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of
the war.”187 Efforts to balance the demands of military necessity with the requirements of
humanitarianism initially focused on conduct during general belligerency. 188 Yet prolonged
occupation creates distance between the present and the triggering conflict. 189
This distance poses questions regarding the function of the occupation framework. These query
whether an occupation’s duration influences how the framework balances both military and
humanitarian considerations. They ask if duration tempers recourse to exceptions.190 A
prolonged occupation—as seen in the West Bank, Northern Cyprus, and Western Sahara—has
moved from a military contest and become an administrative relationship. Although this shift
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does not discount the possibility of security threats or periodic incidents of violence, recourse to
military necessity and the security needs of the occupier become less immediate.
Many articulations of the management approach begin from the premise that the occupation’s
duration presents challenges that the legal framework is ill-suited to address. Efforts to manage
these challenges and meet the needs of the local population are heavily-weighted. Inversely,
security or military necessity-based exceptions surrender much of their normative pull. Attempts
to rebalance the military-humanitarian calculus represent yet another response to the challenges
of prolonged occupation. Whether corresponding appeals propose strengthening humanitarian
protection or (less commonly) assert broader security exceptions, they seek a better means of
managing prolonged occupation.
During proceedings for the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Swiss Confederation
considered the influence of duration on the relationship between military necessity and
humanitarianism. 191 Switzerland submitted that:
In the context of an occupation, international humanitarian law ensures consistency
between humanitarian aims and the occupier’s security needs and reduces the risk of
a deterioration in relations between the occupying Power and the occupied. Any
examination of necessity and proportionality in circumstances of prolonged
occupation when hostilities have ceased must be more rigorous, since stricter
conditions govern the imposition of restrictions in such circumstances on the
fundamental rights of protected persons.192
Israel has not directly pursued justifications that rely upon the unconventional view that an
occupation’s duration expands the occupier’s recourse to military necessity. Instead, the High
Court of Justice noted that “military and security needs predominate in a short-term military
occupation. Conversely, the needs of the local population gain weight in a long-term military
occupation.”193 Despite the Court’s conventional approach, Israel’s presence within the West
Bank brought mounting security challenges. Israel reverted to Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations. It embraced a factual conception of occupation and appealed to the exigencies of
duration in response to these challenges.194
The promotion of safety, as per the English translation of Article 43, is commonly invoked to
justify amendments to local legislation. 195 In Ja’amait Ascan, the High Court of Justice claimed
that the establishment and scope of the military government’s powers to manage “public order
and safety” are influenced by the occupation’s duration.196 The Court recalled the early work of
Doris Appel Graber. Reciting the consensus opinion that the occupation framework is ill-suited
to regulate prolonged occupation, the Court claimed that, “this distinction between a short-term
191
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military government and a long-term military government has significant influence over the
content which is to be infused into securing “public order and safety.” 197
The Court reached a similar determination in Abu Aita et al. v. Commander of Judea and Samaria. It
confirmed that duration influences the implied balance between military requirements and
humanitarian considerations. Interpreting Article 43, the Court held:
It is true that this article contains no rules as to adjustment or reclassification bound
up with, or conditional upon the time element, but the effect of the time dimension is
implicit in the wording, according to which there is a duty to ensure, as far as
possible, order and public life, which patently means order and life at all times, and
not only on a single occasion. The element of time is also decisively involved in the
question of whether it is absolutely impossible to continue acting in accordance with
existing law, or whether it is essential to adapt that law to new realities. In the legal
interpretation of Article 43, the relationship between the time element, and the form
taken by the provisions of Article 43 is stressed more than once. It follows that the
time element is a factor affecting the scope of the powers, whether we regard military
needs, or whether we regard the needs of the territory, or maintain equilibrium
between them. 198
These decisions adhere to the prominent interpretation of the occupation framework. They are
premised upon and cite directly from scholars who forward the prevalent view that, within
prolonged occupation, the legal framework is unable to regulate the needs of the occupier and the
occupied. Without questioning the nature or normative structure of the occupation, they offer a
means of better managing the challenges that result from prolonged occupation.
The implications of Israel’s expansive conception of the “public order and safety” provision
would, however, become apparent. Despite the Article’s intended focus on the needs of the
occupied population, Article 43 was again interpreted to include the influx of Israeli settlers that
now resided in the West Bank. 199 Initiatives, justified in accordance with the Hague Regulations,
were implemented to ensure the settler population’s security needs. Often, this elevated the
interests of the occupying power above efforts to ensure the welfare of protected persons. 200 As
tensions rose and the occupation endured, Israel employed initiatives and policies that purported
to manage the deteriorating security situation. A fence was erected around the Beit Hadassah
building in Hebron. It was justified as a security measure, necessary for the protection of the
Israeli families that had settled in the building’s upper stories. Its construction, however,
restricted access to the Palestinian-owned shops at ground-level. The Military Commander
declared the fence an essential security requirement.201 The High Court ruled that the
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Commander’s authority to impose security-based policies extended to arrangements that
safeguarded the settler population. 202
This reasoning has created an artificial distinction. It has diluted the restraining influence of
Article 43. The legal regulation of Israeli settlements and the needs of their population were
placed under the auspices of the occupation framework.203 Israeli authorities consistently cited
the challenges of prolonged occupation. They forwarded realist contentions regarding the nature
and demands of the occupation and in justification of policies imposed throughout the West
Bank.204 These appeals were grounded within an interpretation of the legal framework that treats
occupation, regardless of duration or cause, as a fact that required regulation. Many Israeli
initiatives were condemned. The foundational interpretative approach assumed by both Israel and
its detractors was, however, consistent. Divergences, while significant and often framed as legal
violations, primarily concerned the most effective means of managing prolonged occupation.
III. THE NORMATIVE INTERPRETATIVE APPROACH: ASSESSING THE LEGALITY OF
OCCUPATION
Despite its civilian presence, notwithstanding its increasing control of the territory, Israel has
refrained from claiming sovereignty of the West Bank. It has instead appealed to IHL in
justification of its settlement initiatives. Maiden development projects were linked to Israel’s
security apparatus.205 Later, following judicial intervention, settlement policy increasingly
focused on the allocation of “public” land. 206 Both approaches went beyond the mere denial of
the occupation framework’s relevancy. Instead, Israel justified its settlement policy—the source
of much international opprobrium—as consistent with various provisions of IHL.
Israel presented expansionist interpretations of the occupation framework’s military necessity
and property provisions. It read, restrictively, the framework’s humanitarian clauses and its
prohibition on the transfer of civilian populations.207 These engagements are emblematic of what
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Aeyal Gross terms the “pick and choose” approach. Israel selectively applies the occupation
framework, accepting the application of the Hague Regulations and denying the formal
applicability of the Geneva Conventions. 208 This has allowed Israel to treat the West Bank as
either occupied territory under military control or as its own territory where civilian laws are
applicable to Israeli settlements.209
These selective appeals were often justified in tandem with references to the occupation’s
duration. They could not, however, mollify the principal purpose of the occupation framework—
ensuring the inalienability of sovereignty. They failed to assuage criticisms that Israel’s presence
in the West Bank purposefully impeded Palestinian self-determination. Contemporary
manifestations of occupation, traditionally perceived as compatible with self-determination, had
altered. Since the era of decolonization, occupation was increasingly framed as a symptom of
foreign domination.210
The High Court of Justice addressed the void between Israel’s appeals to specific Hague
provisions and the framework’s guardianship of self-determination and sovereignty. In Saliman
Tawfiq Ayub et al., v. Minister of Defense et al. (the Beth El Case), the Court pondered, “how
can a permanent settlement be erected on land which was seized for temporary use only?”211 It
accepted the state’s position that “civil settlement may continue to exist in that location only so
long as the IDF holds the area by virtue of the confiscation order.”212
The High Court of Justice has confirmed that an occupying power does not assume sovereign
prerogative.213 The Court recognized the corresponding requirement that an occupation must
remain temporary. It, however, coupled these pronouncements with the declaration that “this
temporariness may be long-term.”214 Israeli officials and the High Court referenced the legal
framework’s neutral conception of occupation and temporal neglect. They drew upon the
prominent interpretative approach. The Court contended, correctly, that “international law does
not set a time limit thereto and [the occupation framework] continues as long as the military
government effectively controls the areas.”215
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Though this is an accurate reading of the occupation framework, it is ultimately incomplete. 216
The prominent interpretative approach privileges considerations of the jus in bello. By
embracing an interpretation that accentuates the framework’s durational neglect and
uninterrupted relevancy, the requirement of temporality is diminished. Legal considerations,
expressing jus ad bellum principles and conveyed by a holistic conception of temporality, are
relegated alongside the normative pronouncements that they contain. 217
Israel increasingly claimed that controversial – and seemingly permanent – aspects of the
occupation were, in fact, provisional. This coupled appeals to specific allowances, often under
the Hague Regulations, with a limited conception of temporality. Senior IDF officials testified
that the construction of the West Bank barrier was a “temporary fence erected for security
needs.”218 Settlements were described as non-permanent. Following Israel’s 2005 disengagement
from the Gaza Strip, a group of settlers challenged a legislative act that required the
dismantlement and evacuation of several settlements in Gaza. Again, the High Court stressed the
temporary nature of the occupation and the rules imposed by international law. The Court held,
most Israelis do not have ownership in the land on which they built their homes and
businesses in the evacuated area. They acquired their rights from the military commander
or from those acting on his behalf. These are not the owners of the property, and they
cannot transfer more rights than they have. 219
These contentions have created a judicially endorsed concept of temporality that privileges a
literal notion of non-permanence above transitory characteristics. 220 It is premised upon the
prominent interpretation of the occupation framework. This continues to view occupation,
regardless of its assumed form, as a factual phenomenon. While practice and commentary largely
adhere to this interpretive approach, some have attempted to move the resulting discourse
beyond its traditional boundaries. They have forwarded normative interpretations of the
occupation framework. These accentuate aspects of the framework that Israel’s faciliatory legal
engagements sought to indefinitely defer or failed to credibly address.
Aeyal Gross favors a normative conception of occupation. This, Gross contends, is necessary to
hold an occupying power accountable.221 As occupation is both a fact and a norm, it may not
continue indefinitely. Recognition of occupation’s normative character—based upon the
requirement of temporariness and the principle of sovereign preservation—is necessary to
maintain an occupation’s legitimacy. It is essential to ensure that imposed foreign control may
not become indefinite.222 Gross correctly and convincingly recognizes how the occupation
framework, traditionally interpreted, may prolong subjugation. The pivot towards normative
216
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content becomes crucial when engagements with the occupation framework preference a factual
conception that perpetuates or neglects the occupation regime’s sovereign encroachments.
Within the Palestinian territories, the resulting state of affairs prompted Hani Sayed to propose a
more radical departure from the occupation framework. Sayed argues that the:
post Oslo regime of Israeli control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is
objectionable on normative grounds because it is perpetuating Palestinian
subordination and forcing on the Palestinians a particular unviable final settlement of
the conflict that is unrepresentative of the political dynamics inside the Palestinian
polity in the [West Bank and Gaza Strip], inside the green line and in exile. The
challenge is ultimately to imagine a legal framework for understanding the situation
in the [West Bank and Gaza Strip] that does not link the Palestinian right to selfdetermination to the law of occupation. 223
Although Sayed does not fully articulate what form this framework would assume, he
acknowledges the necessity of a normative focus and a shift from the traditional legal approach
to occupation. Such a shift has now occurred. Departures from a strict factual conception of
occupation increasingly identify the framework’s normative structure to assess the legality of
particular forms of occupation.
A. The Illegality Approach
Recently, Michael Lynk, the UN’s Special Rapporteur to the Palestinian territories, has urged the
international community to amend its legal treatment of prolonged occupation. Lynk asserted
that Israel’s occupation has, “become a legal and humanitarian oxymoron: an occupation without
end.”224 Lynk cited the prevalence of a factual conception of occupation. His report noted that
“the prevailing approach of the international community has been to treat Israel as the lawful
occupant of the Palestinian territory. . . .”225 This, the Rapporteur suggested, had long become an
inaccurate legal characterization.226 The report proposes a means of assessing when an
occupation is rendered illegal. 227
This draws upon a history of past practice. The international community has, on several
occasions, reached determinations of illegality.228 The General Assembly described the
Palestinian territories as controlled through an illegal occupation.229 Since the 1980s, however,
these classifications of Palestine’s occupation have decreased. Elsewhere though, South Africa’s
presence in Namibia, Portuguese control of Guinea-Bissau, the Vietnamese invasion of
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Kampuchea, Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait, and the regular presence of Ugandan forces in
Congolese territory have been pronounced illegal. 230
Such pronouncements prompted Yaël Ronen to identify the existence of a juridical category of
illegal occupation.231 Ronen explains that an occupation becomes illegal upon violation of a
preemptory norm of erga omnes character.232 This acknowledgement, however, is not ubiquitous.
Yoram Dinstein and Rosalyn Higgins both suggest that there is a strong doctrinal basis for the
dismissal of the illegality claim. 233 Dinstein argues that a myth surrounds the legal regime of
belligerent occupation. This implies that a particular occupation is, or in time becomes, illegal. 234
Alluding to the prominent interpretative approach, Dinstein asserts that “far from viewing
belligerent occupation as innately unlawful, there is a whole body of international law regulating
this state of affairs.”235
The dismissal of the illegality approach is facilitated by a factual conception of occupation. This
moderates the significance of the occupation framework’s normative requirements. By
preferencing international law’s regulation of occupation, by privileging the view that the
existence of an occupation is a neutral legal phenomenon, the accompanying discourse remains
fixated on the means of management. This diminishes the significance of the occupation
framework’s fundamental purpose. Yet many of the international community’s references to the
illegality of a particular occupation fail to articulate their legal reasoning.
The recent report by the Special Rapporteur did, however, present a normative framework to
assess the legality of occupation. The report prescribed that an occupant may not: (1) annex
territory; (2) that an occupation shall remain temporary and not become permanent or indefinite;
(3) that the best interests of the occupied population guides the occupying power’s interventions;
and (4) that the territory must be administered in good faith and in accordance with international
law.236 An occupying power whose administration breaches these identified principles verges
into illegality. 237
These criteria draw heavily upon the work of Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal Gross, and Keren
Michaeli.238 The authors propose identifying “a norm that governs the [occupation] phenomenon,
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differentiating between a legal and illegal occupation.”239 They identify three evaluative
principles: (1) the notion that sovereignty or title does not vest in the occupying power; (2) the
maintenance of public or civil life by the occupying power in accordance with the principle of
self-determination; and (3) that occupation must be temporary and may not become either
permanent or indefinite. 240 Should the occupying power violate any of these principles, the
occupation becomes illegal. 241
The desire to brand a particular occupation illegal, especially one which is prolonged, reflects a
perceived failure of law and an accompanying sense of injustice. It is, however, worth
recognizing a practical impediment. Applied to Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories, a
normative assessment of the occupation’s legality would likely be resisted by influential states.
Mainstream political and legal engagements with the conflict are inherently pragmatic. Security
Council Resolution 242, for example, begins by emphasizing the “inadmissibility of the
acquisition of territory by war.”242 Its enduring legacy, however, is seen through its entrenchment
of the land for peace formula. 243 This provides a highly-incentivized calculation designed to both
encourage and guide negotiations.
The international community’s exchanges with the Israelis and Palestinians are steeped in the
custom, diplomacy, and law that seek to manage this enduring conflict. A normative assessment
of legality would likely struggle to influence this dominant approach. As the international
community continues to prioritize engagement, declared illegality would presumably be viewed
by, amongst others, the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom as
facilitating isolation. Some may see benefit in such a result. This would, however, be resisted by
dominant elements within the international community and, accordingly, raise questions
regarding the approach’s effectiveness.
Considerations of effectiveness raise subsidiary questions. It is unclear how a determination of
illegality would alter subsequent legal engagements with the occupation regime. It is uncertain
whether it would influence the application of the occupation framework. As Yaël Ronen notes,
“for the category of illegal occupation to be meaningful, it must have consequences that advance
the removal of the illegality.” 244 The Special Rapporteur report suggests several such
ramifications. These include encouraging member states and judicial bodies to prevent the
cooperation of various entities that indirectly sustain the occupation. 245 The report contends that
a declaration of illegality would “invite the international community to review its various forms
239
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of cooperation with the occupying power as long as it continues to administer the occupation
unlawfully.”246
Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli suggest that normative results follow a declaration of
illegality. 247 Citing the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, they recall that conduct
constituting an internationally wrongful act must cease. 248 They concede that law does not
replace statesmanship and cannot compel an occupation’s termination. The recognition of
illegality may, however, affect subsequent legal considerations including the occupying power’s
recourse to security measures and efforts to frame the illegal occupation as an act of
aggression.249
Declarations of illegality have been accompanied by the requirement to make reparations. This,
too, is consistent with the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 250 In the Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo case, the ICJ found Uganda liable for its illegal presence in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and required the Ugandan Government to make
reparations. 251 This rebuked an illegal occupation. Confirmed illegality, however, is not a
harbinger of legal consequence or sanction.
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, the ICJ did
not declare the Israeli occupation to be illegal. 252 Nevertheless, it acknowledged numerous
violations of the occupation framework.253 This compelled legal redress. Israel was obliged to
comply with and cease violations of its international obligations. 254 It was required to provide
reparations, ensure restoration, and offer compensation to those impacted by the Wall’s
construction. 255 Referencing Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co. Ltd., the Court found
Israel to have violated international obligations of an erga omnes character.256 The occupation
did not require a declaration of illegality in order for the Court to recognize violations that
compel state concern and protection. 257 Where the Special Rapporteur report called upon the
international community to review its forms of cooperation with the occupying power, so too did
the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion. The Court held that states were forbidden from recognizing the
situation resulting from the construction of a wall. It stated that they may not render aid or
246
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assistance in maintaining the existing status quo. Members of the international community held a
positive duty to end impediments, which stemmed from the wall’s construction, to Palestinian
self-determination. 258
It is unclear whether the categorization of illegal occupation offers legal import not otherwise
present within international law. Violations of the occupation framework inevitably taint
prolonged occupation. Prolonged occupation is defined by subsidiary failures to adhere to
various aspects of IHL. Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions requires High Contracting
Parties to “respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” 259 The
general rules relating to compliance with IHL fully apply to situations of occupation. 260 These
are not contingent upon the occupation’s legal status.
Significantly, the development of settlements is perhaps the most controversial feature of the
occupation. They are almost universally viewed as a blatant violation of the Fourth Geneva
Convention.261 They constitute a grave breach of the Convention and are punishable under the
Rome Statute.262 Again, the severity of these sanctions is not influenced by the occupation’s
legal status. Recourse to such sanctions, however, is contingent on political and diplomatic will.
Appeals to state responsibility, to the non-recognition of wrongful acts, or to reparations do not
appear more attainable if grounded in the illegality approach.
Declarations of illegality do, however, carry rhetorical weight. Adam Roberts acutely observed
that the categorization of an illegal occupation is “invariably used to refer to an occupation
which is perceived as being the outcome of aggressive and unlawful military expansion.” 263
Often, though with exception, evocations of “illegality” are devoid of legal specificity.
Perception, however, is important. The legitimacy attributed to an occupation regime greatly
influences the international community’s reaction to the occupant. It affects its treatment of the
occupation. A prolonged occupation will inevitably suffer a deficit of legitimacy. Yet the source
of illegitimacy that shrouds Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories is largely derived
from the myriad features of the occupation that themselves constitutes violations of the legal
framework. The continued expansion of settlements, restrictions on the Palestinian right to selfdetermination, and the chronic violation of human rights are both sources of illegitimacy and
violations of the occupation framework. It is doubtful that labeling the occupation illegal, in its
totality, would alter or lessen the legitimacy calculus of a reality that is already widely
denounced.
Determining when an occupation becomes illegal will remain contested. Whether the
implications of such a determination introduce otherwise unavailable legal consequences appears
258
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uncertain. It is improbable that the label of illegality will further delegitimize an occupation
already perceived as apocryphal. This should not discount the value of the determination. BenNaftali, Gross, and Michaeli note that reaching an assessment of illegality – through a normative
account of an occupation regime – allows the observer to move beyond obfuscation and blurred
boundaries. 264 Israel’s myriad engagements with the occupation framework appeal to the
indeterminacy that follows from a factual conception of occupation. Infusing normative content
into considerations of an occupation regime is essential to gain legal clarity regarding the
consequences of the occupying power’s efforts to manage prolonged occupation.
Yet, as the ICJ claimed in its Namibia Opinion, “the qualification of a situation as illegal does
not by itself put an end to it. It can only be the first, necessary step in an endeavor to bring the
illegal situation to an end.”265 In accordance, efforts to meet the challenges of prolonged
occupation should neither seek complete disassociation from the existing legal framework nor
attempt to effectively manage the ongoing situation within the existing framework. Rather, they
should embrace the occupation framework’s normative content. These efforts must move to
identify a legal basis to encourage the termination of prolonged occupation.
IV. FROM MANAGEMENT TO TERMINATION: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO PROLONGED
OCCUPATION
In the ICJ’s 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall,
Judge Elaraby offered a common-sense observation. Tasked with determining the legality of
Israeli actions and policies, Judge Elaraby simply concluded, “the only viable prescription to end
the grave violations of international humanitarian law is to end the occupation.”266 As the
occupier becomes increasingly distant from the interests that led to the occupation’s initiation, as
the occupied population faces growing subjugation and the continued suspension of their civil
and political rights, the reality of prolonged occupation unavoidably fosters continued violations
of international law.
The benevolent occupier may successfully provide basic social or economic rights. The
occupation framework, however, is structurally precluded from addressing many of prolonged
occupation’s inescapable challenges. Consequentially, myriad responses to these challenges
attempt to circumvent the framework. Political, diplomatic, and grassroots initiatives often favor
ending the occupation. International law, however, remains fixated on an unattainable status quo.
Guided by the prominent interpretative approach, these legal appeals endeavor to better regulate
the present so as to preserve the past.
Attempts to manage prolonged occupation may be benevolent. They may come in response to
undeniable challenges that demand redress. They also, however, promote an interpretation of the
occupation framework that perpetuates occupation. This prominent interpretative approach
allows an occupying power to strengthen its control of the territory and of the population.
Commonly and regardless of intention or motive, responses to prolonged occupation contort the
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legal framework. They expand its provisions. In response to prolonged occupation, they claim
latitude, while pledging fidelity to a factual, alegal conception of occupation that may continue
indefinitely.
Instead, responses to prolonged occupation must embrace a normative reading of the legal
framework. They must situate their engagements, their management efforts, in an interpretative
approach that identifies and accentuates a holistic conception of temporariness. This is intended
to move from responses that produce perpetual management. The interpretative approach
proposed here remains cognizant of both the occupation’s duration and the form that it assumes.
The proposed interpretative approach harnesses a good faith obligation to terminate prolonged
occupation. This must be preferred to interpretations whose silence on the question of duration
facilitates the selective employment of international law, the perpetual management of identified
challenges, and, by design or by default, the eventual entrenchment of foreign control.
This proposed shift, taken under the framework’s auspices and cognizant of its confines, cannot
unilaterally terminate occupation. Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli are correct. International law
does not replace diplomacy. 267 Yet it may facilitate or hinder its efforts. The interpretative
approach offered here recognizes that engagements with the occupation framework are premised
on a choice. This is between a factual, alegal conception of occupation and one that rests on
normative acknowledgements regarding the nature and purpose of occupation. Further, it is
amongst legal appeals that rely exclusively upon the jus in bello and those that additionally
acknowledge the relevancy of the jus ad bellum. Engagements based on the latter interpretation
are more likely to constrain the occupation regime. They are better equipped to safeguard the
preservation of sovereignty, maintain competing relations, ensure the occupying power’s military
needs, and protect the occupied population. Legal appeals, grounded in this interpretative
approach, are more consistent with the spirit of IHL and the principles espoused by the jus ad
bellum.
The proposed good faith approach to enable termination provides an alternative path. This is
based on a normative recognition. It places the principle of temporality at the center of the legal
regulation of occupation. Adherence to this approach will facilitate three objectives. These
collectively strengthen international law’s relationship with prolonged occupation. First, it will
recognize the significance of the interpretative choices that structure subsequent legal
engagements with prolonged occupation. These reflect either an unconstrained or temporal
conception of occupation. Such interpretative choices are further grounded within either
exclusive appeals to the jus in bello or those engagements that draw upon a wider array of
principles that exist in both IHL and the law governing the use of force. Next, it will appeal to
the notion of good faith to accentuate the principle of temporariness and the objective of
termination. This provides a more efficacious means of structuring and evaluating the legal
regulation of prolonged occupation. Finally, it will contribute to a necessary shift in legal
discourse. This shift follows the direction of diplomatic appeals by preferencing calls to
terminate prolonged occupation above attempts to manage its unconstrained duration.
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The interpretative approach proposed here links engagements with the legal framework to the
framework’s fundamental purpose—ensuring temporality. Appeals to identified tenets of
international law facilitate a reemphasized interpretation of the occupation framework’s
normative structure. This can moderate the framework’s lax temporal dimensions by elevating
the innate requirement to enable the occupation’s termination. Such a reading of the occupation
framework will provide a clear legal basis requiring an occupying power to delimit actions that
perpetuate occupation. And it will preference interim initiatives, taken to address the challenges
of prolonged occupation, that may stretch the framework’s conservationist origins but do not
frustrate the requirement to enable termination. This alternative reading of the occupation
framework is firmly grounded in international law.
A. Recognition of an Interpretative Choice
Many of Israel’s engagements with the occupation framework are conventional. Ostensibly, they
draw upon a widely endorsed interpretative approach. 268 This prominent approach and the
responses to prolonged occupation stemming from it are, however, the result of a deliberate
choice. This exists between readings that emphasize the framework’s lax temporal limitation and
those that accentuate a holistic conception of temporality. 269 Adherence to the prominent
interpretative approach is influenced by the traditional distinction between the jus ad bellum and
the jus in bello. Devoid of context, these choices constitute accurate readings. The occupation
framework privileges temporariness and fails to ensure precision. 270 In practice, however, these
interpretative approaches become antinomies. They allow Meir Shamgar to claim that an
occupation may continue indefinitely and they support Lassa Oppenheim’s contention that “there
is not an atom of sovereignty in the authority of an occupying power.”271
Shamgar’s interpretative choice enabled the legal architecture of Israel’s occupation. 272
Distinguishing between “political problems” and the “observance of the humanitarian provisions
of the Fourth Geneva Convention,” the then Attorney General delineated considerations of the
jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. 273 This distinction is firmly grounded within international
law.274 The collective legal treatment of war separates the regulation of the use of force from the
means by which force is used. Israel has elsewhere cited the importance of this distinction. 275
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Traditionally, the exclusive legal treatment of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello ensures that
the latter applies regardless of the former’s assessment. This was conveyed, in relation to
occupation, by an American Military Tribunal at Nuremburg. In the Hostages Trial, the Tribunal
submitted that:
international law makes no distinction between a lawful and an unlawful occupant in
dealing with the respective duties of occupant and population in territory. There is no
reciprocal connection between the manner of the military occupation of territory and
the rights and duties of the occupant and population to each other after the
relationship has in fact been established. Whether the invasion was lawful or criminal
is not an important factor in the consideration of this subject.276
The separate and non-contingent application of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello was read
into Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions. This requires High Contracting Parties to
“respect and ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”277 The distinction
received explicit recognition in the preamble to the First Additional Protocol. Accordingly, the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions and of the Protocol “must be fully applied in all
circumstances to all persons who are protected by those instruments, without any adverse
distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict. . . .”278
As Yoram Dinstein explains, “the law of belligerent occupation is a branch of the jus in bello.”
The rights and obligations attributed to the occupying power are not altered by “the chain of
events in which the belligerent occupation was brought about.”279 This is reflective of strong
policy considerations. 280 It is grounded within the realist contention that despite war’s
prohibition, armed conflict continues to occur. War’s inevitability compels legal regulation and
humanitarian moderation.281 In practice, however, the distinction between the jus ad bellum and
the jus in bello becomes absolute. It is interpreted to require “a total normative separation.” The
norms of one regime may not affect the “validity, application, compliance, or interpretation of
the other.”282
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The duality of international law’s relationship with armed conflict is deeply rooted in the legal
orthodoxy that regulates occupation. Rotem Giladi has termed this the “total separation
paradigm.”283 This distinction “prohibits answering IHL questions by recourse to jus ad bellum
issues. It assumes that the jus in bello is neutral or autonomous.” 284 Political or diplomatic
considerations regarding the nature or status of the occupation are discounted by engagements
grounded in IHL. The legal regulation of occupation is distinguished from politicized
considerations that contest the cause, effect, and legitimacy of occupation. 285 The influence of
this rigid distinction is evidenced by the general reluctance of humanitarian and legal
organizations—those otherwise consumed with tempering and critiquing occupation—to refrain
from assessing the occupation’s legality. Accordingly, legal approaches deemphasize
temporality’s significance. The pursuit and fulfillment of termination becomes the concern of the
political sphere.
Strict adherence to the total separation paradigm is, however, an interpretative choice. It
facilitates the prominent approach to prolonged occupation. Grounded in the jus in bello, this
preferred reading portrays occupation as fact. Subsequent considerations fixate on duration but
neglect the fundamental principles that are compromised when the character of an occupation
alters to become a form of quasi-permanent control. Accompanying legal engagements neglect
the occupation’s origins. They do not engage with causes of occupation or those influences that
contribute to its continuation. These factors—queries concerning the occupation’s duration—
remain within the political sphere. They are beyond the reach and relevancy of IHL. As the
ICRC expert panel noted, since IHL did not impose formal limits on the occupation’s duration, it
is incapable of preventing prolonged occupation. 286 An unconstrained notion of occupation
supersedes temporariness. It becomes the function of international law to manage, not resolve,
occupation.
The implications of this interpretative choice neglect the primacy of temporality. They negate its
prominence within the occupation framework and they abandon its relevance to foundational
considerations of the jus ad bellum. These are unnecessary concessions. While aspects of
prolonged occupation will demand management, it need not come at the expense of broader
considerations. Though the occupation framework is correctly assumed to form part of the jus in
bello, this does not discount the continued significance of the jus ad bellum.
Commentators have long-acknowledged the simultaneous relevancy of the jus ad bellum and the
jus in bello. 287 Christopher Greenwood notes, “while the former will always operate before the
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latter comes into play, once hostilities have commenced it is necessary to consider both. The
relationship between them thus becomes of considerable importance.”288
Rotem Giladi extends this reasoning to the case of occupation. 289 While the applicability of the
occupation framework continues without distinction, “jus ad bellum considerations . . . play an
important role in bringing about and shaping specific cases of occupation.”290 Giladi
convincingly illustrates how the phenomenon of occupation requires reference to the jus ad
bellum. The occupation framework is bound in duality. It is concerned, “like other IHL norms,
with the humane treatment of individuals. It also uniquely addresses questions of governance and
sovereignty.”291 Accordingly, the norms of occupation are reliant upon the norms of the jus ad
bellum. 292 This reliance is reflected in the occupation framework’s prohibition of annexation. 293
As Giladi explains, “the prohibition on annexation is still implicit in the transient, alegal nature
of the occupation, but at the same time also serve to ensure the preservation of world order by
removing one legal incentive for war.”294
An interpretative choice that preferences a factual conception of occupation neglects the
centrality of jus ad bellum norms. Responses to prolonged occupation that favor management
while remaining silent on temporality surrender a principal function of the occupation
framework. This implied deference is unnecessarily dismissive of the position that temporariness
holds within the occupation framework and of the centrality that jus ad bellum norms claim both
within general international law and for the legal regulation of occupation. Instead, a revised
interpretative approach to the legal treatment of prolonged occupation should opt to accentuate
the principle of temporariness and the subsequent requirement to enable occupation’s
termination.
B. Accentuating Temporariness and a Good-Faith Standard to Terminate Prolonged Occupation
On the eve of the occupation’s fifth decade, a Military Appeals Court in the West Bank ruled that
it possessed the authority to review the compatibility of military orders with the law of
occupation. The Court pronounced that the occupation framework was “the grundnorm of the
occupation regime, and judicial review was the only check against [the] unrestrained exercise of
power by the military commander.”295 Elsewhere, Martti Koskenniemi described the High Court
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of Justice’s reliance upon the principle of proportionality as constituting “the Grundnorm against
which the activities of the occupation authority must be measured.” 296
Identifying a basic norm reflects the interpreter’s conception of what the occupation framework
should achieve. It constitutes how the framework should be understood. To be effective—to
accurately capture the spirit of IHL and the purposes of the jus ad bellum—this determination
must not be influenced by a factual, indefinite conception of occupation. Instead, the proposed
good faith approach to enable termination offers an alternative foundation. It is structured around
two interconnected elements: the understanding that occupation constitutes a provisional state
and the principle of good faith. These two factors collectively support the proposed interpretative
shift. They identify and accentuate the principle of temporariness and invoke fundamental norms
of international relations.
Temporality’s identification is not innovative. The notion that occupation constitutes a
provisional state remains undisputed.297 Article 55 of the Hague Regulations holds that an
occupying power assumes the status of a temporary administrator.298 With reference to the
objectives of the conservationist principle and the purposes of Article 43, the ICRC
Commentaries define an occupying power as “merely being a de facto administrator.”299 The
2015 Clapham Commentaries simply note that “occupation is a temporary situation, not
equivalent to annexation.”300 Eyal Benvenisti surmises that “because occupation does not amount
to sovereignty, the occupation is also limited in time and the occupant has only temporary
managerial powers, for the period of time until a peaceful solution is reached.” 301
The prominent normative approaches proposed elsewhere recognize temporariness’s centrality.
This is reflective of temporality’s ubiquity. Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli acknowledge that
“the temporary, as distinct from the indefinite, nature of occupation is thus the most necessary
element of the normative regime of occupation.” 302 The consequences of the approach proposed
here, however, diverge from the foundational normative and non-normative approaches
identified elsewhere.
The abovementioned approaches associate the failure to ensure temporality with declared
illegality. The proposed approach, however, imposes a positive obligation—the enablement of
termination. It articulates a means of shifting the international legal discourse from the
prominent, management-focused approach to an understanding that better responds to the altered
form of control that prolonged occupation represents. Referencing the Draft Articles on State
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Responsibility, the illegality approach notes the obligation to cease wrongful acts.303 While this
is a compelling legal argument, to extend its relevancy beyond a particular, recurring violation of
the occupation framework, requires a holistic understanding of temporality.
The proposed good faith obligation to enable termination provides this. It acknowledges that
temporality is defined both by duration and the character of the occupation. The illegality
approach offers a more limited notion of temporality that is linked to the occupation’s duration.
Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli call upon the international community to establish a clear
durational limitation. An occupation exceeding one year, they suggest, be transferred to an
international authority.304 Further, the qualification of an occupation as “illegal” does not affect
the continued application of the occupation framework.305 This maintains the risk of perpetual
management. The proposed approach provides a means of coupling the employment of the
occupation framework with a holistic conception of temporality that is conscience of and
responsive to the form that the occupation has assumed.
Temporality’s prominence reflects both political and humanitarian purposes. These are crucial
features of international law’s relationship with occupation. They are expressive of the norms
governing relations amongst states and between nations and individuals. Accordingly,
employment of the occupation framework must embrace this holistic conception of
temporariness. It must harness these grander meanings and preference a reading that facilitates
the objective of termination. Engagements with the occupation framework, in response to
prolonged occupation, must accentuate both this principle and reflect its origins and purposes.
1. The Political and Humanitarian Purposes of the Occupation Framework Are Premised on a
Holistic Notion of Temporality
The legal construct of occupation developed as a rejection of conquest. 306 International society
discounted the validity of sovereign title that historically followed debellatio. Occupatio bellica
became an intermediate status. It recognized a military authority’s territorial control and began
establishing a temporary regulatory framework. This framework provided that an occupying
force would administer the territory “on a provisional basis, but has no legal entitlement to
exercise the rights of the absent sovereign.”307
The emergent principle—that “belligerent occupation is in essence a temporary condition in
which the powers of the belligerent occupant are not without limit”—was initially codified in
Francis Lieber’s General Order No. 100.308 Further articulation and codification followed. A
host of military manuals acknowledged a temporary conception of occupation. This temporal
303
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conception informed, and was formalized by, the international law-making initiatives of the midnineteenth and twentieth centuries. 309 These efforts continued to premise occupation’s regulation
upon the notion of a durational limitation. They infused both political and humanitarian
objectives into international law’s relationship with the occupation of foreign territory. 310
Temporality undergirds initiatives to both preserve sovereignty and to protect a vulnerable
population subject to foreign control.
Sovereignty’s divergence from the historical right to conquest necessitated the construction of a
provisional phase. This existed during the period between when a foreign state established
control of a hostile’s territory and when the belligerents completed a peace treaty determining the
territory’s status. This temporary state was to ensure that “de facto power did not immediately
translate into de jure sovereignty, conquest, and subjugation.” 311 Though the occupation
framework’s origins reflected the desire to preserve European order, the notion that occupation
constituted a provisional, de facto phenomenon privileged sovereign preservation.
The prioritization of European order waned. Global initiatives structured the community of
nations around the principles of sovereign equality and the prohibition of the acquisition of
territory by force.312 Temporality assumed a constitutive function. It facilitated many of the
foundational principles of international order. These principles received expression within the
occupation framework. Prominently, temporality is reflected in the framework’s prohibition of
annexation. 313 This remains part of customary international law and receives articulation within
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and in the Declaration of Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Amongst States.314
Temporality is reflected in the rules regulating an occupier’s authority. These rules establish the
occupier as an administrator whose power is derived from its factual presence—not its sovereign
entitlement.315 The requirement to preserve existing legislation—articulated within Article 43 of
the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention—both constitutes and is
reliant upon the principle of temporality. 316
Engagements with prolonged occupation that accentuate temporality better represent the political
objectives conveyed within the occupation framework. They are reflective of fundamental
international norms. Temporality’s relationship with and support of these norms go beyond
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political considerations and structural components of the jus ad bellum. It is expressive of the
occupation framework’s humanitarian purposes. Temporality constitutes a requisite condition of
the framework’s jus in bello function.
The occupation framework’s humanitarian purpose has become paramount. Article 4 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention establishes the status of protected persons.317 The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia described the Convention’s “object and purpose”
as safeguarding those individuals “who do not enjoy the diplomatic protection, and . . . are not
subject to the allegiances and control, of the State in whose hands they may find themselves.” 318
Humanitarian requirements are imbued throughout the Convention. 319 Benvenisti remarked that
“the very decision to dedicate the Fourth Geneva Convention to persons and not governments
signified a growing awareness in international law of the idea that peoples are not merely the
resources of states, but rather that they are worthy of being subjects of international norms.” 320
These developments, however, proceeded sequentially. The Hague Regulations made minimal
reference to explicit humanitarian requirements. 321 Nevertheless, the early willingness to deny an
occupying power sovereignty forbade foreign control from becoming a means to subjugate a
local population. The limitation of the right to conquest, through the temporal conception of
occupation, accompanied the increasing humanization of conflict. Gregory Fox describes this
lineage. The law governing occupation, “emerged in the late eighteenth century as a humanizing
trend in the law of war, modifying a state’s previously unencumbered right to subjugate
conquered foreign territories.” 322 Though the use of force maintained legitimacy, these
modifications tempered a foreign power’s rule. By establishing occupation as a temporary
phenomenon, contingent upon a negotiated agreement, regulatory attempts endeavored to modify
the “harsh but common consequences of foreign control over territory.” 323
The humanitarian purpose of the occupation framework evolved in tandem with the legal
regulation of war. Now, an occupying power assumes responsibility for an array of humanitarian
considerations. These directly influence the lived experiences of the occupied population.
Corresponding humanitarian considerations are privileged by contemporary readings of the
occupation framework.324 The management approach, ostensibly, endeavors to ensure
humanitarian requirements. It seeks to fill a void. This exists when the needs created by an
occupation’s duration exceeds the allowances that an occupying power may take to fulfill its
humanitarian obligations. The ability of the occupied population to fully address their
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humanitarian needs—to fulfill their political, economic, and cultural wants through the
realization of self-determination—becomes contingent upon the principle of temporality. 325
The occupation framework embodies international norms. It sets particular objectives. These are
widely acknowledged. They contend that occupation is not equivalent to annexation. The legal
framework imposes duties of good governance and humanitarian concern upon the occupying
power. And it provides the occupying power with specified allowances to ensure its military’s
wellbeing and to provide effective administration of occupied territory. 326 Again, each of these
principles are contingent upon temporality.
The purpose here is not to reiterate these principles. Their existence is not in doubt. The purpose
here, instead, is to preference an interpretation of the occupation framework that accentuates a
holistic, not merely durational, notion of temporality. It is to disentangle prolonged occupation’s
treatment from the prominent interpretative approach. Attempts to manage prolonged occupation
continue to cite, or are premised upon, an interpretation that emphasizes the absence of a firm
durational limitation. Engagements that appeal to the management approach do not question
whether initiatives taken under the framework’s auspices are conducive with enabling the
occupation’s termination. They deemphasize a central and constitutive purpose of the occupation
framework—ensuring an occupation’s temporality. For if an occupation is to constitute a
temporary state, if sovereignty will revert, if the occupying power is to serve as a trustee and not
a sovereign, then the occupation must end. While the framework may be silent on the chronology
of such termination—and an exclusive focus on the question of duration may support the
position assumed by Yoram Dinstein, the ICRC expert meeting, and others—to permit that such
silence equates to or facilitates the implied permanence of prolonged occupation would render
the entire framework an absurdity.
2. Termination Is the Necessary Corollary of Temporality
When the Namibian Mandate terminated, South Africa was deprived of the international
recognition that legitimized its control as a Mandatory Power. The Mandate’s termination,
however, did not compel South Africa to vacate the foreign territory. 327 The proposal presented
within these pages does not purport to exact occupation’s termination. It is mindful of
international law’s limitations.328 The proposal recognizes that the occupation framework cannot
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coerce an occupying power to end its prolonged control of foreign territory when a
predetermined threshold is reached.
As noted, such determination is not suited to a fixed chronological scale. 329 Yet, when the
situation on the ground becomes one where neither The Hague Regulations nor the Fourth
Geneva Convention can competently protect sovereignty or effectively balance the relationship
between the occupier and the occupied, resulting legal engagements must recognize that the
occupation has or risks becoming indefinite. The proposed approach wishes to reject the creeping
prevalence of an indeterminate conception of occupation. By moving from a factual,
unconstrained notion of occupation, this favored interpretation links the principle of temporality
to its inevitable corollary, termination.
The requirement to cease unlawful activity is firmly grounded in international law. The Draft
Articles on State Responsibility compel an offending party to end unlawful activity and provide
assurances of non-repetition.330 This suggests that a state, occupying foreign territory without
legal justification, is required to immediately terminate the occupation.331 Calls for cessation are
often contingent upon the perception that an occupation is itself illegal. 332 Yaël Ronen illustrates,
however, that such declarations are themselves predicated upon acknowledgement of violations
that affect the constitutive nature of the occupation regime. Accordingly, “the cessation of a
violation necessarily means termination of the occupation.” 333
In its Namibia opinion, the ICJ required South Africa to withdraw from and end its occupation of
the administered territory. Again, this decision was reliant upon the Court’s determination of
illegality. 334 Similarly, the international community often predicates calls to terminate occupation
on the assumption of illegality. 335 A declaration that an occupying power is obliged to end its
territorial control follows, as Benvenisti suggested, the burden to resolve the underlying political
stalemate.336 This determination is influenced by the perceived legitimacy of the occupation.
Such perception, however, does not reactively prompt a declaration of illegality. The
international community has not reverted to the determinative language that the General
Assembly employed in the late 1970s when describing the Israeli occupation.337 This has
prompted the Special Rapporteur’s recent initiative to establish a framework assessing
occupation’s legality. As noted, the Rapporteur’s report accurately observed that “the prevailing
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approach of the international community has been to treat Israel as the lawful occupant of the
Palestinian territory.”338
The interpretative approach presented here separates the objective of termination from
assessments of legality. This distinction is motivated by the abovementioned apprehensions
concerning the illegality approach.339 The proposed approach does not deny that an occupation
may be, or may become, illegal. It instead recognizes that a determination of illegality, within a
context as fraught as Israeli-Palestinian relations, is inseparable from politics. To move beyond
the political resistance that would accompany such a declaration, to bypass the pragmatic
challenges of selecting which individuals or what mechanisms possess the authority to render
such a determination, the proposed approach embraces the more modest standard of enabling the
occupation’s termination. This requirement is associated not with the occupation’s legal status,
but with its duration and form.
Despite the prevalence of the management approach, the requirement to enable an occupation’s
termination is indicative of international will. Notwithstanding the common association between
termination and illegality, calls to conclude occupation are not dependent on the occupation’s
legal status. Following the U.S. and British occupation of Iraq, the Security Council held that the
Iraqi right to self-determination was contingent upon the occupation’s expeditious termination. 340
Termination thus becomes the necessary fulfillment of the occupation framework’s fundamental
purposes. It is the prerequisite of the principle pacta sunt servanda. 341
Linking the enablement of termination to temporality provides an objective. If an occupant is
determined to violate international law, it provides a subsequent step—a means of redress—that
is not immediately conveyed by the illegality approach. Devoid of a legal determination, it
acknowledges that termination is not merely a means to rectify a legal wrong. It is a positive
requirement compelled by the occupation framework’s normative purpose. This durational
limitation is effectively absent from the prominent interpretative approach, which maintains that
nothing under IHL prevents an occupant from embarking on a long-term occupation. 342
Temporality’s dependency on termination reiterates an inescapable truth. This holds that the
principles conveyed by the occupation framework—preserving sovereignty, safeguarding local
needs, ensuring self-determination—prevent an occupation from becoming prolonged. These
principles are contingent on the basic norm of temporality and the fulfillment of this primary
requirement compels termination. To avoid perpetual management, to better capture the spirit of
IHL, an amended interpretative approach that accentuates temporality and preferences
termination may derive faciliatory support from the principle of good faith.
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3. The Relevance and Potential of the Principle of Good Faith
In 1973, largely in response to Israel’s continuing occupation of the Palestinian territories, the
General Assembly passed Resolution 3171. The resolution supported the rights of peoples living
under foreign occupation to “regain control of their natural resources.”343 Eyal Benvenisti
remarked that Resolution 3171 conveyed that an occupying power may not purposefully delay a
conflict’s peaceful settlement. It may not perpetuate occupation. 344 The occupant, Benvenisti
noted, “has a duty under international law to conduct negotiations in good faith for a peaceful
solution.”345
The second element of the proposed interpretation appeals to the principle of good faith. This
reinforces an amended normative approach that views temporality as a basic norm and
termination as an objective imbued throughout the occupation framework. Within the IsraeliPalestinian context, the notion of good faith often appears as a rhetorical device. It assumes the
form of a loaded allegation that both parties enthusiastically accuse the other of lacking. 346
Alongside this popular usage, the principle of good faith has become an evaluative criterion. It
provides a standard of compliance against which an occupation’s legality is assessed. Proponents
of the illegality approach link determinations of malfeasance to particular violations of the
occupation framework.347 Commonly, these violations amount to de facto annexation. They
manifest through the refusal to “engage in good faith negotiations toward ending the
occupation.”348 Benvenisti has long contended that an occupant, acting in bad faith to stall an
occupation’s termination, becomes an aggressor and is tainted with illegality. 349
The present invocation of good faith, however, assumes a more fundamental purpose. It protects
against the misuse of international law. It ensures that legal interpretations and engagements with
the occupation framework maintain consistency with the framework’s ostensible purposes. 350
Good faith is firmly rooted in international law and underpins many preeminent legal rules.351 It
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is expressive of the international community’s desire to preserve order and avoid arbitrariness
and chaos.352 In its Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ explained that, “One of the basic principles
governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the
principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation, in
particular in an age when this co-operation in many fields is becoming increasingly essential.”353
The good faith principle governs the conduct of international negotiations. It requires,
“negotiating in a way that is likely to yield an agreement.” 354 The ICJ further elucidates. The
Court has explained that good faith negotiations must demonstrate willingness to contemplate
alternative proposals, avoid preconditions, and accept assistance from third-parties.355 This is
supportive of the view, expressed by Benvenisti and others, that bad faith conduct compels
illegality. However, the good faith obligation to enable termination does not purport to oblige
negotiations. It does not assess the legality of an occupation regime. Instead, this proposal
recognizes that responses to the challenges posed by prolonged occupation are the result of
interpretative discordance between a temporal understanding of occupation and one that
accentuates the framework’s failure to assert a firm durational limit. It is between a factual and a
normative conception of occupation. And it contests an alegal and an illegal vision of the
occupation regime.
Each interpretative account is premised upon a particularized reading of the occupation
framework. Despite temporality’s incontestability, despite its embodiment and expression of the
occupation framework’s constitutive norms, it continues to be relegated through an interpretative
approach that views occupation as an unconstrained fact. A reading of the occupation framework
that appeals to the requirements of good faith is better situated to emphasize temporality’s
preeminence. It better facilitates an interpretative approach that, recalling Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention, accentuates the “object and purpose” of the occupation framework. 356 The
proposed approach creates a link between a treaty’s interpretation and its performance.357 It
clearly articulates the claim, established within the occupation framework, that temporality is
contingent upon termination. Such an interpretation offers a more purposeful reading of the
occupation framework and a more efficacious means of engaging with the myriad challenges
posed by prolonged occupation.
4. Ensuring an Effective Safeguard Against Misuse
The desire to move from a factual, unconstrained notion of occupation and the corresponding
management approach does not discount the challenges posed by prolonged occupation. These
challenges are real and often urgent. As noted, occupations traditionally conclude when the
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fortunes of war are altered or upon a negotiated agreement.358 The good faith obligation to enable
termination seeks to facilitate the latter. In the West Bank, the first traditional means—the
changing fortunes of war—is improbable due to Israel’s disproportionate military strength.
Equally, it is undesirable in a region plagued by instability and violence. Yet it is these regional
realities that heighten the risk of an already prolonged occupation continuing indefinitely. An
occupying power, disinclined to withdraw from territory and harboring security-based
apprehensions, is unlikely to make concessions that stray from its immediate interests. An
occupied population, politically divided and hamstrung by ineffective leadership, will struggle to
represent its constituent’s objectives.
The approach proposed here presupposes that temporality compels termination. The posited
interpretation is immediately concerned with ensuring that the legal framework is not interpreted
to facilitate occupation or resigned to its perpetual management. It recognizes that an adjustment
to the occupation framework will not usurp geopolitical and regional dynamics and simply
compel an occupation’s termination. Thus, certain management is inescapable. It is a required
means of ensuring the interests of a population bereft of political and economic autonomy. It is
obliged by the occupation framework.359 In accordance, the enablement of termination becomes
an accompaniment to and an objective of management initiatives. The proposed interpretative
shift intends to alter understandings of the legal framework so that termination moves from the
background to the forefront of relevant legal engagements. Thus, the objective of termination
becomes a bulwark against initiatives—masquerading as management efforts and compelled by
the occupation’s duration—that frustrate, rather than facilitate, the principle of temporality.
The proposed imposition of a check is not novel. Often, however, the prescribed restraint
accompanies engagements with prolonged occupation that adhere to the prominent interpretative
approach. This permeates much of the academic literature. The aforementioned “inherent
dilemma”—concerning the latitude required to effectively treat prolonged occupation—often
fails to link purported management initiatives with the principle of temporality or the obligation
to terminate occupation.
In as early as 1942, E.H. Feilchenfeld argued that an occupying power may disregard the
conservationist principle by providing “appropriate justification.360 This would provide the
occupying power with what Feilchenfeld believed was the necessary latitude to address the
economic challenges of prolonged occupation. Yoram Dinstein proposed a litmus test. It is
axiomatic, Dinstein held, that an occupying power requires increased legislative latitude to
effectively manage prolonged occupation.361 Misuse, however, could not be discounted. If the
occupying power truly requires further legislation to meet the needs of the occupied population,
if it endeavors to successfully manage the prolonged occupation, it must, Dinstein concluded,
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exhibit a similar (legislatively enacted) concern for its own population.362 In Abu Aita, the High
Court of Justice adopted Dinstein’s litmus test.363 The Court held that imposed initiatives,
ostensibly intended to benefit the local population, were valid if “the military government is
filled with the same concern in regard to its own people and applies the same measures taken in
the area of military government in its own area.”364
Subsequent efforts to both increase and regulate the legislative latitude received by an occupant
maintained fidelity to the prominent interpretative approach. These initiatives rarely linked the
proposed means of preventing abuse with the principle of temporality. Adam Roberts, for
example, acknowledged the need to amend the occupation framework. Such alterations would,
however, be susceptible to misuse. To safeguard against potential abuse, Roberts favored
limiting particular allowances while extending only those deemed necessary to effectively
manage prolonged occupation.365
Similar proposals followed. The scholarly treatment of prolonged occupation offered an array of
regulatory methods. These intended to both better manage occupation and safeguard against
legislative overreach by the occupying power. Marco Sassòli proposed appealing to the Security
Council. 366 Eyal Benvenisti suggested a consultative process that solicits local participation and
input.367 While Benvenisti’s response lends a degree of democratic legitimacy to the
management process, others seek a broader international mandate. Richard Falk has proposed the
development of an international convention. If an occupation continues for ten years, the
convention would direct the management of the prolonged occupation and safeguard local
interests.368 Similarly, Brian Walsh and Ilan Peleg call for the creation of an “occupation
document.” To effectively manage prolonged occupation, the proposed mechanism would
identify imposed foreign control as a “special legal condition which requires specific legal
doctrine designed to meet the needs of an occupation.”369 Effective management is derived from
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human rights law. This, according to Walsh and Peleg, balances protections that safeguard the
local population and the occupier’s right to pursue genuine security interests. 370
Other proposals indirectly allude to temporality’s importance. Most often, though, these fail to
reference the requisite criterion of termination. Proponents of a self-determination-based
standard, such as Alain Pellet, acknowledge the discordance between the legal framework and
the challenges posed by prolonged occupation. This discordance compels initiatives to better
facilitate effective management. Pellet asserts that “humanitarian” responses, necessary to
address these challenges, are lawful to the extent that they do not threaten the occupied
population’s right to self-determination. 371
Considerations of an occupying power’s legislative discretion consistently fail to build upon an
interpretation of the legal framework that accentuates temporality. This process begins before an
occupation becomes prolonged. Scholarly deliberations concerning how and when an occupant
may introduce legislation remain within the direct wording of Articles 43 and 64.372 Legislation
may be introduced to maintain order, to ensure the safety of the occupant’s military forces, or to
realize the legitimate purposes of the occupation. 373 Subsequent efforts to reconcile the
framework’s conservationism with prolonged occupation followed this approach. They permit
expansive authority to better manage the exigencies of prolonged occupation but fail to couple
these allowances with the principle of temporality or the requirement to enable termination of
prolonged occupation.
The proposed good faith approach offers an alternative. It insists that initiatives, undertaken for
the ostensible benefit of the local population, must remain consistent with the occupation
framework’s purposes. These must not compromise a notion of temporality that is cognizant of
the foundational norms that this principle encapsulates. Instead, they must enable its termination.
This is justified by a simple assumption. This holds that responses to the challenges posed by
prolonged occupation are most effective when premised upon temporality. That the interests of
the occupied population, the requirements of the occupying power, and the demands of
international order are best satisfied when occupation terminates. Too often, the international law
governing the phenomenon of occupation preferences a factual, unconstrained notion of
occupation. Where diplomatic appeals and the principle of self-determination have constantly
called for the occupation to end, international law is largely silent. The good faith approach to
enable termination seeks to more accurately represent the spirit of IHL. It wishes to realign legal
appeals with the principle of self-determination and diplomatic calls for the conclusion of
prolonged occupation.
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C. Aligning the Occupation Framework with Diplomatic Appeals to Terminate Prolonged
Occupation and the Principle of Self-Determination
Shortly following the 1967 War, the Security Council gathered in New York. On November 22,
it adopted Resolution 242. The Security Council cited the illegality and inadmissibility of the
acquisition of territory by force.374 It directly referenced the recent war. Continuing, the
resolution famously affirmed that the establishment of a “just and lasting peace” required Israeli
withdrawal from the recently occupied territories. 375 The termination of belligerency was
premised upon respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all
states in the region. 376 The resulting “land for peace” formula compelled the nascent
occupation’s termination and the normalization of relations. 377 This formula became the
foundation of the diplomatic approach to the enduring conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians.
A decade later, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat journeyed to Jerusalem and addressed the
Knesset. A new era of optimism was heralded. Sadat declared that “peace cannot be worth its
name unless it is based on justice, and not on the occupation of the land of others.”378 The
Egyptian leader evoked the international consensus that had developed around Resolution 242.
Sadat pronounced that the call for a “permanent and just peace, based on respect for the United
Nations resolutions, has now become the call of the whole world. It has become a clear
expression of the will of the international community. . . .”379 The following year, Egypt and
Israel signed the Camp David Accords. A framework for Middle East peacemaking was
reestablished. Palestinian autonomy would be implemented over five years. Transitional
arrangements would be negotiated. Upon Palestinian self-governance, Israel was required to
withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.380
Similar optimism accompanied Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat on the White House lawn in
1993. The symbolism of an Israeli Prime Minister embracing the hand of a Palestinian Chairman
was momentous. The era of Oslo and the Declaration of Principles again premised a negotiated
peace upon Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian self-governance. 381 Yet optimism would flounder
following an intifada, a series of deadly wars in Gaza, and the continued entrenchment of Israel’s

374

S.C. Res. 242, ¶ 1 (Nov. 22, 1967).
Id.
376
Id.
377
See Bruce D. Jones, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Wars: Responsibility Without Power, in THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE E VOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 298, 308
(Vaughn Lowe et al. eds., 2008).
378
Anwar Sadat, Egypt President, Address at the Israeli Knesset (Nov. 20, 1977), reprinted in THE ISRAELIPALESTINIAN CONFLICT: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 1967–1990 136, 139, 142 (Yehuda Lukacs ed., 1992).
379
Id.
380
A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, Isr.-Egypt, Sept. 17, 1978, 1136 U.N.T.S. 196, in THE ISRAELIPALESTINIAN CONFLICT: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 1967–1990 155, preamble, sec. 1 (Yehuda Lukacs ed., 1992).
381
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Isr.-P.L.O., art. 1, 7(2), Sept. 13, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1525.
375

74

civilian presence throughout the West Bank. Still, however, the international community remains
steadfast. It continues to insist that Israel end its occupation of the Palestinian territories.
Since at least 1980, the international community has referenced the prolonged character of the
occupation. It has directly appealed to Israel to end its control of the West Bank and Gaza.
Security Council Resolution 476 cites the “overriding necessity to end the prolonged occupation
of Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967.”382 Similar calls have become ubiquitous.383
From widely endorsed UN resolutions to the activist’s placard, appeals to terminate the
occupation are ever-present. Yet international legal engagements, premised on the prominent
interpretive approach, assume that the occupation’s duration is neither limited nor affected by the
occupation framework. Alternative interpretations that draw upon occupation’s normative
character find that an occupation regime violates fundamental principles of the legal framework.
Often, the occupation is declared illegal. It is unclear, however, whether this declaration triggers
legal consequences not otherwise elicited by the underlying violation(s). It is not immediately
apparent what subsequent steps follow declared illegality.
Both interpretative approaches diverge from the international community’s affirmed diplomatic
course. The proposed good faith approach to enable termination offers an alternative. It better
represents the spirit of IHL. It aligns the occupation framework with the prominent diplomatic
treatment of the occupation. International law is understood to inform diplomatic engagement.
Though it may not always be a decisive factor, “the rules of international law frequently
[provide] the framework in which diplomatic negotiations, arguments, and positions [are]
formulated.”384 International law shapes the content of and the positions offered in “multilateral
forums and in bilateral diplomatic representations.”385 As observed throughout the IsraeliPalestinian conflict “the long-term framework for [normalizing] relations between hostile actors”
has been articulated in a legal vernacular and imposed through numerous diplomatic
initiatives. 386
To influence and support diplomatic initiatives, international law must be effective. The
international law of occupation, as prominently interpreted, threatens to frustrate the principles
espoused by the international community. These principles directly align with the occupation
framework’s normative character. Yet, they are continuously neglected by an interpretative
approach that is either resigned to benevolent attempts to humanize a purportedly unalterable
situation or vulnerable to manipulation. International law, the former Secretary General Javier
Pérez de Cuéllar declared, must become more effective in governing international relations. It
must not “stagnate but keep pace with change in the conditions of international life. . . . It must
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evoke a shared understanding and it must be seen to derive from the morality of international
behavior.”387
General Assembly Resolution 44/23 announced the “decade of international law.”388 The
General Assembly spoke of the need to strengthen the “rule of law in international relations.”389
It reaffirmed the role of international law in promoting the “means and methods for the peaceful
settlement of disputes between states.”390 The proposed good faith approach facilitates the
alignment of legal and diplomatic discourses. In accordance with the demands of the
international community and the constitutive principles upon which they draw, engagements
with the occupation framework that accentuate temporality are better suited to present
termination as the required means of preserving sovereignty, protecting local interests, and
ensuring self-determination. An occupying power may not legitimize initiatives that appeal to the
occupation’s duration but do not enable its termination. An interpretative approach that
acknowledges occupation as fact and merely seeks to manage its effects compromises
international law’s efficacy and thus its relevancy.
Diplomatic appeals to terminate occupation are often grounded in the principle of selfdetermination. Building upon Palestinian nationalism and the spirit of Camp David, formal
appeals to self-determination accompanied American and Egyptian calls to terminate the
occupation. 391 The principle of self-determination vests in Article 1 of the UN Charter.392 It is
confirmed in both the international human rights covenants.393 Its normative development,
however, corresponds with the era of decolonization. Self-determination would associate with
state-building initiatives.394 These advancements, however, proved difficult to reconcile with the
occupation framework’s conservationist design. The law of occupation is described as
antithetical to state-building initiatives.395 Several have questioned its compatibility with the
principle of self-determination.396
This poses an important distinction. Consideration of self-determination’s compatibility with the
occupation framework followed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. This debate largely focuses on the
387

See Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, U.N. Secretary-General, Address at the University of Bordeaux (Apr. 24, 1991), in
Press Release, Secretary-General’s Statement at University of Bordeaux, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/4560 (1991).
388
G.A. Res. 44/23, preamble, ¶ 2(b), (Nov. 17, 1989).
389
Id.
390
Id.
391
See NATHAN THRALL, THE ONLY LANGUAGE THEY UNDERSTAND: FORCING COMPROMISE IN ISRAEL AND
PALESTINE 22 (2017).
392
See U.N. Charter, art. 1, ¶ 2 (states that the purpose(s) of the United Nations are to, “develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples…”).
393
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1., Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. See also,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3.
394
Manuela Melandri, Self-Determination and State-Building in International Law: The Need for a New Research
Approach, 20 J. CONFLICT. & SEC. L. 74, 83 (2015).
395
Nigel D. White, Settling Disputes: A Matter of Politics and Law, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS:
READING MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI 61, 70 (Wouter Werner, Marieke De Hoon & Alexis Galán eds., 2017). See also
Melandri, supra note 394, at 82–85.
396
Melandri, supra note 394, at 83. See also Steven Wheatley, The Security Council, Democratic Legitimacy and
Regime Change, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 531 (2006).

76

phenomenon of transformative occupation. 397 The notion of state-building evoked by this context
differs from that discussed within this article. The proposed normative reading of the occupation
framework is applicable to transformative occupations. This, however, raises various issues that
are beyond the current scope but will be considered elsewhere. The form of control exhibited by
prolonged occupation differs from that of transformative occupation. It is employed for
alternative purposes and serves distinguishable ends.
Since Sadat’s journey to Jerusalem, calls for Palestinian statehood increasingly appeal to selfdetermination.398 This provides a legal basis that favors the termination of occupation. Marco
Sassòli notes that the fact of occupation may be construed as incompatible with the right to selfdetermination.399 Palestinian statehood, the two-state solution, and the realization of selfdetermination compels, and is contingent upon, termination. The occupation framework,
traditionally conceived, does not facilitate this process. Sassòli explains that the right to selfdetermination cannot be implemented by an occupying power. To ensure self-determination,
Sassòli continues, an occupying power need not legislate. Instead, it must withdraw.400
The consequences of the right to self-determination and the objective of the proposed
interpretative approach are identical. Each identify termination as a constitutive requirement.
Yet, adherence to the non-normative interpretative approach poses a conflict. Though Sassòli
acknowledges that the fulfilment of self-determination compels cessation, this is described as an
issue of the jus ad bellum. The self-determination argument “cannot be used to deny an
occupying power the right to legislate under the jus in bello.”401 The proposed approach does not
suggest the revocation of an occupant’s legislative competence. It, however, aligns the purposes
of the occupation framework with the right to self-determination. By acknowledging the
relevancy of jus ad bellum norms by insisting that termination is the corollary of temporality, the
proposed approach wishes to insulate the occupation framework. It intends to ensure that the law
of occupation does not become an anachronism; that it is not dismissed in favor of more
efficacious legal approaches that better align with prevailing normative standards or diplomatic
objectives. This does not require radical restructuring. But it compels a recommitment to the
object and purpose of the occupation framework.
The proposed interpretative approach operates within the confines of international law.
Accordingly, it remains susceptible to many of its weaknesses. 402 Little here will move the
hardened skeptic to reconsider the viability of international law and its place within the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Yet it is important to recognize—even upon such dismissive terms—that
simply rejecting the role assumed by international law as inept underestimates how the
prominently interpreted occupation framework perpetuates occupation.
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Still, one is entitled to wonder whether the proposed interpretative approach fares better than the
specific provisions contained within the occupation framework. This, however, misunderstands
the purpose of the approach. The proposed interpretive approach is not intended to replace
treaty-based provisions. Instead, it wishes to complement them. Employment of the good faith
obligation does not compel a choice between specific provisions and fundamental norms. The
conformity of settlement development, for example, may be evaluated in accordance with both
Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention but also with broader legal considerations. As
presently interpreted, the occupation framework engages with the symptoms of prolonged
occupation. A non-normative interpretation of the legal framework, confined to management,
does not acknowledge or address the altered form of control that a prolonged occupation
imposes. The proposed approach facilitates engagement with the causes of this control.
Settlement construction perpetuates, and thus prolongs, occupation. Beyond Article 49(6),
settlement construction may be construed as an act of aggression. 403 The perpetuation of
occupation, the altered form of quasi-permanent control that prolonged occupation has become
may be understood to contravene Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The occupation framework will
contribute to a discourse grounded in uncontested principles—regarding the use of force, the
annexation of territory, and the realization of self-determination—that resonate with and within
international society.404
When the Cypriot government remonstrated with the international community, it called for the
termination of Turkey’s occupation of the northern-third of its territory. It did not, however,
emphasize the occupation framework.405 It spoke clearly of occupation and invoked international
law. The Cypriot government coupled calls to terminate the occupation with the principles of the
jus ad bellum. 406 It appealed to the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. It
employed human rights law.407 Such foundational principles of international order vest within
the occupation framework. They are inherent to the principle of temporality and their assurance
logically compels termination. Should an occupying power choose to pursue permanent control,
the proposed normative approach will strip away the façade provided by a factual conception of
occupation. It will pivot the accompanying discourse from perpetual management to termination.
And it will facilitate appeals to fundamental norms, neglected by the prominent interpretative
approach, but which constitute cornerstones of the international order.
CONCLUSION
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank has now reached fifty years in duration. It demonstrates
little prospect of subsiding. Within this occupied landscape, strong legacies have been forged.
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These extend from clearly identifiable spaces that constitute settlements and their associated
infrastructure to the increasingly fraught relations between the Israelis and Palestinians who live
amongst these spaces—settler and indigenous; occupying power and protected person; other and
other. IHL and the occupation framework are intended to manage these relations and confront
their potential legacies so as they do not become eternal features of the conflict. With the passage
of time, however, and the construction of a status quo, the traditional occupation framework has
proven incapable of regulating the inevitabilities and challenges of prolonged occupation.
The proposals within this article, of a good faith obligation to enable termination, of a holistic
notion of temporality, offer an amended normative approach. This approach is grounded in
general principles of international law. It exclusively focuses, however, on the obligations of the
occupying power. This is not intended to discount or undervalue the role the Palestinians and
their leadership in Ramallah must assume to facilitate the occupation’s termination and the
normalization of relations with Israel. Instead, this singular focus acknowledges the position of
strength that an occupying power assumes. Over the course of prolonged occupation, Israel’s
presence has become entrenched. As such, it faces a significant burden and responsibility in
realizing the occupation’s termination. The good faith obligation attempts to ensure that the
occupying power is unable to apply the existing framework so as to indefinitely defer the
consequences of this burden.
Naturally, this only represents a point of departure within the confines of international law. Many
questions remain and untold obstacles will present. The good faith obligation to enable
termination does not represent the extent to which the occupation framework requires
reevaluation. Nor has this article considered all of the shortcomings or challenges of international
law’s relationship with prolonged occupation. Instead, the approach proposed here recognizes
how a factual or alegal conception of occupation threatens the fundamental principles conveyed
by the framework itself. In response, the good faith obligation is intended to challenge the legally
manufactured status quo that has facilitated the occupation’s duration. It must, however, remain
conscious of its own limitations and recognize that international law—an amended legal
framework or normative structure—does not provide all of the answers to the challenges or
unintended consequences presented by prolonged occupation and entrenched conflict. Yet it may
better contribute to their redress.
In relation to the West Bank, this is particularly pertinent. Many in Israel have long recognized
that the occupation presents a self-imposed existential dilemma. This stems from the
demographic realities of the West Bank’s Palestinian population, which with the Palestinian
citizens of Israel, will eventually become a majority. The consequences of this were succinctly
conveyed by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak: “As long as in this territory west of the
Jordan River there is only one political entity called Israel it is going to be either non-Jewish, or
non-democratic.”408
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The traditional occupation framework allows this dilemma to remain unaddressed. It facilitates a
status quo that is viewed as indeterminate and legally neutral but in which specific violations,
like settlement construction, create a far more powerful reality that frustrates the entire enterprise
and purpose of the framework. The imposition of the good faith obligation may not directly
result in the freeze of settlement development or the termination of the occupation. It can,
however, move an occupying power to confront and no longer benefit from a manufactured
status quo that has developed under the guise of the occupation framework. It can limit appeals
to a facilitatory interpretation that discounts normative content.
Israeli society has long been split—left and right—in its response to the demographic dilemma
posed by the occupation. This is often viewed as a point of ideological departure. It has defined
elections and distinguishes political parties. The left favors recognition of the occupation,
acceptance of its governing framework, and its eventual termination in accordance with a twostate solution and Palestinian self-determination. The right continues to deny its status,
preferencing security justifications, and an accompanying notion of a Greater Israel. Yet when
viewed in collaboration with the means by which international law has been engaged by
proponents of settlement development, and those wishing to perpetuate the occupation, this
fundamental political distinction presents an unexpected paradox.
While the occupation framework is most likely to be received by those who favor the
occupation’s termination and to be rejected by those who oppose territorial compromise, Joseph
Weiler describes how the traditional framework favors rejectionists:
It is exactly here that the construct of belligerent occupation can be manipulated. For
it presents those who would wish to retain the Territory with the preferred position:
You exercise control over the territory (as a belligerent occupant) but you are able to
deny the local citizens any political rights since they do not become citizens of the
occupying state – and all of this with the penumbra of legality accorded to this status
in international law. Legally you get the land without the people. 409
The good faith obligation reemphasizes the normative structure of the traditional framework. It
recognizes that with prolonged occupation, the traditional framework can serve as an unwilling
accomplice, but an accomplice nonetheless, to the occupation’s protraction and thus the
conflict’s perpetuation. Adopting a good faith obligation to enable termination, triggered by
prolonged occupation, will begin to strip the occupying power of an indeterminate, legallyconfirmed status that permits it to indefinitely maintain an advantageous status quo. Instilling a
requirement to act in accordance with prolonged occupation’s termination, the occupying power
will be reduced in its ability to use the occupation framework as a legal guise to avoid the
consequences of its prolonged occupation. Facing such consequences may prove a more
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powerful motivator to move towards the occupation’s termination than any codified legal
provision has or could.
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INVESTIGATION AS LEGITIMISATION:
THE DEVELOPMENT, USE AND MISUSE OF INFORMAL
COMPLEMENTARITY
Investigation as Legitimisation
DAVID HUGHES*
This article introduces the idea of informal complementarity. Where the principle of
complementarity allows the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) to assess the admissibility of a
particular case, informal complementarity is employed by states. It exists independently (or preemptively) of an International Criminal Court investigation. Appeals to informal
complementarity speak fluidly of individual criminal proceedings and state-level investigations
or inquiries. When a state appeals to informal complementarity, it is not immediately concerned
with individual criminal liability or the admissibility of a particular case. Instead, informal
complementarity serves to deny the state’s non-criminal responsibility. Appeals to informal
complementarity constitute an emergent vocabulary. It increasingly features within the lexicon of
states that engage in the use of force. It provides a novel means of asserting legitimacy. Within
armed conflict, states are supplementing traditional appeals to international law and assertions
of legal fidelity with claims of post-hoc legal accountability. Grounded within a study of Israel’s
engagements with international law during and after the 2008–09 and 2014 Gaza wars, this
article demonstrates that the post-war discourse has moved from exclusive assertions of legal
compliance to include pronouncements of investigative willingness. Framed around the
metaphor of the proleptic show trial, four phases of legal engagement are introduced that
collectively constitute both an appeal to informal complementarity and an emergent means of
asserting legitimacy.
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INTRODUCTION

On 16 January 2015, Fatou Bensouda, the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court (‘ICC’), began a preliminary examination into the ‘situation in
Palestine’. 1 This followed years of diplomatic and legal manoeuvring by the
Palestinian Authority (‘PA’). In the preceding weeks, Palestine had acceded to
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘Rome Statute’)2 and
under art 12(3) of the founding treaty accepted ICC jurisdiction over alleged
crimes committed throughout the Palestinian territories since 13 June 2014. 3
Israel had long resisted Palestinian efforts to gain formal international
recognition by means other than bilateral peace negotiations and was staunchly
opposed to the Court’s pending jurisdiction. 4 Predictably, the Israeli response to
the Prosecutor’s announcement was harsh, constituting a near ontological attack
on the Court.5 Then Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman announced plans to
lobby Israel’s allies to defund the Court and declared that ‘Israel will act in the
international sphere to bring about the dismantling of this court which represents
hypocrisy and gives impetus to terror’.6

1 See Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, ‘The Prosecutor of the

2
3

4

5

6

International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the
Situation in Palestine’ (Press Release, ICC-OTP-20150116-PR1083, 16 January 2015)
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1083>
archived
at
<https://perma.cc/7LC5-F9MW>.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187
UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) (‘Rome Statute’).
Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, ‘The Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the Situation in
Palestine’, above n 1. See also Mahmoud Abbas, Declaration Accepting the Jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court (31 December 2014) <https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/press/Palestine_A_12-3.pdf> archived at <https://perma.cc/8U8QFA3C>.
See, eg, Daniel Benoliel and Ronen Perry, ‘Israel, Palestine, and the ICC’ (2010) 32
Michigan Journal of International Law 73, 73–6. See also Mohamed M El Zeidy, ‘Ad Hoc
Declarations of Acceptance of Jurisdiction: The Palestinian Situation Under Scrutiny’ in
Carsten Stahn (ed), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford
University Press, 2015) 179.
Jodi Rudoren, ‘Joining International Criminal Court Wouldn’t Guarantee Palestinians a War
Crimes
Case’,
The
New
York
Times
(online),
1
January
2015
<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/02/world/middleeast/court-membership-wouldntguarantee-palestinians-a-war-crimes-case.html>. See also ‘Israel Slams International
Criminal Court for Letting Palestinians Join: “There is No Palestinian State”’, The National
Post (online), 1 April 2015 <http://nationalpost.com/news/world/israel-middle-east/israelslams-international-criminal-court-for-letting-palestinians-join-there-is-not-palestinianstate>; Khaled Abu Toameh, Tovah Lazaroff and Lahav Harkov, ‘Israel Freezes Palestinian
Tax Revenues in Response to ICC Membership’, The Jerusalem Post (online), 3 January
2015
<http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Israel-freezesPalestinian-tax-revenues-in-response-to-ICC-membership-386556>
archived
at
<https://perma.cc/Z2EF-6P8B>.
Justin Jalil, ‘FM Calls to Dismantle ICC After Launch of “War Crimes” Probe’, The Times
of Israel (online), 16 January 2015 <https://www.timesofisrael.com/fm-calls-to-dismantleicc-after-launch-of-war-crimes-probe/> archived at <https://perma.cc/W6ZL-M6K5>.
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Within months, however, Israel began to shift its position. Initially, it refused
to cooperate with the Court’s investigation but later, to the wonderment of many
observers, amended its stance. It opened a formal dialogue with ICC officials. 7 In
September 2016, Israel acquiesced to the Prosecutor’s request to visit the region
in coordination with the Court’s preliminary inquiry. 8 Israeli officials suddenly
appeared to welcome the ICC’s pending intervention: ‘We have nothing to hide
and we would be happy to show the court at The Hague how serious,
professional and independent the Israeli legal system is’. 9
Facing a potential criminal investigation and amidst the fury of condemnation
that followed the 2014 Gaza war — Operation Protective Edge — these
newfound Israeli assurances allude to both the principle of complementarity and
the obligation of states to investigate non-criminal violations of international
humanitarian law (‘IHL’). These notions are formally and legally distinct.
Criminal and civil respectively, each convey an obligation, incentive and
prerogative upon the state to address alleged violations of international law that
may amount to, inter alia, war crimes. 10 Complementarity, as articulated within
the Rome Statute, structures the relationship between national and international
jurisdictions and intends for each system to simultaneously complement the
other.11 It incentivises domestic redress of international crimes by premising
international intervention upon the absence of national proceedings. 12
The obligation to investigate non-criminal violations of IHL compels states to
monitor and assess compliance with their legal commitments.13 Each intends to
strengthen compliance with international law. Each provides a form of redress
should these obligations not be met. In practice, however, states often conflate
these principles and reference one, the other, or both to assert the primacy and
7 Initially, Israel officials made clear that their dialogue with the Court did not constitute

8

9
10

11
12

13

cooperation with the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) investigation but this stance
would also alter. See generally Barak Ravid, ‘Exclusive: Israel Decides to Open Dialogue
with ICC over Gaza Preliminary Examination’, Haartez (online), 9 July 2015
<http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.665172>
archived
at
<https://perma.cc/8CNM-PC67>.
Barak Ravid, ‘Netanyahu Weighs International Criminal Court Prosecutors’ Request for
Israel,
West
Bank
Visit’,
Haartez
(online),
2
September
2016
<http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.739905> archived at <https://perma.cc/MGY92RGW>. See also Barak Ravid, ‘ICC Delegation Arrives in Israel for Five-Day
“Educational Visit”, Won’t Conduct Evidence Collection’, Haartez (online), 5 October 2016
<http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.745849> archived at <https://perma.cc/EG3R778D>.
Ravid, ‘Netanyahu Weighs International Criminal Court’, above n 8.
Article 5 of the Rome Statute explains that only the most serious international crimes that
concern the international community as a whole come within the ICC’s auspices. The scope
of the civil obligation of a state to investigate violations of international humanitarian law is
not as clearly defined. See Michael N Schmitt, ‘Investigating Violations of International
Law in Armed Conflict’ (2011) 2 Harvard National Security Journal 31, 37–9. See also
Françoise J Hampson, ‘An Investigation of Alleged Violations of the Law of Armed
Conflict’ (2016) 46 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 1, 12–16.
See Mohamed M El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal
Law: Origin, Development and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 4.
See generally William W Burke-White, ‘Proactive Complementarity: The International
Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice’ (2008) 49
Harvard International Law Journal 53. See also William W Burke-White, ‘Implementing a
Policy of Positive Complementarity in the Rome System of Justice’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law
Forum 59.
See Hampson, above n 10, 8–9.
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appropriateness of employing domestic measures to address incidents that allege
individual criminal liability or the violation of the state’s non-criminal
responsibilities.14
Since the PA embarked upon its strategy of ‘internationalising’ the conflict
with Israel — an attempt to shift the conflict from its traditional political
paradigm to accentuate the legal questions that accompany the PA’s grievances
and policies — recourse to the ICC has served as the endgame. 15
Correspondingly, Israel has viewed ICC membership as the most serious and
threatening of the various international bodies and treaty regimes in which the
Palestinians have pursued membership.16 As the PA began to formalise their
relationships with a host of international bodies and signalled their intention to
prosecute the conflict before judicial and quasi-judicial institutions, various
commentators wrote about the potential consequences and legal questions
resulting from the PA’s successive jaunts to The Hague.17 These queries,
however, commonly fixate on formal legal questions. Often, they seek to reach
14 Orna Ben-Naftali describes this confluence in relation to the Israeli High Court of Justice’s

treatment of targeted killing decisions. See Orna Ben-Naftali, ‘A Judgment in the Shadow of
International Criminal Law’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 322, 329.
See also Jo Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National
Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) vol 34, 15;
Jennifer Trahan, ‘Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the International Criminal
Court’s Crime of Aggression? Considering the Problem of “Overzealous” National Court
Prosecutions’ (2012) 45 Cornell International Law Journal 569, 571. For an account of the
well-established position that states are required to investigate alleged violations of
international law occurring within their jurisdiction, see Amichai Cohen and Yuval Shany,
‘Beyond the Grave Breaches Regime: The Duty to Investigate Alleged Violations of
International Law Governing Armed Conflicts’ (2011) 14 Yearbook of International
Humanitarian Law 37, 41. See also Alon Margalit, ‘The Duty to Investigate Civilian
Casualties During Armed Conflict and its Implementation in Practice’ (2012) 15 Yearbook
of International Humanitarian Law 155, 160–1; Paul Seils, Handbook on Complementarity:
An Introduction to the Role of National Courts and the ICC in Prosecuting International
Crimes (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2016) 5–7.
15 President Mahmoud Abbas announced the Palestinian Authority’s intention to
‘internationalise’ the conflict in a 2011 New York Times op-ed: Mahmoud Abbas, ‘The
Long Overdue Palestinian State’, The New York Times (online), 16 May 2011
<https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/opinion/17abbas.html>. See also Barak Ravid,
‘Israel’s Troubles are Just Beginning: Enter the Palestinian “Nuclear Option”’, Haaretz
(online), 1 January 2015 <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.634807>
archived at <https://perma.cc/UL5P-BA8M>.
16 See Orde F Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (Oxford University Press, 2016) 208.
17 See, eg, Maryne Rondot, ‘The ICC and the Israel–Palestine Conflict: Current Developments,
Implications and Future Scenarios’ (Report, American Non-Governmental Organizations
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 7 August 2013); Benoliel and Perry, above n
4; El Zeidy, ‘Ad Hoc Declarations of Acceptance of Jurisdiction’, above n 4; David Luban,
‘Palestine and the ICC — Some Legal Questions’ on Just Security (2 January 2015)
<https://www.justsecurity.org/18817/palestine-icc-legal-questions/>
archived
at
<https://perma.cc/Y2QX-H9XK>; Luis Moreno Ocampo, ‘Palestine’s Two Cards: A
Commitment to Legality and an Invitation to Stop Crimes’ on Just Security (12 January
2015)
<https://www.justsecurity.org/19046/palestines-cards-commitment-legalityinvitation-stop-crimes/> archived at <https://perma.cc/3G48-NJUY>; Alan M Dershowitz,
‘Response to My Friend Luis Moreno Ocampo on the International Criminal Court and the
Palestinian
Situation’
on
Just
Security
(20
January
2015)
<https://www.justsecurity.org/19248/response-friend-luis-moreno-ocampo-internationalcriminal-court-palestinian-situation/>; Bar Levy and Shir Rozenzweig, ‘Israel and the
International Criminal Court: A Legal Battlefield’ (2016) 19(2) Strategic Assessment 129;
Eugene Kontorovich, ‘Israel/Palestine — The ICC’s Uncharted Territory’ (2013) 11 Journal
of International Criminal Justice 979.
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determinations of legality. They question the appropriate jurisdiction of the
Court. And they seek corresponding conclusions regarding the Court’s
competence, the associated requirements of Palestinian statehood and standing or
the formal admissibility of a particular petition. 18
These debates often allude to (or conflate) the principle of complementarity
and the obligation to investigate non-criminal violations of IHL. 19 When Israel
reversed its approach to the ICC and spoke of its efforts and capacity to address
alleged legal violations, the concurrent discourse assessed the sincerity of these
assurances. Israel was accused of ‘shielding’.20 Valentina Azarova, for example,
argued that ‘Israel, well aware of the complementarity principle, is clearly taking
steps to shield itself from ICC investigation’. 21 Azarova cites what she perceives
as the tokenistic convictions of Israel Defense Forces (‘IDF’) soldiers — the
Israeli State Comptroller’s appeal to international law within an examination of
political and military decision-making structures, and the joint reports of the
Israeli Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs into IDF conduct and the legal
questions posed by the 2014 Gaza war — as evidence of the intent to shield.22
These initiatives, however, also enable an alternative conclusion. David
Luban has explained that
[c]omplementarity would offer Israel a large measure of protection from most war
crimes charges. If Israel carries out its own investigations in good faith, it would
be insulated from most liability — potentially, even if it never indicts anyone. 23

Luis Moreno Ocampo, the ICC’s inaugural Prosecutor, argued that Israel
has the ability to avoid the opening of an ICC investigation. As a court of last
resort the ICC can intervene only when there are no genuine national
investigations of the crimes under its jurisdiction.24

By appealing to the principle of complementarity, Ocampo claimed Israel ‘can
conduct national investigations of the alleged crimes committed after June 13,
2014 and make the situation inadmissible’.25
Divergent interpretations of complementarity’s potential application and the
sincerity of Israel’s domestic accountability measures emerged. One understood
complementarity as offering Israel a direct opportunity to avoid ICC scrutiny. It
held Israel’s practice of self-investigation and willingness to resort to domestic
criminal proceedings as satisfying its legal requirements and rendering a
18 These debates have taken various approaches but have largely focused on jurisdictional

19
20

21
22
23
24
25

quandaries and associated questions of statehood and eligibility. See Kontorovich, above n
17, 982–3. See also Dershowitz, above n 17. Alternatively, John Quigley has argued in
favour of recognised Palestinian statehood for the purposes of satisfying art 12(3) of the
Rome Statute. See John Quigley, ‘The Palestine Declaration to the International Criminal
Court: The Statehood Issue’ (2009) 35 Rutgers Law Record 1, 2, 9.
See Hampson, above n 10, 16.
Valentina Azarova, ‘Palestine’s Day in Court? The Unexpected Effects of ICC Action’ on
Al-Shabaka (1 April 2015) <https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/palestines-day-in-court-theunexpected-effects-of-icc-action/> archived at <https://perma.cc/C2EJ-6M5A>. The notion
of shielding is addressed in art 17 of the Rome Statute and will be discussed in Part II below.
Azarova, above n 20.
Ibid.
Luban, above n 17 (emphasis added).
Moreno Ocampo, above n 17.
Ibid.
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potential petition to the ICC inadmissible. 26 The other interpreted these same
actions as a nefarious strategy designed to insulate the state from the Court’s
oversight.27 Should the Palestinian petition to the ICC move beyond the
preliminary examination stage, the Prosecutor and Court will have the
opportunity to examine the domestic measures undertaken by Israel and
determine whether the necessary admissibility requirements have been
satisfied.28 Within this process, the principle of complementarity asks whether
domestic proceedings have occurred and, if so determined, may then present
contestable legal questions — regarding accusations of shielding and exploring
whether Israel’s domestic initiatives constitute ‘genuine’ efforts to investigate or
prosecute the alleged international crime(s) — that will likely influence the
Court’s determination of admissibility. 29
This article does not, however, attempt to provide answers to these questions.
It does not seek to assess whether Israel’s efforts following the Gaza wars
constituted genuine attempts to investigate and prosecute alleged crimes
committed during the conduct of hostilities. Equally, it does not seek to reach a
legal determination regarding the admissibility of a Palestinian petition. It
assumes an agnostic approach to such formal legal questions.
Instead, this article will observe and explore the significance of informal state
engagements with the principle of complementarity. It considers how these
observed engagements are employed to generate legitimacy and establish an
advantageous legal narrative in defence of controversial military actions. Within
armed conflicts, states are increasingly supplementing their traditional appeals to
international law and assertions of compliance with evidence of investigative
willingness. In response to international scrutiny, states are moving from a
discourse of legal fidelity to one of post-hoc legal accountability. The traditional
refrain of we respect and adhere to the law is increasingly coupled with a novel
chorus of we investigate the law.
Complementarity provides a legal vernacular through which this emerging
form of legitimacy may be asserted. This does not suggest that states will feign
investigation simply to discharge their legal duty. Frédéric Mégret has
questioned the extent to which a state is likely to undertake such explicit forms
of shielding. Mégret argues that understandings of shielding, as conveyed within

26 See Dershowitz, above n 17.
27 See B’Tselem — The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied

Territories, ‘ICC Jurisdiction Cannot Be Denied Based on Israel’s Façade of Investigation’
(Press
Release,
16
July
2015)
<https://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20150715_israel_claims_regarding_icc_authority_
unfounded> archived at <https://perma.cc/XW7X-37HS>.
28 Formally, determinations of admissibility apply to specific cases and not general or
preliminary investigations. Often, the Office of the Prosecutor will examine an entire
‘situation’ before individual cases are identified through the formal accountability processes
provided by the Rome Statute. See Stigen, above n 14, 91. See also Office of the Prosecutor,
International Criminal Court, ‘The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou
Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Palestine’, above n 1.
29 See Rome Statute art 53(1).
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art 17 of the Rome Statute, often do not fit with reality. 30 If anything, Mégret
claims, typical ICC cases
are those in which there will be no investigation whatsoever (regardless of the
adequacy of legislation) and where a state evidences no intention of complying
with either their Rome Statute or general international law obligations to try
certain crimes … In fact, it was always unlikely politically that states would
conduct ‘mock’ proceedings for the purposes of holding off ICC jurisdiction. If a
state is unwilling, it will generally be unwilling all the way. 31

Israel does not demonstrate the overt unwillingness that Mégret references. It
has long professed at least a rhetorical devotion to the precepts of international
law.32 Much of the literature addressing questions of admissibility, the
application of the complementarity principle and potential instances of shielding
exhibits a formalist orientation. This is reflective of the approach promoted by
the ICC’s jurisprudence and the drafting history of the Rome Statute.33
While Frédéric Mégret is likely correct — that states will not routinely engage
in sham proceedings — this article traces Israel’s employment of informal
complementarity when facing alleged violations of international law during or
after armed conflicts. These legal appeals occur well before, or in the absence of,
formal ICC proceedings. They are not immediately concerned with individual
criminal liability or the admissibility of a particular case (which may never
occur). Instead, they serve principally, though not wholly, to deny the state’s
non-criminal responsibility and substantiate assertions of legitimacy. The state
may offer examples of investigations, criminal proceedings and efforts to ensure
against impunity. Redress may be provided should an alleged violation be
substantiated. These actions are displayed as evidence of legal compliance. They
imply legitimacy of process. Collectively, they are required and necessary but
may also be duplicitous. Informal appeals to complementarity enable efforts to
frame the conflict and present a gainful narrative of legal compliance through
fulfilment of the prescribed inspective processes. Within these processes, the
state may both interpret international law and adjudge compliance through its
advantageously conveyed dictates. Coupled with appeals to the legitimacy of
process, this facilitates efforts to exhibit legitimacy of substance.
30 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Too Much of a Good Thing? Implementation and the Uses of

Complementarity’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds), The International
Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge University
Press, 2011) 361, 376.
31 Ibid.
32 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Operation in Gaza 27 December 2008 – 18
January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects’ (Report, 29 July 2009) 2 [6], 35 [89] (‘Operation
in Gaza Report’).
33 See, eg, William A Schabas, ‘“Complementarity in Practice”: Some Uncomplimentary
Thoughts’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 5; William W Burke-White, ‘Complementarity
in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-Level Global
Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of
International Law 557; Kevin Jon Heller, ‘The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The
Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Process’ (2006) 17 Criminal Law
Forum 255; Federica Gioia, ‘State Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and “Modern” International
Law: The Principle of Complementarity in the International Criminal Court’ (2006) 19
Leiden Journal of International Law 1095. For a broad overview of related judicial
consideration, see El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal
Law, above n 11, 163–75.

88

As these observed forms of engagement draw upon the formal language and
purpose of complementarity but are likely to occur as a response to broad
situations and not the individual cases that are the focus of international criminal
law, they are described here as informal legal engagements. Informal
complementarity, as it is understood within these pages, occurs independently (or
pre-emptively) of an ICC case and beyond the strictures of statutory
requirements. Where the Rome Statute and international criminal law address the
actions of individuals — the unruly solder, the negligent commander or the
unrelenting génocidaire — informal complementarity conflates the language of
criminal and non-criminal liability under international law. It speaks fluidly of
individual criminal proceedings and state-level investigations or inquiries.34
Despite the orientation of such assertions and the formal distinction between
individual liability and state responsibility, collective appeals to informal
complementarity provide a vocabulary to diffuse international condemnation of
state actions, establish a narrative of legal fidelity, and substantiate the
legitimacy of state behaviour and policy within instances of armed conflict.
As a means of achieving particular preordained and didactic purposes, these
legal engagements, and the processes through which they are conveyed, may be
understood as a form of show trial. This framing is not intended to be
unavoidably pejorative. It differs significantly from the famous show trials of the
20th century — in Moscow, of Klaus Barbie, Slobodan Milošević, Saddam
Hussein and others.35 Significantly, where general understandings of such trials
foretell guilt and conviction, the processes described here ‘show’ compliance and
legitimacy. They are not an individual trial in which there is an accused and an
accuser. Instead, the state’s efforts to exhibit investigative willingness may be
understood as a proleptic show trial. It serves rhetorical purposes in anticipation
of legal objections and criticisms so as to answer them pre-emptively. The state
places itself on trial, not formally, but through a series of self-investigations and
multifaceted legal engagements that are facilitated by, and appeal to, informal
complementarity.
To begin to understand the development, use and misuse of informal
complementarity, this paper explores recent events in Israel, Palestine and The
Hague. These considerations, however, are removed from the formal legal
questions posed by the Palestinians’ recent overtures. Instead, this paper wishes
to understand how the post-war performance of a proleptic show trial — how
appeals to and engagements with informal complementarity — allow Israel to
34 Françoise Hampson alludes to this conflation when she notes that the ‘duty to investigate’ is

used, confusingly, to describe both monitoring obligations under international humanitarian
law (‘IHL’) and criminal investigations. See Hampson, above n 10, 10. In practice, there is
of course much necessary overlap. See generally Beatrice I Bonafè, The Relationship
between State and Individual Responsibility for International Crimes (Martinus Nijhoff,
2009).
35 See, eg, Max Radin, ‘The Moscow Trials: A Legal View’ (1937) 16(1) Foreign Affairs 64;
Awol K Allo, ‘The Show in the Show Trial: Contextualising the Politicization of the
Courtroom’ (2010) 15 Barry Law Review 41, 56; Jeremy Peterson, ‘Unpacking Show Trials:
Situating the Trial of Saddam Hussein’ (2007) 48 Harvard International Law Journal 257;
Gerry Simpson, ‘Politics, Sovereignty, Remembrance’ in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe
and Eric Donnelly (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy
Issues (Hart Publishing, 2004) 47; Michael P Scharf, ‘The International Trial of Slobodan
Milosevic: Real Injustice or Realpolitik?’ (2002) 8 ILSA Journal of International &
Comparative Law 289.
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move from viewing a Palestinian petition to the ICC as what Avichai Mandelblit,
then the Military Advocate General (‘MAG’), labelled as an act of war to now
welcoming the Court’s intervention. 36
Part II of this article briefly describes the principle of complementarity and
the obligation of states to investigate alleged violations of IHL. This is intended
to provide context. It distinguishes between the widely understood purpose of
complementarity — as applied to determine admissibility under the Rome Statute
— and the notion of informal complementarity introduced within these pages.
Part III situates informal complementarity within the broader discussion of
international law’s relationship with legitimacy. It acknowledges that when states
use force they attempt to exhibit the rightfulness of their actions and recall
international law to provide the requisite justification. This Part traces Israel’s
early appeals to international law. It argues that over a succession of conflicts
and ensuing diplomatic contestations of legitimacy, the post-conflict discourse
has moved from exclusive assertions of legal compliance. Now it includes
pronouncements of investigative willingness. Part IV observes Israel’s increasing
appeals to informal complementarity following the 2008–09 and 2014 Gaza
wars. Framed around the metaphor of a proleptic show trial, this section
introduces four broad phases of legal engagement. These are expressive of state
recourse to informal complementarity. Part V concludes. It considers the efficacy
of appeals to informal complementarity. A tension exists between the desire for
states to investigate their conduct upon the use of force and the potential for
engagements with complementarity to facilitate something other than what the
principle intends.
This may be significant. Appeals to informal complementarity and the
preordained and didactic purposes of the proleptic show trial can facilitate state
efforts to forestall formalist measures and endeavour to nationalise international
scrutiny of state actions during instances of armed conflict or upon the use of
force. A significant tension exists between the desire for states to seriously
engage with their formal legal commitments, to protect against impunity, and to
investigate and redress potential violations of IHL and the capacity of appeals to
domestic measures to formalistically assert post-hoc legitimacy. The strategic
legal focus exhibited by appeals to the latter, and in neglect of the former,
threatens to promote a conception of international humanitarian law that
understands breaches as occurrences requiring redress not prevention.
II

THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE OBLIGATION TO
INVESTIGATE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

States often conflate the principle of complementarity with the obligation to
investigate violations of IHL.37 This blurs the formal distinction between

36 See Colum Lynch, ‘Should Israel Fear ICC War Crimes Prosecutions if Palestine Becomes a

State?’,
Foreign
Policy
(online),
12
September
2011
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/12/should-israel-fear-icc-war-crimes-prosecutions-ifpalestine-becomes-a-state/> archived at <https://perma.cc/U85T-U6LB>. See also Kittrie,
above n 16, 208.
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individual responsibility under international criminal law (‘ICL’) and the noncriminal, civil liability of states for violations of IHL. 38 Despite the formalism of
this distinction, these separate means of legal accountability often merge in
practice and objective. This is observed in the political speech of states.
Increasingly, they apply the language of self-investigation, appeal to the preeminence of local measures or promote their capacity to conduct independent
and impartial domestic proceedings. The state purports that these efforts protect
against ICC scrutiny and/or international censure. Merger, however, is also
present when either criminal or non-criminal accountability mechanisms are
applied in good faith. Much practical overlap exists between these respective
legal measures and obligations. 39
This confluence is exhibited through the political rationale presented by an
Israeli official who asserted that,
against the background of both the events of Operation Protective Edge and in the
wake of the 2009 United Nations Goldstone Report concerning Operation Cast
Lead in Gaza [the 2008–09 Gaza war], that a thorough internal investigation will
reduce international pressure and thwart legal measures against IDF officers
abroad.40

This appeals to both criminal and non-criminal measures. It offers a means of
satisfying an amalgamated notion of international justice. While the convergence
of these notions is common — in rhetoric and in practice — it is necessary to
understand the formal purpose of both complementarity and the obligation to
investigate non-criminal violations of IHL before considering the informal legal
engagements identified throughout.
A

The Principle of Complementarity

The principle of complementarity serves important and necessary purposes. It
works to promote compliance. It encourages the domestication of international
law and assuages the sovereignty-based concerns of member states. It ensures an
37 See Turkel Commission, ‘The Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31

May 2010 — Second Report: Israel’s Mechanisms for Examining and Investigating
Complaints and Claims of Violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict According to
International Law’ (Report, February 2013) 85–7 [33] (‘Second Turkel Commission
Report’).
38 The Nuremberg Trials viewed individual prosecutions as an essential means of international
legal enforcement. See Judicial Decisions, ‘International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg):
Judgment and Sentences’ (1947) 41 American Journal of International Law 172. See also
Cohen and Shany, above n 14, 44. See Dianne Orentlicher, Report of the Independent
Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity — Addendum: Updated Set of
Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat
Impunity, UN ESCOR, 61st sess, Agenda Item 17, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (8
February 2005).
39 See André Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State
Responsibility in International Law’ (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 615, 615. See generally Bonafè, above n 34; Thomas Franck, ‘Individual
Criminal Liability and Collective Civil Responsibility: Do They Reinforce or Contradict
One Another?’ (2007) 6 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 567; Willian A
Schabas, ‘State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’ (2008) 98 Journal of Criminal
Law & Criminology 953.
40 Amos Harel, ‘Preempting The Hague: How the IDF Seeks to Avoid International Legal
Action’, Haaretz (online), 3 January 2015 <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.635021>
archived at <https://perma.cc/3PDH-P2FZ> (emphasis added).
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efficient and co-dependent relationship between national and international
jurisdictions. 41 Collectively, it facilitates the primary objective of the ICC. In so
doing, it pursues the promise of universal justice by encouraging states to
employ domestic measures to prevent impunity for the most serious international
crimes. 42
Complementarity builds upon a succession of developments that occurred
throughout the 20th century.43 Most commonly, though, while various notions of
complementarity have long existed, it is prominently associated with the ICC and
the Court’s jurisdictional governance. 44 Though the Rome Statute does not
explicitly reference complementarity, the principle is articulated throughout art
17.45 To establish admissibility and balance the co-dependent relationship
between national legal systems and the ICC, the article provides a two-step test.
First, art 17 determines whether a case has been investigated or prosecuted. If it
has not, then the case will be admissible. Second, if a case has been prosecuted at
the national level, the ICC may assess the proceedings and assert jurisdiction
only if the state is deemed to have been unwilling or unable to genuinely conduct
proceedings.46
41 Tatiana E Sainati, ‘Divided We Fall: How the International Criminal Court Can Promote

42

43

44
45

46

Compliance with International Law by Working with Regional Courts’ (2016) 49 Vanderbilt
Journal of Transnational Law 191, 200.
Then United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan explained the purpose of the ICC as
providing ‘the promise of universal justice’: United Nations Office of Legal Affairs,
Overview: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998–99)
<http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm> archived at <https://perma.cc/95XAFELM>, quoting United Nations, ‘International Criminal Court Promises Universal Justice,
Secretary-General Tells International Bar Association’ (Press Release, SG/SM/6257, 12
June 1997). See also David Wippman, ‘The International Criminal Court’ in Christian ReusSmit (ed), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 151, 176;
Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman, ‘The Law and Economics of Humanitarian
Violations’ (2004) 36 Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 211, 229–30.
El Zeidy presents four major models of complementarity that have developed throughout the
twentieth century. See El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International
Criminal Law, above n 11, 6–8.
Mohamed M El Zeidy, ‘The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement
International Criminal Law’ (2002) 23 Michigan Journal of International Law 869, 870.
The closest direct reference is found in art 1 of the Rome Statute. This holds that:
An International Criminal Court (‘the Court’) is hereby established. It shall be a
permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this
Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The
jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this
Statute.
Rome Statute art 1 (emphasis added). For a general account of the drafting history of art 17,
see John T Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’ in Roy S Lee (ed), The
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute — Issues, Negotiations,
Results (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 41.
Rome Statute art 17 holds, inter alia, that:
(1) … the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless
the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State
genuinely to prosecute;
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The Rome Statute balances the sovereign concerns of member states with the
need to ensure an efficient relationship between the ICC and national
jurisdictions. Article 17’s inclusion of the unwilling and unable exceptions,
however, acknowledged that this procedural requirement — as conveyed by the
test’s first step — may become susceptible to abuse or manipulation. 47 The
‘unwilling’ and ‘unable’ exceptions provide safeguards against such abuse.
‘Unable’ refers to the criterion of inability. It objectively evaluates a state’s
capacity to undertake a genuine investigation. 48 This assesses conditions or
factors that may bar a state from conducting the necessary proceedings within
circumstances where it would otherwise be inclined to meet the requisite
standard.49 Primarily, the ‘unable’ requirement addresses instances in which a
state cannot pursue genuine prosecution due to such factors as civil disorder,
war, natural disaster or the collapse of a national judicial system. 50
The criterion of ‘unwillingness’ is of more immediate relevance. 51 In relation
to the focus of this paper, and as Azarova asked following the Palestinians’
initiation of proceedings at The Hague, ‘[t]he question is not whether Israel is
“able” to conduct any investigations, but whether it is “willing” to do so’.52
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under
article 20, paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
Court.
See also El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law, above
n 11, 161; El Zeidy, ‘A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law’, above n
44, 898. See also Darryl Robinson, ‘The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity’
(2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 67, 90.
47 See Rome Statute art 17(1)(a). The inclusion of the unwilling or unable standard recognises
that although states have the first responsibility and right to prosecute international crimes
and that the ICC may only exercise jurisdiction where national legal systems fail to act,
exceptions allow the Court to assert jurisdiction when the state ‘purport[s] to act but in
reality [is] unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out proceedings’. See Office of the
Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, ‘The Principle of Complementarity in Practice’
(Informal Expert Paper, 2003) 3 (‘Complementarity in Practice’). See also Cohen and
Shany, above n 14, 57; Margalit, above n 14, 157–8.
48 El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law, above n 11,
222. See Margalit, above n 14, 157.
49 The determination of inability is discussed broadly in Rome Statute art 17(3). This holds
that:
In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether,
due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system,
the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
50 See El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law, above n 11,

222. Further, the ICC held that Libya was unable to conduct an adequate investigation and
prosecution of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi. See Carla Ferstman et al, ‘The International Criminal
Court and Libya: Complementarity in Conflict’ (Meeting Summary, Chatham House, 22
September
2014)
3
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140922Li
bya.pdf> archived at <https://perma.cc/BT4U-V4KY>. See also Prosecutor v Gaddafi
(Decision on the Admissibility of the Case) (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial
Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/11–01/11–344–Red, 31 May 2013).
51 Valentina Azarov and Sharon Weill, ‘Israel’s Unwillingness? The Follow-Up Investigations
to the UN Gaza Conflict Report and International Criminal Justice’ (2012) 12 International
Criminal Law Review 905, 910.
52 Azarova, above n 20.
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Ostensibly, this may be answered in the affirmative. Since the commencement of
Operation Cast Lead in 2008, Israel has conducted numerous investigations and
formed several commissions to evaluate, post-hoc, its conduct and compliance
with international law. 53 Yet, Israel’s investigative initiatives remain susceptible
to the various interpretations that accompanied the Office of the Prosecutor’s
announcement of a preliminary examination. The ICC has made clear, however,
that the simple occurrence of an investigation does not reactively render a case
inadmissible.54 The Rome Statute provides further specification. Article 17(2)
explains that the Court’s Prosecutor may invoke jurisdiction, despite the
occurrence of national proceedings, on the basis of the accused state’s
unwillingness if: the purported national proceeding was made for the purpose of
shielding the accused from criminal responsibility; there has been an unjustified
delay deemed ‘inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice’; or if the domestic measures were or are not being conducted
independently or impartially. 55
Mohammed El Zeidy notes that the unwillingness requirement in art 17 is a
‘test of the good faith of national authorities’.56 The article’s second paragraph
provides preconditions to assure the test’s effectiveness. 57 Shielding, conveyed
in sub-para (a) and as alluded to by Azarova, is of greatest relevance to the
divergent assessments of Israel’s post-war accountability measures and
investigative efforts. El Zeidy explains that circumstances constituting shielding
vary greatly. He cites examples of explicit bad faith, the formal adoption of
amnesty laws or (despite Mégret’s dismissal) 58 the orchestration of sham
proceedings.59 Still, it is difficult to qualify the totality of circumstances that may
53 For example, the Turkel Commission examined both the naval incident and Israel’s existing

54

55
56
57
58
59

mechanisms for investigating alleged violations of international law during armed conflicts.
See Turkel Commission, ‘The Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31
May 2010 — Part One’ (Report, 23 January 2011) (‘First Turkel Report’). See also Second
Turkel Commission Report, above n 37. Further, a government commissioned report on the
legal status of settlement construction considered both the domestic and international legal
status of West Bank settlements. See Levy Commission, ‘The Levy Commission Report on
the Legal Status of Building in Judea and Samaria’ (Report, 21 June 2012)
<http://israelipalestinian.procon.org/sourcefiles/The-Levy-Commission-Report-on-theLegal-Status-of-Building-in-Judea-and-Samaria.pdf> archived at <https://perma.cc/9SLFWWY5>. Section C of the 2010 Israeli report into the factual and legal aspects of the 2008–
09 Gaza war and chapter seven of the Israeli report published in 2015 following Operation
Protective Edge provide detailed accounts of Israel’s investigative procedures following
alleged violations of IHL and the status of undertaken investigations for alleged incidents
having occurred during the respective conflicts. See Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32,
76–151 [209]–[430]; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual
and Legal Aspects’ (Report, State of Israel, 14 June 2015) 218–41 [409]– [457] (‘2014 Gaza
Conflict Report’).
See Prosecutor v Lubanga (Warrant of Arrest) (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial
Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04–01/06–2–tEN, 10 February 2006). For discussion of the
Lubanga decision and a detailed account of the drafting history and development of the
unable and unwilling criteria, see El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in
International Criminal Law, above n 11, 161–70.
Rome Statute arts 17(2)(a)–(c).
El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law, above n 11,
168.
Ibid.
Mégret, above n 30, 376.
El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law, above n 11, at
175.
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constitute shielding. 60 These varied understandings support competing
assessments of Israel’s domestic accountability measures. They also raise
questions about the necessary means of legal compliance and the potential for
manipulation. This has caused Kevin Jon Heller to ask ‘what kinds of national
investigative steps are required to establish that a state is indeed genuinely
investigating the suspect targeted by the ICC’?61
The inclusion of complementarity and the art 17 criteria pacified traditional
proponents of state sovereignty. This drew upon the foundational contention that
a state possesses the right ‘to exercise its jurisdiction over crimes committed in
its territory’.62 Historically, states were exceedingly reluctant to dilute sovereign
rights and resisted initiatives to delegate their bestowed prerogatives beyond
local structures.63 Efforts, initiated during the inter-war years and under the
auspices of the League of Nations, to establish a permanent international
criminal court were required to negotiate with a devout Westphalian state
system.64 When such negotiations became formalised in the lead up to the
creation of the ICC, the principle of complementarity, as articulated through art
17 of the Rome Statute, was the resulting compromise.65 El Zeidy explains:
In order to create an international criminal court to punish grave crimes of an
international character, this historical obstacle had to be overcome. The
compromise reached is the principle of complementarity. This principle requires
the existence of both national and international criminal justice functioning in a
subsidiary manner for the repression of crimes of international law. When the
former fails to do so, the latter intervenes and ensures that perpetrators do not go
unpunished. 66

The principle of complementarity also serves a pragmatic function. The ICC
has limited resources and cannot possibly provide redress for the totality of

60 See ibid.
61 See Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Radical Complementarity’ (2016) 14 Journal of International
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63

64
65

66

Criminal Justice 637, 640 (emphasis in original). See also Prosecutor v Muthaura
(Judgement on the Appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the Decision of Pre-Trial
Chamber II of 30 May 2011) (International Criminal Court, Appeals Chamber, Case No
ICC-01/09–02/11–274, 30 August 2011) [40]–[43].
See El Zeidy, ‘A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law’, above n 44,
870. The territoriality principle is a general principle of public international law and holds
that a state has the right to prosecute criminal offences that occur within its borders. See SS
Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 10. See also Ian Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2003) 301.
See Antonio Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment
of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International
Law 2, 11–12. See also Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the
Transformation of International Law: Justice for the New Millennium (Transnational
Publishers, 2002) 8, 25.
Cassese, above n 63; Sadat, above n 63. See also Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The International
Criminal Court and National Courts: A Contentious Relationship (Ashgate, 2011) 3, 5.
Member states to the ICC have reached opposing interpretations of whether the Rome
Statute obliges or reaffirms the entitlement of states to invoke jurisdiction following the
suspected commission of international crimes. See Jann K Kleffner, Complementarity in the
Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (Oxford University Press, 2008) 235–7.
See also Rome Statute Preamble, para 6.
El Zeidy, ‘A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law’, above n 44, 870.
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international crimes that may come within its mandate. 67 Complementarity
recognises that in many instances domestic legal systems are best suited to
ensure appropriate remedies. 68 In practice, the Court would rather defer to a
functional domestic system to provide protection and ensure against impunity. 69
This is consistent with complementarity’s primary efforts to encourage states to
investigate alleged violations domestically, to ensure that states possess the
necessary legal mechanisms to pursue such prosecutions and to address impunity
at the national level. 70
When states, subject to international scrutiny, point towards the various
domestic measures that they purport satisfy accountability requirements (and
thus preclude admissibility under art 17), they often identify both individual and
general investigative procedures. Mireille Delmas-Marty describes the necessity
of a formalist distinction between criminal and non-criminal accountability:
An important point to be verified in appreciating a state’s willingness to
investigate is not only the opening of an investigation into a general situation, but
whether or not the investigation is in fact directed toward the persons truly
responsible. 71

While this formal distinction is widely acknowledged, there are practical
reasons why evaluations of domestic proceedings may wish, at least initially, to
avoid too rigid a distinction.72 Nevertheless, when states claim legitimacy by
employing the language of complementarity, when they reference national-level
inquiries into the legality of a general situation, they often conflate the principle
of complementarity with the obligation of states to investigate non-criminal
violations of IHL.

67 See Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, ‘Paper on Some Policy Issues

68
69
70

71

72

before the Office of the Prosecutor’ (Policy Paper, September 2003) 3 <https://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf> archived at <https://perma.cc/VP5EG52K>. See also Olympia Bekou, ‘Building National Capacity for the ICC: Prospects and
Challenges’ in Triestino Mariniello (ed), The International Criminal Court in Search of its
Purpose and Identity (Routledge, 2015) 133, 138–9.
Sainati, above n 41, 204–5.
Complementarity in Practice, above n 47, 3.
William Burke-White has termed this approach ‘proactive complementarity’: Burke-White,
‘Proactive Complementarity’, above n 12, 54. Moreno Ocampo noted in 2004 that the
Office of the Prosecutor would apply a positive approach to complementarity and that
‘rather than competing with national systems for jurisdiction, we will encourage national
proceedings wherever possible’. See Luis Moreno Ocampo, ‘Statement of the Prosecutor
Luis Moreno Ocampo to Diplomatic Corps’ (Speech delivered at The Hague, 12 February
2004)
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/0F999F00-A609-4516-A91A80467BC432D3/143670/LOM_20040212_En.pdf> archived at <https://perma.cc/7U6LSTZG>.
See Mireille Delmas-Marty, ‘Interactions between National and International Criminal Law
in the Preliminary Phase of Trial at the ICC’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal
Justice 2, 5.
See El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law, above n 11,
166–7. See also Second Turkel Commission Report, above n 37, 147 [109].
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B

The Obligation to Investigate Non-Criminal Violations of International
Humanitarian Law

International criminal law is premised on the belief that ‘only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be
enforced’. 73 IHL provides states with the obligation to investigate non-criminal
violations. Prominently, violations of IHL involve individual conduct.74 The
Geneva Conventions, however, address both individual criminal liability and the
civil responsibility of states for the commission of international crimes and
wrongful acts.75 Marco Sassòli notes that this recalls IHL’s origins of governing
relations between belligerent states: ‘violations are attributed to States and
measures to stop, repress and redress them must therefore be directed against the
State responsible for the violations’.76
The relationship between state and individual responsibility was succinctly
distinguished by the International Law Commission (‘ILC’). During the arduous
codification process of its Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the ILC
declared:
the criminal responsibility of individuals does not eliminate the international
responsibility of States for the consequences of acts committed by persons acting
as organs or agents of the State. But such responsibility is of a different nature
and falls within the traditional concept of State responsibility. The criminal
responsibility of the State cannot be governed by the same régime as the criminal
responsibility of individuals …77

This dual focus is reflective of international practice. Countless historical
examples demonstrate that, most often, international crimes and individual
violations of IHL feature substantial state involvement.78
It is widely understood that states hold a legal duty to investigate their
conduct for non-criminal or civil breaches of IHL. Positivist readings of IHL do
not, however, provide substantive guidance regarding the content or cause of the
73 Judicial Decisions, above n 38, 221. As part of the fulfillment of these obligations, a state
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may be required to conduct a criminal investigation. Although this may contribute to the
conflation of the two legal frameworks (criminal and civil), they remain both formally and
substantively separate. See Hampson, above n 10, 4–5.
See Marco Sassòli, ‘State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’
(2002) 84 International Review of the Red Cross 401, 401–2.
Ibid. Reference to state obligation is found in art 51 of the first Geneva Convention and is
repeated in arts 52, 131 and 158 of the second, third and fourth Geneva Conventions
respectively. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31
(entered into force 21 October 1950) art 51 (‘Geneva Convention I’); Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force
21 October 1950) art 52 (‘Geneva Convention II’); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135
(entered into force 21 October 1950) art 131 (‘Geneva Convention III’); Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 12
August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) art 148 (‘Geneva
Convention IV’).
Sassòli, above n 74, 402.
‘Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its
Thirty-Sixth Session’ [1984] II(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 11. See
also Bonafè, above n 34, 33.
Bonafè, above n 34, 71.
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required investigations. 79 Instead, the substance and source of the obligation to
investigate is derived from international human rights law. 80 In Velásquez
Rodríguez v Honduras, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights interpreted
the requirement that states ‘ensure’ the rights within the American Convention on
Human Rights81 as presenting an affirmative duty to ‘prevent, investigate and
punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention’.82 Several
international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’)83 and the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘CAT’),84 contain
language obliging states to undertake investigations of alleged legal violations. 85
In its art 2 jurisprudence, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the
right to life imposes positive obligations. These include a duty to investigate
deaths that may have occurred in breach of the European Convention of Human
Rights.86 Further, in Resolution 60/147 the General Assembly affirmed the
Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘Customary International
Humanitarian Law: Rules’ (Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol 1, 530–3. Article 4(1) of
the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts holds that:
The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any
other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and
whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of
the State.
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, GA Res 56/83, UN GAOR, 56th
sess, 85th plen mtg, Agenda Item 162, UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (28 January 2002, adopted 12
December 2001) annex (‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’) art
4(1). See also Hampson, above n 10, 12. See generally Sassòli, above n 74.
See generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave
Human Rights Violations in International Law’ (1990) 78 California Law Review 451. See
also Michael Scharf, ‘The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal
Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes’ (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems
41.
American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 22 November 1969, 1144
UNTS 123 (entered into force 18 July 1978).
See Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras (Judgement) (1988) Inter-Am Court HR (ser C) No 4,
[166] (emphasis added). See also Roht-Arriaza, above n 80, 469–74.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December
1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (‘ICCPR’).
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26
June 1987) (‘CAT’).
See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31: The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, 80th sess, 2187th mtg, UN Doc
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004) [8]. See also CAT art 12. For an overview of
these developments, see Marzuki Darusman, Steven R Ratner and Yasmin Sooka, ‘Report of
the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka’ (Report, United
Nations Secretary-General, 31 March 2011) 73–5 [262]–[269] (‘Panel of Experts on
Accountability Report’).
The Court held that:
a general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing by the agents of the State would be
ineffective, in practice, if there existed no procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of
the use of lethal force by State authorities. The obligation to protect the right to life
under this provision (art 2), read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under
Article 1 (art 2+1) of the Convention to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction
the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention’, requires by implication that
there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have
been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State.

79 See

80

81
82
83
84

85

86

98

requirement that states investigate cases of gross violations of human rights and
humanitarian law. 87 Both the International Committee of the Red Cross and the
United Nations Secretary-General’s Expert Panel on Accountability in Sri Lanka
have found that the obligation to investigate serious violations of human rights
and IHL ‘are now buttressed by a generation of state practice’ and form part of
customary international law. 88
Françoise Hampson explains that a state’s obligation to investigate and
monitor civil or non-criminal violations of IHL is influenced by the requirements
that states ‘respect’ and ‘ensure respect’ for the Geneva Conventions.89 This
supposes a state obligation to both prevent violations and to act should a
violation occur.90 While the regulation of grave breaches instils individual
criminal responsibility, 91 each of the Conventions have common language
requiring that a ‘High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the
suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other
than the grave breaches’.92 The requirement to suppress transcends war crimes
and the liability of individuals. As Hampson notes:
In order to suppress something, States need to know whether it is occurring. This
would appear to require some form of monitoring. If, as a result of monitoring, a
State determines that a violation of the Conventions is occurring, it is required to
suppress it. This may be by means of criminal proceedings but, unlike the case
with ‘grave breaches’, it does not have to be by such means. The only obligation
is to put an end to the behaviour in question. 93

To ensure respect, under Common Article 1, and to satisfy treaty provisions
requiring the ‘prevention’, ‘suppression’ and ‘repression’ of violations, states are
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McCann and Others v The United Kingdom [1995] 21 Eur Court HR 1, 41 [161], citing
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). See
generally Alastair Mowbray, ‘Duties of Investigation under the European Convention on
Human Rights’ (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 437.
See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, GA Res 60/147, UN GAOR, 60th sess, Agenda Item 71(a),
UN Doc A/RES/60/147 (21 March 2006).
Panel of Experts on Accountability Report, above n 85, 75 [269]. See Henckaerts and
Doswald-Beck, above n 79, 607.
Common Article 1 holds that: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to
ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances’. See Geneva Convention I art
1. See Hampson, above n 10, 12.
Hampson notes that this view is affirmed by the obligation to disseminate the treaty
provisions of the Geneva Conventions as conveyed by arts 47, 48, 127 and 144 of the four
Conventions respectively: Hampson, above n 10, 12. See Geneva Convention I art 47;
Geneva Convention II art 48. The wording of the obligation is extended by both the third
and fourth Conventions. See Geneva Convention III art 127; Geneva Convention IV art 144.
See also Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, ‘The Obligation to
Disseminate International Humanitarian Law’ (Fact Sheet, International Committee of the
Red Cross, 28 February 2003) <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/obligation-disseminateinternational-humanitarian-law-factsheet> archived at <https://perma.cc/9G4S-P2W8>.
Hampson, above n 10, 13.
Geneva Convention I art 49; Geneva Convention II art 50; Geneva Convention III art 129;
Geneva Convention IV art 146. See also Hampson, above n 10, 13.
Hampson, above n 10, 14.
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required to monitor the function of their military systems and investigate alleged
violations that may occur within an armed conflict. 94
As with the principle of complementarity, the obligation to investigate noncriminal violations serve important and necessary purposes. These should be
encouraged and enabled. Both individuals and states, however, may be reluctant
to assume such responsibility. Frequently, when facing accusations of serious
legal violations, states reactively deny such accusations. 95 They argue and
interpret the relevant provisions of international law and present corroborating
facts to support their claim and assert legitimacy. 96 These traditionally structured
forms of legal argumentation remain ever-present features of armed conflicts.
They manifest throughout the discourse that follows the use of force. States,
however, are increasingly supplementing their international legal engagements
with pre-emptive and informal appeals to the principle of complementarity and
the obligation to investigate non-criminal violations of IHL. Investigations are
conducted for various reasons and often in good faith.97 However, the informal
appeals to complementarity identified here are intended, principally, to generate
legitimacy upon the use of force and through the legal discourse that follows the
cessation of hostilities.
III

INTERNATIONAL LAW, LEGITIMACY AND THE USE OF FORCE

‘You cannot win a war today without simultaneously keeping legitimacy
inside the country and around the world’, declared Mandelblit following the
Second Lebanon War in 2006.98 States have long acknowledged an
interconnectedness between legitimacy and the use of force.99 M Cherif
Bassiouni dates this relationship to antiquity. 100 From this time, states have
coupled initiations of force with appeals to the legitimacy of their actions.101
International relations scholars ponder the source, purpose and effects of these
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See David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton University Press, 2006) 7–8.
Ibid 34.
See Alan Craig, International Legitimacy and the Politics of Security: The Strategic
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Advocate General (‘MAG’) Avichai Mandelblit’s testimony before the Winograd
Commission.
See David Armstrong and Theo Farrell, ‘Force and Legitimacy in World Politics:
Introduction’ (2005) 31 Review of International Studies 3, 3. See generally Jeremy Black,
‘War and International Relations: A Military-Historical Perspective on Force and
Legitimacy’ (2005) 31 Review of International Studies 127, 127.
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Western Reserve Journal of International Law 299, 299.
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Richard Falk, ‘Legality and Legitimacy: The Quest for Principled Flexibility and Restraint’
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assertions. 102 Though these considerations are beyond the present scope, a broad
recognition has emerged, that from at least the latter half of the 20th century,
international law influences appeals to legitimacy. It now provides states a
vocabulary to justify (or contest) the use of force. 103
It is, of course, possible to distinguish between legitimacy and legality. 104
However, since the post-World War II shift towards international institutions, the
Charter of the United Nations’ (‘UN Charter’) prohibition of the use of force105
and the dissemination of IHL, the embrace of legal argument has become ‘one of
the staple features of state practice on the use of force, so that when states use
force against other states, they also use international law to define and defend,
argue and counter-argue, explain and rationalise their actions’.106 This goes
beyond positivist appeals to the specific provisions that express the limited
grounds upon which states may resort to force and which govern, often in great
detail, the means by which such force may be applied. 107 Christian Reus-Smit
notes that when states began codifying the principles that govern the conduct of
hostilities, they were not only enshrining rules. They also established a
framework of what constituted rightful state actions within the international
sphere.108 Accordingly,
[i]nternational law has become a site for the social construction of models of
legitimate agency and action, and the models it enshrines have become key
justificatory touchstones in the constitutive political struggles of global society.109

Law is also framed as an excuse. Critical legal scholars have traced the
evolution of law’s humanising endeavours.110 Premised on the assumption that
legal war is a more humane exercise than illegal war, legalised contestations
have long provided states a means of explaining the need for war and excusing
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Weapons’ (1997) 10 Leiden Journal of International Law 137.
Charter of the United Nations art 2(4) (‘UN Charter’).
Dino Kritsiotis, ‘When States Use Armed Force’ in Christian Reus-Smit (ed), The Politics of
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 45, 47 (emphasis in original). See
also Jennifer Welsh, The Return of History: Conflict, Migration, and Geopolitics in the
Twenty-First Century (Anansi Press, 2016) 64.
David Kennedy, for example, explains that for the past century law and international law
have been in revolt against formalism. Law and legal argument, Kennedy claims, have
successfully become a ‘practical vocabulary for politics’. See Kennedy, above n 96, 45.
Christian Reus-Smit, ‘The Politics of International Law’ in Christian Reus-Smit (ed), The
Politics of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 14, 20.
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particular actions taken during combat.111 Inside the domestic polity and
throughout the international sphere, the legal regulation of war provides states
with, as David Kennedy identified, a means of privileging the use of force. 112
Adherents to various strands of international relations question the association
between international law and politics. Realist, rationalist and constructivist
approaches offer differing accounts of international law both generally and in
times of armed conflict.113 Though a diversity of motivational perspectives exist,
understandings of international law and the use of force mostly accept that states
do appeal to the former upon engagement of the latter.114 Despite international
law’s acknowledged weaknesses — its deficient enforcement mechanisms and
the absence of formal requirements compelling legal justifications — states
willingly invoke law.115 Numerous observed instances of state recourse to legal
argument substantiate the self-reliant nature of international law’s relationship
with the politics and legitimacy of armed conflict. This does not endorse the
validity of, or suggest parity between, particular legal claims. Such appeals to
international law are commonly contested, may be offered in bad faith or strain
plausible interpretations beyond reasonable recognition. 116
Notwithstanding tenuous appeals and alongside particular rules, customs and
treaty provisions, international law provides ‘a framework and vocabulary for
states to imagine, negotiate and realise social relations’.117 Yet war’s inevitable
tragedy induces heightened controversy. Cicero declared inter arma enim silent
leges (in war law is silent) but Grotius contended that war is ‘so horrible, that
nothing but the highest necessity or the deepest charity can make it be right’.118
Silence has long given way to contestations of legitimacy. Claims that war or the
use of force are ‘right’ now assume a familiar argumentative structure. Andrew
Hurrell notes that the state’s reliance on law is not a result of the law’s
(perceived) capacity to unambiguously determine the legality of a military
action. 119 Instead, reliance reflects law’s internal structure, which contains
well-established patterns of argumentation about the use of force, about the rules
that have governed and might govern the use of force, about the ways political
interests can be expressed in a common language of claim and counter-claim. 120

Similarly, Kennedy has described war as both a fact and an argument.121
Within the argument that accompanies the use of force, international law has
111 Ibid 50. See also David Kennedy, ‘Lawfare and Warfare’ in James Crawford and Martti
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Kritsiotis, ‘When States Use Armed Force’, above n 106, 46.
Kritsiotis, ‘The Power of International Law as Language’, above n 101, 402.
See One Humanity: Shared Responsibility — Report of the Secretary-General for the World
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become ‘the rhetoric through which we debate and assert the boundaries of
warfare’.122 These appeals to international law, however, serve divergent
purposes. Kennedy contends that if law can
increase friction by persuading relevant audiences of a campaign’s illegitimacy, it
can also grease the wheels of combat. Law is a strategic partner for military
commanders when it increases the perception of outsiders that what the military is
doing is legitimate. And of course, it is a strategic partner for the war’s opponents
when it increases the perception that what the military is doing is not
legitimate. 123

Proponents and opponents of war may possess symmetrical access to the legal
vernacular that structures contestations of legitimacy. However, as Max Weber
famously opined, only states successfully claim a monopoly on the legitimate
use of force.124 Corresponding attempts to demonstrate the legitimacy of the use
of force by state actors traditionally appeal, often separately, to both jus ad
bellum and jus in bello. Israel has promoted the formality of this distinction. 125 In
accordance, Israel claims that evaluations of military conduct must observe this
division to ensure that an alleged violation does not unduly influence overall
assessments of a military operation’s legitimacy. 126
Collectively, states appeal to both the cause of war and the means through
which it is conducted. This intends to demonstrate the legitimacy of their actions
and the consistency of their methods with the requirements of international law.
The common refrain of we obey the law underscores specific arguments. The
public and diplomatic discourses accompanying the use of force emphasise the
general legitimacy (or legality) of the overall operation. In accordance with the
prohibition on the use of force, states have traditionally appealed, under jus ad
bellum, to the self-defence exception contained within the UN Charter. On
countless occasions, from the Caroline incident to the US-led wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, states have followed a familiar argumentative structure. This recalls
international law and self-defence, it demonstrates legal compliance and asserts
legitimacy. 127 This traditional structure of legal argument, in justification of the
use of force, remains a prominent feature of contemporary conflicts. States,
however, are increasingly coupling accounts of legal adherence, to jus ad bellum,
with appeals to the legitimacy of their actions, through jus in bello.
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A

Israel’s Early Appeals to International Law and Legitimacy

Israel has long viewed the relationship between diplomacy — including its
legal aspects — and security policy as a strategic calculation. David Ben-Gurion
described this relationship. He explained that ‘[t]he Minister of Defense is
authorized to make defense policy; the role of the Foreign Minister is to explain
that policy’. 128 Israel’s earliest appeals to the legitimacy of its military actions
primarily invoked self-defence. Upon the use of force, Israel employed the
language of art 51 of the UN Charter to purport legal compliance. 129 As many
states claim, the use of force was presented as a final resort, a demand of
necessity. Although war has been a palpable feature of the Israeli–Arab conflict
since the Mandate era and despite cyclical episodes of violence, Israeli and
Palestinian actors remained cognisant of the evolving legal framework that
rapidly formalised in the latter half of the 20th century.130
In 1948 Israel achieved statehood and a war began. 131 In response to the
Security Council, Israeli officials sought to illustrate the conformity of their
actions with the UN Charter.132 Asked whether its military forces were operating
beyond its borders, the Provisional Government of Israel replied that
[n]o area outside of Palestine is under Jewish occupation but sallies beyond the
frontiers of the State of Israel have occasionally been carried out by Jewish forces
for imperative military reasons, and as part of an essentially defensive plan.133

Undertaken military actions were presented in accordance with international
law. They appealed to the self-defence exception contained in art 51 of the UN
Charter and purported to respect the prohibition on the use of force within art
2(4).134 Collectively, Israel claimed that its military actions were taken ‘in order
to repel aggression, as part of our essentially defensive plan, to prevent these
areas being used as bases for attacks against the State of Israel’. 135 They were
intended to
protect Jewish population, traffic and economic life, including the protection of
those Jewish settlements outside the area of the State where, owing to the absence
128 Dan Horowitz, ‘The Israeli Concept of National Security’ in Avner Yaniv (ed), National
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of any duly constituted authority and the failure to implement the guarantees and
safeguards provided for under the General Assembly Plan, life and property are in
imminent danger.136

Israel’s justifications directly appealed to international law and asserted
compliance with its newly codified dictates. Significant segments of the
international community were generally (though not completely) supportive of
Israel’s defensive claims and the Security Council neither formally endorsed nor
directly rebuked them. 137
Nearly two decades later, in reaction to the events of June 1967, Israel
displayed a similar reliance upon the language of self-defence and international
law. Many in Israel believed that the nation verged on the brink of annihilation
prior to its swift victory in the 1967 war.138 Despite Israel’s newfound control of
the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula
and the Golan Heights, the Security Council moderated its initial engagements
with the political and legal questions that accompanied the regional
transformation. 139 Throughout the international community, however, Israel
faced growing condemnation. This too harnessed an international legal
vocabulary. It appealed to the UN Charter, claiming that Israeli actions violated
the UN Charter’s prohibition on the aggressive use of force.140 The Israeli
response was immediate and decisive. Abba Eban, addressing the Security
Council, purported that Israel’s actions were consistent with international law.
They were presented as legitimate and as a necessary response to an
overwhelming threat:
as time went on, there was no doubt that our margin of general security was
becoming smaller and smaller. Thus, on the morning of 5 June, when Egyptian
forces engaged us by air and land, bombarding the villages of Kissufim, Nahal-Oz
and Ein Hashelosha we knew that our limit of safety had been reached, and
perhaps passed. In accordance with its inherent right of self-defence as formulated
in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Israel responded defensively in full
strength. Never in the history of nations has armed force been used in a more
righteous or compelling cause.141

Israel’s response was multifaceted. However, to the extent that it employed
international law to demonstrate legitimacy, it purported compliance with the
immanency and necessity requirements of self-defence.142
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The legal questions, diplomatic exchanges and contestations of legitimacy
that followed the 1967 war were principally fixated on the jus ad bellum before
shifting towards the protracted conflict accompanying Israel’s subsequent
occupation of the Palestinian territories. Though such considerations were rarely
absent over the tumultuous decades that followed, during the escalating conflict
with the Palestinians, and within the increasingly entrenched occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Second Lebanon War featured expansive appeals
to international law. These increasingly emphasised the legitimacy of state
actions under jus in bello. Now, assertions of legal compliance, based on appeals
to defensive necessity, were expanded. Commonly, the state would profess that
its specific military actions — its selection of targets, choice of weaponry or
calculation of proportionality — adhered to the requirements of international
law.
B

Lebanon and an Increased Reliance on International Law

On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah operatives crossed into Israel. They sought to
ambush and abduct an IDF patrol unit. The operation had been planned for
months. It served Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s strategy of
antagonising Israel, of bolstering his domestic standing and of gaining leverage
to free Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners held within Israel.143 Early that
morning, two IDF military vehicles were fired upon with heavy weaponry. The
unit was separated. Three soldiers were killed while others hid nearby. Udi
Goldwasser and Eldad Regev were captured by militants, transferred to jeeps and
driven north into Lebanon. 144 Although the abductions of Goldwasser and Regev
triggered the Second Lebanon War, tensions had been mounting between Israel
and Hezbollah in the years that followed Israel’s withdrawal from southern
Lebanon in 2000. 145 Israel framed the abductions, not as a terrorist or militant
action undertaken by Hezbollah, but instead as a state act that required and
warranted a decisive military response. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
announced: ‘The events of this morning cannot be considered a terrorist strike;
they are the acts of a sovereign state that has attacked Israel without cause’. 146
Almost immediately, the IDF launched attacks against Hezbollah targets in
southern Lebanon. In response, communities in Israel’s north — in and near
Nahariya and Safed — came under rocket attack. Over the next month Israeli
forces bombed targets within Lebanon. Hezbollah militants launched rockets into
Israel. 147 International efforts to produce a ceasefire were initially blocked by the
143 See Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon
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Americans and British, who viewed the Israeli offensive as a necessary facet of
the broader struggle against regional terrorist organisations.148 When the UNbrokered ceasefire came into effect on 13 August, approximately 1200 Lebanese
and over 40 Israeli civilians had been killed. 149
Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs framed the continuous rocket attacks by
Hezbollah as violations of the principle of distinction and thus IHL. It claimed
Hezbollah employed human shields, also in violation of IHL, and intentionally
targeted Israeli civilians through their choice of weaponry and means of
combat.150 Again, Israel presented its response as a legitimate and necessary
appeal to self-defence. Israel claimed that diplomatic means were exhausted, its
actions necessary, and the use of force proportionate.151
Initially, Israel’s decision to launch a military operation received qualified
international support.152 This, however, would falter. As the campaign
continued, civilian casualties rose. Shiite villages and neighbourhoods in Beirut
were bombarded and the IDF began targeting Lebanese infrastructure.153 In
response, Israel faced mounting condemnation. 154 On 30 July, the Israeli Air
Force (‘IAF’) attacked the village of Qana. The strike killed an estimated 28
civilians and evoked a strong international reaction.155 Kofi Annan condemned
the attack.156 The Security Council expressed ‘shock and distress’. 157 Following
the conflict, the UN Soares Report held:
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while Hezbollah’s illegal action under international law of 12 July 2006 provoked
an immediate violent reaction by Israel, it is clear that, albeit the legal justification
for the use of armed force (self-defence), Israel’s military actions very quickly
escalated from a riposte to a border incident into a general attack against the entire
Lebanese territory.158

The report continued to note that Israel, jus in bello, exhibited a ‘lack of
respect for the cardinal principles regulating the conduct of armed conflict, most
notably distinction, proportionality and precaution.’159 It held that ‘[t]he
particularly tragic impact on civilians and civilian property is certainly due to
this deficit.’160 In reply to mounting accusations of legal disregard, Israel
professed fidelity to international law:
In responding to the threat posed by Hezbollah’s terrorist attacks, and
notwithstanding the fact that Hezbollah made no effort to comply with the
principles of humanitarian law, the IDF regarded itself as bound to comply with
the established principles of the law of armed conflict.161

Israel claimed that it carefully determined what constituted a legitimate military
target, adhered to the principle of proportionality when assessing targets, and
emphasised the distinction between military objectives and civilian objects. 162
Strikes against Lebanese infrastructure — including the Beirut airport and the
Al-Manar television station — that had provoked significant condemnation were
presented as being in accordance with international law. 163 Israel claimed these
facilities served dual-use purposes.164 The airport was said to constitute a
legitimate military target as it was likely to be used to supply weaponry and
military materials to Hezbollah and transport the abducted Israelis from
Lebanon.165 Al-Manar purportedly relayed messages to terrorists and incited acts
of violence. 166 Israel claimed that pursuant to the Committee established to
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review NATO bombings in Yugoslavia, such actions rendered the station a
legitimate military target.167
The Israeli assault on Qana was immediately described as a war crime. 168 The
UN Soares Report would later hold that it found no evidence suggesting the
buildings Israel had attacked were used by Hezbollah to launch rockets.
Accordingly, they did not constitute military targets.169 The IDF were adjudged
to have used disproportionate force. They were censured for the deaths of
civilians. 170 Again, in response, Israel claimed that its actions did not constitute a
violation of international law.171 Qana was presented as a hub of terrorist
activity. Israel claimed that the IAF targeted launching sites, undertook
precautions to minimise civilian casualties and only took action against terrorist
infrastructure. Israel steadfastly rejected that it purposefully targeted civilians. 172
In Jerusalem and at The Kirya in Tel Aviv, politicians and military officials
discussed the likely international reactions to Israel’s proposed response. 173
Assessments of legitimacy and perception weighed heavily throughout
deliberations. Attorney-General Menachem Mazuz was asked to adjudge the
legality of strikes against homes that intelligence indicated were used to store
rockets but would also result in civilian casualties. 174 Military lawyers were
deployed in theatre to evaluate proposed targets. They received broad discretion
to veto targets that contravened IHL. 175 The IDF’s International Law Department
(‘ILD’) contributed to the formation of general military policy and, despite
institutional resistance to the newfound prominence accorded to international
law, military lawyers substantively contributed to operational decisions. 176
Following the war, as Israel faced persistent condemnation ‘legal discourse
became central to Israel’s defence of its campaign and the lawyers now played
167 The Committee held that ‘[i]f the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it is a
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an unprecedented international role in defending the legality of the war and
mitigating legitimacy costs to the state.’177 Advocacy professed compliance.
Daniel Reisner, the former head of the ILD, provided the Israeli Government’s
response to a Human Rights Watch report.178 The report claimed the high
numbers of civilian casualties resulted from Israel’s failure to distinguish
between military objectives and civilian objects. 179 Reisner argued that military
targets were vetted by lawyers, resulting civilian damage was proportionate and
that Israel’s actions were consistent with the requirements of jus in bello.180
The Second Lebanon War featured increased reliance upon international law.
The legal engagements that accompanied the use of force shifted from exclusive
assertions of defensive legitimacy to broader exhibitions of legal compliance. As
with the major conflicts that preceded it, Israel justified its decision to use force
in a legal vernacular that appealed to self-defence and the UN Charter. When
Israel faced international condemnation that challenged the legitimacy of its
actions, Israel increased its reliance upon the legitimising potential of law. It
expressed adherence to relevant legal norms, professed total compliance and
exhibited its efforts to ensure that specific targets were vetted to determine the
legality of military actions. These engagements recall Kennedy’s description of
law’s strategic potential. 181 They are expressive of the common state refrain of
we obey the law and serve to illustrate the military campaign’s legitimacy.
Domestically, however, the Second Lebanon War was perceived as a
failure.182 Israel did not significantly weaken Hezbollah or exhibit a strong
deterrent capability. It suffered reputational damage within the international
community and faced questions about the IDF’s capacity and readiness. 183 The
Winograd Commission was formed to evaluate political and military decisionmaking within the much-maligned campaign.184 Testimonies from AttorneyGeneral Mazuz and Mandelblit described the function of IDF lawyers and their
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reliance upon international law during the conduct of hostilities. 185 The
Commission criticised what it perceived as an unnecessary deference to
international law. It accused Mazuz of ‘taking international law too seriously’.186
In response, the Attorney-General directly referenced complementarity and
argued that the role of international law within armed conflict had increased.
Such legal engagements, claimed Mazuz, would provide opportunity to ensure
that Israel’s military conduct was not adjudicated in international forums. 187 In
order to both avoid criticism and to ensure against individual responsibility, the
Attorney-General stressed international law’s strategic importance and
legitimising potential. 188
Although Israel would later employ the Attorney-General’s advice, its direct
response to the criticism it faced during and upon conclusion of the Second
Lebanon War followed a familiar pattern. Israel countered claims of legal
violations with assertions of legal fidelity. It sought to demonstrate that its
military actions, jus ad bellum and jus in bello, complied with international law.
Israel appealed to legal reasoning and offered broad interpretations of
international law that facilitated its claims of legality, and thus legitimacy. These
arguments were relatively silent on questions of process. Following the assault
on Qana, Israel had argued that its targets constituted military objectives,
presented evidence of rocket sites and accused the Lebanese militants of using
human shields. However, when the Association for Civil Rights in Israel called
for a state inquiry into the incident, neither the Government nor military were
willing to comply. 189 Although little direct attention was paid to the legitimising
potential of formal investigations, this soon would change as Israel’s security and
185 Mazuz’s testimony noted that the Lebanon campaign featured the greatest involvement of
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legal apparatuses shifted their attention from Hezbollah and the northern border
to Hamas and the Gaza Strip.
IV

INVESTIGATION AS LEGITIMISATION: INFORMAL COMPLEMENTARITY AND
GAZA

The Winograd Commission’s efforts to constrain the IDF’s recourse to
international law were unsuccessful. Israel furthered its appeals to legal
argument and justification. Over subsequent military campaigns, Israel became
progressively cognisant of the strategic benefit conveyed by complementarity.
Pnina Sharvit Baruch, the former head of the IDF’s International Law Division,
noted that
[t]he main way to confront the anticipated allegations in the international arena,
and especially in potential criminal proceedings, is to carry out independent
investigations that are thorough, effective, fast, and transparent, and are conducted
in such a way that the investigative mechanism will also receive international
legitimacy. In specific cases — if for example, it becomes clear that IDF forces
acted contrary to military orders and the laws of warfare — a hard line should be
taken against those responsible, including prosecution in suitable cases. This is
necessary in order to preserve and protect the rule of law and the values of the
IDF. But in addition, this will enable reliance on the principle of
complementarity, whereby international proceedings and foreign judicial
intervention are not appropriate when the state concerned carries out a genuine
and effective investigation on its own. 190

Israel appealed to the principle of complementarity after a Spanish court
claimed universal jurisdiction to hear a case regarding the targeted killing of
Salah Shehadeh. 191 In 2002, an Israeli operation to kill Shehadeh, then the
military commander of Hamas’ Izz ad-Din al Qassam Brigade, resulted in the
deaths of 14 civilians.192 The operation was condemned throughout the
international community but Israel initially refused to conduct criminal
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proceedings.193 Israel exhibited a common posture — dismissive of the threat of
international prosecution and supportive of both the individual actions taken
during the operation and the general policy that propagated the controversial
event.194 After a non-governmental organisation advocated for criminal
proceedings against the involved members of the IDF, General Dan Halutz, the
Commander of the IAF, reassured the pilots that conducted the operation:
You aren’t the ones who choose the targets, and you were not the ones who chose
the target in this particular case [the Shehadeh assassination]. You are not
responsible for the contents of the target. Your execution was perfect. Superb …
You did exactly what you were instructed to do. You did not deviate from that by
as much as a millimeter to the right or to the left.195

Following the Second Lebanon War, however, Israel had become increasingly
mindful of international law’s strategic potential. 196 In 2008, upon the initiative
of Chief Justice Aharon Barak, Israel established a commission of inquiry to
assess the Shehadeh operation. This would ‘examine the circumstances
surrounding the harm inflicted on uninvolved civilians’. 197 When a Spanish court
began proceedings against a number of high-level Israeli officials a year later,
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Israel referenced complementarity.198 Israel replied to the Spanish authorities
that the Shehadeh incident was subject to a domestic inquiry. This would
establish whether criminal proceedings were necessary. 199 The Israeli
communication claimed that Spanish jurisdiction would infringe upon Israeli
sovereignty, violate the principle of subsidiarity and contradict the principle of
complementarity.200 Meanwhile, it continued to detail the various methods of
domestic review available for suspected legal violations by Israeli personnel and
the efforts taken under these procedures following the Shehadeh incident. 201
Israel’s various accountability measures addressed (and dismissed) issues of
state responsibility and not individual criminal liability. Regardless, upon
review, the National Court of Spain declined to pursue prosecution on the basis
of Israel’s demonstrated domestic initiatives. 202 Despite Israel’s initial reluctance
to employ criminal proceedings or display investigative aptitude, the postLebanon embrace of legal recourse signalled a shift in tactic. When international
attention refocused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict following the 2008–09 and
2014 Gaza wars, Israel coupled traditional assertions of legal compliance with
appeals to informal complementarity. These novel efforts to generate legitimacy
following the use of force — by appealing to the state’s willingness to
investigate alleged violations of international law — were presented as evidence
of legal compliance and through what may be conceptualised as a proleptic show
trial.
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The 2008–09 and 2014 Gaza Wars

It was not happenstance that upon acceding to the Rome Statute, the
Palestinians chose the date of 13 June 2014 to accept the Court’s jurisdiction. 203
A day earlier, on 12 June, Marwan Qawasmeh and Amar Abu Aysha stole a car
near Hebron. The two were members of Hamas but believed to be acting on their
own initiative.204 They drove towards Gush Etzion, a bloc of Israeli settlements
in the Judean Mountains south of Jerusalem. Here they came upon three students
from a nearby yeshiva. Eyal Yifrach, Gilad Shaar and Naftali Fraenkel were
hitchhiking home. They were forced into the car. Upon being taken, Gilad Shaar
attempted to contact the police on his phone and report the abduction. Kawasmeh
and Abu-Isa, discovering this attempt, shot and killed the three young
students.205
Weeks later, when the bodies were found, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu directly implicated Hamas: ‘Hamas is responsible, and Hamas will
pay … [the students] were kidnapped and murdered in cold blood by wild
beasts’.206 Israeli society galvanised around the abduction and killing of the three
students.207 Tensions throughout Israel and the Palestinian territories continued
to rise. A day after the burials of Yifrach, Shaar and Fraenkel, Mohammad AbuKhdeir, a 16-year old Palestinian from East Jerusalem, was forced into a car by a
group of Israelis believed to be members of an extremist cell. Abu-Khdeir was
driven from near his home in Shua’fat to the Jerusalem Forest, beaten, doused in
gasoline and ignited in an act of vengeance that would claim his life. 208
The escalating events interrupted a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Gazan
militants that preceded the murders in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Protests
spread across the region. Militant groups in Gaza, believed to be unaffiliated
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kidnap plot, though these claims were strongly doubted by many observers and dismissed as
untrue by alternative sources within Hamas. See Orlando Crowcroft, ‘Hamas Official: We
were Behind the Kidnapping of Three Israeli Teenagers’, The Guardian (online), 21 August
2014
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/21/hamas-kidnapping-three-israeliteenagers-saleh-al-arouri-qassam-brigades> archived at <https://perma.cc/42VQ-XLS3>.
See, eg, Sarah Gruen, ‘Bring Back our Boys Campaign Inspires Hope’, Jerusalem Post
(online), 14 June 2014 <http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Israelis-launch-social-mediacampaign-to-help-find-missing-boys-with-BringBackOurBoys-359326>
archived
at
<https://perma.cc/F9GN-39BE>.
Adiv Sterman, ‘Six Jewish Extremists Arrested in Killing of Jerusalem Teen’, The Times of
Israel (online), 6 July 2014 <http://www.timesofisrael.com/suspects-arrested-in-killing-ofeast-jerusalemteen/?fb_comment_id=674432782648910_675281995897322#f18a8e8139248c> archived
at <https://perma.cc/8MEJ-B2KL>; See Nathan Thrall, ‘Hamas’s Chances’ 36(16) London
Review of Books 10.
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with Hamas, began launching rockets towards Israel in declared acts of defiance
and solidarity. When the attacks increased, Israel ordered an airstrike that killed
seven Hamas militants in Khan Yunis. In response, Hamas assumed
responsibility for the rocket attacks and increasingly began to target sites in
southern Israel. The following day, on 8 July 2014, Israel announced the
commencement of Operation Protective Edge. 209
The resulting conflict, as with the international community’s response,
followed a similar pattern to the 2008–09 Israeli offensive against Hamas in
Gaza — Operation Cast Lead. In both instances, the international community
appealed for restraint before condemning the military actions taken by Israel and
Hamas.210 As formal hostilities ceased, the parties presented competing legal
narratives. Each vied for legitimacy. 211 Sharvit Baruch, who served as the head
of the ILD between 2003–09, acknowledges that Israel was fully aware that its
military campaigns are likely to receive condemnation. 212 In reply, and
consistent with previous practice, Israel appealed to self-defence and the legality
of its actions under jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It sought to demonstrate the
legitimacy of its military operations and the necessity of its decision to use force.
Sharvit Baruch notes that while considerations of legitimacy are only a factor of
operational decision-making, appeals to legitimacy serve important post-conflict
purposes:
it is important on a diplomatic level — to be able to give good answers to allies
like the United States and the United Kingdom. Now it is also important, with the
potential of [international] criminal investigations, to demonstrate the legitimacy
of actions and also be able to give good answers. Beyond criminal proceedings,
however, it is necessary to respond to international organizations, NGOs and
others who are critical of the military action. 213

These post-hoc engagements may be placed within a process of normative
judgment. As described by Alan Craig, standards are set and states engage in the
strategic promotion of their policies. Craig notes that ‘[i]n the area of security
policy, states can be expected to deploy their lawyers at home and abroad to
influence understandings of international legitimacy that best fit the execution of
209 See generally Thrall, above n 208, 11.
210 See United Nations General Assembly, ‘General Assembly Demands Full Respect for

Security Council Resolution 1860 Calling for Immediate Gaza Ceasefire, as Emergency
Session Concludes’ (Press Release, GA/10809/Rev.1, 16 January 2009)
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/ga10809.doc.htm> archived at <https://perma.cc/F7S33PPT>. See also SC Res 1860, UN SCOR 1860, 6063rd mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1860 (8
January 2009). The response to the 2014 war followed a similar pattern. See United Nations
Security Council, ‘Security Council Weighs Effectiveness during “Eventual and at Times
Tragic
Month”’
(Press
Release,
SC/11502,
30
July
2014)
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11502.doc.htm> archived at <https://perma.cc/PV9W8E4Y>. For an account of the international community’s shift from acceptance of Israeli
claims regarding jus ad bellum to condemnation pursuant to jus in bello, see Joel Peters,
‘Gaza’ in Joel Peters and David Newman (eds), The Routledge Handbook on the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict (Routledge, 2013) 196, 203. See also Colin Shindler, A History of
Modern Israel (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 379–80.
211 Barak Ravid, ‘Delegitimization of Israel Must Be Delegitimized’, Haaretz (online), 16
October 2009 <https://www.haaretz.com/1.5250761> archived at <https://perma.cc/F74CQH9L>.
212 Interview with Colonel (Retired) Adv Pnina Sharvit Baruch, (Tel Aviv, 20 March 2017).
213 Ibid.
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their policies’. 214 In accordance with traditional appeals to international law,
where compliance is asserted through a legal vernacular, Israeli officials drew
upon supportive segments of the international community to articulate selfdefence-based justifications for the use of force and profess legal fidelity upon its
application. 215
Such legal appeals were not exclusive to Israel. The PA claimed that Israel, as
an occupying power, had abdicated its responsibilities towards the Palestinian
population. It called upon the international community to ensure Israeli
compliance with its associated obligations. 216 Hamas, who do not hold a formal
voice within the international community and do not often engage a legal
vernacular when addressing grievances with Israel, also made allusions to
international law. These held Hamas to be acting in self-defence, as possessing a
right to resist foreign domination, and claimed that their armed groups undertook
necessary efforts to avoid targeting civilians. 217
Israel’s initial efforts to employ a legal vernacular and articulate a narrative of
compliance did not, however, halt the inevitable chorus of condemnation.
Following the 2008–09 and 2014 wars, the resulting legal discourse developed

214 Craig, International Legitimacy and the Politics of Security, above n 98, 1. See generally

Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of
International Relations (Routledge, 2005) 184.
215 In response to the mounting condemnation that followed the 2008–09 war, Israel’s appeals
to self-defence drew upon the principles of imminence and proportionality. See Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Operation Cast Lead — Israel Defends Its Citizens (Press
Release,
2013)
<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/GazaFacts/Pages/Operation-Cast-LeadIsrael-Defends-its-Citizens.aspx>. See also Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 5 [16],
14–15 [38], 19–21 [52]–[54]; The Situation in the Middle East, Including the Palestine
Question, UN SCOR, 6060th mtg, UN Doc S/PV.6060 (31 December 2008) 5–6. At the
commencement of the 2014 war, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to draw
upon self-defence while citing assurance received by Israel from United States President
Barack Obama, British Prime Minister David Cameron and UN Secretary-General Ban Kimoon. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Operation Protective Edge — Q&A (Press
Release, 14 August 2014) <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Issues/Pages/OperationProtective-Edge-QA.aspx> archived at <https://perma.cc/TQP3-32C9>. See also 2014 Gaza
Conflict Report, above n 53.
216 See Riyad Mansour, Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory: Identical Letters Dated 29 December 2008 from the
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General
and President of the Security Council, UN GAOR, 10th sess, Agenda Item 5, UN Doc A/ES10/429–S/2008/828 (29 December 2008). See also Negotiations Affairs Department,
Palestinian Liberation Organization, ‘Dr Erekat Condemns “the Savage Israeli Assault on
the Gaza Strip”’ (Press Release, 27 December 2008) https://www.nad.ps/en/mediaroom/press-releases/dr-erekat-condemns-savage-israeli-assault-gazastrip%E2%80%99%E2%80%99; Negotiations Affairs Department, Palestine Liberation
Organization, ‘Gaza: Occupation by Siege’ (Factsheet, 28 February 2011)
https://www.nad.ps/en/publication-resources/factsheets/gaza-occupation-siege.
217 See C Jacob, ‘Hamas Responds to Goldstone Report — On PA’s Behalf; Issues Apology for
Harming Israeli Civilians, then Denies and Renounces Doing So’, Memri (online), 23
February
2010
<https://www.memri.org/reports/hamas-responds-goldstone-report%E2%80%93-pas-behalf-issues-apology-harming-israeli-civilians-then>
archived
at
<https://perma.cc/6RC4-E4WQ>.
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around a series of UN fact-finding reports.218 These presented detailed
accusation of legal violations by Israeli and Palestinian actors.219 The most
serious accusations were contained within the 2009 Goldstone Report and would
become the source of considerable controversy. 220 The report held that Israel had
deliberately targeted Gaza’s civilian population as part of its military
operation.221 Both the Goldstone Report and the 2014 Independent Commission
Report would also accuse the PA and Hamas of various legal violations that
ranged in severity. 222 Hamas was held to have, inter alia, engaged in
indiscriminate attacks against a civilian population, actions which could amount
to war crimes. 223
The UN-mandated reports became the fulcrum for much of the post-conflict
legal discourse. Israeli officials interpreted this process as an effort to
delegitimise their military operation. 224 Prime Minister Netanyahu announced
218 See, eg, Richard Goldstone et al, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab
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Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, UN
GAOR, 12th sess, Agenda Item 7, UN Doc A/HRC/12/48 (25 September 2009) (‘Goldstone
Report’); William Schabas, Mary McGowan Davis and Doudou Diène, Human Rights
Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the Detailed
Findings of the Independent Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Human Rights
Council Resolution S-21/1, 29th sess, Agenda Item 7, UN Doc A/HRC/29/CRP.4 (24 June
2015) (‘Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Commission’).
See Goldstone Report, UN Doc A/HRC/12/48, [151]. For background on the mission’s
evolving mandate, see The Grave Violations of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, Particularly Due to the Recent Israeli Military Attacks against the Occupied
Gaza Strip, HRC Res S-9/1, UN GAOR, 9th sess, 3rd mtg, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/S-9/1 (12
January 2009). See also Raimond Gaita, ‘Introductory Essay’ in Raimond Gaita (ed), Gaza:
Morality, Law & Politics (University of Western Australia Publishing, 2010) 1, 9. The
commission formed after the 2014 war and its subsequent report contained a similar focus.
See Ensuring Respect for International Law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Including East Jerusalem, HRC Res S-21/1, 21st sess, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/S-21/1 (24 July
2014) para 13. See also Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Commission,
UN Doc A/HRC/29/CRP.4.
See generally Michael P Scharf and Leila Nadya Sadat, ‘Understanding the Goldstone
Report: Controversy and Ramifications’ (2009) 18 International Law Students Association
Quarterly 14.
Goldstone Report, UN Doc A/HRC/12/48, [809], [810], [815], [1884]. Specifically, the
report detailed a series of incidents in which Israeli attacks led to civilian deaths with what
the report alleged to be a total absence of a justifiable military objective: at [704]–[885].
The fact-finding mission received reports of alleged violations by the Palestinian Authority
including the unlawful arrest and detention of suspected Hamas affiliates and practices by
the PA security services that were alleged to amount to torture and cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment. These included the deaths of individuals in detention that may have
resulted from torture. Complaints concerning such practices were not, however, subject to
full investigation by the fact-finding mission. The report continued to accuse the PA of
committing acts of international violence including torture, of having targeted Hamas
supporters and of imposing limitations on the freedoms of assembly, expression and the
press. See ibid [97], [1550]–[1575], [1584].
Ibid [108]. The Goldstone Report concluded that ‘the Gaza authorities have an obligation to
respect and enforce the protection of the human rights of the people of Gaza, inasmuch as
they exercise effective control over the territory, including law enforcement and the
administration of justice’: at [1369]. The report’s contention was partly based on statements
by the Hamas leadership that, upon assumption of control of Gaza in 2007, they would
respect international human rights standards and that ‘the Government is in permanent
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Craig, International Legitimacy and the Politics of Security, above n 98, 200.
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that such efforts must, in turn, be delegitimised.225 The Israeli response exhibited
many features commonly employed by states that faced allegations of legal
violations. Declarations of compliance and interpretations of legal provisions
were presented. Now, however, Israel also supplemented its claims of legal
compliance and legitimacy with informal appeals to complementarity and
expressions of investigative willingness.
Israel’s collective response was robust. Initially, following the 2008–09 war,
Israel refuted the perceived efforts of the UN’s Goldstone Report to delegitimise
the undertaken military operation. Israel mounted its own claims to legitimacy.
Initially, these followed a familiar pattern. Protestations were forged in legal
vernacular and designed to establish the legitimacy of Israeli conduct under jus
ad bellum.226 While elements of Israel’s immediate reaction to the Goldstone
Report devolved into ad hominem attacks, Israel attempted to pivot the post-war
debate towards reiterations of the self-defence-based justifications that had
gained notable traction with significant elements of the international community
in the war’s earliest days and which Israel accused the UN report of failing to
sufficiently acknowledge.227
Israel’s retorts moved from broad pronouncements to specific analysis. This
recognised that despite the appeal of self-defence-focused arguments, much of
the ensuing criticism addressed Israeli actions pursuant to jus in bello. Sharvit
Baruch noted that ‘the more significant claims concern the manner in which the
IDF used force in the operation and the application of the laws of warfare (that
is, the area of jus in bello)’.228 Israel addressed these accusations through a series
of reports following both the 2008–09 and 2014 Gaza wars.229 The reports,

225 Ravid, ‘Delegitimization of Israel’, above n 211.
226 The status and visibility of the Goldstone Report, and the subsequent attention it would

receive both within formal international institutions and throughout civil society surpassed
comparable criticism of past Israeli military actions and likely represented the first instance
in which a UN commissioned report had directly accused Israel of having committed war
crimes. See Jennifer Barnette, ‘Initial Reactions to the Goldstone Report and Reflections on
Israeli Accountability’, in Chantal Meloni and Gianni Tognoni (eds), Is There a Court for
Gaza? A Test Bench for International Justice (TMC Asser Press, 2012) 123, 125. In its most
public manifestations, Israel sought to discredit the Report as an exercise in political bias.
See Roni Sofer, ‘Netanyahu: Goldstone Report “A Prize for Terror”’, Ynet News (online),
16 September 2009 <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3778079,00.html>
archived at <https://perma.cc/2SJ4-5FN8>. For a detailed account of the public Israeli
response to the publication of the Goldstone Report, see Barnette, ‘Initial Reactions to the
Goldstone Report and Reflections on Israeli Accountability’, above n 226, 127–38.
227 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Initial Response to Report of the Fact Finding
Mission on Gaza Established pursuant to Resolution S-9/1 of the Human Rights Council’
(Press
Release,
24
September
2009)
<http://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/pages/initial-response-goldstone-report-24sep-2009.aspx> archived at <https://perma.cc/F88P-LM9E>. Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu would later note that legal efforts to deny Israel the right to selfdefence constituted one of the most significant threats facing the state. See Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, ‘PM Netanyahu Addresses the Saban Forum’ (Press Release, 15 November
2009)
<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/Pages/PM_Netanyahu_addresses_Saban_Forum_
15-Nov-2009.aspx>. See also Robbie Sabel, ‘Manipulating International Law as Part of
Anti-Israel “Lawfare”’ in Alan Baker (ed), Palestinian Manipulation of the International
Community (Jerusalem Center of Public Affairs, 2014) 13, 19; Weizman, above n 196, 102.
228 Sharvit Baruch, above n 190, 66.
229 See Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32; 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, above n 53.
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prepared jointly by the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, provide
examples of (and themselves constituted) informal appeals to complementarity.
It is, of course, unsurprising that Israel responded to the accusations it faced
and contested international attempts to adjudicate the conflict. Equally, it is
predictable that these responses served to deny accusations, to posit
advantageous interpretations of international law and to frame the ensuing debate
within supportable narratives that drew upon legitimising legal frameworks and
the repetitious call of we obey the law. 230 While these responses contained a
range of legal justifications that commonly feature when a state asserts that its
military actions are legitimate, they would move beyond the expected legal and
factual claims that the state conformed to the requirements of international law.
Through the employment of various accountability measures and the initiation of
formal investigative processes, Israel appealed to informal complementarity and
the obligation to investigate.
The series of Israeli reports, disseminated following the Gaza wars, chronicle
what is characterised here as a proleptic show trial. Informal appeals to
complementarity were woven throughout Israel’s various diplomatic interactions,
domestic investigations and commissions, and documented within the series of
reports that followed the succession of wars in Gaza. Commonly, the proleptic
show trial features four phases of engagement that purport legal compliance,
advocate for broad and permissive interpretations of various provisions of IHL,
and document investigative initiatives. Within the first stage of the proleptic
show trial, the state establishes its legal capacity and esteem. Next, it asserts
standing. Thirdly, the state conducts and conveys general investigations into the
legality of its conduct. And, finally, it performs and then disseminates the results
of individual criminal proceedings. These described forms of legal engagement
overlap. They are not linear and often conflate the formal distinction between
individual criminal responsibility and the non-criminal liability of states for
violations of IHL. Collectively, though, these diverse, multifaceted and informal
forms of engagement seek to achieve didactic purposes, establish a narrative of
legal compliance and substantiate associated claims of legitimacy.
B

Establishing Legal Capability and Esteem

The proleptic show trial begins abstractly. During the first phase of
engagement, the state demonstrates the capacity, independence and esteem of its
domestic legal system. These efforts recall the Israeli official who, following the
230 For Israel, these efforts were initially premised around the notion of self-defence and framed

in accordance with international efforts to combat terrorism. See Israel Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, ‘Responding to Hamas Attacks from Gaza — Issues of Proportionality’
(Background
Paper,
29
December
2008)
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/state/law/pages/responding%20to%20hamas%20att
acks%20from%20gaza%20-%20issues%20of%20proportionality%20%20march%202008.aspx>; Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 14 [38], 26–7 [69]–[70].
In contrast, the PA’s position was framed around the notion of belligerent occupation and
sought to accentuate the obligations and requisite legal framework placed upon Israel, the
occupying power, under The Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention IV. See
Negotiations Affairs Department, Palestine Liberation Organization, ‘Gaza: Occupation by
Siege’, above n 216; Negotiations Affairs Department, Palestinian Liberation Organization,
‘Dr Erekat Condemns “the Savage Israeli Assault on the Gaza Strip”’, above n 216. See also
Geneva Convention IV arts 47–78.
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Palestinian petition to the ICC, did not refer to a specific investigation or
prosecution but instead expressed a willingness to ‘show the court at the Hague
how serious, professional and independent the Israeli legal system is’.231 This
does not allude to complementarity’s formal focus. It does not claim that the
state has initiated criminal proceedings against an individual accused of violating
ICL. Instead, it provides a declaration of capacity. This initial phase of
engagement is broad. It speaks generally, to the international community, of the
state’s willingness to ensure accountability. Additionally, it attempts to influence
the ICC’s preliminary investigation. This may consider general questions of
domestic judicial competence.232 When the Prosecutor initiates proceedings, she
will often begin by examining an ‘entire situation’ before identifying specific
cases for direct scrutiny and potential prosecution. 233
In addition to the admissibility requirements contained within art 17 of the
Rome Statute, the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence encourage states to
demonstrate that their national courts meet internationally recognised standards
for independence and impartiality. 234 Commenting on the strength of Israel’s
legal system, Alan Baker, a former Israeli diplomat, veteran negotiator and
member of Israel’s delegation to the Rome Conference, asserts:
this is a fact. If a delegation or the Prosecutor of the ICC comes to Israel to talk
and to present the ICC, then clearly it is in Israel’s interest to impress upon the
delegation the fact that Israel has a very advanced legal system … Israel has an
interest in telling the world — whether it is the ICC, or the UN, or Goldstone —
that Israel has an advanced legal system in its army and therefore investigates
anytime there is a need to investigate.235
231 Ravid, ‘Netanyahu Weighs International Criminal Court’, above n 8.
232 Asked whether investigations conducted within the Israeli army itself will be considered as

fulfilling the complimentary requirement, Fatou Bensouda replied:
During the course of this preliminary examination, any information given by the
Israel and Palestinian governments related to complementarity efforts will be
evaluated in order to determine whether national investigations and prosecutions are
genuine, and bearing in mind the Office’s policy of focusing investigative efforts on
those most responsible for the most serious crimes. The Office will also consider
information gathered from other reliable sources, as well as open sources, in
assessing complementarity.
Quoted in Aeyal Gross, ‘ICC Prosecutor: Low-Ranking Israeli Soldiers, as well as
Palestinians, Could Be Prosecuted for War Crimes’, Haaretz (online), 1 May 2015
<https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-icc-prosecutor-low-ranking-idf-soldiers-palestinianscould-be-prosecuted-1.5357334> archived at <https://perma.cc/NN6Q-GJBR>. See also
Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, ‘Policy Paper on Preliminary
Examinations’ (Policy Paper, November 2013) 12 <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otppolicy_paper_preliminary_examinations_2013-eng.pdf>
archived
at
<https://perma.cc/LGW4-7TA5>; Stigen, above n 14, 88.
233 See Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, ‘The Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the
Situation in Palestine’, above n 1. The distinction between situations and cases is intended to
provide the Court with independence so as it can identify cases that merit prosecution
following the referral of a general situation by the Security Council. See Stigen, above n 14,
91–2.
234 See International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Doc No ICC-ASP/1/3
(adopted 9 September 2002) r 51 (‘ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence’). Jo Stigen notes
that ‘[t]he question as to which weight should be placed upon such general information
remains, however, highly discretional’. See Stigen, above n 14, 131.
235 Interview with Ambassador Alan Baker (Jerusalem and Toronto, 19 March 2017).
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Israel began responding to claims that it had violated international law during
the Gaza wars by describing its national legal capacity and the esteem of its
domestic legal system. The series of reports disseminated following the 2008–09
war exhibited this first phase of engagement with informal complementarity.
Between the conclusion of Operation Cast Lead and the publication of Israel’s
principal report into the ‘factual and legal aspects’ of the war, the National Court
of Spain had declined to prosecute the Israeli officials accused of war crimes
during the targeted killing of Salah Shehadeh. 236 Israel referenced the Court’s
decision to substantiate the claim that it is capable and ‘committed to fully
investigating alleged violations of Israel’s legal obligations’.237 The report
accentuated that the Criminal Chamber of the (Spanish) National Court had
emphasised Israel’s ability to fully and fairly investigate the charges itself. It held
that Israeli procedures and decisions with regard to the legality of preventive
strikes under international law, and the military, civilian and judicial review in
Israel of the Shehadeh incident, comport with the principle of complementarity, as
the State of Israel is a democratic country where the rule of law applies.238

The series of reports disseminated following the Gaza wars further exhibit this
first phase of engagement. Each report dedicates substantial space to detail the
function of Israel’s various accountability measures — both military and civilian
— and favourably compares these procedures with those of other states.239 Israel
acknowledged that ‘all allegations regarding violations of international law in
Gaza by any party, for which there is reliable information, must be thoroughly
investigated, and where appropriate, prosecuted’.240 The reports provide
accounts of the investigative processes. These include IDF field investigations,
review by the MAG and the Attorney-General and appeal to the Supreme Court.
Independence is accentuated.241 These claims intend to demonstrate legitimacy
of process. They claim that domestic legal and investigatory systems are capable
of providing redress and preventing impunity, that they meet or exceed
international standards and that ‘Israel does not shy away from investigating its
operations, or from filing criminal complaints where they are warranted’.242
Legitimacy is derived from the assertion that the state is both able and willing
to investigate allegations of international legal violations. It trades upon the
democratic credentials of the state, its commitment to the rule of law and the
professional esteem of its judiciary. Though investigative willingness is initially
presented abstractly, it facilitates pre-emptive appeals to the principle of
complementarity. Following Operation Protective Edge in 2014, Israel’s
references to domestic capacity drew upon the Second Turkel Commission
236
237
238
239

See Weill, above n 191, 631.
Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 107 [283].
Ibid [306].
For example, Israel’s primary report following the 2008–09 war provided a detailed
comparison between the Israeli system and its US and British counterparts. See ibid [307]–
[311].
240 Ibid [312].
241 Ibid [312]–[445]. See Follow-Up to the Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission
on the Gaza Conflict — Report of the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, 64th sess, Agenda
Item 64, UN Doc A/64/651 (4 February 2010) annex I (‘Gaza Operation Investigations: An
Update’) 7, 10, 31–7.
242 Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 107 [283], 157 [451].

122

Report.243 The Commission was formed following the 2010 naval raid of the
Mavi Marmara which, alongside five other ships, attempted to breach Israel’s
blockade of Gaza.244 Mandated to investigate the legality of the flotilla raid and
the maritime blockade, the Commission was further tasked with assessing
Israel’s mechanisms for evaluating complaints and alleged violations of IHL. 245
When Israel sought to reaffirm its investigative capacity, it offered the
endorsement of the Turkel Commission. This was presented as evidence of the
comprehensiveness of Israel’s domestic investigative and accountability
mechanisms and the favourable standing of these procedures in comparison to
several western, democratic nations. 246 This further facilitated efforts to establish
the legitimacy of process. Mandelblit, the MAG, described the report’s strategic
importance as a means of substantiating Israel’s assertions of operational
legitimacy and as providing evidence of and support to claims that under the
complementarity regime Israel is capable of satisfying its legal obligations:
The report thus has tremendous significance for strengthening Israel’s image
around the world. It has an important role to play in Israel’s battle for legitimacy,
which has been unjustly impugned over the past decade. It is also a significant
step in eliminating the international community’s doubts about the credibility of
the Israeli judicial system and its ability to investigate complaints and allegations
of violations of the laws of war.247

Israel asserted that it possesses a respected and internationally endorsed legal
system that exhibits the requisite values of ‘independence, impartiality,

243 See, eg, 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, above n 53, 218–19 [410]–[411]. See also Second

Turkel Commission Report, above n 37.
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International Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law,
Including International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, Resulting from the
Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian Assistance, 15th sess, Agenda
Item 1, UN Doc A/HRC/15/21 (27 September 2010).
245 See First Turkel Report, above n 53, 17 [4]. Alongside its initial mandate, the Commission
was also asked to examine
the question whether the examination and investigation process for complaints and
allegations raised with regard to violations of the law of combat, as generally
practiced in Israel and as implemented with regard to the incident under
consideration, is consistent with the obligations of the State of Israel pursuant to the
rules of international law.
At 17 [4], quoting Resolution 1796 of the 32nd Government: ‘Appointment of an Independent
Public Commission, Chaired by the Supreme Court Judge (ret), Jacob Turkel, to Examine
the Maritime Incident of May 31, 2010’ (Israel) 14 June 2010, art 5. See also Second Turkel
Commission Report, above n 37, [1]–[2].
246 Israel’s primary report following the 2014 Gaza war made explicit reference to the findings
of the Turkel Commission. See 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, above n 53, 218 [410].
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effectiveness, thoroughness, and promptness’.248 It claimed it is capable of
fulfilling the requirements of the state’s investigatory obligations. 249 This
encouraged Prime Minister Netanyahu to respond to the ICC preliminary inquiry
by appealing to complementarity and citing Israel’s investigative capacity and
the esteem of its legal system. The Prime Minister stated:
It’s absurd for the ICC to go after Israel, which upholds the highest standards of
international law … Our actions are subject to the constant and careful review of
Israel’s world-renowned and utterly independent legal system. 250

The Prime Minister’s remarks capture both the traditional state approach of
asserting legal fidelity and novel appeals to the legitimising potential of
investigation.
C

Asserting Appropriateness and Standing

Upon establishing an abstract capacity to ensure legal accountability, the
second phase of the proleptic show trial makes a specific claim of
appropriateness and standing. Various legal and diplomatic engagements frame
complementarity and the obligation to investigate non-criminal violations of IHL
as a state right or prerogative. These efforts are, of course, consistent with
traditional understandings of international law, sovereignty and the drafting
history of the Rome Statute. Equally, these do not deny that complementarity or
investigative requirements are understood as obligations. Instead, they serve to
accentuate the appropriateness and primacy of the state’s jurisdiction. 251
Following Operations Cast Lead and Protective Edge, Israel expressed
willingness to investigate incidents in which the IDF were accused of violating
international law. 252 The series of Israeli reports, however, premised this
willingness on the proposition that ‘[u]nder international law, the responsibility
to investigate and prosecute alleged violations of the Law of Armed Conflict by
a state’s military forces falls first and foremost to that state’.253
Israeli appeals to the appropriateness of domestic jurisdiction allude to the
principle of complementarity. The first Israeli update report — which provides
accounts of individual investigations and criminal proceedings conducted
248 Independence, impartiality, thoroughness, promptness and effectiveness are ‘universal
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following Operation Cast Lead — cites an ICC expert paper. This defines and
explains complementarity as establishing that ‘[s]tates have the first
responsibility and right to prosecute international crimes’. 254 These appeals to
informal complementarity are again presented in the abstract. They serve to
assert the legitimacy of domestic jurisdiction, presented as capable within the
first phase of engagement, and now offered as the appropriate means of
assessment. This subtly shifts complementarity’s emphasis from structuring a codependent relationship between the ICC and national courts to confirming the
primacy of domestic jurisdiction.
Appeals to informal complementarity attempt to establish the legitimacy of
state actions. Pleas to the appropriateness of domestic jurisdiction ensure that
legitimising assessments of state behaviour occur at the (preferential) national
level. Following Operation Cast Lead, the rhetoric that accompanied Israel’s
investigative efforts equated complementarity with the prominence of national
proceedings:
The international community and national fora must respect and support national
investigations currently in progress in Israel. To the extent that external
organisations have gathered information related to the Gaza Operation, in the
interest of justice, they should provide the information and any evidence on which
it is based to Israel to facilitate those investigations. This is the essence of the
principle of complementarity. 255

The Second Turkel Commission Report accentuates the appropriateness of
domestic jurisdiction. 256 The view that complementarity elevates the standing of
domestic legal systems draws upon the principle’s association with sovereignty.
The ICC was established amidst the widespread reluctance of states to relinquish
their prerogative over criminal jurisdiction. 257 Complementarity, in part,
appeased state concerns. It was presented to ensure that states would retain
‘investigative and prosecutorial priority’. 258 Thus, when a state pre-emptively
appeals to complementarity and frames complementarity as conveying an
investigative prerogative, it draws upon this formative conception. Made within
the proleptic show trial, however, recourse to informal complementarity claims
standing and facilitates subsequent efforts to establish the legitimacy of process
and of substance.
Assertions of complementarity — which prioritise domestic jurisdiction —
often blur measures intended to address individual criminal liability with those
that pursue collective state responsibility. By framing complementarity and
investigative obligations as a prerogative, the state may broaden
complementarity’s formal focus on domestic criminal proceedings to include
general national investigations, commissions of inquiry or fact-finding missions.
These serve, principally, to assess the overall legality of the military action or
254
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use of force. The facilitating language of complementarity is employed to
establish a forum in which broadly conceived investigations may be conducted,
where legality is assessed and through which legitimacy may be purported.
D

Development of a Legal Narrative through General Investigations of State
Conduct

Establishment of the state’s capacity and prerogative to investigate facilitates
the third phase of the proleptic show trial. In this phase, the state addresses the
merits of its military operation. In anticipation of condemnation, it assesses the
legality of its actions and policies. It conducts and publicises the results of
general investigations or commissions of inquiry. These are offered in
satisfaction of the complementarity principle. This, purportedly, renders
international scrutiny unnecessary. Appeals to informal complementarity
recognise that, most often, states face broad accusations of legal violations.
Within the public sphere, these accusations rarely differentiate between
individual and state responsibilities. In response, the state builds upon the esteem
of its domestic legal system to address accusations that its actions or policies are
themselves illegal or illegitimate.
The investigative process exhibits characteristics of a show trial. 259 General
investigations enable efforts to frame the conflict. They attempt to achieve preordained and didactic purposes by showing a greater ‘truth’ and developing a
legal narrative that purports investigative willingness, compliance and
legitimacy. Following the Gaza wars, Israel’s response to the mounting
accusations of legal wrongdoing built upon the experiences of Lebanon. Israeli
officials recognised that by conducting investigations they may appeal to
complementarity and substantiate claims of legal compliance. Motivated by
international law’s perceived prominence and its ability to convey legitimacy,
unprecedented resources ensured a thorough level of legal engagement both
during and after Operation Cast Lead.260 Six years later, following the ICC
Prosecutor’s commencement of a preliminary examination, Israel’s State
Comptroller, Joseph Haim Shapira, announced a broad inquiry into Israel’s
conduct during the 2014 war. He coupled this announcement with the claim that:
According to principles of international law when a State exercises its authority to
objectively investigate accusations regarding violations of the laws of armed
conflict, this will preclude examination of said accusations by external
international tribunals (such as the International Criminal Court in The Hague).261

259 Jeremy Peterson argues that a show trial is defined by the presence of two related elements.
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260 Weizman, above n 196, 90. See generally Amichai Cohen, above n 177, 367.
261 State Comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel, ‘The State Comptroller Investigation of
Operation Tzuk Eitan — Protective’ (Press Release, 20 January 2015)
<http://www.mevaker.gov.il/(X(1)S(loetsz0npwuzelkraw3ut1ok))/he/publication/Articles/Pa
ges/2015.1.20-Tzuk-EItan.aspx?AspxAutoDet
ectCookieSupport=1>
archived
at
<https://perma.cc/4DKD-DZMK>. See also Kershner, above n 250.

126

The State Comptroller responded directly to the ICC announcement. The
proposed investigation sought to insulate the State from formal international
scrutiny. Israel, however, had begun investigating its conduct and establishing a
narrative of legal compliance and legitimacy while still in theatre. Writing after
Operation Protective Edge, Sharvit Baruch discussed the difficulty of
substantiating claims that a particular use of force was in fact legal. To address
this challenge, Sharvit Baruch described the importance of expeditious
investigation — of documenting events, attaining relevant testimonies and
compiling photographic evidence that illustrates adherence to requisite legal
principles. 262 Through the series of reports disseminated following the Gaza
wars, Israel presented its investigative initiatives as inferring legitimacy of
process. Many of the investigations detailed within these reports prioritise
assessments of state responsibility above questions of individual criminal
liability. While this stage of engagement demonstrates investigative willingness,
these investigations primarily evaluate state conduct. They provide a platform to
advocate in favour of permissive interpretations of foundational legal principles.
They detail Israel’s investigative efforts and processes. And, collectively, they
present a narrative, crafted in an international legal vernacular, of the state’s
military operation that substantiates claims to legitimacy of substance.
Israel’s investigative willingness — as well as its assessments of the cause
and conduct of each war — was framed within a compelling defensive context.
As with the jus ad bellum-based arguments that accompanied Israel’s decisions
to use force in 1948 and 1967, each report is framed around the threat posed by
the rocket and mortar attacks emanating from Gaza. Following Operation Cast
Lead, Israel asserted:
For eight years, Hamas, a terrorist organisation avowedly dedicated to the
destruction of Israel, has launched deliberate attacks on Israeli civilians, from
suicide bombings to incessant mortar and rocket attacks. Since October 2000,
Hamas and other terrorist organisations unleashed more than 12,000 rockets and
mortar rounds from the Gaza Strip at towns in Southern Israel. Even though Israel
withdrew from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, the attacks continued. Even though
Israel made repeated diplomatic efforts, including appeals to the UN Security
Council, to end the violence, the attacks continued. The death, injuries and — as
Hamas intended — terror among the civilian population, including children, were
intolerable, particularly as Hamas increased the range and destructiveness of its
attacks.263

In response to constant peril, Israel justified its decision to use force through
the language of the UN Charter. Post-conflict legal engagements were premised
on the position that military action was necessary, that it constituted selfdefense.264 Investigations of military actions remained mindful of this context.
They were evaluated alongside a narrative of defence against a persistent,

262 Sharvit Baruch, above n 190, 66.
263 Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 5 [15]. The primary Israeli report following

Operation Protective Edge contained detailed accounts and documentations of Hamas’
operations, chronicling the impact of rocket attacks in southern Israel. See 2014 Gaza
Conflict Report, above n 53, 58–136 [107]–[230].
264 See, eg, Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 1 [3], 5 [16], 26 [68].
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asymmetrical, campaign of terror.265 Legal evaluations were to acknowledge, as
Israel claimed, that
Hamas’ cynical choice of tactics — including the unlawful strategy of
deliberately shielding their operatives and munitions in civilian buildings and
protected sites — made difficult, complex and hazardous battlefield decisions by
IDF even more difficult, more complex, and more hazardous.266

Despite the appeal of defensive necessity, Israel recognised that the
implications of these decisions evoked international condemnation and presented
challenges to the legitimacy of its military operations. 267 In acknowledgment,
Israel’s investigative efforts moved beyond well-received articulations of selfdefence. They assessed the state’s conduct upon the use of force.268
The Israeli reports, and the results of the various investigations, were in part a
response to the demands of the international community. 269 Following both the
2008–09 and 2014 Gaza wars, Israel expressed willingness to investigate any
credible allegation of legal wrongdoing. 270 When Operation Cast Lead
concluded, the IDF initiated field investigations into allegations that it had
violated IHL. The MAG and the Attorney-General were tasked with evaluating
the findings of these inquiries.271 After its initial response, the IDF conducted an
overarching examination of its conduct during Operation Cast Lead. This was
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said to emanate from, and satisfy, the IDF’s ‘professional, moral and legal’
obligations to thoroughly investigate its conduct during the 2008–09 war.272
In accompaniment of Operation Protective Edge, Israel launched three
inquiries to investigate the campaign’s conformity with international law. The
first began during the conflict. Upon the initiative of the IDF Chief of General
Staff, a fact-finding assessment mechanism was established to investigate
‘Exceptional Incidents’.273 This prompt expression of investigative willingness
was promoted as evidence of the IDF’s commitment to the rule of law and to the
requirements of international law. 274 In the months following the cessation of
hostilities, along with the State Comptroller investigation, the Knesset’s Foreign
Affairs and Defense Committee launched an inquiry into Protective Edge. 275
By conducting and publicising investigations, the state gains an opportunity to
advocate for (and apply) broad and permissive interpretations of IHL. During
this phase of engagement, as the state moves from abstract pronouncements to
specific analysis, it attempts to influence evaluative legal standards. This recalls
Joseph Nye’s description of soft power. Within, states attempt to shape
international rules in accordance with their own interests, so that their actions
appear more legitimate to external observers. 276 Incident-specific investigations
appealing to the principle of complementarity, employ permissively interpreted
standards of legal compliance to reach an advantageous determination and
exhibit legitimacy of both process and substance.
Addressing the source of much of the condemnation it faced following
Operation Cast Lead, Israel referenced the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) and argued, ‘[t]he fact of civilian casualties in
an armed conflict, even in significant numbers, does not in and of itself establish
any violation of international law’. 277 Constitutive principles like distinction and
proportionality were understood within Israel’s diplomatic communications as
broad and permissive. They were interpreted to provide the state significant
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operational latitude.278 These readings of international law became the evaluative
standards that Israel applied to assess its actions in theatre.
Didactic and procedural investigative objectives merged within the conveyed
assessments of IDF conduct. During the third phase of engagement, the state
investigates the factual and legal aspects of controversial incidents. The resulting
assessments, however, focus on the legality of state policy. Accordingly, in the
maiden hours of Operation Cast Lead, Israel launched several strikes against
police facilities throughout Gaza.279 These resulted in numerous casualties, a
torrent of international condemnation and competing discourses regarding the
legitimacy of the IDF’s targeting determinations.280 Following the strikes, an
IDF spokesperson noted that targeting decisions are made on the presumption
that anyone involved with terrorism and in Hamas constitutes a valid target.281 In
reply, Human Rights Watch asserted that, in accordance with IHL, police and
police infrastructure are presumptively civilian. They maintain this status
throughout hostilities unless members of the police forces become direct

278 The 2009 report, following Operation Cast Lead, addressed both the principles of distinction
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participants in the armed conflict.282 The Goldstone Report determined that the
Gazan police maintained their status as a civilian law enforcement agency. It
found that many of those killed in the Israeli attacks were not participating in
hostilities and thus did not forfeit their civilian status.283 Israel’s actions, at the
commencement of Cast Lead, were labelled a violation of IHL.
The legitimacy and legality of Israel’s operation had been challenged. In
response, Israel conveyed the results of its investigation into these (and other)
incidents. The ensuing discourse attempted to influence the factual and the legal.
Despite the potential for individual criminal liability, these investigations
assessed Israel’s targeting determination policy. First, Israel framed its military
action within the established narrative of avowedly defensive objectives. The
operation was presented as a necessary means of reducing Hamas’ terrorist
capability. 284 Numerous factual assertions were offered in substantiation of
Israel’s claim that the Gazan police forces served a military function. 285 Next,
Israel communicated the process of its investigative efforts. The requisite —
albeit broadly interpreted — legal framework was applied to adjudge legality and
assess legitimacy. Legal norms like distinction and proportionality, interpreted
abstractly, now provided evaluative standards of self-assessment. The
investigation found that while members of a solely civilian police force are
immune from attack, this principle does not apply where the police are part of an
armed party. 286 Within these circumstances, police forces constitute a legitimate
military target.287
Israel further evaluated its targeting decisions in accordance with the principle
of distinction. Israel had called for a permissive reading of distinction. This held
the foundational humanitarian principle to address only the deliberate targeting
of civilians and not incidental harm incurred in the course of striking a legitimate
military target.288 This reading provided Israel with an advantageously
interpreted legal framework, under which incident-specific evaluations were
282 See Human Rights Watch, ‘Israel/Gaza: Civilians Must Not Be Targets’, above n 280. See
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rendered. These substantiated traditional claims of legal fidelity. However, they
also allowed Israel to demonstrate that it investigated allegations of legal
violations, that it adhered to the required processes that the international
community demanded. Investigative willingness entered the well-established
patterns of argumentation that have long accompanied the use of force.
Demonstration of such willingness allowed the state to claim compliance, to
further its legal argument and ultimately to assert legitimacy.
Israel disseminated the results of its investigations. Amalgamated factual and
legal arguments purportedly conveyed legitimacy of process and substance.
Upon review, the MAG found that the strike against police stations in alSajaiyeh and Deir al-Balah adhered to the principle of distinction. 289 The stations
constituted legitimate military targets. The policy that identified these targets
was deemed consistent with international law. The station in Deir al-Balah was
designated as part of Hamas’ ‘internal security’ apparatus and said to be
occupied by armed operatives. The attack was found to have served a legitimate
objective by ‘substantially weakening the military force available to Hamas’.290
Despite the professed legality of the attack, a number of civilians had been killed
while shopping at a nearby market.291 The MAG investigation concluded,
however, that the IAF was not aware of the market’s existence. It could not have
planned the attack to avoid the resulting casualties. Therefore, it did not violate
the principle of distinction by intentionally targeting those civilians in the
vicinity of the attack.292
The investigation demonstrated the purported legitimacy of Israel’s targeting
policy. It contributed to a general narrative of legal conformity and engagement.
Israel was credited for having employed measures to minimise collateral
damage. 293 It had performed investigations into the incident and found that the
IDF’s actions were in conformity with the requirements of IHL. The perceived
benefit of these general, state-centric, investigative initiatives is multifaceted.
They provide a platform upon which the state may present, uninterrupted, its
narrative or theory of the case. The state gains an opportunity to advocate for,
and then apply, permissive interpretations of legal provisions like distinction or
proportionality. By engaging in this process, appealing to these investigative
requirements, the state may illustrate legal compliance of both process and
substance. Although these legal engagements did not fully moderate the
condemnation Israel faced following both Gaza wars, they facilitated efforts to
generate legitimacy.
Following the investigations into the incidents in al-Sajaiyeh and Deir alBalah, the MAG declined to recommend assessment for individual criminal
liability. During Operation Protective Edge and under the direction of Major
General Danny Efroni, who served as MAG from 2011–15, Israel employed
near-immediate investigations following contentious incidents. These, claimed
289 Gaza Operation Investigations: Second Update, UN Doc A/64/890, annex I 23–4 [79]–[82].
290 Ibid 24 [83].
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Efroni, would ensure the rule of law while also reducing international pressure
and thwarting legal measures against the IDF abroad. 294 The third phase of legal
engagement is primarily focused on state behaviour and assesses military
decisions and policies central to the controversy that accompanies the use of
force. Often, these find that a particular incident, in which these policies are
exercised, does not require further criminal assessment.295 Efroni’s statement,
however, is illustrative of a dual focus. Despite recognising complementarity’s
potential to legitimise Israel’s conduct during the Gaza wars, appeals to this
principle are not completely separate from complementarity’s formal purpose.
When criminal proceedings are deemed necessary, the final phase of the
proleptic show trial exhibits the state’s willingness to employ these proceedings
in direct appeal to the principle of complementarity.
E

The Employment of Individual Criminal Proceedings

The incident-specific assessments featured within the third phase of the
proleptic show trial serve a subsidiary purpose. Despite pleas to
complementarity’s implied ability to legitimise general state conduct, appeals to
this principle are not made in isolation of its formal purpose. As illustrated by the
al-Sajaiyeh and Deir al-Balah cases, these investigations prioritise assessments of
state policy. Upon completion, however, general investigations will also assess
whether additional criminal proceedings are necessary. Often, the incidentspecific investigations displayed during the third phase substantiate claims that
individual criminal proceedings are unwarranted. The fourth and final phase of
the proleptic show trial, nevertheless, exhibits the state’s willingness to
investigate individual criminal liability, and when deemed appropriate, prosecute
individuals accused of violating international law.
The state (or military) may pursue these investigations in good-faith and for
various reasons. 296 Within the proleptic show trial, however, these investigations
are presented collectively. They illustrate the willingness of the state to
investigate allegations of individual misconduct. These efforts are presented in
satisfaction of complementarity. Incident-specific investigations and, if
necessary, criminal proceedings convey a willingness to consider whether an
individual violation occurred. They purport evidence of accountability. And they
claim to display adherence to the purposes of the complementarity regime. These
investigations differentiate illegitimate individual actions from state policy and
from the — professedly legitimate — domestic framework that governs the
conduct of hostilities. They are likely to occur well before the formal attention of
the ICC. Offered collectively, within the proleptic show trial, these appeals to

294 Harel, ‘Preempting The Hague’, above n 40. See also Gili Cohen, ‘Israeli Reservists
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Vos
Iz
Neias?
(online),
19
February
2015
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295 Nye Jr, above n 276, 10.
296 Hampson, above n 10, 3.
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and examples of the state’s willingness to investigate and prosecute cases again
present as legitimacy of process and of substance.
Israel, as with many states, has rejected abstract calls for members of its
military to be prosecuted before international tribunals. Prime Minister
Netanyahu, following the PA’s accession to the Rome Statute, vowed to his
Cabinet that ‘[w]e will not allow Israeli soldiers and officers to be dragged to
[the International Criminal Court in] The Hague’. 297 Ehud Olmert, who served as
Prime Minister during Operation Cast Lead, stated that
[t]he soldiers and commanders who were sent on missions in Gaza must know
that they are safe from various tribunals and that the State of Israel will assist
them on this issue and defend them just as they [boldly] defended us during
Operation Cast Lead.298

Israeli officials have of course, recognised the importance of individual
prosecutions as a means of ensuring domestic accountability, discipline and
structure within the IDF. 299 Additionally, however, officials acknowledge that
such prosecutions generate legitimacy and enable appeals to the principle of
complementarity. This recalls Sharvit Baruch’s claim that to rely upon
complementarity and confront both allegations in the international arena and
potential criminal proceedings, Israel should employ independent investigations
that will receive international legitimacy. 300 The Turkel Commission sought to
facilitate these efforts.301 It recognised the importance of legislative readiness in
ensuring that a state possesses the required legal framework to ‘investigate and
prosecute individuals for the offenses set out in the Rome Statute’.302
Israel presented its post-conflict investigative efforts as in accordance with
international obligations.303 Following Operation Cast Lead, Israel asserted that
its ‘legal and judicial apparatus is fully equipped and motivated to address
alleged violations of national or international law by its commanders and
soldiers.’304 Investigations were conducted by the Military Police Criminal
297 Daniella Peled, ‘How Israel Stands to Lose at the ICC, without a Single Trial Taking Place’,
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Haaretz (online), 6 January 2015 <http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.635650>
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Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Cabinet Communique’ (Communiqué, 25 January 2009)
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2009/pages/Cabinet_communique_25-jan2009.aspx>. See also Human Rights Watch, Turning a Blind Eye: Impunity for Laws-of-War
Violations during the Gaza War (Report, April 2010) 22 (‘Turning a Blind Eye’).
Harel, ‘Preempting The Hague’, above n 40. Decisions to investigate and efforts to
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relation to the events related to conduct of Operation Protective Edge. See, eg, Yonah
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Harel, ‘Preempting The Hague’, above n 40.
Second Turkel Commission Report, above n 37, 162 [8]. The Turkel Commission noted that
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its own nationals, should that be necessary, served as a catalyst for amendment and
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of armed conflict’.
See, eg, Gaza Operation Investigations: An Update, UN Doc A/64/651, annex I 38 [91].
Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 107 [284].
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Investigation Division (‘MPCID’), the MAG and the Military Courts.305 The
scope of these investigations was considerable. They included legal assessments
of numerous incidents that had evoked concern amongst international
observers.306 Israel’s post-conflict accountability efforts supplemented the
incident-specific investigations of state policy with assessments of individual
criminal liability. When the war concluded and attention shifted to the diplomatic
sphere, Israel conveyed the results of these inquiries. Many of the incident
specific investigations, featured during the third phase of engagement, did not
find a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. These cases were closed. 307
A number of investigations into high-profile incidents that occurred during
Operation Cast Lead were dismissed as intelligence failures that did not entail
individual (or state) responsibility. 308
The permissive interpretations of legal standards like proportionality and
distinction — for which Israel had advocated — were initially applied to assess
state conduct. Now they would determine individual criminal liability. 309 A
series of 90 command-level investigations evaluated incidents that resulted in
civilian injuries, fatalities and the destruction of property. These investigations
were premised on the view that ‘injuries to civilians and damage to civilian
property during hostilities do not, in themselves, provide grounds for opening a
criminal investigation into potential violations of the Law of Armed Conflict’.310
In cases where investigations found that international law had been breached,
such breaches also constituted violations of the IDF’s rules of engagement. 311 In
one incident ‘a Brigadier General and a Colonel had authorized the firing of

305 Ibid 108 [286].
306 Following Operation Cast Lead, five broad categories of alleged violations, encompassing
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thirty individual incidents, were initially investigated under the direction of Lieutenant
General Gabi Ashkenazi, the IDF’s Chief of General Staff. These addressed:
Claims regarding incidents where UN and international facilities were fired upon and
damaged during the Gaza Operation; Incidents involving shooting at medical
facilities, buildings, vehicles and crews; Claims regarding incidents in which
civilians not directly participating in the hostilities were harmed; The use of
weaponry containing phosphorous; and Destruction of private property and
infrastructure by ground forces.
Ibid 119 [318].
See, eg, 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, above n 53, 236 [455].
For example, an investigation into an operation targeting a weapons storage facility that
resulted in civilian deaths found that the IDF had mistakenly targeted the home of the AlDaya family rather than the neighbouring building. In another incident under consideration,
the update report described an incident where the lead car of a UNRWA convoy was fired
upon. The report noted, however, that the investigation revealed that this was due to a
communications error and found no legal responsibility under IHL/ICL. Gaza Operation
Investigations: An Update, UN Doc A/64/651, annex I 42 [99].
See Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 35–42 [90]–[91], 36–42 [94]–[115]; 2014 Gaza
Conflict Report, above n 53, 186 [332].
Gaza Operation Investigations: An Update, UN Doc A/64/651, annex I 48 [129]. See also
Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 118 [315].
See, eg, Gaza Operation Investigations: An Update, UN Doc A/64/651, annex I 42 [100].
See also Cohen and Shany, above n 14, 55.
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explosive shells which landed in a populated area’. 312 This was held to be a
violation of IDF orders limiting the use of artillery fire in such areas. 313
Similar patterns emerged following Operation Protective Edge. Upon the
recommendation of the Turkel Commission, the fact-finding assessment
mechanism provided the MAG with information that would be used to determine
whether reasonable grounds existed to begin a criminal investigation. 314 The
principal Israeli report noted the significant number of complaints that Israel had
received and was reviewing following the war. 315 126 incidents were under
consideration by March 2015.316 General investigations of state conduct gave
way to specific investigations that would determine whether a particular incident
entailed criminal liability. Assessments were rendered as to whether accused
individuals adhered to a standard of reasonableness. The Israeli position held
that:
Rooted in the idea of the ‘reasonable commander’, the legal analysis is focused on
circumstances at the time of the incident, in light of information that was known
to the commander (or should have been known). Thus, for example, targeting
decisions that result in civilian casualties do not, ipso facto, indicate a [criminal]
violation of the Law of Armed Conflict, whereas the deliberate targeting of
civilians would indicate such a violation. 317

Often, such investigations into high-profile events — those that elicited
significant international controversy — served to demonstrate legal compliance,
defuse state responsibility and generate legitimacy through their individual focus.
In one incident, a MAG investigation into an IDF strike that killed two
caregivers at a centre for people with mental and physical disabilities in Beit
Lahiya found that the intelligence assessment did not produce evidence of a care
centre.318 Under the auspices of an investigative mechanism that was intended to
assess criminal liability, the Israeli investigation served a dual purpose.
Conveyed and disseminated through a post-conflict report, Israel could
312 Gaza Operation Investigations: An Update, UN Doc A/64/651, annex I 42 [100].
313 The report explains that in this case ‘[t]he Commander of the Southern Command
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disciplined the two officers for exceeding their authority in a manner that jeopardized the
lives of others’: ibid.
Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Commission, UN Doc
A/HRC/29/CRP.4, 164 [612]. See also Second Turkel Commission Report, above n 37, 425–
6 [8]–[9].
2014 Gaza Conflict Report, above n 53, 233 [448]. As noted in all Israeli reports,
investigations could (and commonly were) initiated followed any credible complaint from a
wide variety of sources that include Palestinian civilians, local or international nongovernmental organisations, UN bodies or agencies, in response to media reports, or on the
IDF’s own initiative. See, eg, Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32, 108 [288]; Gaza
Operation Investigations: An Update, UN Doc A/64/651, annex I 38–9 [91].
2014 Gaza Conflict Report, above n 53, 233 [449].
Ibid 234 [452].
Ibid 236 [456]. The strike was intended to target a weapons depot located inside the home of
a senior Hamas commander. The report explained:
According to the factual findings and material collected by the FFA Mechanism
[Fact Finding Assessment] and presented to the MAG, the strike was directed at a
weapons depot located inside the residential home of a senior Hamas commander, in
a building comprising four apartments. While the operating forces were aware of the
existence of a kindergarten in the same building, close to the weapons depot, there
was no information indicating the existence of a care centre.
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demonstrate that the incident had been investigated and that there was no
evidence of individual criminal liability. Israel could avail of an additional
platform to reiterate that its conduct and policy accorded with relevant legal
requirements:
the MAG found that the targeting process followed in this case accorded with
Israeli domestic law and international law requirements. The attack was directed
against a military objective, while adhering to the requirements of the principle of
proportionality, and the decision to attack was made by the authorities authorised
to do so. Further, the MAG found that the attack was carried out after a number of
precautions were undertaken intended to minimise the potential for civilian harm,
and that the professional assessment at the time of the attack — that civilians
would not be harmed as a result of the attack — was not unreasonable under the
circumstances. Although seemingly civilians were harmed as a result of the attack
— indeed a regrettable result — it does not affect its legality post facto.319

When investigators found that international law had been breached, that an
individual criminal offense had occurred, they did not question state policy or
action. Such cases were well-removed from the responsibilities of the state. They
were also few in number. After Operation Cast Lead, of the 36 criminal
investigations referenced in the first Israeli update report, only one led to
indictment, seven were dismissed due to a lack of evidence or inability to obtain
testimony and the remainder were in progress. 320 In totality, following the 2008–
09 Gaza war, Israel initiated approximately 400 investigations. From these, the
MAG commenced 52 criminal investigations. Two produced convictions — in
the first a soldier was sentenced to seven and a half months’ imprisonment for
the theft of a credit card, while in the other two soldiers were convicted of using
a child as a human shield and each received suspended sentences of three
months. 321
The post-conflict response to Operation Protective Edge drew upon a factfinding assessment mechanism. Resulting investigations into ‘exceptional
incidents’ allowed Israel to demonstrate adherence to a process that had been
endorsed by the Turkel Commission. Under the mechanism, Israel would first
investigate and document a particular event. This allowed for an assessment of
state conduct. On the basis of this investigation, however, Israel determined
319 Ibid.
320 See Gaza Operation Investigations: An Update, UN Doc A/64/651, annex I 43–6 [104]–

[120], [130], [131], [134], [137]. Following Operation Protective Edge, of the 126 incidents
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of cases the MAG had requested further information. A further 19 criminal investigations
were opened by the MAG. 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, above n 53, 233 [448]. The focus of
these investigations ranged from incidents of looting and obstruction of military
investigations to cases in which civilians had been killed: at 235–42 [453]–[457].
321 The results of these investigations were detailed in a report of the UN Committee of
Independent Experts that was formed to monitor Israeli and Palestinian efforts to implement
the recommendation of the Goldstone Report. See Mary McGowan Davis and Lennart
Aspegren, Report of the Committee of Independent Experts in International Humanitarian
and Human Rights Law Established Pursuant to Council Resolution 13/9, 16th sess, Agenda
Item 7, UN Doc A/HRC/16/24 (18 March 2011) [24], [30], [32] (‘McGowan Davis Report’).
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whether additional criminal investigation was necessary. 322 Regardless of the
assessment, this facilitated the claim that alleged breaches of international law
were investigated for criminal liability. The final MAG update report explained
that 190 incidents had been referred for investigation.323 Some remained pending
and many had been closed.324 In one incident, the MAG opened a criminal
investigation when two soldiers were accused of stealing NIS2420 from a home
in the Shuja’iyya neighbourhood of Gaza City. Three soldiers were indicted. 325
On 16 July 2014, four children were killed when playing on a beach near the
Gaza port. Ahed, Ismail, Mohamad and Zakaria Bakr were cousins. Two shells
from a naval vessel exploded as they ran along the shore of the Mediterranean. 326
The Israeli strike became one of the most controversial events of the war. The
UN Commission of Inquiry found ‘strong indications that the IDF failed in its
obligations to take all feasible measures to avoid or at least minimize incidental
harm to civilians’.327 The Israeli response coupled the traditional refrain of we
obey the law with the novel claim of we will investigate. Only hours after the
incident, an IDF spokesperson claimed the attack was against a ‘legitimate’
military target.328 Soon after, however, the IDF announced that it was
investigating the events.329
The incident was referred to the fact-finding assessment mechanism (‘FFA’)
for evaluation. The mechanism found reasonable grounds for suggesting that the
attack ‘was not carried out in accordance with the rules and procedures
applicable to IDF forces’. 330 In accordance, the MAG began a formal
investigation. 331 When the investigation was complete, the MAG found that
there was insufficient evidence that a criminal offence had occurred. The case
was closed. The MAG held that the IDF targeted an area known to be used by
322 Report
323

324

325
326

327
328
329

330
331

of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Commission, UN Doc
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Incidents — Update 4: Decisions of the IDF Military Advocate General’ (Press Release, 11
June
2015)
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Hamas naval forces and that was exclusively utilised by militants. A day earlier
the IDF had targeted a nearby site used to store military supplies. Intelligence
reports were said to show that Hamas planned to use this area to launch an attack
against Israel. Aerial surveillance identified four individuals running through the
site. It was unclear that they were children.332 The MAG found that the attack
was in accordance with Israel’s legal obligations. The decision to attack ‘was
aimed at figures who were understood to be militants from Hamas’ Naval
Forces, who had gathered in order to prepare to carry out military activities
against the IDF’. 333 The attack was not ‘expected to result in any collateral
damage to civilians or to civilian property’ and several precautionary measures
were taken.334
When Israel communicated the results of its investigation, it emphasised the
process used to reach its legal determination:
The investigation that was conducted was thorough and extensive. During the
investigation process testimony was collected from a large number of IDF
soldiers and officers who were involved in the planning and execution of the
attack. Additionally, an extensive number of documents relating to the attack
were reviewed, along with video footage documenting the attack in real time, as
well as media images and video footage which documented parts of the incident.
Moreover, MPCID investigators made efforts to collect the testimonies of Gaza
Strip residents who were, allegedly, witnesses to the incident. In this context, the
collection of testimony from three witnesses was coordinated. Regretfully, despite
the prior coordination, the witnesses eventually declined to meet with the MPCID
investigators, and instead provided affidavits in regard to the incident. 335

The Israeli response attempted to illustrate the legitimacy of its military action
and investigative processes. Each was intended to demonstrate the State’s
compliance with international law. 336 Following the 2008–09 and 2014 Gaza
wars, Israel partook in an international dialogue regarding the conflict and in
assessment of the use of force.337 It is of course not unusual that Israel defended
its military action, that it professed compliance with international law. Such
declarations of legal fidelity commonly accompany the use of force. They form
part of the conversation that follows conflict and attempts to justify state
violence. Now, however, the state is incentivised to cite complementarity. The
traditional post-conflict discourse increasingly includes assertions of legitimacy
that draws upon the state’s willingness to investigate.
V

CONCLUSION: THE UNCERTAIN EFFICACY AND INHERENT TENSION OF
INFORMAL COMPLEMENTARITY

The proleptic show trial is a metaphor. The phases of legal engagement
described throughout Part IV are not fixed. In practice, they do not follow a
linear progression and they continue to emerge and evolve. Certain features of
the proleptic show trial are formal. This includes professional investigations.
332
333
334
335
336
337
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Undertaken by the state, these may adhere to international standards and are
employed for various purposes. One such purpose, however, is to generate
legitimacy. This is the principal objective of the proleptic show trial, which
displays adherence to a process and contributes towards a narrative that
traditionally draws upon the justificatory tone of international law. 338 While the
outcome of a particular investigation may not be predetermined, it is weighted in
favour of the state. Investigations commonly substantiate claims of legal
adherence or distinguish between an overt violation and the state policy
governing the use of force. Within the proleptic show trial the state may
determine the appropriate standards of legal compliance and evaluate incidents
for conformity with these standards. The prosecutor becomes both the legislator
and the judge.
As such, many ardent critics remain unmoved by Israeli engagements with
international law. They receive accompanying appeals to complementarity with
scepticism. 339 Israel’s displays of investigative willingness — to the extent that
Israel sought to achieve didactic objectives and generate legitimacy — did,
however, experience qualified success. Israel received diminishing scrutiny
within limited but noteworthy circumstances. Significantly, Richard Goldstone
— the former South African judge and primary author of the report often placed
at the centre of the legal discourse and who arguably became the most highprofile critic of Israeli actions following the 2008–09 Gaza war340 — recanted
his most damaging accusation. Writing in The Washington Post, Goldstone
claimed: ‘If I had known what I know now, the Goldstone Report would have
been a different document’.341 He continued that at the time of writing, Israel had
conducted 400 investigations of operational misconduct while Hamas had
conducted none. Goldstone cited with approval comments from a UN expert
panel formed to oversee the implementation of his report. This, in part,
commended the Israeli investigations.342
Ultimately, Richard Goldstone reconsidered and disavowed his report’s
primary accusation, that Israel had intentionally targeted civilians. The former
judge noted the influence of the numerous investigations undertaken by Israel:
The allegations of intentionality by Israel were based on the deaths of and injuries
to civilians in situations where our fact-finding mission had no evidence on which
to draw any other reasonable conclusion. While the investigations published by
the Israeli military and recognized in the UN committee’s report have established
338 See, eg, Byers, War Law, above n 103, 3.
339 See Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Commission, UN Doc
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International Legitimacy and the Politics of Security, above n 98, 201–3.
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the validity of some incidents that we investigated in cases involving individual
soldiers, they also indicate that civilians were not intentionally targeted as a
matter of policy.343

The Israeli experience, following the succession of wars in Gaza, supports
Mégret’s contention that states are unlikely to conduct ‘mock’ proceedings to
avoid ICC scrutiny. 344 The conclusion, however, that ‘[i]f a state is unwilling, it
will generally be unwilling all the way’ 345 is contestable. When Luban, Azarova
and others considered the role that complementarity may play should the ICC
Prosecutor move beyond a preliminary examination and bring a case before the
Court, their opposing assessments queried the genuineness of Israel’s
investigative and accountability initiatives. 346 These inquiries employ the
language of art 17 of the Rome Statute. They attempt to assess whether a
(hypothetical) case is admissible due to the unwilling exception or if Israel’s
domestic efforts ensure that cases are ‘investigated and prosecuted by a State
which has jurisdiction over it’.347
The purpose of this paper is not to relitigate the Israel-Palestinian conflict or
the Gaza wars. Instead, this paper suggests — through its description of informal
complementarity — that a broader, more encompassing understanding and
purpose of this principle exists. This goes beyond the formal usage conveyed
through art 17 of the Rome Statute. It exceeds complementarity’s formulistic
assessment of a particular case’s admissibility. Informal complementarity, as
understood throughout, facilitates an emerging means of generating legitimacy
following the use of force. It has entered the post-conflict discourse and
diplomatic debates. The state now couples its traditional assertions of legal
compliance with evidence of both its capacity and willingness to investigate.
These legal engagements with informal complementarity occur pre-emptively,
in advance of ICC involvement — which may never transpire. They conflate the
formal distinction between individual criminal liability and the non-criminal
obligation of states under IHL. States often appeal to informal complementarity
with multiple motives. Primarily, they rely upon the language of
complementarity to convey legitimacy of process and of substance. The requisite
investigations provide a platform from which the state may build a narrative of
legal compliance. They may demonstrate the legality of state policy, in both jus
ad bellum and jus in bello, and defend particular decisions within specific
operations. Overt violations of international law can be acknowledged and
identified as exceptional. Informal complementarity allows proactive
differentiation between an individual violation and the state’s policy or the
military’s rules of engagement. Finally, appeals to informal complementarity
343 Goldstone, above n 340. While Richard Goldstone retracted part of the report’s conclusion,
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provide a means of insulating both the state and its officials from international
scrutiny.
These forms of legal engagement do not suggest that the domestic
investigations, fact-finding missions, commissions of inquiry and criminal
proceedings that substantiate appeals to informal complementarity are not
genuine. States are expected to investigate and encouraged to ensure domestic
accountability so as to avoid international scrutiny. This is a central purpose of
the complementarity regime. Certain domestic initiatives — that profess to
satisfy investigative requirements and preclude ICC admissibility — may, of
course, be in bad faith. Others may exhibit mixed motives. As Abram Chayes so
ably demonstrated, it is difficult, often impossible, to know the extent to which
international legal considerations influence domestic political decisions. 348
Within the increasingly fraught and polarised context of Israeli-Palestinian
relations, appeals to complementarity may be processed as manipulations of
international law. Equally, they may present as evidence of compliance to a
proscribed process. They can, and have, been observed in condemnation and in
vindication. The primary purpose of this paper, however, has not been to assess
Israel’s investigative mechanisms. It has been to observe this larger use of
complementarity and identify a shift toward investigative legitimacy.
The political and legal debates that accompany the Israeli-Palestinian context,
however, illustrate an inherent tension that rests at the core of informal
complementarity. This exists between the desire to encourage investigation by
states and the unavoidable implication that appeals to informal complementarity
are somehow disingenuous efforts to manufacture legitimacy. Despite the
sceptical tone often evoked by appeals to informal complementarity, it is vital
that states are encouraged to investigate and redress alleged violations of
international law. Such encouragement is central to the formal complementarity
regime. This promotes the internalisation of international law and compels states
to ensure against impunity. It is what Moreno Ocampo meant when he declared
that, ‘as a consequence of complementarity … the absence of trials before this
Court … would be a major success’. 349
Yet, it is necessary to understand the implications of informal
complementarity and ask whether this principle has become or facilitates
something other than what it initially intended. Asking such questions, however,
risks producing what Darryl Robinson termed ‘inescapable dyads’. 350 A state is
faulted for either failing to engage or engaging with its investigative obligations.
A state official or military leader may interpret these forms of criticism as
products of a winless situation, the positioning of moral judgement above legal
standard.
This is understandable. But as David Kennedy and others have explained,
professed legitimacy risks enabling conflict and emboldening states to use
force.351 The extent to which investigation as legitimisation facilitates the use of
348 Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis (Oxford University Press, 1974) 4. See also
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force and excuses state violence requires further consideration. Do informal
appeals to complementarity help break, or facilitate, the cycle of violence that
continues to plague Palestine, Israel and beyond? Whether these informal legal
engagements can facilitate state efforts to forestall formalist measures and
endeavour to nationalise international scrutiny of state behaviour compels
additional thought. The inherent tension that exists between the desire for states
to investigate potential violations of IHL and the capacity of appeals to domestic
measures to formalistically assert post-hoc legitimacy must be contemplated.
And the implications of strategic legal engagements in appeal to the latter, and in
neglect of the former, must also be recognised to ensure that states do not
understand breaches of international law as something that requires redress not
prevention. A violation must not become an occurrence that is to be explained
but not avoided.
VI

ADDENDUM

On 14 March 2018, Israel’s State Comptroller issued its long-awaited report
evaluating the 2014 Gaza War. 352 Adopting an international legal framework, the
report assessed political and military decision-making during Operation
Protective Edge. The State Comptroller — tasked with providing independent
governmental oversight — had announced this investigative initiative mere days
after the ICC Prosecutor launched the preliminary examination into the ‘situation
in Palestine’.353 The report’s title — IDF Activity from the Perspective of
International Law, Particularly with Regard to Mechanisms of Examination and
Oversight of Civilian and Military Echelons — signalled its purpose and
emphasis. The Comptroller would audit how the ‘political echelon carried out its
responsibilities from the perspective of international law in the context of the
Cabinet’s deliberations during Operation “Protective Edge”’. 354 It would
evaluate the ‘implementation and the recommendations of the Turkel II Report’
as it pertained to the methods of investigating alleged violations of international
law.355 It would consider the effectiveness of the fact-finding assessment
mechanism that had been deployed during the war and in its aftermath. And it
would review various IDF policies that were implemented throughout the
conflict.356
The State Comptroller cited the strategic benefits of the proposed
investigation when announcing its audit of the Gaza war. 357 The 2018 report
reiterated these motivating factors. On the first page the Comptroller assures that
international criminal law provides that ‘the domestic judicial system has
352 State Comptroller of Israel, ‘Operation “Protective Edge”: IDF Activity from the

353
354
355
356
357

Perspective of International Law, Particularly with Regard to Mechanisms of Examination
and Oversight of Civilian and Military Echelons’ (Report, 14 March 2018) (‘State
Comptroller Report 2018’).
Kershner, above n 250.
State Comptroller Report 2018, above n 352, 6.
Ibid.
Ibid 6–7.
The Comptroller remarked that ‘when a state exercises its authority to objectively
investigate accusations regarding violations of the laws of armed conflict, this will preclude
examination of said accusations by external international tribunals’: Kershner, above n 250,
quoting State Comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel, above n 261.
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precedence over an extraterritorial judicial system in adjudicating international
law violations’. 358 Referencing the principles of complementarity and
subsidiarity, the Comptroller noted that ‘investigative and judicial systems in the
State of Israel which function properly will help prevent the intervention of
external courts and tribunals in the sovereign affairs of the State of Israel’.359
This is framed around contestations of legitimacy. 360
The State Comptroller report considers the extent to which international law
informed high-level decision-making. It evaluated whether IDF command
received adequate legal training, how legal considerations influenced operational
initiatives and whether necessary measures were taken to reduce harm to
uninvolved civilians and to protect against humanitarian crisis. 361 Previous postwar assessment reports — those published jointly by the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs and Defense — addressed policy provisions in relation to specific
accusations of legal violation.362 The Comptroller report, however, focuses
abstractly on broader policy. 363 It attempts to determine whether an overarching
commitment to the requirement of international law informed Israel’s conduct
during the 2014 war. The Comptroller reviewed the minutes of Cabinet meetings
and interviewed numerous high-level political and military officials. 364 The
report concludes that
it is evident that both the political echelon and the senior military echelon
explicitly considered the limitations and rules set forth in international law
regarding the conduct of the fighting in Gaza, and even the Prime Minister
instructed against harming uninvolved civilians.365

358 State Comptroller Report 2018, above n 352, 3. The report notes that

[t]his is based on two principles: the ‘principle of complementarity’, according to
which the authority of an international jurisdiction will be exercised as a last resort
when states are unwilling or unable to exercise their duty to investigate and
prosecute; and the ‘principle of subsidiarity’, according to which a jurisdiction with
territorial or national affiliation has precedence over an international jurisdiction,
which has subsidiary responsibility.
359 Ibid.
360 Ibid 19.
361 Under the rubric of ‘Conduct of the Political Echelon during Operation “Protective Edge”

362
363

364

365

from the Perspective of International Law’, the report evaluated the extent to which
international legal considerations influenced efforts to reduce harm to uninvolved civilians:
ibid 66–77.
See generally Operation in Gaza Report, above n 32. See also 2014 Gaza Conflict Report,
above n 53.
For example, the evaluation of targeting decisions conveyed, following interviews with
senior officials, that general measures were taken to ensure that civilians were protected. A
senior legal official noted that ‘[t]he army is working together with the International Law
Department at the MAG Corps with respect to the “incrimination” of targets’: State
Comptroller Report 2018, above n 352, 70. During a Cabinet meeting, the Chief of General
Staff noted: ‘I am very proud that, wherever possible, attacks where we believed uninvolved
civilians might be harmed were stopped’. The Attorney-General was cited as noting during a
Cabinet meeting that ‘we saw with our own eyes the caution taken by the Air Force when
bombing. We saw how much effort was invested in respect of each and every house, how
many phone calls were made to the house. We, at least, were very impressed’.
The audit was conducted within, inter alia, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of
Justice, the IDF, the Operations Directorate, the MAG Corps and the Military Police
Investigations Department. See ibid 27, 73.
Ibid 73.
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The Comptroller found that, ‘in providing their instructions at the cabinet
meetings, the political echelon and the military echelon were careful to take steps
to prevent potential violations of the provisions of international law’.366
The Comptroller report cites Moshe Ya’alon. The former Minister of Defense
told the audit that ‘[a] military action should be planned both in terms of ethics
and in terms of legal defense’.367 Constituting a significant portion of the report,
consideration of the State’s capacity to investigate is presented by the
Comptroller as part of that legal defence. The Comptroller recalls that following
Operation Cast Lead and the formation of the Turkel Commission, the United
Nations cited Israel’s investigative initiatives with approval. It noted ‘that Israel
had dedicated significant resources to investigate allegations of operational
misconducts in the course of [Operation Cast Lead], and has made progress in
investigating the concrete cases mentioned in the Goldstone Report’.368
The Comptroller describes Israel’s reliance upon various investigative
mechanisms in response to ‘exceptional incidents’ during the 2014 Gaza War.369
Again, assessed abstractly, these efforts were described as in accordance with the
State’s international legal obligations. 370
The Comptroller references the now 464 investigations that were launched
since the conclusion of Operation Protective Edge. The responsibilities of the
MAG and the fact-finding assessment mechanism are described. 371 Where past
reports detailed the investigative processes and conveyed their findings, much of
the Comptroller report evaluates whether the State sufficiently internalised the
recommendations of the Turkel Commission. 372 Effectively, the Comptroller
report recognises the legitimising potential of investigative procedures. It
accentuates the importance and influence of the Turkel Commission’s work. Its
recommendations are said to convey the ‘principles guiding the state and the
military’ in their investigative duties.373 Stressing the strategic importance of
these duties, the report provides recommendations intended to strengthen the
ability of officials to actualise the legitimising potential of investigations. 374
Ultimately, the Comptroller report endorses and exhibits informal
complementarity. It provides further checks to ensure that the recommendations
of the Second Turkel Commission Report are fully implemented. This purports
366 Ibid 167.
367 Ibid 72.
368 Ibid 78–9. Citing the United Nation’s Davis Commission, the Comptroller continued that

369
370
371
372

373
374

the Commission had noted positively the work of Turkel and concluded that ‘a public
commission of inquiry like the Turkel Commission is an example of a mechanism that Israel
can use’: at 79, citing McGowan Davis Report, UN Doc A/HRC/16/24, 19 [80].
State Comptroller Report 2018, above n 352, 79–80.
Ibid 78.
See, eg, ibid 79, 144–65.
The report found that the fact-finding mechanism and the State’s investigative capacity
exhibited flaws regarding their efficiency and expediency. Overall, however, the report
determined that these investigative initiatives were conducted ‘in good faith and out of a
sincere desire to conduct a thorough and complete fact-finding assessment and to arrive at
the truth’: ibid 163.
Ibid 89.
For example, recommendations to amend reporting and documentation procedures are
explained as, inter alia, having ‘great significance with regard to the legitimacy of IDF’s
operations and its ability to manage the legal and media campaigns that accompany its
military operations’: ibid 94.
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to be additional evidence of Israel’s investigative willingness. Characteristic of
informal complementarity, this accentuates the potential of general investigations
— often focused on policies and state actions and irrespective of individual
criminal liability — to discharge legal requirements and discount international
scrutiny. The Comptroller, in accordance with the Turkel Commission, notes that
in order to ensure that the fact-finding assessment fulfills its purpose and to
justify, in the eyes of international bodies, the MAG’s decision not to open a
criminal investigation, it is appropriate to apply to the [fact-finding assessment
mechanism] the general principles set forth in international law as material
requirements for the existence of an investigation that will be considered
effective. 375

Proposals to reform the investigative processes and improve the various
mechanisms are, again, presented as responses to the legal campaigns and
accusations of violations that are assumed inevitable following war or upon the
use of force.376 They become another means through which the state may contest
and assert both the legitimacy of substance and the legitimacy of process.

375 Ibid 144.
376 Ibid 164–8.
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WHAT DOES LAWFARE MEAN?
David Hughes*
1. “LAWFARE DESCRIBES A METHOD OF WARFARE
WHERE LAW IS USED AS A MEANS OF REALIZING
A MILITARY OBJECTIVE.” .....................................................2
2. “THE FIRST TYPE OF LAWFARE IS ASYMMETRICAL
WARFARE. DURING THE RECENT CONFLICT WITH
IRAQ, ALLIED FORCES WERE THE TARGET OF A
PERSISTENT LAWFARE CAMPAIGN. EVEN
BEFORE THE CONFLICT BEGAN, INTERNATIONAL
ACTIVISTS USED LEGAL MEANS TO TRY TO
DECLARE MILITARY ACTION ILLEGITIMATE. IN
COORDINATION WITH IRAQI AUTHORITIES,
HUMAN SHIELDS WERE POSITIONED AT
PROSPECTIVE TARGETS TO DISRUPT AMERICAN
WAR PLANS.” ...........................................................................7
3. “OUR STRENGTH AS A NATION WILL CONTINUE TO
BE CHALLENGED BY THOSE WHO EMPLOY A
STRATEGY OF THE WEAK USING
INTERNATIONAL FORA, JUDICIAL PROCESSES,
AND TERRORISM.” ................................................................14
4. “LAST YEAR THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION (ACLU) AND THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS
(NACDL) ESTABLISHED THE JOHN ADAMS
PROJECT TO “SUPPORT MILITARY COUNSEL AT
GUANTANAMO BAY.” THE MISSION BEHIND THIS
TREACHEROUS ENTERPRISE WAS TO IDENTIFY
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS INVOLVED IN
INTERROGATING GUANTANAMO BAY
* PhD Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School. Many thanks to Faisal Bhabha for his
insightful comments and the editorial team at the Fordham International Law Journal for their
careful attention. Mistakes are my own.
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DETAINEES AND THEN PROVIDE THAT
INFORMATION TO MILITARY DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING DETAINEES SO
THAT THEY COULD ATTEMPT TO CALL
INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL TO TESTIFY.” .................... 19
5. “AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TRIAL, ONCE MORE THE
BROTHERS MUST INSIST ON PROVING THAT
TORTURE WAS INFLICTED ON THEM BY STATE
SECURITY [INVESTIGATORS] BEFORE THE
JUDGE.” ................................................................................... 26
6. “SUCH LAWFARE – THE MANIPULATION OF
WESTERN LAWS AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS TO
ACHIEVE STRATEGIC MILITARY ENDS – OFTEN
MANIFESTS AS FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS DESIGNED
TO SILENCE, PUNISH, AND DETER THOSE WHO
PUBLICLY SPEAK AND REPORT ON MILITANT
ISLAM, TERRORISM AND THEIR SOURCES OF
FINANCING.”.......................................................................... 31
7. “TRUTH BE TOLD, WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO
EMBRACE LAWFARE, FOR IT IS VASTLY
PREFERABLE TO THE BLOODY, EXPENSIVE, AND
DESTRUCTIVE FORMS OF WARFARE THAT
RAVAGED THE WORLD IN THE 20TH CENTURY…I
WOULD FAR PREFER TO HAVE MOTIONS AND
DISCOVERY REQUESTS FIRED AT ME THAN
INCOMING MORTAR OR ROCKET-PROPELLED
GRENADE FIRE.” ....................................................................35
1. “LAWFARE DESCRIBES A METHOD OF WARFARE WHERE
LAW IS USED AS A MEANS OF REALIZING A MILITARY
OBJECTIVE.”
— Major General Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF (Ret.)1
When four planes, commandeered by al-Qaeda hijackers, struck
the economic and military heart of the United States, international

1. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian
Values in 21st Century Conflicts 4 (Carr Ctr. Human Rights, John F. Kennedy Sch. Gov’t,
Harvard Univ., Working Paper, 2001) [hereinafter Dunlap Working Paper].
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law’s relationship with terrorism, war, and national security was
altered.2 The proliferation and institutionalization of international law
that had followed the Second World War was suddenly met with
increased resistance.3 The term “lawfare,” upon entering the
concurrent discourse, initially described what observers perceived as
the novel use of international law within situations of traditional or
asymmetrical conflict, before later developing into a blanket term of
competing meanings.
Major General Charles J. Dunlap Jr. of the United States Air
Force first popularized lawfare in a paper describing the challenges
posed by international law when engaging in a modern military
intervention. Lawfare, he posited, was an innovative form of warfare
in which law was employed to achieve a traditional military
objective.4 Years later Dunlap would evolve his understanding of the
term, holding that lawfare constituted “the strategy of using – or
misusing – law as a substitute for traditional military means to
achieve a warfighting objective.”5 When Dunlap sought to define the
term, he claimed ideological neutrality. Lawfare, like traditional
weaponry, could be wielded for legitimate or illegitimate purposes.6
Furthermore, lawfare conveyed limited descriptive potential. Dunlap
would later explain that lawfare was intended to focus “principally on
circumstances where law can create the same or similar effects as
those ordinarily sought from conventional warmaking approaches.”7
Yet when the term lawfare entered the public vernacular and policy
2. For a discussion of how the events of September 11, 2001 have effected or been used
to justify a ‘new paradigm’ in international law, see Stephen P. Marks, International Law and
the ‘War on Terrorism’: Post 9/11 Responses by the United States and Asia Pacific Countries,
1 ASIA P AC. L. REV . 43, 48 (2006). See also Anthea Roberts, Righting Wrongs or Wronging
Rights? The United States and Human Rights Post-September 11, 15 EUR. J. INT ’L L. 721
(2004). See generally DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, FROM 9-11 TO THE ‘IRAQ WAR 2003’:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY (2004).
3. For a detailed and critical overview of the Bush Administration’s approach to
international law, see JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015).
4. As Dunlap recognized, the term is widely believed to have originated in a paper
published as part of an edited volume in 1975. See Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1. The
authors used the term lawfare to decry the adversarial nature of western legal systems. See
John Carlson & Neville Yeomans, Whither Goeth the Law – Humanity or Barbarity, in THE
WAY OUT: RADICAL ALTERNATIVES IN AUSTRALIA 155 (David Crossley & Margaret Smith
eds., 1975).
5. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Lawfare Today…and Tomorrow, 87 INT ’L L. S TUD. SER. US
NAVAL WAR C OL. 315, 315 (2011) [hereinafter Dunlap Today and Tomorrow].
6. Id. at 315-16.
7. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT ’L
L. 121, 122 (2010) [hereinafter Dunlap Apologia].
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discourses that followed the September 11th attacks, its meaning
became blurred and its uses varied.
Today, there is no consensus as to lawfare’s meaning.8 It has,
however, moved from Dunlap’s purportedly neutral connotations to
assume a pejorative or polemic tone within popular and political
speech.9 The propagation of the term lawfare that followed Dunlap’s
early framing of the neologism, its influence on the concurrent
discourse, has occurred on the margins of the US-led War on Terror,
though it is not limited to these events.
Within such a context, lawfare has evolved to describe and
denounce various forms of international legal engagement.10 Often,
though not exclusively, these usages are directed towards non-state
actors: individuals, non-governmental organizations, international
institutions, or sub-state militant groups. Descriptions or accusations
of lawfare have occurred in relation to the general and the specific.
Lawfare has been understood as the imposition or manipulation of
international legal standards to confine traditional military means and
operations and to limit both state responses to terrorism and the use of
force.11 Those who employ the precepts of international law, often
before international fora, to shame countries like the United States or
Israel have been accused of engaging in lawfare.12 The use of human
8. See Michael P. Scharf & Elizabeth Andersen, Is Lawfare Worth Defining? - Report of
the Cleveland Experts Meeting - September 11, 2010, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT ’L L. 11, 13-15
(2010); see also Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries – Part Two, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(May 22, 2003), http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/lawfare-latest-asymmetries—-parttwo/p6191; Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 18, 2003),
http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/lawfare-latest-asymmetries/.p5772.
9. David Luban, Carl Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT ’L
L. 457, 458 (2010).
10. For a more detailed account of how the term “lawfare” has evolved since being
reintroduced by Charles Dunlap, see Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Semiotic Definition of Lawfare, 43
CASE W. RES. J. INT ’L L. 29, 51-57 (2011). See also Wouter G. Werner, The Curious Career
of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT ’L L. 61 (2010).
11. For example, the position assumed by the Council on Foreign Relations described
lawfare as “a strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to
achieve military objectives.” This understanding of lawfare does not differ from Dunlap’s
offering but the Council held, in accordance with this meaning, that “[e]ach operation
conducted by US military results in new and expanding efforts by groups and countries to use
lawfare to respond to military force.” See Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, supra note 8.
12. W. Chadwick Austin and Antony Barone Kolenc, for example, argue that the
International Criminal Court is vulnerable to abuse by the United States’ adversaries who may
seek to shame the United States by misusing the Court’s investigative processes, filing dubious
complaints with the Court, or by engaging the media in relation to ICC proceedings to generate
international pressure against the United States. See W. Chadwick Austin & Antony Barone
Kolenc, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf? The International Criminal Court as a Weapon of
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shields by non-state actors engaged in asymmetrical warfare has been
held to constitute lawfare.13 Further, the use of libel laws to attempt to
silence groups who “oppose” the threat of “militant Islam” and seek
to expose the means of terrorist financing have been described as acts
of lawfare.14 Lawfare has also been used to label and deride the
efforts of lawyers and organizations representing foreign nationals
held at the Guantánamo Bay detainment camp in Cuba.15 Finally, and
in close association to Dunlap’s intended use of the term, the label of
lawfare has described the strategic use of international law by States
for the purpose of achieving a particular, often military, objective.16
This paper is built around several prominent quotations which
claim to either define lawfare or describe what the user deems as an
act of lawfare. It will explore these varied uses of the term and
attempt to understand what the significance of lawfare’s advent is for
the practice and function of international law. It accepts that a
consensus definition of the term will remain elusive and does not
attempt to provide one. Instead, it borrows from Alison Young’s
argument that to better understand a particular discourse, and our
investment in it, we should “flow with the current meaning.”17 As
such, it is not consumed by the definitional question of what lawfare
is. Rather, it asks what the label of lawfare means for both the
understanding and practice of international law.
In exploring this question, it attempts to (re)frame the debate that
surrounds lawfare. Currently, this exists amongst three broad camps:
those who understand lawfare as the use and abuse of international
law to threaten state interests; those who view it as a rhetorical device
intended to discredit parties who attempt to engage with international
law as a means to ensure accountability and compliance; and those
who describe lawfare as a weapon, the legitimacy of which is defined
by its user’s intentions.

Asymmetric Warfare, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 291 (2006); see also David Scheffer,
Whose Lawfare Is It, Anyway?, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT ’L L. 215, 223 (2010); infra discussion
in Sections 2, 3.
13. See infra Sections 2, 7.
14. See infra Section 6.
15. See infra Sections 4, 5.
16. See infra Section 7.
17. ALISON YOUNG, FEMININITY IN DISSENT 43 (1990); see also Anne Orford, Muscular
Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism, 10 EUR. J. INT ’L L.
679, 682 (1999).
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A 2010 symposium hosted by Case Western Reserve’s School of
Law, titled LAWFARE!, featured proponents of each view.18 Many
from all sides of the lawfare debate presented positions that held the
notion of lawfare as novel—an observed phenomenon that now
assumed a prominent position within an increasingly internationalized
environment.19 While this view was widely accepted, manifestations
of what is commonly termed lawfare often predate the term’s
popularization. Alongside the proliferation of international law
throughout the twentieth century it is, of course, possible to find
myriad examples of legal engagements and arguments that may
conform with what is now broadly termed lawfare. Furthermore,
critical framings of lawfare that explicitly or implicitly view it as
novel and contextual risk erroneously preserving it within a singular
time and place. Most often this is the United States of George W.
Bush and the War on Terror.20 What is popularly held to constitute
lawfare is neither novel nor contextual, yet the implications of the
term’s use may be significant.
Lawfare, however, as most commonly understood and applied,
has evolved within political and popular discourses to serve as a
warning of the corrosive effects and potential hazards of international
law.21 Opponents of this framing have argued that the labelling of
international legal engagements as lawfare has become a
neoconservative doctrine whose “real target is international law
itself.”22 Thus, lawfare is presented not as a legal argument, but
18. For an overview of the symposium, see Michael P. Scharf & Shannon Pagano,
Foreward: LAWFARE!, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT ’L L. 1 (2010). The papers of the participants
are contained throughout all of 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT ’L L. (2010-2011).
19. E.g., Craig H. Allen, Command of the Commons Boasts: An Invitation to Lawfare, 83
INT ’L L. STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR COL. 21 (2007); see also Michael J. Lebowitz, The
Value of Claiming Torture: An Analysis of Al-Qaeda’s Tactical Lawfare Strategy and Efforts
to Fight Back, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT ’L L. 357 (2010); Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12.
20. For example, see Michael Kearney’s explanation of lawfare having “emerged in
response to human rights litigation during the ‘war on terror’, and rapidly progressed from
conservative newspaper opinions and blogs to legal and political academic journals.” Michael
Kearney, Lawfare, Legitimacy and Resistance: The Weak and the Law, 16 PAL. Y.B. INT ’L L.
79, 88 (2010).
21. The editorial board of the Wall Street Journal has warned about the dangers of
lawfare, holding that “however well our troops do on the battlefield, a reality of modern times
is that the U.S. can still lose the war on terror in the courtroom.” See The Lawfare Wars, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703467004575463
721720570734; see also David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Lawfare, WALL ST . J. (Feb. 23,
2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117220137149816987.
22. Scott Horton, The Dangers of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT ’L L. 163, 167
(2010-2011); see also Scheffer, supra note 12, at 217.
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instead as a policy prescription. Leila Nadya Sadat and Jing Geng
have argued that the use of the term, popularly conceived, constitutes
“an effort to attack and dismantle legal norms – and even some legal
or international institutions – in order to promote the efforts of
America’s (or Israel’s) military.”23
When one observes contemporary applications of lawfare, it is
often intended to decry or delegitimize arguments that themselves
draw upon international legal principles. Viewed singularly, this
provides credence to the understanding of lawfare espoused by Sadat
and Geng. But as several observers have noted, nearly all States
engage with international law in a manner that can fit comfortably
within common conceptions of lawfare.24 Thus, when observing the
debate that surrounds the use of the term, it becomes evident that
pejorative or polemic applications of lawfare are often decrying a
particular use of international law by a particular type of actor. When
framing the lawfare debate or articulating a response to accusations of
lawfare that are intended to delegitimize such specific uses of
international law, it is prudent to understand the application of the
label not as a general means of attacking or dismantling legal norms,
but as a particular strategy intended to limit access to international
justice.
2. “THE FIRST TYPE OF LAWFARE IS ASYMMETRICAL
WARFARE. DURING THE RECENT CONFLICT WITH IRAQ,
ALLIED FORCES WERE THE TARGET OF A PERSISTENT
LAWFARE CAMPAIGN. EVEN BEFORE THE CONFLICT BEGAN,
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVISTS USED LEGAL MEANS TO TRY TO
DECLARE MILITARY ACTION ILLEGITIMATE. IN
COORDINATION WITH IRAQI AUTHORITIES, HUMAN SHIELDS
WERE POSITIONED AT PROSPECTIVE TARGETS TO DISRUPT
AMERICAN WAR PLANS.”
— Council on Foreign Relations25
Lawfare, as initially described by Dunlap, was a reaction to the
perception that international law was assuming a more prominent and

23. Leila Nadya Sadat & Jing Geng, On Legal Subterfuge and the So-Called “Lawfare”
Debate, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT ’L L. 153, 160 (2010-2011).
24. Allen, supra note 19, at 36. See generally ORDE F. KITTRIE, LAWFARE: LAW AS A
WEAPON OF WAR (2016).
25. Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, supra note 8.
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strategic role within situations of international armed conflict.26 With
increasing frequency, actors engaged in traditional conflict situations
were believed to rely upon what Dunlap characterized as lawfare
within “circumstances where law can create the same or similar
effects as those ordinarily sought from conventional war making
approaches.”27 Upon popularizing the term, Dunlap evolved his
understanding of lawfare to include what he perceived to be the
cynical manipulation of particular uses of international law.28
Accordingly, and with what was presented as increased frequency, the
United States’ opponents were understood to nefariously engage the
rule of law and the humanitarian values it represents to create a
perception that the United States is waging war in violation of
international law.29
This notion of lawfare is emblematic of the view forwarded by
the Council on Foreign Relations. This warned, in regards to the Iraq
War, that international activists were turning to legal means to
demonstrate the illegitimacy of the military operation.30 Several
commentators have lent credence to this notion of lawfare, holding
that it endeavors to “gain a moral advantage over your enemy in the
court of world opinion.”31 In response, they have declared that “[t]he
U.S. must go on both the legal and public diplomacy offensive,
utilizing such aggressive litigation tactics as seeking sanctions against
lawyers who make frivolous arguments or violate security
regulations.”32 Often, nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) are
perceived as the primary perpetrators of this notion of lawfare and are
increasingly held to function in opposition to a State’s security
interests.33
The currency that international law-based claims carry within the
public sphere is viewed as an extension of the general influence that
international law has assumed within occurrences of international

26. See Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1, at 2-4.
27. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, at 122; see also Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare: A
Decisive Element of 21 st Century Conflicts?, 54 JOINT FORCES Q. 34 (2009) [hereinafter
Dunlap Conflicts].
28. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7.
29. Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1, at 4.
30. Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries, supra note 8.
31. Rivkin & Casey, supra note 21.
32. Id.
33. See generally Neve Gordon, Human Rights as a Security Threat: Lawfare and the
Campaign against Human Rights NGOs, 48 L. & SOC’Y REV. 311, 311-12 (2014).
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armed conflict.34 Some, observing the increasing application of
international law from within military establishments, have been
inclined to interpret such uses as an obstruction. General Wesley
Clark, who served as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe during the
NATO mission in Kosovo, described the challenges posed by
increased legal oversight within a military campaign:
The processes of approving the targets, striking the targets,
reading the results, and restriking were confusing. The original
plans had presumed that the [Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe] would have the authority to strike targets within overall
categories specified by NATO political leaders, but Washington
had introduced a target-by-target approval requirement. The other
Allies began to be increasingly demanding, too. It was British
law that targets struck by any aircraft based in the United
Kingdom had to be approved by their lawyers, the French
demanded greater insight into the targeting and strikes, and of
course there had to be continuing consultation with NATO
headquarters and with other countries, too.35

The NATO intervention in Kosovo and the accompanying campaign
against Serbia are held by many, from an operational perspective (jus
in bello), to represent “a high-water mark of the influence of
international law in military interventions.”36 Certain commentators,
opposed to the heightened influence of international law on
operational decision-making, described the perceived restrictive or
prohibitive function of international law as lawfare. Often held to be
encouraged by NGOs and as an impediment to the achievement of
military or security objectives, opponents of the restrictive use of
international law claimed:
One of the most striking features of the Kosovo campaign, in
fact, was the remarkably direct role lawyers played in managing
combat operations – to a degree unprecedented in previous
wars . . . The role played by lawyers in this war should also be

34. Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1, at 1.
35. WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR: BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND THE FUTURE
OF COMBAT 224 (2001).
36. Dunlap Working Paper, supra note 1, at 1-2; see also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL
WAR: KOSOVO AND BEYOND 197-98, 200, 207 (2000); Adam Roberts, NATO’s ‘Humanitarian
War’ over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL. & STRATEGY 102, 102 (1999).
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sobering – indeed alarming – for devotees of power politics who
denigrate the impact of law on international conflict.37

The term lawfare, in response, served as a descriptive denunciation of
the perceived rise and prohibitive influence of international law
within conflict situations. Though Dunlap and others would later
insist that understandings of lawfare were intended to maintain a
neutral connotation, these common applications of the term would
retain a pejorative association.38
As the asymmetrical warfare of the twenty-first century replaced
the traditional wars of the twentieth century, an amended
understanding of certain uses of international law – termed lawfare –
employed as a means of achieving a military objective, increasingly
became associated with the tactics of non-state militant groups.39 The
label of lawfare, now applied to an ever-broadening scope of legal
engagements within instances of armed conflict, was held to define
occasions of asymmetrical warfare in which “a group or state that is
facing a nation committed to comply with the laws of war will choose
to openly violate the law not only for the tactical advantage gained
but for the strategic benefit that arises.”40
The 2003 US-led war in Iraq provided the archetypical example.
Lawfare came to describe the tactics of US adversaries. These
included:
. . . attacking from protected places and using protected places or
objects as weapons storage sites, fighting without wearing a
proper uniform, using human shields to protect military targets,
using protected symbols to gain military advantage, and
murdering of prisoners or others who deserve protection.41

In each of these observed instances, the term lawfare is employed to
describe “an inferior force [using] the superior force’s commitment to
adhere to the law of war to its tactical advantage.”42

37. Richard K. Betts, Compromised Command: Inside NATO’s First War, 80 FOREIGN
AFF. 126, 129 (2001).
38. Dunlap Today and Tomorrow, supra note 5, at 315.
39. See Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12; see also Dale Stephens, The Age of Lawfare, 87
INT’L L. STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR COL. 327, 330 (2011); Kittrie, supra note 24, at 340-41.
40. Eric Talbot Jensen, The ICJ’s “Uganda Wall”: A Barrier to the Principle of
Distinction and an Entry Point for Lawfare, 35 DENV. J. INT’L & POL’Y 241, 269 (2007).
41. Id. at 269-70.
42. Id. at 270.
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Thus, three related notions of lawfare emerged from the term’s
description of the use of international law within instances of armed
conflict. The first, as initially identified by Dunlap, employed law and
legal argumentation to imply that the United States was engaging in a
war and actions that violated fundamental principles of international
law. The second notion of lawfare held that through the increased
influence of international law, law served as a prohibitive intrusion on
US efforts to achieve operational and security-based objectives. The
final notion suggests that the United States’ adversaries used a variety
of asymmetrical tactics, deemed lawfare, to disrupt the operational
capabilities of, and gain tactical advantage against, a State committed
to upholding the precepts of international law.
Such conceptions of lawfare, however, cannot be exclusively
attributed to non-state actors. Dunlap, along with many others, has
acknowledged that many states engage with international law through
such means as to constitute lawfare.43 He provides examples that
include the US purchase of selected satellite imagery prior to the
commencement of military operations in Afghanistan, the imposition
of sanctions against Iraq to prevent the purchase of aircrafts or
materials necessary for the maintenance of their existing fleet, efforts
to enhance the rule of law as a strategic objective of
counterinsurgency operations, and the use of legal means
to
44
confiscate financial assets from terrorist groups and their funders.
The use of international law, employed by state actors, however,
goes well beyond these identified examples of strategic legal
engagements. It manifests through instances in which international
law is employed by States for similar purposes to those that prevalent
uses of the lawfare label commonly accuse the United States’
“adversaries” of undertaking. Of relevance to the Council on Foreign
Relation’s assertion that lawfare constitutes efforts to claim that US
wars represent legal violations, David Kennedy notes:
But if law can increase friction by persuading relevant audiences
of a campaign’s illegitimacy, it can also grease the wheels of
combat. Law is a strategic partner for military commanders when
it increases the perception of outsiders that what the military is
doing is legitimate.45

43. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7; see also Scheffer, supra note 12.
44. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, at 123-24.
45. DAVID KENNEDY , OF WAR AND LAW 41 (2006).
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Furthermore, claims that lawfare is demonstrative of the increasingly
prohibitive application of international humanitarian law seeks to
assign pejorative implications to what is purely a debate concerning
the purpose or necessity of law and legal regulation within a particular
context. Since the mid-twentieth century, when the Geneva
Conventions opened for ratification, they have been subject to
interpretative disagreement.46 Yoram Dinstein explains that
international humanitarian law is predicated on an equilibrium
between opposing impulses – military necessity and humanitarian
considerations.47 This naturally facilitates interpretive discord:
“[B]etween military commanders and humanitarian workers, there
might be a different understanding of that which constitutes
acceptable collateral damage, simply because their respective
interpretations of the principle of proportionality are taken from
different standpoints.”48
The suggestion that the source of such disagreement concerning
the applicability or necessity of legal regulation constitutes a notion of
lawfare seeks to delegitimize a particular interpretation of
international humanitarian law. It preferences the interpretation of the
military commander, while denouncing, or assigning pejorative
implications to, a humanitarian-focused reading of the law that
becomes the form of legal engagement employed by the weak,
employed by the adversary.
Furthermore, the described forms of legal engagement and
denouncement that hold lawfare to have become a tactic employed by
non-state actors against US interests and commitments to
international law are scarcely limited to this context. Neither are they
the sole manifestations of the asymmetrical wars fought in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Human shields, often presented as a lawfare method in
which opponents of a State committed to international law manipulate
this commitment to gain an operational or moral advantage, are
consistently discussed as tactics employed by US adversaries in the
War on Terror.49 The use of human shields for tactical purposes,
46. Jamie A. Williamson, The Knight’s Code, Not His Lance, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT ’L
L. 447, 447-48 (2010).
47. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE C ONDUCT OF H OSTILITIES UNDER THE L AW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED C ONFLICT 16 (2004).
48. Williamson, supra note 46, at 448.
49. See, e.g., Robert Gates, Sec’y of Defense, & Michael Mullen, Joint Chief of Staff,
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen on U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Press Conference from the
Pentagon (May 12, 2009), available at http://iipdigital. usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/20
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however, has been observed in such early military encounters as the
American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War.50 The British
Manual of Military Law, issued at the start of the First World War,
denounced the practice, as did the Commentaries to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.51 Nevertheless, human shields have been employed
within many of the conflicts that have occurred throughout the
twentieth century.52
Similar discourses as those observed in relation to the use of
human shields against US interests and by sub-state armed groups
have featured prominently in numerous conflict situations. These
include Israel’s official response to the international condemnation
that followed its military operations within the Gaza Strip in 2014.53
Russian forces commonly accused Chechen fighters of tactically
employing human shields during the bombardment of Grozny in the
late 1990s, and Pakistani Security Forces made similar claims during
the siege of Lal Masjid in Islamabad.54 Commonly, these claims hold
that the employment of such tactics by non-state actors demonstrate
not simply a violation of international law, but instead the
manipulation of international law. This infers, often directly, that state
actors, otherwise committed to upholding the various provisions of
international humanitarian law within situations of international or
non-international armed conflict, are placed in a manufactured
environment in which compliance with international law is
compromised. It serves to delineate two forms of international law –
09/05/20090512113947eaifas0.118664.html#axzz4ErRG1lTZ (describing how the Taliban
provokes and exploits civilian casualties); see also Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries,
supra note 8; Dunlap Today and Tomorrow, supra note 5, at 315; Jensen, supra note 40, at
269-70; Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12, at 326.
50. Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 292, 293 (2009).
51. Id. at 293-94.
52. Id. at 294-96.
53. See, e.g., Behind the Headlines: Fighting Hamas terrorism within the law, ISR.
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (Aug. 7, 2014), http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Issues/
Pages/Fighting-Hamas-terrorism-within-the-law.aspx; see also Hamas’ Use of Human Shields
is a War Crime, ISR. DEF. FORCES (July 14, 2014), https://www.idfblog.com/blog/
2014/07/14/hamas-use-human-shields-war-crime/; Captured Hamas Manuel Explains Benefit
of Human Shields, ISR. DEF. FORCES (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.idfblog.com/blog/
2014/08/04/captured-hamas-combat-manual-explains-benefits-human-shields/>.
54. Chechens ‘using human shields’, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 1999, 7:37 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/545672.stm; see also Pakistan’s Red Mosque Showdown:
Jihadists Using Girls as Human Shields?, SPIEGEL ONLINE (July 5, 2007),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/pakistan-s-red-mosque-showdown-jihadists-usinggirls-as-human-shields-a-492545.html>.
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legitimate and illegitimate – that are employed by the state and nonstate actor respectively.
From such origins, the notion of lawfare presented by Dunlap,
evolved from its particular application to instances of traditional and
asymmetric armed conflict and was increasingly viewed as a threat to
US interests in a post-September 11th internationalized landscape.
With newfound prominence, lawfare came to describe a host of
international legal engagements. Its popularized usages would
maintain a pejorative slant and would present a deep skepticism
concerning the role and utility of international law within this
environment. Denunciations of international law, however, were not
absolute and instead focused specifically on the use of international
law by non-state actors.
3. “OUR STRENGTH AS A NATION WILL CONTINUE TO BE
CHALLENGED BY THOSE WHO EMPLOY A STRATEGY OF THE
WEAK USING INTERNATIONAL FORA, JUDICIAL PROCESSES,
AND TERRORISM.”
— United States of America, 2005 National Defense Strategy55
That the National Defense Strategy of the United States equated
recourse to international law with acts of terrorism demonstrates the
extent to which particular forms of legal engagement were viewed as
a threat to US interests. Jack Goldsmith, an international lawyer and
scholar, who served as the head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the
Bush Administration, recalls the extent of this concern: “[Secretary of
Defense] Rumsfeld had already been worrying about this problem
under the rubric of ‘lawfare’, an idea that had been discussed in the
Pentagon for years.”56 Within the White House, the Department of
Justice, and the Pentagon, lawfare provided an all-encompassing term
to describe the means by which the United States’ foes engaged with
international law to shame and attempt to weaken US efforts within
the War on Terror and the broad security apparatus that developed in
the wake of the September 11th attacks. Goldsmith explained this
emergent notion of lawfare:
55. DEP’T DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 5 (2005), http://archive.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf.
56. JACK G OLDSMITH, THE TERROR P RESIDENCY : LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 58 (2007).
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Enemies like Al Qaeda who cannot match the United States
militarily instead criticize it for purported legal violations,
especially violations of human rights or the laws of war. They
hide in mosques so that they can decry U.S. destruction of
religious objects when attacked. They describe civilian deaths as
“war crimes” even when the deaths are legally permissible
“collateral damage” or they complain falsely that they were
tortured . . . . Lawfare works because it manipulates something
Americans value: respect for law.57

Yet the perceived threat of lawfare was not simply viewed as a tactic
undertaken by non-state actors like al-Qaeda or the Taliban, with
whom the United States was engaged in asymmetrical war. Secretary
Rumsfeld and the Pentagon viewed lawfare as constituting an
unwarranted, but potentially influential, check on US military power.
The expressed commitment of the United States’ traditional allies in
Europe and South America to human rights regimes caused Rumsfeld
to believe “that opponents incapable of checking American military
power would increasingly rely on lawfare weapons instead.”58 A
Department of Defense memorandum, authored by Secretary
Rumsfeld, directly articulated the implied extent of the threat posed
by such a notion of lawfare:
In the past quarter century, various nations, NGOs, academics,
international organizations, and others in the “international
community” have been busily weaving a web
of
international laws and judicial institutions that today threatens
[US Government] interests . . . . Unless we tackle the problem
head-on, it will continue to grow. The issue is especially urgent
because of the unusual challenges we face in the war on
terrorism.59

Despite its broad usage, within a variety of contexts and by various
actors, lawfare gained much of its political currency and popular
practice amid the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the
emergent national security response to the terrorist attacks in New
York and Washington, D.C.60 Increasingly, law-based criticisms (both
57. Id. at 58-59.
58. Id. at 59.
59. Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., on Judicialization of
International Politics to Vice President et al. (Apr. 9, 2003), http://library.rumsfeld.com/
doclib/sp/221/2003-04-09%20to%20Vice%20President%20et%20al%20re
%20Judicialization%20of%20International%20Politics.pdf.
60. Horton, supra note 22, at 167.
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international and municipal) of US actions and policies were met with
accusations of lawfare. This popularized notion of lawfare had shifted
considerably from Dunlap’s professed neutrality.61 It developed a
broad reach that extended well beyond the term’s initial conception as
a means of legal engagement focused on the achievement of a
traditional military objective.62 This emergent reactive notion of
lawfare was firmly embedded within neoconservative doctrine, an
extension of an entrenched skepticism that viewed international law
as a cumbersome and ultimately ineffective means of addressing
national and global security challenges.63
Many within the Bush Administration viewed this scant
understanding of international law as an avoidable constraint on
efforts to expand the boundaries of executive power and as
constituting an affront to US sovereignty.64 Yet despite their
ideological disdain and the professed ineffectiveness of international
law, neoconservatives, paradoxically, view particular forms of legal
engagement as a direct (and potentially effective) threat to the United
States’ domestic and foreign interests.65 Various conservative
commentators and ideological allies echoed the Administration’s
cautions concerning the threat posed by international law.66 They held
that “the most significant common thread among all these actions is
the clear desire to portray U.S. government actions as illegal and
unprecedented” and that “international law constitutes a real and
immediate threat to U.S. national interest.”67
61. Dunlap himself, in a later paper, noted this ideological shift and asserted that “despite
the lawfare’s [sic] frequent negative characterization as a tool of terrorists, it is vital to
remember that it is not restricted to one side of a conflict.” See Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7,
at 123-24.
62. In relation to this development, Dunlap held that “lawfare was never meant to
describe every possible relation between law and warfare. It focuses principally on
circumstances where law can create the same or similar effects as those ordinarily sought from
conventional warmaking approaches.” See id. at 122.
63. Francis Fukuyama, After Neoconservatism, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 19, 2006), http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/magazine/after-neoconservatism.html.
64. Ohlin, supra note 3, at 8-9; see also Horton, supra note 22, at 167-68.
65. See generally JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (2005).
66. See, e.g., John Fonte, Democracy’s Trojan Horse, NAT’L INT. (2004),
http://nationalinterest.org/article/democracys-trojan-horse-1155; Clare Lopez, SEALs Case
Shows How Terrorists Use ‘Lawfare’ to Undermine U.S., HUM. EVENTS (Mar. 8, 2010),
http://humanevents.com/2010/03/08/seals-case-shows-how-terrorists-use-lawfare-toundermine-us/; David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Rocky Shoals of International Law,
62 NAT ’L INT. 35 (2000-2001) [hereinafter Rocky Shoals]; Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12.
67. Rivkin & Casey, supra note 21; Rocky Shoals, supra note 66, at 35.
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Though this strayed considerably from Dunlap’s more limited
iteration of lawfare, it came to represent the term’s prevalent,
politicized application.68 Opponents of lawfare’s
current
manifestation and ideological grounding often (though not
exclusively) hold that, however defined, “lawfare is a potentially
powerful term that reflects the importance of law in the conflicts of
the twenty-first century.”69 Still, its most ardent critics argue that the
accusation or labelling of lawfare, popularly understood, facilitates
the critique and silencing of human rights advocacy, verges towards
propaganda, and ultimately discredits the intended function of
international law.70
Sadat and Geng, continuing their argument that lawfare’s
common use serves to attack and dismantle legal norms, assert that
the use of the term lawfare “poses a frontal challenge to our
constitutional system, as well as the specific rules of war,
international human rights law, and the international legal system, and
even U.S. Constitutional rights, such as the right to habeas corpus.”
Opponents who view lawfare within this context, as attempting to
silence or delegitimize international law-based criticisms of state
actors, place the use of lawfare within a culture of international legal
neglect and unchecked impunity. This understanding and rejection of
such uses of lawfare often accompanies the view that the Bush
Administration and neoconservative ideology express general
hostility towards international law, that it dismisses its dictates.71
But framing lawfare, generally, as an attack on international law
or as an attempt to dismantle legal norms perpetuates an overtly
utopian view of international law. It reduces understandings of
68. The Cleveland Experts Meeting discussed whether the term lawfare had been
hijacked by neoconservative interests and debated how best to respond to this. While there
appeared broad consensus that the term had been manipulated along ideological lines, there
was no broad agreement about how to best respond. Several participants expressed that “now
that others have widely propagated an alternative definition of the term, the academy has lost
the initiative and would be fighting a futile cause in trying to recapture the concept as a neutral
term.” See Scharf & Anderson, supra note 8, at 12-13.
69. This did not discount the view that “lawfare may not be a particularly useful term
and may serve simply as an invented phenomenon useful only to anti-international
humanitarian law hijackers as a tool of intimidation.” Id. at 13, 15.
70. See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 20, at 88-89.
71. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Crying War, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS : BRIDGING THEORY AND PRACTICE 93, 100 (Thomas J.
Biersteker et al. eds., 2007). See generally JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION ’S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE “WAR” ON TERROR (2007); Ohlin, supra
note 3.
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international law to binary conceptions of conformity/violation, and
fails to recognize the myriad forms of legal engagement that occur
under the broad rubric of international law.72 The
Bush
Administration and its neoconservative allies, so often the recipients
of allegations of international legal maleficence, nevertheless engaged
consistently with international legal arguments.73 Secretary
Rumsfeld’s Department of Defense memorandum, which warned of
the international community’s efforts to use international law to
threaten US interests, continued to provide a host of potential
responses to what was perceived as the judicialization of international
politics.74 These themselves drew heavily upon international law.
They called for the formulation of legal arguments under the laws of
armed conflict and belligerent occupation to justify a US presence and
the use of force within and against Iraq. In attempting to delegitimize
the International Criminal Court, Secretary Rumsfeld’s prescriptions
sought to strengthen and expand bilateral frameworks through Article
98 agreements to protect US officials from prosecution at the Court
and proposed the enactment of legislation that would effectively
sanction nations that pursue charges against US officials.75
Such forms of legal engagement by the Bush Administration do
not imply fidelity with international law or dismiss claims grounded
within law that undertaken actions or policies by the Administration
served to violate US legal commitments or international legal norms.
Instead, this is intended to illustrate the folly of viewing lawfare
72. See generally EYAL WEIZMAN, THE LEAST OF ALL POSSIBLE EVILS:
HUMANITARIAN VIOLENCE FROM ARENDT TO GAZA (2011); Kennedy, supra note 45.
73. For an account of the Bush Administration’s legal argumentation in relation to many
of its most controversial practices, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Bush Administration and
International Law: Too Much Lawyering and Too Little Diplomacy, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 57, 68 (2009). For an overall account of the role assumed by international law
within successive US administrations and within the State Department, see M ICHAEL P.
SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER (2010).
74. Memorandum from the U.S. Sec’y of Defense, supra note 59.
75. Article 98 agreements reference Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute which holds, inter
alia, that the ICC may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under an existing international
agreement. On this basis, the United States has signed over one hundred bilateral immunity
agreements with individual countries to ensure they do not surrender any American to the
Court’s jurisdiction. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 98(2), July 17,
1998, 183 U.N.T.S. 9; see also David J.R. Frakt, Lawfare and Counterlawfare: The
Demonization of the Gitmo Bar and Other Legal Strategies in the War on Terror, 43 CASE W.
RES. J. INT ’L L. 335, 352 (2010); Memorandum from the U.S. Sec’y of Defense, supra note
59.
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through such a generalized lens – as a broad assault on the discipline
of international law. What is often described, critically, as lawfare is
not a total or ontological challenge to international law, but is instead
a denouncement of particular groups of law’s users. It is therefore
more prudent to understand lawfare not as a general dismissal of
international law, but instead as a particular affront to international
law. This affront seeks to limit the access of particular groups and
individuals to international recourse and delegitimize the means and
methods through which such recourse may be pursued.
4. “LAST YEAR THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
(ACLU) AND THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS (NACDL) ESTABLISHED THE JOHN ADAMS
PROJECT TO ‘SUPPORT MILITARY COUNSEL AT
GUANTANAMO BAY.’ THE MISSION BEHIND THIS
TREACHEROUS ENTERPRISE WAS TO IDENTIFY
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS INVOLVED IN INTERROGATING
GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES AND THEN PROVIDE THAT
INFORMATION TO MILITARY DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
REPRESENTING DETAINEES SO THAT THEY COULD ATTEMPT
TO CALL INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL TO TESTIFY.”
— Florida Congressman Jeff Miller (R)76
Lawfare came to describe the efforts of lawyers and
organizations attempting to challenge the bestowed legal status and
detention of foreign nationals held in the US Naval base at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The foreign national detention program,
initiated by the Bush Administration in 2002, became a notorious
symbol of the US-led War on Terror. The location, and uncertain
legal status of the detainees, constituted a deliberate strategy to place
these individuals beyond the jurisdiction of US courts.77 This initially
served to create a legal gray area, where detainees were denied
habeas corpus protections under the US Constitution and effectively

76. Jeff Miller, Guest Blogger: Congressman Jeff Miller (R-FL) On Investigating the
John Adams Project, DAILY SIGNAL (May 21, 2010), http://dailysignal.com/2010/05/21/guestblogger-congressman-jeff-miller-r-fl-on-investigating-the-john-adams-project/.
77. Fiona de Londras, Guantanamo Bay: Towards Legality?, 71 MOD. L. REV. 36, 36-37
(2008); Frakt, supra note 75, at 347 (recalling how alternative locations, like Andersen Air
Force Base in Guam, were rejected due to the possibility that detainees held there may gain
access to US Courts).
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insulated from legal challenges that would contest the grounds of their
detention.78
The Administration’s strategy evoked a torrent of criticism that
drew upon domestic constitutional law and a human rights-based
framework.79 Foreign States, alongside regional and international
organizations, joined the mounting chorus of condemnation.80 The
European Parliament called on the United States to “close the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility and insist[] that every prisoner
should be treated in accordance with international humanitarian law
and tried without delay in a fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent, impartial tribunal.”81
Within the United States, the Bush-era detention program faced
mounting domestic legal challenges.82 A series of petitions,
coordinated through the Center for Constitutional Rights, brought
78. John Yoo, a former lawyer in the Office of Legal Counsel and architect of much of
the Administration’s legal framework concerning many of the most controversial aspects of
the war on terror, confirmed this intention. See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN
INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 142-46 (2006).
79. The US section of Amnesty International have been amongst the most high-profile
critics of the Guantánamo Bay detention program, holding that “[f]rom day one, the USA
failed to recognize the applicability of human rights law to the Guantanamo detentions.” See
Amnesty Int’l, Guantanamo, A Decade of Damage to Human Rights, AI Index No. AMR
51/103/2011 (2011). Numerous other human rights-focused NGOs expressed similar, rightsbased, condemnations of the detention program. See e.g., Locked Up Alone: Detention
Conditions and Mental Health at Guantanamo, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 9, 2008),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/locked-alone/detention-conditions-and-mental-healthguantanamo.
80. See, e.g., Merkel: Guantanamo Mustn’t Exist in Long Term, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Jan. 9
2006, 9:58 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/20uantan-interview-merkel-guantanamomustn-t-exist-in-long-term-a-394180.html (comments of German Chancellor Angela Merkel);
Blair: Guantanamo is an anomaly, GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2006, 7:38 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/feb/17/politics.guantanamo (comments of former
British Prime Minister Tony Blair); see also UK told US won’t shut Guantanamo, BBC NEWS
(May 11, 2006, 2:55 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4760365.stm.
81. Resolution on Guantanamo, EUR. PARL. DOC. B6-0299/2006 (May 23, 2006); see
also Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n on H.R., Inter-American Commission Urges United
States to Close Guantanamo Without Delay, Resolution No. 1/06 (July 28, 2006); Juan E.
Mendez (Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of
punishment), Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture at the Expert
Meeting on the situation of detainees held at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay (Oct. 3,
2013), delivered by Ms. Stephanie Selg, Associate Human Rights Expert, Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13859&.
82. See generally Meredith B. Osborn, Rasul v. Bush: Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction
over Habeas Challenges and Other Claims Brought by Guantanamo Detainees, 40 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 265 (2005); de Londras, supra note 77.
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numerous writs of habeas corpus on behalf of various detainees. The
representation provided by these lawyers, dubbed the Guantánamo
Bay Bar, in bringing forth habeas petitions attracted instant
controversy and would be viewed as an example of an expansive
notion of lawfare.83
Several commentators perceived the actions of these lawyers,
and the intentions of their clients, as treacherous and equated the legal
motions with national security threats:
Lawyers can literally get us killed . . . . We may never know how
many of the hundreds of repatriated detainees are back in action,
fighting the U.S. or our allies thanks to the efforts of the
Guantanamo Bay Bar . . . . Allowing lawyers to subvert the truth
and transform the Constitution into a lethal weapon in the hands
of our enemies – while casting themselves as patriots – makes
84
mockery of the sacrifices made by true patriots

Others assumed a critical but more measured response to the assigned
intentions of the lawyers and the habeas petitions. While these did not
reach the levels of hysteria displayed by some commentators, they
served to provide an expansive understanding of how lawfare was
understood:
Most instances of lawfare, such as the more than 400 habeas
corpus lawsuits filed by detainees held at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, simply seek to harass and burden our legal mechanisms.
Like a computer virus or a hacker’s denial-of-service attack on a
network, meritless suits seek to grind the wheels of justice to a
halt.85

This emergent notion of lawfare moved well beyond Dunlap’s
conception of law as a substitute for a traditional military means to
achieve an operational objective.86 As David Frakt, a former Defense
Counsel with the Office of Military Commissions, asks of this
imposed notion of lawfare: “[W]hat exactly are the military ends
83. For an overview of the associated controversy, see Frakt, supra note 75, at 336-40.
See also Scott Horton, Silencing the Lawyers, HARPER’S MAG. (May 26, 2010, 10:23 AM),
http://harpers.org/blog/2010/05/silencing-the-lawyers/ [hereinafter Horton Silencing the
Lawyers].
84. Daniel Halper, Lawfare Warning, WKLY. STANDARD (Mar. 5, 2010),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/lawfare-warnings/article/422507, quoted in Frakt, supra note
75, at 338.
85. C. Peter Dungan, Fighting Lawfare: At the Special Operations Task Force Level, 21
SPECIAL WARFARE 9, 10 (2008).
86. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, at 122.
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pursued by [this] lawfare? What is it that a military enemy is
theoretically trying to accomplish through manipulative legal
actions?”87
Yet when the Supreme Court of the United States held District
Courts had jurisdiction to hear the habeas petitions and, later, that the
Guantánamo detainees were entitled to protection under the US
Constitution, accusations of lawfare were accompanied by firm policy
prescriptions that served to further obfuscate the detainees’ access to
judicial remedies and the ability of their lawyers to bring forth such
petitions.88 This emergent notion of lawfare, described in a
Washington Post op-ed as the use of federal courts to undermine the
military’s ability to keep dangerous enemy combatants off the
battlefield, evoked a range of official responses.89
From the time that the Bush Administration initiated the transfer
of foreign detainees to Guantánamo Bay, efforts were taken to limit
their access to both courts and lawyers.90 Initially, many of the
detainees were held incommunicado and had their identities
concealed.91 In direct response to the early Supreme Court decisions
in Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,92 which extended habeas
protections to the detainees, the US Congress passed the 2005
Detainee Treatment Act, which, inter alia, held that:
[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or
on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.93

Following the Hamdi decision, in which the Court held the detainees
are entitled to some level of due process, the Government established
Combat Status Review Tribunals.94 These, however, were designed to
deny detainees legal representation and prohibited the lawyers who
87. Frakt, supra note 75, at 341.
88. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004);
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723 (2008).
89. Marc A. Thiessen, The ‘al-Qaeda seven’ and selective McCarthyism, WASH. P OST,
(Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/08/AR20100
30801742.html.
90. See generally David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1981, 1987-98 (2008) [hereinafter Luban Lawfare].
91. Id. at 1989.
92. See generally Rasul, 542 U.S. 466; Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507.
93. Detainee Treatment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2005).
94. See generally Robert A. Peal, Combat Status Review Tribunals and the Unique
Nature of the War on Terror, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1629 (2005).
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represented these clients in federal court from discussing the Review
Tribunal procedure.95
When defense counsel formally gained increased access
following the Supreme Court decisions in 2004, they faced numerous
practical obstacles in accessing their clients. Guantánamo’s location,
limiting travel logistics, federal oversight of lawyer-client
communications, and the classified status of such information all
contributed to a climate in which “the mechanics of meeting with
[their] clients comprise[d] one important set of policies that [made]
these representations unusually difficult.”96 These factors were
compounded by several other intentional efforts that sought to deny
the detainees’ access to their lawyers and endeavored to compromise
the lawyers’ abilities to conduct their defense effectively. Deliberate
efforts were taken to ensure that the detainees were unable or
unwilling to meet with their lawyers:
They don’t tell the detainee that his lawyer is there to see him.
Instead, they tell him that he “has a reservation,” which means an
interrogation. The detainee says he doesn’t want to go, so then
they tell the lawyer that his client doesn’t want to see him.97

Numerous other methods were deliberately employed to strain the
client-lawyer relationship. Detainees were told of their lawyer’s
sexual orientation, cultural or religious heritage, or given examples of
their past clients. The detainees were told that their lawyer was gay,
Jewish, or once represented the State of Israel (whether or not these
claims were factual), and were encouraged by Guantánamo
interrogators not to trust their lawyers as a result.98
Beyond the restrictive environment manufactured in
Guantánamo, Jeff Miller, the Congressman from Florida who equated
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’ (“NACDL”) efforts to
support habeas petitions for several of the Guantánamo detainees
with an act of treachery, compelled the Defense Department’s
Inspector General to investigate the “conduct and practice” of lawyers

95. Luban Lawfare, supra note 90, at 1987; see also JOSEPH MARGULIES,
GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF P RESIDENTIAL P OWER 159-70 (2006).
96. Luban Lawfare, supra note 90, at 1989-90.
97. Id. at 1990.
98. Id. at 1992-98.
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who represented clients at Guantánamo.99 Government officials
publicly shamed the defense attorneys as a professional class and
implicitly threatened the business interests of the firms where they
were employed.100 David Frakt asserted that “[t]he Bush
Administration took their counterlawfare efforts to the extreme by
denying detainees all access to lawyers or to courts, and by asserting
that no laws or treaties, including Article 3 [of the Geneva
Conventions], protected detainees . . . .”101
Again, though, this was not a blanket rejection of international
law or an assertion that the exigency of the post-September 11th
landscape compelled derogation from relevant legal frameworks.
Instead, in establishing its response to this expansive notion of
lawfare, the Administration presented intricate legal arguments that
drew directly on interpreted notions of international law. The Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatments of Prisoners of War (The
Third Geneva Convention) was held, based on a formulistic reading
of the Convention’s provisions, to apply only to High Contracting
Parties “which can only be states.”102 In following: “[N]one of the
provisions of [the Third Geneva Convention] apply to our conflict
with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world.”103
Common Article 3 of the Conventions, which provides
protection to combatants captured during battle in instances of noninternational armed conflict, was declared inapplicable due to the
international status of the US military campaigns in Afghanistan and
Iraq.104 The Office of Legal Counsel and the State Department
debated the application of this body of law to the detainees, each
99. This was required through a provision in a Defense Appropriations Act and
compelled formal investigation when defense lawyers were believed to have “interfered with
the operations” at Guantánamo or “violated any applicable policy of the department.” This was
interpreted broadly so that almost any initiative undertaken by defense counsel could trigger a
potential investigation. See Horton Silencing the Lawyers, supra note 83.
100. Gregory P. Noone, Lawfare or Strategic Communications, 43 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 73, 77 (2010); see also Top Pentagon Officials Calls for Boycott of Law Firms
Representing Guantanamo Prisoners, DEMOCRACY N OW
(Jan. 17,
2007),
http://www.democracynow.org/2007/1/17/top_pentagon_official_calls_for_boycott.
These
comments, however, were widely denounced. See Luban Lawfare, supra note 90, at 1982.
101. Frakt, supra note 75, at 346-47.
102. Memorandum from George W. Bush, U.S. President, on Humane Treatment of
Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees to Vice President et al. (Feb. 7 2002),
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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putting forth international law-based arguments detailing how the
President was required to act in response to the threat of terrorism.105
These legal engagements, along with various legislative and policy
initiatives taken by both the Administration and Congress, contrived
to ensure that, until definitive Supreme Court intervention nearly
seven years after Guantánamo Bay received its first detainees in the
War on Terror, habeas petitions were severely limited.106
Contested conceptions and interpretations of international law
were at the core of the debate and controversy that surrounded the
detention program at Guantánamo Bay. The policies and legislative
framework that created the detention facility drew upon
interpretations of international law.107 These arguments failed to
convince many beyond the Administration and its staunchest allies.
The Supreme Court denounced many of the Government’s policies
and supporting legal arguments.108 Yet, the efforts taken by the
detainees themselves, by individual lawyers who offered their
representation, and by private organizations who coordinated or
supported these efforts merited the charge of lawfare. In response to
this expansive understanding of lawfare, the Administration and
Congress increased its efforts to further deny the Guantánamo
detainees, the vast majority of whom were never charged, access to
courts and access to legal representations.109 Again, lawfare did not
equate to a broad denouncement of international law, but instead to a
particular and systematic effort to limit the use of international law
and legal remedies by a particular actor, for a particular purpose.

105. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., on Application of
Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees to William J Haynes II, Gen. Couns.
Dep’t Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf;
Memorandum from William H. Taft, Dep’t of State, on Your Draft Memorandum of January 9
to John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. (Jan. 11, 2002), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/
torturingdemocracy/documents/20020111.pdf. For an account of these international law-based
debates between the Office of Legal Counsel and the State Department, see Bradley, supra
note 73, at 66-67.
106. See Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723 (2008).
107. See Bradley, supra note 73, at 62-67.
108. See supra note 88.
109. Of the 779 individuals detained at Guantánamo, 674 were released without any
charge and others await release. See Guantanamo: Facts and Figures, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2016/04/18/guantanamo-factsand-figures>.
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5. “AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TRIAL, ONCE MORE THE
BROTHERS MUST INSIST ON PROVING THAT TORTURE WAS
INFLICTED ON THEM BY STATE SECURITY [INVESTIGATORS]
BEFORE THE JUDGE.”
— al-Qaeda Training Manual (The Manchester Manual)110
The controversy that surrounded the detainees contributed
towards another understanding of lawfare that carried beyond the
boundaries of the US Naval base at Guantánamo Bay. This use of the
term lawfare is of multifaceted purpose. It claims that accusations of
torture or mistreatment by, or on behalf of, detainees constitute either
a strategic effort to burden tactical operations within zones of combat
or seek to shame the United States’ international reputation and
generate public disapproval of its foreign policy.
The first accused motive holds that, “[r]ecently, insurgent forces
in Iraq and Afghanistan have been waging a legal battle against
tactical-level forces to extend the lines of operation of their leaders’
lawfare efforts and to attempt to blunt America’s tip of the spear.”111
This understanding of lawfare, which manifests simply through the
accusation of torture, abuse, or other forms of mistreatment,
constitutes a strategic attempt to compromise the operational
objectives of the state against whom the accusation is made:
[D]etainees may make claims of abuse at the point of capture by
indigenous forces, claim abuse again when transferred to an
American detachment or team, and then claim abuse once again
when they reach the detention facility . . . . Knowing that U.S.
forces are duty-bound to investigate all claims of detainee abuse,
insurgents can effectively burden leaders at three different levels
of tactical command with detailed investigations.112

Additionally, this notion of lawfare argues that claims of torture
constitute a significant public relations victory for the United States’
enemies:
By latching onto the torture narrative through the confirmed
instances of mistreatment, and further taking this narrative onto
the record in various legal forums, the tactic served to irreparably
110.
Al
Qaeda
Manual,
Part
21,
U.S.
BORDER
http://www.usborderpatrol.com/Border_Patrol1803_21.htm (alteration in original).
111. Dungan, supra note 85, at 10.
112. Id.

P ATROL,
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harm the image of the United States, removed the benefit of the
doubt pertaining to government efforts to combat torture
allegations, and consequentially the government’s ability to
effectively prosecute both a war and its accused war criminals.113

Commentators who perpetuate this notion of lawfare have suggested
that detainees of the War on Terror intentionally provoke US officials
so as to “force” mistreatment and substantiate a claim of abuse.114
That these detainees (often, accused members of al-Qaeda or the
Taliban) would manufacture an accusation of torture or abuse to gain
a tangible advantage over their captors is described as “akin to
malicious prosecution.”115 This understanding of lawfare, however,
extends beyond the individual detainee who claims torture or abuse.
Both non-governmental organizations and media outlets who
have either reported or investigated accusations of torture have been
charged with practicing this form of lawfare. Such groups and their
representatives are believed to be forwarding an ideological agenda
intent on damaging the United States’ reputation and curtailing its
hegemonic design.116 Amnesty International has been accused of
disseminating its literature to detainees held by US forces and
essentially directing detainees to claim torture.117 This particular
claim of lawfare moved beyond the accusation made by the detainee,
often with little regard for the merits of the accusation, and fixated on
the intermediary who sought to substantiate or disseminate the varied
claims.
NGOs and certain media outlets were declared as threats to US
interests.118 Their actions were equated with terrorist organizations:
“This new class of warrior consists of intergovernmental
organizations, transnational guerrilla and terrorist groups,
multinational organizations . . . and a rapidly growing number of
nongovernmental organizations in a wide variety of functional

113.
114.
115.
116.

Lebowitz, supra note 19, at 362.
See Tung Yin, Boumediene and Lawfare, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 865, 880 (2009).
Id. at 881.
See Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12, at 319-20; see also Frakt, supra note 75, at

342.
117. See Lebowitz, supra note 19, at 374; see also Debra Burlingame & Thomas
Joscelyn, Gitmo’s Indefensible Lawyers, WALL ST . J. (Mar. 15, 2010),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704131404575117611125 872740>.
118. Fonte, supra note 66.
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areas.”119 These charges, however, went beyond simple accusations
and talking-points espoused by various commentators who – in
accordance with Michael Kearney’s understanding of lawfare as a
“critique of human rights activism and advocacy” – viewed the role
assumed by NGOs and certain media outlets as detrimental to US
interests within the War on Terror.120
Donald Rumsfeld introduced this notion of lawfare into the
official discourse that surrounded the detainees held in US custody.
The Secretary of Defense claimed, “[t]hese detainees are trained to
lie, they’re trained to say they were tortured, and the minute we
release them or the minute they get a lawyer, very frequently they’ll
go out and they will announce that they’ve been tortured . . . The
media jumps on these claims.”121 Secretary Rumsfeld would
substantiate such accusations with reference to an al-Qaeda training
manual, discovered by the Manchester Metropolitan Police during a
raid of a home in the North-East of England. Dubbed the Manchester
Manual, Secretary Rumsfeld repeated the claim that terrorists have
been trained to lie about abuse and torture while in US captivity
because “their training manual says so.”122
The Manchester Manual served as purportedly uncontroversial
evidence that al-Qaeda practiced aggressive forms of lawfare, were
familiar with and able to advantageously manipulate US and
international law, and employed a standard operating procedure that
manufactured false claims of abuse to both burden and denigrate US
objectives and interests.123 David Frakt has claimed that the Bush
119. Austin & Kolenc, supra note 12, at 303-04; see also Davida E. Kellogg,
International Law and Terrorism, 85 MIL. REV. 50, 50 (2005) (“The opinions of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), terrorist sympathizers and apologists,
and
uninformed reporters with political agendas are not the law, and by our inaction we should not
allow them to become new prerogative norms.”); Fonte, supra note 66.
120. Kearney, supra note 20, at 88.
121. Donna Miles, Al Qaeda Manual Drives Detainee Behavior at Guantanamo Bay,
AM . FORCES P RESS SERV. (June 29, 2005), http://www.dodea.edu/Offices/Safety/upload/13_
Detainee_Behavior _Guantanamo_Bay.pdf>.
122. Id.
123. For example, during a Department of Defense briefing, Paul Butler, the Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, asserted:
During questioning of the detainees, new information is constantly revealed,
confirmed and analyzed to determine its reliability. Unfortunately, many detainees
are deceptive and prefer to conceal their identities and actions. Some of you may be
familiar with a document called the Manchester Manual. This was a document that
was picked up in a search in Manchester, England and has surfaced in various other
venues, including in Afghanistan. It’s really the al Qaeda manual, and in it is a large
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Administration used the existence of the Manual to convince the
public of the legitimacy of its enhanced interrogation program. He
cites a Department of Defense official who argued that
the
Manchester Manual demonstrated al-Qaeda’s ability to remain
impervious to traditional interrogation techniques: “There is a very
lengthy chapter on counter-interrogation techniques. These are
sophisticated terrorists who know how to avoid interrogation.”124
The Manual, described as both an act and evidence of lawfare,
was used by US officials to formally defend the United States against
international law-based accusations of torture and prisoner
mistreatment, despite the fact that the Manual had been discovered in
2000 – before the United States formally began its leadership role in
the War on Terror.125 In response to questions posed by the United
Nation’s Committee Against Torture to the US Government regarding
allegations of abuse and torture, Charles Stimson, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, replied to the UN
monitoring body:
While the United States is aware of allegations of torture and illtreatment, and takes them very seriously, it disagrees strongly
with the assertion that such are widespread or systematic . . .
these allegations must be placed in context: they relate to a
minute percentage of the overall number of persons who have
been detained. Moreover, not everything that is alleged is in fact
truth. For example, it is well-known that al Qaeda are trained to
lie. The “Manchester Manual” instructs all al Qaeda members,

section which teaches al Qaeda operatives counterinterrogation techniques: how to
lie, how to minimize your role.
See Briefing on Detainee Operations at Guantanamo Bay, DEP'T DEF. (Feb. 13, 2004),
https://cryptome.org/dod-gulag.htm; see also Jane Mayer, The Experiment, NEW Y ORKER
(July 11, 2005), http://www.newyorker.com/maga zine/2005/07/11/the-experiment-3>.
124. Paul Butler, The Detainees, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 13, 2004, 12:00 AM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/jan-june04/detainees2-13.html, quoted in Frakt,
supra note 75, at 350.
125. US efforts to reference the Manual as evidence of a lawfare strategy intended to
undermine a variety of American interests was held by several commentators to be
disingenuous. The Manual was discovered prior to September 11th, prior to Guantánamo Bay
or Abu Ghraib, and prior to US initiation of the war on terror. This reading of the Manual did
not appear to instruct detainees to fabricate claims of torture and abuse but instead to report it:
“written in the expectation that its recruits would be detained by . . . enemy Arab regimes, the
manual anticipates torture as an inevitable fact, and simply urges captives to report the
treatment they receive.” Larry Siems, Chapter 5, Part 2 - The Battle Lab, TORTURE REP.
(Sept. 3, 2010, 3:54 PM), http://www.thetorturereport.org/report/chapter-5-part-2-battle-lab.
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when captured, to allege torture, even if they are not subject to
abuse.126

The Administration’s position in the debate over interrogation
techniques and accusations of torture and other forms of mistreatment
did not, however, disassociate from international legal reasoning. The
enhanced interrogation program that gave rise to many allegations of
torture leveled against the United States was based largely upon
particular readings and interpretations of international law. The
notorious definition of torture that would form the basis of the
enhanced interrogation programs operated by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Department of Defense was effectively a legal
argument about the necessary standard of conduct that must be
achieved so as to remain in compliance with the United Nation’s
Convention Against Torture.127 The Bush Administration and the
Department of Justice drew directly upon international law when they
sought to devise the means and methods of interrogation that would
provide their desired security and intelligence outcomes. These legal
arguments were, of course, abject failures that were routinely
denounced and almost universally held to have strayed disastrously
from any plausible account of state obligation pertaining to the
treatment of detainees or the prohibition on torture.128 Yet the merits
of these arguments and legal engagements are not of direct concern,
nor do they alter the fact that US officials attempted to draw directly
upon international legal arguments to legitimize aspects of their
interrogation tactics.

126. United States’ Response to the Questions Asked by the Committee Against Torture,
U.S. DEP’T ST. (May 5, 2006), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/68561.htm.
127. The imposed standard was drafted by the Office of Legal Counsel and held that
“physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying
serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.
For purely mental pain or suffering to amount to torture . . . it must result in significant
psychological harm of significant duration, e.g. lasting for months or even years . . . . In short,
reading the definition of torture as a whole, it is plain that the term encompasses only extreme
acts.” Off. Assistant Att'y Gen. On Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§
2340-2340A to Alberto R. Gonzalez, Couns. to the President (Aug. 1, 2002),
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.08.01.pdf; see also Bradley, supra note
73, at 70-72; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
128. See DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE P OLITICS OF P RISONER ABUSE : THE UNITED
STATES AND ENEMY P RISONERS AFTER 9/11 60-75 (2011). See generally DAVID COLE ,
THE TORTURE MEMOS : RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE (2013); DAVID LUBAN,
TORTURE, P OWER, AND L AW (2014).
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Individuals or organizations who claimed abuse or denounced
these interrogation techniques and the treatment of detainees more
broadly were accused of practicing lawfare. First, the accusation of
lawfare would dismiss the substance of the claim, effectively (albeit
informally) rendering the claim inadmissible due to the perceived and
assigned motives of the individual or organization forwarding the
claim. This allows the claim to be denied by accusing the claimant of
lying as per the Manchester Manual. Second, it accuses third-party
interests (often NGOs or international organizations) who make or
publicize similar accusations of perpetuating a false claim.
Collectively, this delegitimizes the use of international mechanisms
and standards by such actors who seek to pursue or frame claims in
accordance with international law. These particular forms of
international legal engagement become an illegitimate and
(informally) inadmissible means of achieving redress or demanding
account.
6. “SUCH LAWFARE – THE MANIPULATION OF WESTERN
LAWS AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS TO ACHIEVE STRATEGIC
MILITARY AND POLITICAL ENDS – OFTEN MANIFESTS AS
FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS DESIGNED TO SILENCE, PUNISH, AND
DETER THOSE WHO PUBLICLY SPEAK AND REPORT ON
MILITANT ISLAM, TERRORISM AND THEIR SOURCES OF
FINANCING.”
— Brooke Goldstein and Benjamin Ryberg (of the Lawfare
Project)129
On the margins of the War on Terror, lawfare has come to
describe the actions of individuals or organizations who employ libel
or hate speech laws to “silence” criticism of “controversial Islamic
organizations.”130 This marked a significant departure from Dunlap’s
description of law as a substitute for traditional military means to
achieve an operational objective.131 Opponents of this notion of
129. Brooke Goldstein & Benjamin Ryberg, Note, The Emerging Force of Lawfare:
Legal Maneuvering Designed to Hinder Exposure of Terrorism and Terror Financing, 36
FORDHAM INT ’L L.J. 634, 637 (2003).
130. Alan Dershowitz & Elizabeth Samson, The chilling effect of ‘lawfare’ litigation,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2010, 8:30 AM), https://www. theguardian.com/commentisfree/liberty
central/2010/feb/09/libel-reform-radical-islamic -groups.
131. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, at 338; see also Frakt, supra note 75, at 342.
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lawfare hold that, “over the past ten years, there has been a steady
increase in Islamist lawfare tactics directly targeting the human rights
of North American and European civilians in order to constrain the
free flow of public information about radical Islam.”132
This notion of lawfare is believed to create a chilling effect on
individuals disseminating information about such groups.133 Alan
Dershowitz and Elizabeth Samson have argued that “[radical Islamic
groups] have learned to sue their critics for defamation, not with the
intent to win the case, but with the hope of imposing an unaffordably
high cost on criticism of their actions.”134 According to opponents of
this notion of lawfare, it is “effective because one lawsuit can silence
thousands who have neither the time nor the financial resources to
challenge well-funded terror financiers or the vast machine of the
international judicial system.”135
Despite the apparent departure from Dunlap’s intended meaning
of the term, this notion of lawfare has strained its application to
include national security considerations. Brooke Goldstein and
Benjamin Ryberg of The Lawfare Project argue that the significance
of such lawfare tactics has adversely impacted how the US
Government approaches national security reporting.136 This threat,
according to Goldstein and Ryberg, has resulted from formal
engagements with international legal mechanisms:
For more than ten years, an international movement to silence
free speech about Islamist terrorism has emerged from the United
Nations under the guise of “prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of religion or belief” – with a marked focus on Islam.137

Accordingly, this, coupled with the use of domestic courts to bring
libel cases against groups or individuals who attempt to expose
132. Tiefenbrun, supra note 10, at 52; see also Aaron Eitan Meyer, Islamist Lawfare,
AM . SPECTATOR (Sept. 15, 2009, 10:07 AM), http://spectator.org/40898_islamist-lawfare/>;
Brooke Goldstein, The Disproportionate Use of Lawfare, GATESTONE INST. (Apr. 5, 2010,
5:00 AM),
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1132/the-disproportionate-use-of-lawfare>;
Frakt, supra note 75, at 342; Dershowitz & Samson, supra note 130.
133. Tiefenbrun, supra note 10, at 52.
134. Dershowitz & Samson, supra note 130.
135. Tiefenbrun, supra note 10, at 52.
136. Goldstein & Ryberg, supra note 129, at 652-55.
137. Goldstein and Ryberg cite Human Rights Council Resolution 19/25, which
reaffirms the “obligation of states to prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion or belief
and to implement measures to guarantee the equal and effective protection of the law.”
Goldstein & Ryberg, supra note 129, at 650 (quoting Human Rights Council Res. 19/25, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/RES/19/25, at 1 (Apr. 10, 2012)).
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“terrorism or terrorist financing,” carries detrimental effects on
domestic policy and security initiatives.138 Domestically, this has
manifested through a host of initiatives, largely undertaken by the
Obama Administration, that Goldstein and Ryberg believe
to
evidence “how the Islamist lawfare strategy to politicize speech
deemed ‘Islamophobic’, and to silence speech deemed blasphemous
of Islam, is directly impacting U.S. domestic policy.”139
While free speech receives broad formal protection under the
First Amendment to the US Constitution, opponents of this form of
purported lawfare draw upon the threat of “libel tourism.”140 This
supposes that a plaintiff will “forum shop” to find a sympathetic and
legally advantageous jurisdiction to bring forth a libel claim against a
foreign defendant. Most often, the United Kingdom, known for
plaintiff-friendly libel laws and a burden of proof standard under
which the accused must prove his or her own innocence, is the
preferred venue.141 While such methods and legal tactics have
increasingly been discussed in relation to an expansive notion of
lawfare, the use of libel tourism, forum shopping, and the vexatious
employment of domestic laws to silence criticism have long histories
of strategic application.142 Yet it has not been until particular groups –
primarily Muslims or Islamic organizations – began, or were at least
138. Goldstein and Ryberg cite American co-sponsorship of Human Rights Council
Resolutions promoting religious tolerance as evidence of “the suppression of legitimate
dialogue about real and imminent national security threats.” Id. at 650-52; see also Human
Rights Council Res. 16/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18, at 1 (Apr. 12, 2011).
139. Goldstein and Ryberg provide examples including Secretary of State Clinton’s
efforts to implement Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18; a revision of federal
counterterrorism training materials to eliminate reference to “jihad” and “Islam”; the failure of
the Obama Administration’s National Intelligence Strategy to reference Islam or characterize
jihad as a form of holy war against the West; and the classification of the Fort Hood military
base shooting as “workplace violence” rather than an act of terrorism. See Goldstein &
Ryberg, supra note 129, at 652-53.
140. See Arlen Specter & Joe Lieberman, Foreign Courts Take Aim at our Free Speech,
WALL ST . J. (July 14, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121599561708449643.
141. Trevor C. Hartley, Libel Tourism and Conflict of Laws, 59 INT ’L & COMP. L.Q. 25
(2010); see also Sarah Staveley-O’Carroll, Libel Tourism Laws: Spoiling the Holiday and
Saving the First Amendment?, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 252 (2009).
142. See Richard Garnett & Megan Richardson, Libel Tourism or Just Redress?
Reconciling the (English) Right to Reputation with the (American) Right to Free Speech in
Cross-border Libel Cases, 5 J. PRIV . INT ’L L. 471 (2009); see also Yasmine Lahlou, Libel
Tourism: A Transatlantic Quandary, 2 J. INT ’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 199 (2009); Raymond W.
Beauchamp, England’s Chilling Forecast: The Case for Granting Declaratory Relief to
Prevent English Defamation Actions from Chilling American Speech, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
3073, 3074-76 (2006).
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perceived to begin, engaging with libel laws that the term lawfare was
applied and legislative and judicial measures were taken in response.
Following the 2003 publication of Funding Evil: How Terrorism
is Financed and How to Stop It, a book in which author Rachel
Ehrenfeld accused Khalid Salim Bin Mahfouz, a prominent Saudi
banker, of providing financial support to al-Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations, Bin Mahfouz filed a defamation claim in English
court.143 After Ehrenfeld refused to acknowledge the English Court’s
jurisdiction, Bin Mahfouz was awarded damages.144 Bin Mahfouz did
not attempt to enforce the ruling in the United States; however,
Rachel Ehrenfeld filed for a declaratory judgment, arguing that
“under federal and New York law, bin Mahfouz could not prevail on
the libel claim against her and that the English default judgement was
invalid.”145
The New York Court of Appeals declined jurisdiction on the
matter but held that there was a need to protect New York residents
from the chilling effect of foreign libel judgments but that such
actions needed to result from state legislation.146 In direct response,
lawmakers in Albany passed the Libel Terrorism Protection Act,
dubbed “Rachel’s Law,” which “was designed to address the issue of
obtaining personal jurisdiction over a plaintiff in a foreign defamation
action, as well as the substantive issue of whether a New York Court
would enforce a foreign judgment.”147
The legislation focused on narrow jurisdictional issues and the
compatibility of foreign judgments with afforded First Amendment
protections. The accompanying discourse surrounding the drafting
and passage of the legislation, however, fixated on issues of terrorism,
terrorist financing, and the accompanying notion of lawfare.148
Various States followed, passing similarly formed laws and the
143. Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld [2005] EWHC (QB) 1156 (Eng.).
144. Id.; see also Andrew R. Klein, Some Thoughts on Libel Tourism, 38 PEPP. L. REV .
375, 377 (2011).
145. See Michelle Feldman, Putting the Breaks on Libel Tourism: Examining the Effects
Test as a Basis for Personal Jurisdiction under New York’s Libel Terrorism Protection Act, 31
CARDOZO L. REV . 2457, 2458 (2010); see also Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 9 N.Y.3d 501, 507
(2007).
146. Ehrenfeld, 9 N.Y.3d at 507.
147. Klein, supra note 144, at 381.
148. See Rory Lanaman & Dean G. Skelos, The Libel Terrorism Protection Act, Also
Known as Rachel’s Law, Signed by Governor, AM . CTR. DEMOCRACY (May 1, 2008, 5:38
AM),
http://acdemocracy.org/the-libel-terrorism-protection-act-also-known-as-rachels-lawsigned-by-governor/.
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following year federal legislation began moving through Congress.149
While the resulting federal legislation sought to balance free speech
protections with the principle of comity and did not directly mention
issues of terrorism or lawfare, the legislation was largely driven by
such influences.150
Certainly, individuals or groups of litigants may attempt to
advantageously or vexatiously apply libel laws, either within the
United States or through foreign jurisdictions, but this is hardly an
exclusive phenomenon attributable to a particular group. Yet, the
identification of such legal actions, regardless of their respective
merits, as lawfare, is reserved for what Alan Dershowitz and
Elizabeth Samson dubbed “controversial Islamic organizations.”151
The singular focus of this notion of lawfare, and the at least partially
implied intentions of accompanying reactive legislation, serves to
brand any legal action brought by an Islamic group or individual as
malicious and devoid of legal merit often before or without the
substance of the legal claim receiving judicial treatment. This, in
itself, creates a chilling effect. From the moment of commencement,
legal actions brought by a particular class, under the supposed guise
of lawfare, are reactively doubted, limited, and repressed.
7. “TRUTH BE TOLD, WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO EMBRACE
LAWFARE, FOR IT IS VASTLY PREFERABLE TO THE BLOODY,
EXPENSIVE, AND DESTRUCTIVE FORMS OF WARFARE THAT
RAVAGED THE WORLD IN THE 20TH CENTURY…I WOULD FAR
PREFER TO HAVE MOTIONS AND DISCOVERY REQUESTS
FIRED AT ME THAN INCOMING MORTAR OR ROCKETPROPELLED GRENADE FIRE.”
— Phillip Carter (former US Army Officer)152

149. This culminated in the passage of the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and
Established Constitutional Heritage Act. See Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and
Established Constitutional Heritage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 4102 (2010); see also Klein, supra note
144, at 381-84.
150. Mark W. Holzer, Offensive Lawfare and the Current Conflict, HARV. NAT ’L SEC.
J. (Apr. 10, 2012, 1:17 AM), http://harvardnsj.org/2012/04/offensive-lawfare-and-the-currentconflict/.
151. Klein, supra note 144.
152. Phillip Carter, Legal Combat: Are enemies waging war in our courts?, SLATE ,
(Apr. 4, 2005, 5:51 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2005/04/legal_combat.html.
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Much of what was originally termed lawfare is clearly preferable
to the high costs and tragic certainties of war. Charles Dunlap has
acknowledged that “there are many uses of what might be called
‘lawfare’ that serve to reduce the destructiveness of conflicts, and
therefore further one of the fundamental purposes of the law of
war.”153 In such instances, it is not immediately evident why these
uses of international law do not simply represent an intended or
successful function of international law. Though if Dunlap is correct
that acts such as purchasing satellite imagery, imposing sanctions
against Iraq’s Air Force, strengthening the rule of law, or ceasing the
finance of terrorist organizations enabled the evasion of sustained
episodes of violence then such forms of legal engagement are plainly
preferable.154
States, however, have long partaken in such forms of legal
engagement. An increasingly globalized and formalist international
environment, mature legal mechanisms, and developed civil society
organizations may provide greater opportunities for engagement but
such forms of strategic legal employment are well-established.155 The
actions of a State or international actor that invokes international law
in furtherance of a strategic objective do not frequently merit such
general attention or a designated nomenclature.
Despite the ubiquity of much of what Dunlap’s evolved
conception of lawfare describes, the term has gained prominence
within media and amongst policymakers. It is tempting to place the
rise of lawfare within the context of a post-September 11th, War on
Terror, Bush Administration-dominated environment. It is here that
lawfare has its origins, developed its diverse understandings and
applications, and received prominent attention from the highest levels
of political power. But lawfare should not be understood within this
singular context. An analysis of the use of the term lawfare over a tenyear span found that while the term began appearing within the media
in 2003, eighty-seven percent of total references to lawfare occurred
between 2009 and 2013, when the study concluded.156
153. Dunlap Today and Tomorrow, supra note 5, at 316.
154. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, at 123-24.
155. See generally PETER M AGUIRE , LAW AND WAR: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
AMERICAN HISTORY (2010); MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF
INTERNATIONAL L AW: GREAT EXPECTATIONS 1789-1914 (2004).
156. The analysis performed by Neve Gordon was global in scope and found that the
term lawfare appeared in 43 of the 207 “Major World Publications” within the LexisNexis
database. See Gordon, supra note 33, at 318-21.
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Still, the question remains: Do we have every reason to embrace
a state-led notion of lawfare, as many commentators have
suggested?157 Orde Kittrie argues that “the U.S. government’s lack of
systematic engagement with lawfare is a tremendous missed
opportunity” and that “lawfare, deployed systematically and adeptly,
could in various circumstances save U.S. and foreign lives by
enabling U.S. national security objectives to be advanced with less or
no kinetic warfare.”158
Again, it is evident that such uses of international law, while not
necessarily novel, are to be welcomed. Kittrie, and many
commentators engaged in the lawfare debate, however, understand
law within this context to constitute a weapon of war. Dunlap, for
instance, has argued that:
[H]arking back to the original characterization of lawfare as
simply another kind of weapon, one that is produced,
metaphorically speaking, by beating law books into swords . . . a
weapon can be used for good or bad purposes, depending upon
the mindset of those who wield it. Much the same can be said
about the law.159

If one, however, envisions law as a weapon, as opposed to a strategic
tool or some less incendiary analogy, it will facilitate efforts to
brandish such a weapon in instances that its user perceives as a just
cause. Congruently, however, this view of international law also
facilitates an inverse understanding of law’s use by one’s opponent.
Whether an enemy on the battlefield or an ideological challenger, law
becomes a weaponized threat requiring a firm and decisive response.
Considerations of whether we have every reason to embrace lawfare
should be made within this context. Often, when a legal engagement
is branded as lawfare, the response to this particular form of legal
engagement begins to demonstrate what lawfare means. This is not a
definitional question but instead one focused on the implications of
applying the term lawfare to such forms of legal engagement – as an
action, a form of speech, and as a label.
As Neve Gordon demonstrates, the vast majority of literature
dedicated to lawfare focuses on its definition and normative
underpinnings.160 Instead, he holds that “lawfare is not merely used to
157. Carter, supra note 152.
158. Kittrie, supra note 24, at 3.
159. Dunlap Apologia, supra note 7, at 123-24.
160. Gordon, supra note 33, at 312.
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describe certain phenomena, but that it operates as a speech act that
reconstitutes the human rights field as a national security threat.”161
Gordon’s understanding of what lawfare does asks both the correct
question and is well demonstrated through the Israeli case study that
substantiates his work.162 It is now, however, prudent to ask what
lawfare means – to both understandings and functions of international
law – from a more holistic perspective.
If we survey the literature and observe examples of how lawfare
has been deployed and understood as both a description of a
phenomenon and an act with normative implications varied examples
emerge. The claim of torture, filing a habeas brief, and the use of a
human shield are each held to constitute both an international legal
engagement and an act of lawfare. Likewise, the imposition of
sanctions against a foreign military or a defense lawyer, the signing of
an Article 98 agreement to immunize a US official from ICC
prosecution, or the confiscation of terrorist assets constitute both a
legal engagement and a form of lawfare.
The critical view of lawfare, that it popularly constitutes an
attack on or dismantlement of legal norms, serves to endow
international law with a singular, likely virtuous, purpose. It does not
recognize that international law is commonly used for a diversity of
reasons, any of which may evoke their own competing moral
pronouncements or normative attributions. This recalls David
Kennedy’s understanding of international law as “a set of arguments,
rhetorical performances and counter-performances, deployed by
people pursuing projects of various kinds.”163 Labeling certain legal
engagements as lawfare serves to tip the balance of these pursuits.
Its pejorative application – that is, its framing of international
legal engagement as a weapon, as a threat – serves to delegitimize and
ultimately disenfranchise particular forms of legal engagement. It is
thus accurate to view, understand, and frame, this most common
application of the term lawfare, not as a dismantlement of legal norms
or as an attack on the human rights field (though it may do such
things), but instead as a limitation on access to international justice.
The concept of access to justice is well formed within many
domestic jurisdictions. In comparison, however, its articulation within
161. Id.
162. Id. at 318-39.
163. DAVID KENNEDY, LAWFARE AND WARFARE IN THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 158, 173 (James Crawford & Martti Koskinniemi eds., 2012).
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international law, while drawing upon established concepts, is recent
in its use.164 As international law’s focus developed from its early
state-centric conception to include considerations of the individual
actor, the notion of access to international justice began to form.165
Individualized international justice secured its modern foundation
through the drafting of the United Nations Charter and the
establishment of the Nuremburg Tribunal.166 Article 2 of
the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights holds that “[e]veryone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind . . . .”167 Continuing, the Declaration
holds that every individual possesses a right to an effective remedy
for any acts that violate their fundamental rights and that all are
“entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of his rights
and obligations . . . .”168
These foundational principles, which gave license to individuals
within international mechanisms, began the transformation of
established domestic legal principles into international legal
obligations.169 These received further grounding through the host of
global developments occurring throughout the latter-half of the
twentieth century. Adoption of the International Covenants on Civil
and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
strengthened the legal effect of these provisions. The development of
legally binding regional human rights treaties and accompanying
enforcement mechanisms like the European Court of Human Rights
further facilitated the ability of the individual to gain access to the
promise of international justice and redress.170
164. Patrick Keyzer, Vesselin Popovski, & Charles Sampford, What is ‘access to
international justice’ and what does it require?, in ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1, 2
(2015).
165. For an account of this development and international law’s growing recognition of
the individual subject, see ANTONIO AUGUSTO CANCADO TRINDADE, THE ACCESS OF
INDIVIDUALS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 3-8 (2011). See generally BRUNO SIMMA, FROM
BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (1994).
166. Keyzer et al., supra note 164, at 3.
167. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 2, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
168. Id. art. 8, 10.
169. For an account of these developments, see Keyzer et al., supra note 164, at 1-5.
170. Id. at 3; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5,
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Narrowly, access to international justice, like its domestic
counterpart, can be understood as “the right to a judicial remedy
before an independent court of law.”171 While it is not the purpose of
this paper to trace the development of the concept of access to
international justice, it is employed here in its broadest sense. This
holds that under international law, respect for principles, provisions,
and individual rights receive meaning and actualization through the
ability of individuals to engage with them through formal and
informal, state and non-state, systems or regimes.
As commonly employed, the accusation of lawfare serves to
justify interference, or attempted interference, with this ability. It does
not represent an ontological challenge to international law. Those who
scream lawfare loudest and denounce the role and influence of
international law rarely (if ever) intend their denouncement to
discount the totality of ways which international law can be engaged.
Often, their response to lawfare draws upon international law, at least
in part and not always convincingly. But equally, they are actors
under international law who engage and apply it accordingly.
The claim of lawfare, the perceived threat of international law
that constitutes many of lawfare’s popularized usages, as they have
developed, serves to limit particular forms of legal engagement. Most
of these are by or on behalf of individual subjects or are directed
towards state actors. Lawfare serves to resist or delegitimize these
particular engagements. It serves to justify legal measures or policies
that discount these engagements. Despite self-evident examples of
international legal engagements that appear vastly preferable to
warfare or the use of force, when one suggests that we have every
reason to embrace lawfare it is necessary to understand what lawfare
often means for the function and efficacy of international law, and the
status of the individual or non-state actor.

available at https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?
documentId=0900001680063765.
171. FRANCESCO FRANCIONI , THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE
UNDER
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL L AW IN ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 1, 3
(2007).
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HOW STATES PERSUADE: AN ACCOUNT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT
UPON THE USE OF FORCE
David Hughes*
How States Persuade presents a theory of international legal communication. It considers and maps how
persuasion, through international legal argument, shapes legal change and influences notions of compliance.
Commonly, international law is portrayed as a medium for debate. Within the resulting debates,
persuasion is understood as a tool to induce compliance. Yet this is only one side of the conversation.
Persuasion is a two-way discourse. Efforts to alter the behavior of a “non-compliant” state through cogent
communication are often met with or preempted by legal arguments put forth by the state. This is perhaps
most apparent in the deliberative environments that accompany the use of force and the conduct of warfare.
Built around a series of case studies in which states offer legal arguments in support of actions that, prima
facie, extend beyond the limits of legal permissibility, this article presents a theory of persuasion and legal
communication that differs from how legal argument and international law are commonly understood. It
offers the first detailed and theorized account of the processes through which the non-compliant state argues,
persuades, and employs international law. By mapping and conceptualizing persuasive techniques, I suggest
that international law must be considered both in compliance and in violation. Switching emphasis and
considering the actions and arguments offered by the “non-compliant” state facilitates a novel and complete
understanding of the diplomatic, informal, and daily interactions that more commonly and more
consequentially define how international law is understood, practiced, and altered.

I. INTRODUCTION
Barack Obama arrived at Oslo City Hall in December 2010 to deliver the Nobel Lecture and receive
the Peace Prize. The President recalled the legacy of Henry Dunant.1 In 1901, Dunant became the
Prize’s inaugural recipient. He had founded the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
and oversaw the adoption of the first Geneva Convention. The call for humanity that Dunant brought
forth from the fields of Solferino initiated the legal regulation of warfare. Resulting efforts did not
outlaw hostilities. They began an arduous process of codification, dictating both when and how states
may use force. A legal vocabulary emerged in concurrence. This structured the discourse
accompanying war. It provided a means to contest when force is justifiable. Legitimacy demanded
transparency. In a later address, President Obama cited the need to publicly explain and justify US
military actions. The inability to provide reasoning, the President warned, encouraged international
suspicion, eroded legitimacy, and reduced accountability. 2
States have long coupled the use of force with contestations of legitimacy.3 As the international legal
framework governing both jus ad bellum and jus in bello matured, states increasingly harnessed a legal
* Grotius Research Scholar, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to Steven Ratner, Craig Scott, and Yahli Shereshevsky. This
article benefited from and developed through their insights and comments.
1 Barack Obama, “A Just and Lasting Peace” (Nobel Peace Prize Lecture, delivered at Oslo City Hall, Oslo, 10 December
2009) [Obama Nobel Lecture].
2 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony” (delivered
at U.S. Military Academy – West Point, New York, 28 May 2014).
3 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Terrorism: The Persistent Dilemma of Legitimacy” (2004) 36 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 299 at 299.
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vernacular.4 Diplomatic communications accompanied military forays. The battlefield expanded from
the frontline into international fora. David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister, described the
institutional relationship between his nation’s Defense and Foreign Ministries. Ben-Gurion succinctly
elucidated that, “the Minister of Defense is authorized to make defense policy; the role of the Foreign
Minister is to explain that policy.”5
The turn to legal rationale increased following the Second World War. The prohibition of the use of
force and the proliferation of international humanitarian law (IHL) were a global response to war’s
unmitigated horror. These developments further facilitated the embrace of legal argument which
would become, “one of the staple features of state practice on the use of force, so that when states
use force against other states, they also use international law to define and defend, argue and counterargue, explain and rationalise their actions.”6
As the nature of warfare evolved, as states perceived new dangers, the post-war legal vernacular was
understood as incomplete. Responses to the altered nature of warfare feature inventive (and, at times,
dubious) legal claims. These address the gaps, where the laws of war fall silent and fail to directly
contemplate evolving scenarios and emerging threats. These discussions influence conceptions of
permissibility, they establish new standards, and they formalize through state practice, opinio juris,
authoritative argument, and the recognition of custom. States have, however, altered the ways that
they invoke international law.7 Sophisticated legal appeals have moved the discourse accompanying
the use of force beyond assertions of legal conformity. The use of force is coupled with appeals that
attempt to persuade the international community that inventive legal arguments constitute an
acceptable interpretation or application of international law. Legal arguments may be offered in goodfaith, in response to a lawmaking moment. They may also accompany events that clearly violate
international law. Legal arguments supplement state behaviour that stretches or exceeds the
boundaries of legal permissibility. International law is invoked to persuade audiences that a particular
action, interpretation, or policy is acceptable.
Yet the relationship between international law and persuasion is understood differently. Law is often
portrayed as a medium for debate and agreement.8 Within this debate, persuasion is assigned a
particular purpose. Steven Ratner explains that “for those international actors seeking to promote
respect for international law, persuasion is at the core of the enterprise.”9 Thus persuasion becomes a
means to encourage fidelity towards international law. It forms a subset of the broader discussion

See, Michael Byers, War Law (New York: Grove Press, 2006) at 3, 43 [Byers War Law].
Dan Horowitz, “The Israeli Concept of National Security” in Avner Yaniv, ed, National Security and Democracy in Israel
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) 11 at 12.
6 Dino Kritsiotis, “When states use armed force” in Christian Reus-Smit, ed, The Politics of International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004) 45 at 47.
7 Yahli Shereshevsky, “Back in the Game: The Re-Engagement of States in International Humanitarian Lawmaking,” 36
Berkeley J. Int’l L. [forthcoming in 2018] [Shereshevsky Back in the Game].
8 Harlan Grant Cohen, “Finding International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Community,” (2011) 44 N.Y.U. J. Int'l
L. & Pol. 1050 at 1067.
9 Steven R. Ratner, “Persuading to Comply: On the Deployment and Avoidance of Legal Argumentation” in Jeffery L.
Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, eds, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 568 at 568 [Ratner Persuading to Comply].
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regarding compliance. Through a communicative process, reliant upon legal argument, the noncompliant state is convinced to alter its behaviour and adhere to legal dictate.10
This is only one side of the conversation. Persuasion is a two-way discourse. It is both a means to
ensure compliance and a method to define how international law should be understood. Efforts to
alter the behaviour of a non-compliant state through cogent communication is often met with or preempted by legal argumentation put forth by the state. These pages consider how states employ
persuasion upon or following the use of force. I emphasize instances in which states offer legal
arguments in support of actions and legal interpretation that, prima facie, extend beyond the limits of
legal permissibility. Persuasion is understood broadly. The state becomes not only the “engine and the
target” of compliance but a participant actively engaged in defining what compliance means.11
Section two of this paper poses the question: why do states persuade? This section begins abstractly
before moving beyond the contestations of compliance that often frame considerations of persuasion.
It explores reasons why a non-compliant state, devoid of obligation and absent coercion, may employ
legal argument and engage in a persuasive discourse. These reasons vary and are non-exhaustive. A
state – whose actions are broadly understood to be in violation of international law – may employ
persuasive legal argument to supplement a lie (e.g. we did not do what you claim that we did). The
state may appeal to persuasion in support of a particular legal interpretation (e.g. what you said
happened but it is not illegal or the law is unclear). Or the state may invoke persuasive legal argument
to generate legitimacy for its general policies or purposes (e.g. military action is a necessary response
to an emerging threat).
Section three asks whom do states persuade? This section considers the audiences that states engage
through legal argument. The target of persuasion alters alongside the form and purpose of persuasion.
The target may be broad (e.g. the international community) or narrow (e.g. interpretative communities,
another state, a key ally).
Section four considers how do states persuade? It provides an account of the communicative process
that states employ when engaging in this particular form of legal argumentation. The described process
– also non-exhaustive – offers five broad phases of engagement. First, the state identifies a “common
lifeworld.” Second, the state establishes itself as a general norm-acceptor. Third, the state
demonstrates its authority to interpret the law. Fourth, it establishes a standard of compliance based
on the “acceptable legal argument.” And fifth, the state draws upon precedent and commonalities.
Through these phases, the state forwards a particular form of legal argument. This argument intends
to influence understandings of law and fact. It seeks to generate legitimacy for state action and policy.
And it justifies the use of force in ways that often extend beyond previously endorsed limits.
Section five merges the question of why with the question of how. It presents a series of case studies.
These correspond with the abovementioned categories, describing a state’s motives and methods of
persuasion. Within, descriptive accounts chronicle uses of legal argumentation. The first case study
describes Russia’s appeals to international law following the annexation of Crimea. It traces Russia’s
reliance upon international law to supplement various lies that denied, excused, and then explained
Ibid, at 573. See also, Nicole Deitelhoff, “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the
ICC Case” (2009) 63 International Organization 33.
11 Ratner Persuading to Comply, supra note 9 at 570.
10
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Russian actions in Ukraine. The second case study chronicles the United States and the United
Kingdom’s employment of international legal argument to persuade selected audiences of a particular
legal interpretation’s validity. Situated within the war on terror, this study retells the interpretative
development of the unwilling and unable standard in accompaniment of the use of force against a
non-state armed group in Syria. The final case study demonstrates the use of international law to
legitimize a particular, controversial, use of force. It details Israel’s reliance upon legal argument both
during and in the aftermath of the 2014 Gaza war. In each instance, legal arguments, persuasive
endeavours, are offered by a state whose actions are deemed non-compliant with conventional legal
understandings. In each instance, the non-compliant state exhibits a similar persuasive methodology.
Section six concludes. It identifies challenges in evaluating the effectiveness of persuasion and legal
argumentation.
In A Memory of Solferino, Henry Dunant described the furious violence that defined nineteenth century
warfare.12 The nature of war has changed in the 108 years between Dunant’s receipt of the first Peace
Prize and President Obama’s acceptance of the award. As violence assumes new forms and manifests
through novel challenges, international law increasingly structures the discourse that accompanies the
use of force. Often it prescribes limits and instills a standard of compliance. Yet, we remain in a
constant conversation about the moments when the use of force is permissible. We evolve the
boundaries that define acceptable conduct once force is invoked. Persuasion and legal argument
assume a significant role within this debate. They become an invaluable resource for those who
demand greater adherence to the laws governing war. Yet, considerations of the extent to which and
the means by which states employ persuasion in response to the call for greater compliance – to define
the moments and to set the boundaries – are often absent from these conversations.
II. WHY DO STATES PERSUADE?
Contemporary considerations of compliance are frequently premised on Louis Henkin’s oft-quoted
aphorism that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of
their obligations almost all of the time.”13 International law’s influence is disregarded by realists and
neo-realists who view compliance as an unimportant by-product of unitary state interest.14 But beyond
these dismissive understandings, Henkin’s premise is widely embraced.15 Proponents of a liberal
approach accentuate the role of domestic actors within the international sphere. Interactions amongst
these groups and with national governments influence state policy and preference compliance with
international law.16 The institutionalist approach seeks to explain the influence of international
organizations (or regimes) on state behaviour. States are perceived as “utility-maximizers.”
International regimes contribute towards legal compliance by facilitating agreements that conform
with or further the particular interests of states.17 And several prominent theories emphasize

See generally, Henry Dunant, A Memory of Solferino (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1959).
Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979) at 47.
14 See generally, Kenneth W. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1979).
15 For an overview, see, Oona A. Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” (2002) 112 Yale L.J. 1935.
16 See, Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law in a World of Liberal States”, (1995) 6 Eur. J. Int’l L. 503.
17 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2002).
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international law’s normative force. They posit that compliance stems from a state’s acceptance and
internalization of law’s inherent features.18
Compliance is thus assumed. It is prevalent but it is not universal. Andrew Guzman notes, compliance
mostly occurs, “in situations with many repeated interactions, each with relatively small stakes…the
topics that have traditionally held center stage in international law – the laws of war, neutrality, arms
control, and so on – are precisely those in which international law is least likely to be relevant.”19
Observers quickly identify instances of non-compliance, violations of international law that exhibit
legal disregard and precede or accompany tragedy. In response to these legal violations, it is clear why
certain actors – both state and non-state – embrace persuasion as a means to secure legal adherence.
A non-compliant state (or other powerful entity) becomes the target of persuasion.20 To this extent,
international law is a project, a form of advocacy. The persuader employs a familiar language of rights,
obligations, incentives, and norms to convince the state to alter its behaviour.21 Persuasion’s influence
upon this process is either minimized (through focus on the fixed traits of parties or norms) or
accentuated (by examination of the communicative process between the persuader and persuaded). 22
Persuasion, however, remains linked to compliance. Communicative interactions move from those
seeking to ensure adherence towards those whose behaviour is deemed impermissible.
Yet moments of non-compliance also produce instances of persuasion. A legal violation may question
international law’s efficacy but it does not discount law’s relevancy.23 Law is more than a constraint
on state power. It is a discursive medium.24 Constructivist scholars contend that, “actors assume the
existence of a set of socially sanctioned rules, but international law ‘lives’ in the way in which they
reason argumentatively about the form of these rules…”25 Within this discourse, persuasion is not
only a means to influence state behaviour. It is a form of interaction that accompanies the discussions
and debates exhibited by law’s transformative potential. 26 George Brandis, the Attorney General of
Australia, explained that “it is vital that States (and their international legal advisers) have the courage

See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Thomas M.
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International Organization 175; Harold Hongju Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” (1997) 106 Yale L. J.
2599 at 2600.
19 Andrew T. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,” (2002) 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823 at 1828 [Guzman
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20 Ratner Persuading to Comply, supra note 9 at 570.
21 See generally, David Kennedy, “Lawfare and Warfare” in James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi, eds, The Cambridge
Companion to International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 158.
22 See, Ratner Persuading to Comply, supra note 9 at 571.
23 Frédéric Mégret, “International Law as Law” in James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi, eds, The Cambridge Companion to
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 64 at 77.
24 Ibid, at 8.
25 Christian Reus-Smit, “The politics of international law” in Christian Reus-Smit, ed, The Politics of International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 14 at 41. See also, Charlotte Peevers, The Politics of Justifying Force: The Suez
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26 Ibid, at 10.
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to explain and defend their legal positions.”27 The state – so often the target of persuasion – engages
in this communicative process. It too employs persuasive argument.
The assumption that international law is least relevant in areas where its weaknesses are apparent and
compliance illusive encourages the present focus. Daniel Reisner, when head of the Israel Defense
Force’s (IDF) International Law Division (ILD), claimed that:
“If you do something for long enough, the world will accept it. The whole of international
law is now based on the notion that an act that is forbidden today becomes permissible if
executed by enough countries…After we bombed the reactor in Iraq, the Security Council
condemned Israel and claimed the attack was a violation of international law. The
atmosphere was that Israel had committed a crime. Today everyone says it was preventive
self-defense. International law progresses through violations.”28
The laws governing the use of force provide compelling examples of law’s persuasive function. They
illustrate myriad ways and reasons that a state – whose actions or policy preferences are deemed
inconsistent with legal requirements – employs international legal argument and persuasion. Despite
periodic violation, the norm prohibiting aggression has become so entrenched that states are
compelled to justify military incursions. International law may appear as an ineffective constraint yet
legal argument is ever present. States, upon the use of force, read international law permissibly. They
argue that the world faces unforeseen threats. IHL, when drafted, failed to foresee these emergent
dangers and must be interpreted to facilitate necessary responses.29 Sir Daniel Bethlehem, the former
legal adviser to the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), noted in defense of his efforts
to reform the jus ad bellum that, “if the law is to influence, it must descend from the heights of broad
principles to engage with the reality of particular circumstances that requires its attention.”30
Humanitarians, acutely aware of law’s destructive potential, offer a restrictive reading of these same
laws. They wish to limit the state’s ability to use force and constrain the forms of violence that are
employed.31 This creates a deliberative environment. Within this environment, the prevalence,
diversity, and purposes of a more expansive conception of persuasive legal argument may be better
understood.
The willingness of states to offer legal argument is predictable. If we assume that international law is
important, that states exhibit a propensity to comply, then persuasion becomes a form of justificatory
discourse. It aligns the state’s tendency to couple uses of force with legal reasoning.32 Ryan Goodman
has termed this the politics of justification. This entails, “the political mobilization of support for
George Brandis, “The Right of Self-Defense Against Imminent Armed Attack in International Law” (25 May 2017)
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sent-and-advise-1.269127> [Feldman & Blau Consent and Advise].
29 See generally, Michael P. Scharf, “How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law,” (2016) 48 Case West Reserve
J. Int’l L. 1 [Scharf The War Against ISIS]. See also, Victor Kattan, “Furthering the ‘war on terrorism’ through international
law: how the United States and the United Kingdom resurrected the Bush doctrine on using preventive military force to
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30 Daniel Bethlehem, “Principles of Self-Defense – A Brief Response,” (2003) 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 579 at 581.
31 See generally, David Luban, “Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law,” (2013) 26 Leiden J. Int’l L. 315.
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Rev. 113 at 117-120.
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escalating hostilities.”33 Often, this process is internalized. The state’s justificatory discourse targets
domestic audiences. International norms are cited and governments employ legal vocabularies to
establish policy preferences, explain undertaken initiatives, and justify institutional changes.34
Of course, this process of justification goes beyond the domestic sphere. It occurs within international
institutions, amongst allies, and in response to adversaries.35 Here, as Chayes and Chayes demonstrate,
questionable actions are explained and justified by foreign ministries which rationalize state behaviour
through diplomatic exchanges. It is, “almost always an adequate explanation for an action, at least
prima facie, that it follows the legal rule. It is almost always a good argument for an action that it
conforms to the applicable legal norms, and against, that it departs from them.”36 However, the
discursive process, described by Chayes and Chayes, is primarily understood as a tool to influence
state behaviour and, “as a principle method of inducing compliance.”37
This underappreciates persuasion’s prevalence. For a variety of purposes and through a diversity of
forms, legal argument extends beyond efforts to compel or demonstrate state compliance. Its uses are
greater and more sophisticated then the justificatory tones habitually offered by states upon the use
of force. When George Brandis called upon states to “explain and defend” their legal positions, the
Attorney General clarified that this ensures that “states maintain control over the development of
international law.”38 Though state appeals to persuasion vary, exhibiting numerous motives, I identify
three reasons why states persuade – to supplement a lie; to posit a preferred interpretation of law; or
to legitimize a situation or establish policy involving the use of force. These are non-exhaustive, may
be subjectively distinguished, often overlap, and only constitute broad categorizations. Commonly,
the first two categorizations lead to the third. A state will lie. It will interpret the law. Or, it will do
both to reach a determination that a particular situation is legitimate. Persuasive interactions may be
more limited, singularly focuses on an episodic event, negotiation, or interpretative moment. Through
confluence or as independent legal interactions each of the identified reasonings demonstrate how a
state – in defense or in furtherance of a legal position or policy that is broadly held to be legally
impermissible – employs persuasion and legal argument in ways that extend beyond a complianceviolation binary.
A. To Substantiate a Lie:
On 31 August 1939, Heinrich Himmler initiated a series of events that began the Second World War.
Under Himmler’s direction, members of the German SS and SD undertook a false flag operation.
Donning Polish military uniforms, they attacked German radio stations, railways, and custom posts.
Reinhard Heydrich, then head of the SD, instructed his operatives to manufacture evidence of the
attacks, “for the foreign press as well as for German propaganda purposes.” 39 Prisoners from a
concentration camp were dressed in Polish apparel, killed, and left at the site of the raids. A radio
Ryan Goodman, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Pretexts for War,” (2006) 100 Am. J. Int’l. L. 107 at 116.
See, Andrew P. Cortell & James W. Davis, Jr., “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research
Agenda,” (2002) 2 Int. Stud. Rev. 65 at 70.
35 Peevers Politics of Justifying Force, supra note 25 at 47.
36 Chayes & Chayes The New Sovereignty, supra note 18 at 118-119.
37 Ibid, at 25-26.
38 Brandis The Right to Self-Defense, supra note 28.
39 Lord Russell, The Scourge of the Swastika: A History of Nazi war Crimes During World War II (New York: Skyhorse Publishing,
2008) at 11-12.
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station in Gleiwitz was overtaken. A Polish-speaking SD officer broadcast a call to arms, announcing
that the time for conflict had arrived and that the Polish, “should unite and strike down any German
from whom they met resistance.”40 The following day Adolf Hitler commenced the invasion of
Poland, citing the fiction of Polish aggression and the previous night’s events in justification of a
“defensive” German response.41
Political leaders appear more willing to mislead domestic constituencies then they are international
audiences.42 Within international affairs, Ian Johnstone explains that “purely self-serving arguments,
or those seen as arbitrary or beside the point, are simply not persuasive. For that reason, they are rarely
heard when public policy choices are being debated.”43 Although true in most deliberative scenarios,
distinguishable examples exist. States – in neglect of even a semblance of good-faith – may present
legal arguments that are posited on a demonstrable falsehood. Such instances recall Hans
Morgenthau’s sceptical assertion that states can always offer a legal argument to justify their policies.44
These legal appeals constitute disingenuous misuses of law. However, they need not be understood
singularly. A state, willing to violate international law, that feels compelled to offer a legal argument,
reveals a broader purpose of persuasion. Legal argument allows the violating state to supplement a lie
with legal language and attempt to persuade a particular audience that the state’s actions are not as
they seem or meet some standard of permissibility. A liberal state may lie to justify or dismiss
behaviour that contradicts the values that they otherwise espouse.45 The British insistence that the
bombing of Dresden targeted military installations – and the subsequent American claim that the
operation constituted a strategic necessity – are irreconcilable with accounts of the civilian sites that
were directly targeted during the campaign.46
A state, outwardly committed to liberal values but that seeks an alliance or military partnership with
an illiberal nation or group, may present a similar lie. The state will employ international legal rhetoric
to excuse the illiberal behaviour of the strategic partner.47 The United States has maintained numerous
advantageous relationships with such regimes. From its efforts to portray Stalin’s Soviet Union as an
aspiring democracy to its more recent interest-driven affiliation with Aliyev’s Azerbaijan, the United
States has coupled a legal vernacular with misleading claims regarding the domestic reality of certain
strategic partners.48
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Actors may lie to dismiss a legal accusation. Following the April 2017 sarin-gas attack in Khan
Sheikhoun, President Bashar al-Assad denied the use of, or intent to deploy, chemical weapons.49
Russia furthered this narrative. Supplementing the Syrian denial with legal argument, Russian officials
contended that the airstrike featured conventional weapons. Syrian warplanes, Russia claimed, directed
the strike against legitimate military targets and thus acted consistently with legal requirements.50
These invocations of international legal argument are often dismissed as abuses of law. Whether they
wish to shift the discourse from a controversial event to an abstract legal discussion, illustrate a
commitment to normative values, or simply provide the most expedient option, states may invoke
legal argument to supplement a lie. These uses of legal argument are often aimed at a limited audience.
They are intended to substantiate assertions of compliance. More commonly, however, persuasive
legal argument is employed to influence conceptions of compliance. It is employed to preference a
particular interpretation of law, to determine what precisely compliance entails.
B. To Posit a Preferred Interpretation of Law:
The Israel Defense Forces launched Operation Cast Lead in December 2008. Israel insisted that the
22-day military offensive was designed to eliminate Hamas’ rocket-launching capacity and
infrastructure.51 Officials immediately offered legal justification.52 Within Gaza, growing death tolls
and mounting hardship caused many within the international community to amend their response to
the hostilities. Initial calls for restraint and affirmations of Israel’s right to self-defense were replaced
by condemnation of IDF actions.53 An international law-based discourse emerged in concurrence. The
Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority (PA) presented an array of factual and legal
assertions. Beyond common assurances of compliance, persuasive appeals were offered to support
novel, often unsound, interpretative claims. Daniel Reisner, the former head of the ILD, described
how military lawyers were tasked with forwarding such legal appeals: “we defended policy that is on
the edge: the “neighbor procedure” [making a neighbor knock on the door of a potentially dangerous
house], house demolitions, deportations, targeted assassination...”54 The PA acknowledged that
launching rockets at civilian populations violated international law. It, however, excused Hamas’
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actions. They were not, the PA claimed, violations of the principle of distinction because the Gazan
militants only possessed crude weaponry and were unable to control the projectiles. 55
States appeal to international legal argument to posit interpretative claims. Claims may follow a
particular action that exists within a legal grey-area or that formally requires a legal response. This
recalls Rebecca Ingber’s notion of an “interpretation catalyst.”56 An interpretative assertion may be in
response to a legal accusation. It may follow a clear violation. The state does not deny the factual
context within which the interpretative claim arises. Instead, it suggests that the law is unclear or that
it differs from that which is broadly assumed.
Interpretation is traditionally understood as a technique to discern meaning from legal texts. 57 More
broadly, however, it constitutes a “persuasive phenomenon.”58 The interpreter’s motives will range.
They may simply wish to extract certainty from an imprecise legal formulation. This allows the state
to operate in accordance with legal dictate or predict the intentions of other actors whose behaviour
will be similarly influenced by the “correct” meaning of the legal text. Alternatively, as Martti
Koskenniemi suggests, the interpreting state may wish to impose a subjective political position onto a
broader policy or legal debate. Interpretation, Koskenniemi concludes, is not a method to discover
meaning but instead a means to create it.59
Interpretation becomes a game. The objective, “is to persuade one’s audience that [a particular]
interpretation of the law is the correct one.”60 The form of the interpretative appeal is determined by
the intended audience. An interpretative claim presented to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
will likely be grounded in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.61 A broad assertion that a
military action conforms with IHL may exhibit fewer rigid invocations of legal principles. Thus, uses
of persuasion to interpret the law vary from official formulations of textual meaning to casual legal
avowals.
The present focus is less concerned with the formal interpretative process. Instead, the invocations of
persuasion, described throughout, emphasize legal argument’s demotic appeal. Iain Scobbie explains
that in domestic and international law alike, persuasive and interpretative arguments exist “in activities
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such as advising clients, engaging in negotiations, research and the construction of academic
arguments, or the presentation of a proposed text or its interpretation to non-judicial bodies.”62
Less-formal interpretative appeals to international law are constant features of the broader
deliberations that accompany the use of force. States employ such rhetoric for a variety of reasons.
The state may offer an interpretative legal appeal to illustrate that a particular action conforms with
international law. When, on 14 May 2018, IDF snipers killed over sixty Gazan protesters – participants
in mass demonstrations near the border fence – the international community demanded answers.63 In
response to a joint petition by a group of Israeli NGOs, the Government offered an inventive legal
appeal.64 The mass protests were defined as part of an armed conflict between Israel and Hamas.65
Israel claimed that a law enforcement paradigm, inspired by human rights law but applied under IHL,
governed the applicable use of force. The protestors, constituting a mass of individuals, had become
collectively active in hostilities. In response, the IDF’s use of live fire was deemed proportionate.66
Such invocations of legal argument occur in response to a particular event. Similar interpretative appeals
may also be presented to validate a general policy objective. Often, the policy has been received
skeptically, as a violation of international law. The state, however, wishes to implement or justify the
policy and engages in interpretative appeals to persuade a broader audience of the policy’s legality. In
2010, the Obama Administration detailed its legal support for the use of drones to aid in the United
States’ global response to terrorism. The legality of using weaponised drones for targeted killing was
increasingly questioned.67 Harold Koh, then the Legal Adviser to the State Department, addressed the
American Society of International Law’s Annual Meeting. Koh detailed the Administration’s claim.
The US drone policy was limited to military targets. Koh assured that civilian casualties were
proportionate to the military advantage gained. The general policy was thus a legitimate act of selfdefense and consistent with IHL.68
By interpreting international law to either exhibit compliance or validate a controversial policy, the
state relies on persuasive legal appeals. These arguments identify an international legal question and
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interpret a particular point of law. An established doctrine or treaty provision is read in accordance
with the desired outcome. Beyond appeals to specific interpretative questions, states will also invoke
international law broadly. These legal appeals may be independent acts or the end-product of a legal
contention premised upon a lie or a counterintuitive interpretation. Similar to the interpretative
arguments addressed here, the state employs international legal rhetoric and reasoning to persuade
various audiences that a military action or particular use of force is legal and thus legitimate.
C. To Legitimize a General Situation or to Advance a Particular Policy:
During the 2002 State of the Union, President George W. Bush began building the case for war against
Iraq. Hostile against the United States, the Iraqi regime was portrayed as a security threat. It was a
source of regional and international instability. Saddam Hussein, the President explained, had
committed egregious human rights violations and had expelled weapons inspectors. Indifference, in
response to this mounting threat, would be catastrophic.69 In the wake of the 11 September attacks,
appeals to security – links to terrorism – carried significant currency.70 In the United Kingdom,
however, British participation in a US led coalition was framed as a “war of choice.” Policymakers
accepted this. They sought to, “persuade public opinion that that choice was necessary to ensure
freedom and security.”71
Throughout Whitehall, within the FCO, and across British society, questions of the pending war’s
legality assumed prominence. Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Labour Government employed legal reason
in justification of the use of force against Iraq. Following much internal debate – and staunch
opposition from the FCO’s own lawyers – military action was initially premised on United Nations
involvement.72 A weapons inspection regime would be re-imposed through the UN. When the Iraqis
rejected or violated the initiative, the British could build a legal case justifying the use of force.73
Internal deliberations adhered to traditional legal structures.74 Doctrines and texts were interpreted
and debated. Lex lata declarations were advanced alongside lex ferenda assertions.
States employ legal argument to exhibit legitimacy. Diplomats, military commanders, and elected
officials all invoke legal vernacular as a persuasive and strategic asset.75 Such legal arguments share
much with the tendency of states to offer interpretative claims. However, where the aforementioned
category comprises inventive assertions of specific legal meaning, the current designation captures a
less intricate, redolent use of law. Of course, there is much overlap between these categorizations.
Disparate arguments may be simultaneously employed. Either collectively or exclusively, a state may
use either or both forms of legal argument to persuade diverse audiences.
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Understood independently, this final purpose of persuasion occurs when states attempt to legitimize
a general situation or policy through ill-defined legal (or legal-sounding) language. Such appeals are
reminiscent of what Naz Modirzadeh has termed folk international law: “a law-like discourse that
relies on a confusing and soft admixture of IHL, jus ad bellum, and [international human rights law]
(IHRL).”76 The use of such legal vernacular to exhibit legitimacy can be present for a variety of reasons.
It may offer a persuasive argument that insists a military action is justifiable. It may facilitate a sui generis
legal claim. This legitimizes a particular situation but denies the extension of broader meaning or
precedential value. The use of general legal argument also enables the establishment of emergent
norms through novel legal claims. The development of and appeals to humanitarian intervention
illuminates each invocation of this form of persuasive legal argument.
The NATO military campaign in Yugoslavia began in 1999 and lasted for 78 days. It was justified in
response to Serbian policies in Kosovo where Slobodan Milosevic was leading efforts to ethnically
cleanse the Albanian majority. The North Atlantic Council defended its decision to use force with
reference to the “massive humanitarian catastrophe” that resulted from an unrestrained assault by
Yugoslav forces against Kosovo’s civilian population.77 NATO members consistently cited
humanitarian considerations. Explaining the collective use of force, the aversion of an atrocity
provided legal and moral justification.78 Canada’s Ambassador to the United Nations asserted that,
“humanitarian considerations underpin our action.”79 Similarly, the Dutch noted that military action
found legal basis in prevention of the pending humanitarian crisis.80 However, as Nicholas Wheeler
notes, these actors did not specify the nature of this legal basis. They did not provide legal reasoning
beyond generalized avowals of humanitarian interests.
The British Government offered further uses of legal language to persuade that the use of force was
justifiable. Initially, Prime Minister Blair framed military action as a “battle for humanity.” Accordingly,
it is, “a just cause, it is a rightful cause.”81 The British Secretary of Defense would later expand, noting
that, “our legal justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme
circumstances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe…The use of force in such circumstances can be
justified as an exceptional measure in support of purposes laid down by the Security Council, but
without the Council’s express authorization, when that is the only means to avert an immediate and
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.”82
This directly implied that international law permitted a humanitarian basis for the use of force – a
proposition that, devoid of Security Council authorization, is uncertain.83 While this exhibits the
tendency of states to make persuasive assertions of legitimacy through non-specific legal claims, the
Naz K. Modirzadeh, “Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the Transformation of the Law of Armed Conflict
to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War Governance,” (2014) 5 Harv. Nat. Sec. J. 225 at 229.
77 NATO, The Situation in and around Kosovo, 12 April 1999 (Press Release N-NAC-1(99) 51) online: <https://www.
nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-051e.htm>. See also, Scharf The War Against ISIS, supra note 29 at 42.
78 See, Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Reflections on the legality and legitimacy of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo,” (2000) 4 Int’l
J. Hum. Rts. 145 at 153.
79 Ibid. See also, UNSCOR, 54th Year, 3988th Mtg, UN Doc. S/PV.3988.
80 Ibid. See also, Scharf The War Against ISIS, supra note 29 at 43.
81 Ibid, at 42-43.
82 Ibid, at 43. See also, UK HC, Parliamentary Debates, vol 328, col 616-617 (25 March 1999) (Secretary of Defense George
Robertson).
83 See generally, Harold Hongju Koh, “The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention,” (2016) 53 Hous. L. Rev. 971.
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United Kingdom and the United States would subsequently amend their argumentative focus. States
recognize that their legal arguments contribute to the formation of international law. 84 When justifying
the Nixon Administration’s use of force against the North Vietnamese in Cambodia, Legal Adviser
John Stevenson argued that, “it is important for the Government of the United States to explain the
legal basis for its actions, not merely to pay proper respect to the law, but also because the precedent
created by the use of armed forces in Cambodia by the United States can be affected significantly by
our legal rationale.”85
In Kosovo, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was reluctant to provide precedential support for
unrestricted humanitarian intervention.86 Wishing to maintain claims that NATO action was
legitimate, Albright argued that the military campaign was, “a unique situation sui generis in the region
of the Balkans.”87 Prime Minister Blair reversed assertions regarding humanitarian intervention’s
normative potential. Instead, the Prime Minister argued that the Kosovo operation was exceptional. 88
NATO members made an explicit distinction. They differentiated between specific legal arguments
(that would carry legal weight and give precedential value) and a general claim that employed legal
language to imply that the particular event was legitimate but of no greater legal significance.89 Michael
Matheson, the State Department’s Legal Adviser, would later note that, “we listed all the reasons why
we were taking action and, in the end, mumbled something about it being justifiable and legitimate
but not a precedent. So in a sense, it was something less than a definitive legal rationale – although it
probably was taken by large parts of the public community as something like that.” 90
Finally, a state that wishes to legitimize a general policy – and that may seek to foster the development
of an underlying norm – may also appeal to non-specific legal language. When the United Kingdom
had initially argued in favour of a norm permitting the unilateral use of force in response to
humanitarian crisis, they offered general legal affirmations. Michael Scharf explains that how, “a
custom pioneer describes a new rule of customary international law can greatly impact its international
acceptance.”91 When a Canadian-led initiative answered Kofi Annan’s call to reconcile the traditional
conception of sovereignty with collective efforts to prevent atrocity crimes, the resulting responsibility
to protect (R2P) doctrine employed legal language to persuade. Borrowing from the jus ad bellum and
just war theory, R2P would only justify military action that was based upon “right authority, just cause,
right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.”92
The persuasive use of legal language by states may further good-faith efforts to progressively advance
a policy or develop the law. They may constitute manipulative attempts to secure state interests.
See generally, Harold Hongju Koh, “The Legal Adviser’s Duty to Explain,” (2016) 41 Yale J. Int’l L. 189 [Koh The
Legal Adviser’s Duty].
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Regardless of motivation, persuasion is employed and international legal argument is ubiquitous. The
motivation that accompanies these persuasive appeals may appear obvious. In many instances they
will be subjective. In 2013, when the Al-Assad regime launched a chemical weapons attack in eastern
Damascus, the United Kingdom invoked the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.93 The UK
provided a general legal argument to justify the use of force without Security Council authorization.
This required evidence of significant humanitarian distress; the absence of alternative methods; and
the necessary, proportionate, and limited use of force.”94 This may be received as an attempt to provide
a legal basis to achieve a necessary humanitarian objective. Russia’s invocation of humanitarian
intervention and R2P in 2008 assumed a similar argumentative structure. Yet, this justification of
Russia’s incursion into South Ossetia and Abkhazia was largely perceived as buttressing an increasingly
aggressive foreign policy.95 Often, the intention of the legal arguments forwarded by states, the extent
to which persuasion is offered and received in demonstration of legality and legitimacy, is directed by
the particular audience addressed by the state.
III. WHOM DO STATES PERSUADE?
Chaim Perelman explains that every argumentation is addressed to an audience. The audience may be
large or small; competent or less competent.96 Always, according to Perelman, it consists of “the
ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence...”97 States, upon the use of force, direct
persuasive argument towards a variety of audiences. The form and purpose of the argument corelates
with the target of persuasion. The state may wish to persuade both domestic and international
audiences. They may seek to convince the Security Council that a particular military action is legitimate.
Or, they may hope to assure an interpretative community that a certain tactic, policy, or choice of
weaponry is permissible. Persuasion’s boundaries are broad and its intended audience varies. Most
often, though, the use of legal argument targets a definable group.
Upon or in advance of the use of force, domestic constituencies become a target of persuasion. Legal
argument is employed when a state wishes to advance a military policy. It is offered if the use of force
is contingent upon the formal approval of a legislative body. As per Article One, Section Eight of the
US Constitution, Congress possesses the power to declare war.98 Though the Executive often employs
force without congressional approval, persuasive appeals regarding the legality of military action
commonly feature when a President builds the case for war.99 These appeals also target broader society.
A controversial military action, a war of choice, a foreign intervention will accrue significant costs.
See, United Kingdom, Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime – UK Government Legal Position (29 August 2013) online:
<http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2013/images/08/29/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-posit
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Lives will be lost and huge sums of money will be spent. Governments employ legal argument to
persuade the public that a military action is necessary and legitimate.100 The action may be framed as
a response to an immediate or existential threat. Devoid of an obvious defensive element, it may be
presented as within the state’s broader interest. In both instances, the state speaks to domestic
audiences through the language of international law. In 2015, following a series of attacks by members
of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, the Indian Army conducted airstrikes inside Burma.
Indian officials employed a legal vernacular to offer domestic justification. Rajyavardhan Singh
Rathore, the Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting, invoked the notions of necessity and
“hot pursuit” to validate the counter-insurgency operation.101
Often, however, when states employ a legal vernacular to profess legitimacy or assert the legality of a
particular initiative, they engage in a two-level game.102 Arguments are advanced for both domestic
and international purposes. Robert Putnam explains that within the domestic sphere, local groups and
elected officials compete to advance interests through the mechanisms of government. Internationally,
states “seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse
consequences of foreign developments.”103 International legal arguments target either or both
audiences. When Bashar al-Assad deployed chemical weapons in 2013, the Obama Administration
considered responding through military action. The proposed use of force, however, experienced
domestic and international resistance.104 In reply, the White House Counsel appealed to the
international norm prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. They sought to influence both levels of
opinion:
“[t]he president believed that it was important to enhance the legitimacy of any action that
would be taken by the executive ... to seek Congressional approval of that action and have
it be seen, again as a matter of legitimacy both domestically and internationally, that there
was a unified American response to the horrendous violation of the international norm
against chemical weapons use.”105
A state that attempts to persuade an international audience will target its arguments generally or
specifically. Often, the audience’s composition corresponds with the form of argument offered by the
persuading state. When officials address the international community and claim that the state’s actions,
upon the use of force, adhere to international law they offer broad claims of legitimacy or legality.
Persuasion is presented generally (i.e. towards the international community as a whole). Arguments
that target general audiences may be formal. This will include official statements presented on behalf
of the state, often through their foreign ministry or a diplomatic delegation to an international
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organization. Informally, states will also attempt to persuade an array of additional actors. These will
include social movements, media, and transnational civil society.106
Specific audiences will be targeted through both broad and narrow legal arguments. Broad assertions
– of legitimacy or legality – may be employed to influence the opinion of key allies. The persuading
actor may target particular states with which they hope to form a military alliance or whose cooperation
they desire to facilitate a military objective (e.g. to gain access to airspace).107 Broad arguments may be
directed towards members of a regional organization or bloc that hold particular influence (e.g. a P5
member of the Security Council). While the audience’s identities vary, these persuasive engagements
present broad claims of legal compliance. They target specific audiences whose influence is sought.
Pnina Sharvit Baruch, the former head of the IDF’s ILD contends:
“it is important on a diplomatic level – to be able to give good answers to allies like the
United States and the United Kingdom. Now it is also important, with the potential of
[international] criminal investigations, to demonstrate the legitimacy of actions and also
be able to give good answers. Beyond criminal proceedings, however, it is necessary to
respond to international organizations, NGOs, and others who are critical of military
actions.”108
Specific audiences are also the target of intricate legal claims. These concern specific issues or
interpretative contentions (e.g. the legal status of detainees within a non-international armed
conflict).109 They look to influence common legal assumptions or seek to develop new legal
understandings (e.g. who constitutes a direct participant in hostilities).110 These arguments are directed
towards strategic audiences. Identified audiences may exist within international organizations. Treaty
regimes become persuasive venues. 111 A state that wishes to forward a legal position or defend a
particular action – often one that challenges consensus or exceeds conceptions of permissibility –
directs persuasive assertions at a particular audience. These audiences – which include other states,
norm influencers, or regional and international organizations – overlap with the broad audiences
targeted through general legal claims. Often, however, the persuading entity communicates directly
with specific groups or communities that exist within the identified audience (e.g., members of the
International Law Commission; foreign legal advisers, specific diplomats).
Persuasion is likely to be most prevalent when directed towards small groups that share common
identities.112 Interpretative or epistemic communities become the primary targets of narrow persuasive
Johnstone The Power of Deliberation, supra note 43 at 43-44.
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arguments.113 These communities are “involved in the creation, implementation, and application of
norms. Where both communities offer “knowledge and policy advice,” interpretative communities
also present judgments regarding the meaning and actualization of norms. Ian Johnstone explains that
“interpretative communities” describe the nature of interpretation and not the composition of
interpreters. However, commonalities exist amongst the involved parties. When states direct
international legal arguments towards interpretative communities, they first attempt to influence the
individuals and entities “responsible for the creation and implementation of norms.”114 This includes
those individuals, government agents, and organizational representatives that possess “expertise in
international law and/or special knowledge in the relevant field.”115 Johnstone recalls that this will
include, “political leaders, diplomats, government officials, international civil servants, scholars, and
experts who participate in some way in the particular field of international law or practice.”116 Next,
states that forward legal arguments will address a narrow network. This consists of governmental and
inter-governmental representatives who “share a set of assumptions, expectations, and a body of
consensual knowledge.”117
The membership of these communities is informally defined and often overlapping. These states,
organizations, individuals, groups, and professional networks become the targets of persuasion.
Interpretative communities are the preferred focus of these persuasive efforts because they possess
expertise and have the ability to influence or determine legal meaning. Collectively, members of the
interpretative community – including the persuading state – partake in “a shared enterprise with
broadly similar understandings of what they are doing and why they are doing it.”118 Legal arguments
or interpretations that concern the use of force often appeal to “security communities.” 119 Initially a
description of an informal unity amongst states grouped by their willingness to ensure that differences
between parties were solved without resort to force, the notion of security communities has
developed.120 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett describe security communities as consisting of states
that share common values and agree to formal cooperation.121 These may form through regional
groupings, as with the Association of South East Asian Nations. They may actualize through an
international organization like NATO or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
And they may result from bilateral relationships between certain states.122 Prominent security
communities, both within and among states, will be more likely to accept arguments from partners
with which they share a common identity. They will be open to explanations of behaviour and
interpretations of law if they believe that they may face similar security challenges to the persuading
entity; that they too may be required to use force in similar circumstances and for similar purposes.
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Former Bush Administration Legal Adviser John Bellinger addressed both general and specific
audiences. Bellinger was motivated by the contemptuous reception that many of the Bush-era policies
received throughout the international community. In response, the Legal Adviser engaged in a process
of “international legal diplomacy.”123 This, Bellinger recounts, involved promoting the US
commitment to international law. As Legal Advisor, Bellinger would travel extensively to conduct an
international legal dialogue. Interlocutors – allies, international organizations, individuals, and NGOs
– were targeted. In multilateral forums, through bilateral meetings and speeches, across the pages of
legal blogs, newspaper op-eds, and law review articles, Bellinger addressed these various audiences.124
This process of legal diplomacy, however, offered more than rebuttals of the Bush Administration’s
perceived hostility towards international law. Bellinger lobbied members of the international
community to adopt particular legal constructions. Positions and policies were advanced and
advocated. Amongst allies, Bellinger promoted an extensive reading of the jus ad bellum pertaining to
the US-led war on terror.125 Legal arguments, the use of persuasion, were initially directed generally.
At the regional level, Bellinger sought to convince European allies that the United States was in full
compliance with international law. He proposed increased cooperation to determine the appropriate
legal framework necessary to combat non-state armed groups.126 Victor Kattan traces the resulting
legal diplomatic process. When a schism emerged regarding the classification of the ongoing conflict
in Afghanistan, Bellinger pivoted to a specific target audience.127 This consisted of “a smaller but
geographically more diverse group of countries who face serious terrorist threats and also engage in
international military operations.”128 Legal arguments were directed towards security communities.
These, Kattan explains, consisted of members of the defence, intelligence, and security establishments
of “a smaller, more select, group of legal advisers from states that rely on US military aid and
technology.”129
Brian Egan, who would become Legal Adviser in 2016, continued the process of international legal
diplomacy. At the American Society of International Law’s Annual Meeting, Egan explained that “legal
diplomacy builds on common understandings of international law, while also seeking to bridge or
manage the specific differences in any particular State’s international obligations or interpretations.”130
Continuing, Egan acknowledged the necessity of persuasive legal engagements:
“It is important that our actions be understood as lawful by others both at home and
abroad in order to show respect for the rule of law and promote it more broadly, while
also cultivating partnerships and building coalitions. Even if other governments or
populations do not agree with our precise legal theories or conclusions, we must be able
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to demonstrate to others that our most consequential national security and foreign policy
decisions are guided by a principled understanding and application of international law.”131
The dynamic of a state, articulating the legality of its action, of positing preferred interpretations of
international law, or of presenting policy through an international legal lens is familiar. The substantive
process that accompanies such appeals is, however, underexplored. The question thus becomes, how
do states persuade?
IV. HOW DO STATES PERSUADE?
In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, persuasion and speech exist:
“to affect the giving of decisions – the hearers decide between one political speaker and
another, and a legal verdict is a decision – the orator must not only try to make the
argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own
character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of
mind.”132
State conduct – behaviour evoking controversy, that which is interpreted as a violation, or which
occurs within a grey-area – must be explained and justified. 133 Yet, invocations of international legal
argument are not often subject to formal adjudicative processes. In most instances, an independent
decisionmaker does not evaluate contrasting assertions. Still, in the absence of an authoritative verdict,
legal vernacular buttresses the justifications offered by states before or upon the use of force. The
argumentative pattern employed by states reflects the Aristotelian form. Through a process of
justificatory discourse, Ian Johnstone explains, “claims are made and criticized, actions approved and
condemned, actors persuaded and dissuaded in an often cacophonous discursive interaction where
legal norms loom large.”134
Arguments are structured around these norms and a legalized discourse emerges. Assertions and
exchanges, by and between states, employ the language of international law to convince and to justify.
Chayes and Chayes note that the resulting “diplomatic conversation” constitutes an essential function
of international relations.135 These efforts “make up the ordinary business of foreign ministries as they
seek to generate support for policy positions or to elicit cooperative action.” 136 Such observations,
however, are commonly presented to explain state behaviour. The need to justify certain actions to
both domestic and international audiences compels legal appeals and, through a process of
internalization, induces compliance.137
Persuasion is understood singularly. It constitutes a means to ensure desirable state behaviour. Martha
Finnemore explains that being persuasive entails “grounding claims in existing norms in ways that
emphasize normative congruence and coherence.”138 When normative claims are persuasive they
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become a powerful means of influencing state behaviour.139 The persuasive process is understood to
result in the internalization of new norms. This affects the behaviour of states – the targets of
persuasion – by redefining their interests and identities.140 For Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “the
touchstone of this approach is that actors are consciously convinced of the truth, validity, or
appropriateness of a norm, belief, or practice.”141 The actor “changes its mind” and state behaviour is
altered.
Beyond dismissive realist accounts, the discursive process is widely assumed. However, the substance
of this process – the function of legal argumentation and persuasion – remains underexplored.142
Steven Ratner explains that even the dynamic theories, those that emphasize the role of persuasion,
do not “amply address the invocation of legal norms during the conversation about compliance.”143
Offerings that provide accounts of the microprocesses of persuasive legal engagements focus on how
law can affect state behaviour and ensure compliance. 144 I wish to complement these considerations
by understanding how the non-compliant state – so commonly the target of persuasion – invokes legal
argument within this discursive process. The state will become not merely the subject of persuasion
but an actor whose diplomatic appeals and communicative actions are laced with legal justification.
Compliance is not the only end sought by persuasive legal appeals. To lie, to interpret, and to
legitimize, states employ legal argument. They too become persuading entities. The framework that I
identify and suggest captures how the non-compliant state employs legal argument upon the use of
force proposes five phases of persuasive engagement: (i) identification of a common lifeworld; (ii)
establishing the state as a general norm-acceptor; (iii) demonstrating the authority to interpret; (iv)
instilling the standard of the acceptable legal argument; and (v) drawing upon precedent and
commonality. These phases will be considered in turn.
A. The Identification of a Common Lifeworld
In Rhetoric, the concept of topoi denotes shared ideas.145 These common ideas exist amongst the
proponents, the opponents, and the audiences that present and evaluate argument. The persuasiveness
of a particular argument has since been understood as contingent upon the ability of the speaker to
successfully appeal to these shared ideas.146 The common ideas and beliefs that are held amongst states
Ibid.
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and referenced during legal argumentation are often obvious. A familiar language of shared norms –
opposition to aggression; a commitment to rights; the sanctity of humanitarianism – structures
persuasive engagements. Universally endorsed values become stock phrases of international legal
argument. Yet states do more than appeal to a recurrent vocabulary of values and beliefs. The noncompliant state that undertakes persuasive endeavours often begins by identifying a common premise.
This will be shared amongst interlocutors. It provides the context against which the state’s legal
assertions will be presented and received.
Jürgen Habermas contends that society may be conceived “as the lifeworld of the members of a social
group.”147 The lifeworld complements communicative action and is understood as “the contextforming background of processes of reaching understanding.”148 Thomas Risse, who applies
Habermasian communicative theory to international relations, describes the argumentative process
undertaken by states. Effective communication, Risse contends, requires that actors “share a common
lifeworld.”149 The common lifeworld “consists of shared culture, a common system of norms and
rules perceived as legitimate, and the social identity of actors being capable of communicating and
acting.”150 By appealing to the common lifeworld, states access “a repertoire of collective
understandings to which they can refer when making truth claims.”151 Though international law
provides a prosaic vocabulary, allowing states to articulate common norms and appeal to shared
standards, the advancement of non-conventional or non-adherent legal argument often begins
through the re-establishment of a non-legal, empathetic context.
The notion of the lifeworld, as applied here, departs significantly from Habermas’ usage. As Risse
acknowledges, an anarchic conception of international relations is antithetical to a shared lifeworld.152
As initially conceived, the lifeworld is “holistically structured and unavailable (in its entirety) to
conscious reflective control.”153 Within these pages, however, the lifeworld is used to capture the
identified commonalities, the shared understandings, truisms, and uncontroversial assumptions that
undergird many persuasive interactions. Where Risse and Harald Müller contend that the lifeworld
may be constructed as a means to build trust and authenticate exchanges, I employ the term to describe
a prerequisite communicative phase that identifies and accentuates shared understandings.154
The preliminary identification of a shared and relatable context, that tells of more than legal rules,
precedes substantive legal contentions. The presumption that the state’s actions or policy – upon or
following the use of force – violates international law, distances the state from the common (legal)
norms described by Risse. A state that applies force, in a seemingly offensive fashion, may not
plausibly appeal to the familiar language of non-aggression and Article 2(4). A state whose military is
accused of systematically violating the principle of distinction can not credibly describe their
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, Vol.2, translated
by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987) at 204.
148 Ibid.
149 Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics” (2000) 54 International Organization 1 at 10
[Risse Let’s Argue].
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid, at 10-11.
152 Ibid, at 14.
153 A special thanks to Max Cherem for clarifying this point. See, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Jürgen Habermas
(1929—) by Max Cherem, online: < https://www.iep.utm.edu/habermas/>.
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commitment to the protection of persons not partaking in hostilities. Instead, a state favouring a broad
or inventive interpretation of international law, that has perhaps proposed using force in a manner
deemed inconsistent with legal standards, accentuates non-legal experience. The non-compliant state
identifies a relatable framework within which its actions are contextualized and shared amongst the
target audiences that the state wishes to persuade.
Effective persuasion builds upon “propositions or premises [with] which the audience already
agrees.”155 Legal assertions that, for example, support the use of force against non-state actors establish
a narrative concerning the global threat posed by terrorism and the susceptibility of states to an
emergent danger that exceeds legal categorization and defies conventional defensive responses. They
do not begin by supporting the resulting military action through a strict reading of the jus ad bellum.
Such narratives, however, are not forwarded within an ideational vacuum. 156 The further a legal
interpretation stretches conventional understandings or the extent to which a military policy appears
contrary to legal dictate positions the persuasive claim in opposition to well-established legal norms.
The premise developed by the non-compliant state “must compete with other norms and perceptions
of interest.”157
Constructivist scholars emphasize the usefulness of framing. Normative advancement is centred upon
the ability of actors to “reinterpret” or “rename” a particular issue in a compelling way. Constructivists
associate this process with norm entrepreneurs. The construction of cognitive frames is identified as
an essential component of norm development. The norm entrepreneur is successful when “the new
frames resonate with broader public understandings and are adapted as new ways of talking about and
understanding issues.”158 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks insist that framing is the “first and most
important technique of persuasion.”159
As with broader conceptions of persuasion, framing is presented as a means to influence state
behaviour. It is a method to achieve compliance, to gain endorsement of an emergent norm, or to
coax the state to embrace or repudiate a particular policy. Identification of a common lifeworld, while
similarly focused on accentuating a relatable premise, allows for broader development. It becomes a
technique employed by a non-compliant state. When states develop legal arguments upon the
common lifeworld, they preference appeals to shared culture and familiar challenges. Rules and norms
assume a significant role throughout the persuasive process. The state is not, however, immediately
fixated on forwarding a particular norm or grounding its argument within a formal legal framework.
Persuasive engagements by non-compliant states necessarily push against established norms. Upon
developing a broad and relatable premise upon which a prohibited action can be reconceived as
something other than a legal violation, the state moves to establish its credibility. Though the state
may be in violation of a particular legal provision, it continues the persuasive process by emphasizing
its general commitment to international law.
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B. Establishing the State as a General Norm-Acceptor
States strive to be perceived as compliant with international law. The state emphasizes its deference
to legal norms. It professes respect for the rule of law. And the state positions itself as a member, in
good-standing, of the post-war international order. A state whose behaviour betrays this outward
projection of legal fidelity often continues to situate itself as in general acceptance of international law.
A violation is an exception, not the standard. If, as Oscar Schachter suggests, international law
provides a common language, states covet fluency.160 An action that appears non-compliant, a
favoured interpretation that stretches conventional understanding is explained through reiteration of
the state’s broad legal commitment. In alignment with the Aristotelian conception of persuasion, the
non-compliant state builds its legal contention upon efforts to “make [its] own character look right.”161
Harold Koh, drawing upon the perspective of the government lawyer, contends that public officials
“almost always believe their actions are necessary, correct, and lawful.” 162 The state, Koh suggests,
must provide public justification so that others will accept the resulting assertion of legal compliance.
The justificatory discourse is understood as a necessary factor in establishing both domestic and
international legitimacy.163 Also, however, these legal articulations allow the state to cultivate its
standing as a general norm-acceptor. States wish to maintain this standing within the international
community and undertake efforts to avoid the perception of chronic legal disregard.164 Where legality
denotes legitimacy, persuasion builds upon more than the directly applicable legal norms. Persuasive
efforts, in defense of a questionable action or in furtherance of a non-compliant policy, are established
upon professed adherence to “the general values and principles of international law” that the state
purports to cherish.165
International lawyers do not question the proposition that states hold an interest in “maintaining a
reputation for good faith compliance with the law.”166 This is understood to facilitate reciprocity and
international cooperation. States desire predictability. Stability is associated with legal amenability.167
A good reputation is maintained, Andrew Guzman explains, “as long as a country honors all of its
previous international commitments.”168 A state’s reputation appears more durable than this
suggests.169 While continued instances of legal violation erode credibility, a state may present its
reputation to signal that a novel legal contention – one that strains interpretative likelihood or
proposes illicit military action – is a marginal disagreement about the meaning of a legal norm. It is
not, the state will suggest, an ontological claim regarding the validity of a dominant value. As Thomas
Oscar Schachter, “The Quasi-Judicial Role of the Security Council and the General Assembly” (1964) 58 Am. J. Int’l
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Risse notes, the more a non-compliant state accepts the validity of international norms, the more it
engages with others over the minutiae of a legal proposition.170
Game theorists understand a player’s reputation as a “summary of its opponents’ current beliefs about
the player’s compliance strategy or set of strategies in connection with various commitments.”171 States
actively develop their reputation for general legal fidelity. They seek to nurture conceptions that they
comply with law and honour undertaken commitments. In turn, the state promotes this reputation as
a warrant when the state’s actions deviate from its professed affinity to international law. A
controversial policy, an assumed violation, is juxtaposed with the assertion that the state is a normacceptor. Prior to engaging in substantive accounts – in defense of a particular military action, in
explanation of a permissive legal interpretation – the state recites its liberal credentials. A strong
reputation, emphasizing legal like-mindedness, dampens the consequences of an action that betrays
that affinity. It positions target audiences to receive and take seriously the state’s legal assertions. And
it further establishes a communicative context, upon which the non-compliant state may continue to
build and to persuade by demonstrating its ability to provide authoritative legal interpretation.
C. Demonstrating the Authority to Interpret
Legal disputes often feature competing assertions of competence. Opposing legal propositions are
supplemented with declarations accentuating the respective parties’ capacity to make an authoritative
legal claim. Beyond the core substantive question, competing actors contest expertise and authority.172
This form of persuasion assumes particular salience within international law. The sources of
international law – treaties between states; customary international law; general principles; judicial
decisions; and the writing of the most highly qualified publicists – compel interpretation.173 These
sources facilitate a range of possible meanings and can be applied in a diversity of ways.174 Treaties are
drafted in broad, agreeable language. 175 Customary international law is identified through an ill-defined
and imprecise process.176 Judicial decisions and the works of legal scholars are interpretative exercises
that produce varying opinions.177
As most international legal contentions are not subject to formal decision-making, their persuasive
value is influenced by an actor’s ability to exhibit authority and expertise. Efforts to accentuate the
speaker’s expertise further builds upon the Aristotelian notion of affecting the giving of a decision
through making one’s character look right.178 As Charlotte Peevers demonstrates, “the authority to
speak the law is often determined by the status of the speaker of the invocation or imposition. Some
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actors appear to hold greater legitimacy in claiming powers than others.” 179 Often, a speaker’s
authoritativeness is inherent or institutionalized. A particular state’s foreign ministry is understood to
possess high-level expertise in a certain area or field. A specific court is deemed competent to
determine particular legal questions that have repeatedly come before its docket. A jurist is recognized
as a leading authority on a body of law.
The ability to demonstrate authority and expertise is a formative aspect of the persuasive process.
Expertise, Peevers explains, are conveyed by lawyers, diplomats, academics, and technocrats to
influence the justificatory discourse that accompanies uses of force.180 In part, the turn to expertise
was a reaction to the belief that “traditional approaches to international governance and the traditional
institutions of international law would be ill-equipped to deal with the problems of a globalised
world…”181 Expert networks provided an obvious means to ensure technocratic solutions.182 Also,
however, they would become a means of exhibiting credibility. An actor brandishing expertise, whose
foreign ministry and government lawyers wilfully engage in legal processes and offer a rarefied body
of knowledge is better positioned to persuade. Alistair Iain Johnston notes that persuasion is
contingent upon the authoritativeness of the messenger.183 When a state proposes a counterattitudinal
interpretation, when it engages in a military action that is perceived as a violation, the state couples
accompanying legal rhetoric with an accounting of interpretative authority.
The demonstration of expertise bolsters this sense of interpretative authority. It facilitates state efforts
to form or contribute to existing epistemic communities. 184 These groups, as defined by Peter Haas,
are “networks of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”185 Interpretative
legal avowals are well received when addressed by an actor to an epistemic community of which the
actor is a member or from which the actor may derive credibility. Whether the state wishes to engage
with an epistemic community or make a broad claim, international legal assertions are built upon the
professed expertise or authority of the speaker.
States actively cultivate authoritativeness and expertise. This enables access to and ensures influence
within epistemic communities. It increases the persuasiveness of the state’s legal avowals when it
targets general, non-expert audiences. As Yahli Shereshevsky details, states employ various persuasive
strategies as they engage with formal and informal lawmaking processes.186 States send legal experts to
partake in international law conferences. They draw upon the professional reputations of their legal
representatives.187 Written outputs that convey the state’s legal positions are made accessible and
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widely distributed. When relevant, they are translated into English. These outputs are presented in a
“quasi-academic style” that relies upon extensive footnoting and elaborate legal reasoning. 188 This both
draws upon and exhibits the state’s legal expertise. It places the legal contention, Shereshevsky notes,
within an existing persuasive discourse as opposed to presenting a simple declaration of opinio juris.189
Within this discourse and throughout these persuasive appeals, the state seeks to apply its expertise to
a permissively established standard that permits the acceptable legal argument.
D. Instilling the Standard of the Acceptable Legal Argument
States project legal fidelity. They wish to maintain “a reputation for good faith compliance with the
law…”190 Yet, when a state employs legal argument to explain or to justify, it is often content to meet
a minimum level of compliance or present only a plausible legal argument. A state whose actions are
widely-assumed to violate international law will struggle to dislodge consensus legal opinion. In
response to legal opposition – within the international community, throughout civil society, and
amongst independent legal experts – the non-compliant state acts to instill and to meet the standard
of the acceptable legal argument. Legal interpretations, applications of international law to complex
fact patterns, move from the objective of persuading an audience that an argument is correct to
suggesting that the legal contention is plausible.191 By establishing a reduced legal burden, the state’s
persuasive appeals become more effective. The state benefits from the perception that it has engaged
with the international legal process. Sometimes engagement alone is sufficient to project legitimacy.
Recalling Daniel Reisner’s contention that international law advances through violations, the noncompliant state may begin to alter legal thresholds to further align legal requirements with state
prerogatives.192
As identified by the New Haven School, a discursive understanding of international law suggests that
legal meaning is derived from argumentative reasoning.193 The rhetorical nature of the reasoning
process features a permissive standard of interpretative validity. Interpretations, Peevers identifies,
“no longer need to make the claim of ‘truth’: rather they have to be ‘acceptable’.”194 As Ian Johnstone
explains, states rarely dismiss international law’s relevancy. Instead, when an action is deemed contrary
to international law, the state responds that “this is how we interpret the law, and our interpretation
is correct.”195 Behind this discourse, however, states look to stretch the boundaries of plausibility.
Though every legal or legal-sounding statement will not meet an amended standard of reasonableness,
persuasive efforts appeal to a permissively constructed conception of what constitutes an acceptable
legal argument.
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Much international law – as practiced by its institutions, as defined within its instruments, and as
construed through its arbiters – favours broad and permissive legal formulations. International treaties
are drafted in multivalent language. Human rights agreements converge around “the lowest common
denominator.”196 Such regimes are amenable to an expansive set of legal interpretations that result
from the “diverse cultural and legal traditions embraced by each Member State.”197 Though many
treaties contain dense rules, broad legal arguments are typically removed from legal minutiae. Instead,
arguments reference general principles. This facilitates a panoply of potential interpretations. States
actively encourage the development of legal systems that tolerate an array of legal reasoning. The
European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) margin of appreciation, for example, provides member
states discretion in fulfilling their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR).198 The margin, first referenced in a 1958 European Commission report, is intended to ensure
a minimum level of human rights protection while permitting a range of interpretative contentions.199
Similarly, the ICJ has “rejected any assertion that in any given situation, only one action could possibly
be considered reasonable.”200
The notion of reasonableness is used in international lawmaking to ensure discretion in the
interpretation and application of legal rules. States include the term ‘reasonable’ in legal instruments
to introduce a degree of flexibility.201 Reasonableness is read into the judgements of international
courts – often despite its textual absence – to ensure “adaptability” and to facilitate a diversity of state
interpretations.202 Interpretations of broadly constructed legal rules employ reasonableness to fill the
legal lacunae that results from textual ambiguity and to support a preferred articulation.203 States
preference interpretative flexibility and advocate for the acceptance of diverse legal responses. Within
armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is subject to the assessment of the “reasonable military
commander.”204 Citing the conclusion of the Committee Established to Review NATO Bombings in
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Yugoslavia – which held that a human rights lawyer and a military commander will likely posit
opposing interpretative results – states endorse a standard of legal permissibility based upon the latter’s
assessment.205
Efforts to instill the standard of the acceptable legal argument draw upon international law’s perceived
subjectivity.206 Former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw argued, in a correspondence debating the
legality of the Iraq war, that “everyone knew that international law was uncertain and that, therefore,
reasonable and honestly held differences of opinion could be held.”207 Parameters do, however, exist.
Johnstone notes that, “there are limits to which any language, including the language of the law, can
plausibly be stretched.”208 Good and bad legal arguments are advanced by states. Interpretative
communities, Johnstone suggests, distinguish between these arguments and assess their credibility. 209
Non-compliant states, however, target both narrow and broad audiences. Their legal contentions are
often directed beyond interpretive communities. Legal arguments, dismissed by experts, may resonate
amongst broader audiences. Dominant propositions that make legal claims may hold little salience
within the international legal community but still drive public debates. When attempting to persuade,
the non-compliant state draws upon legal ambiguity, an expansive notion of reasonableness, and the
willingness (or necessity) of legal institutions to accept a plausible explanation. Upon this permissively
construed interpretative foundation, the non-compliant state completes the persuasive process by
appealing to precedent and commonality when applying law to fact.
E. Drawing Upon Precedent and Commonality
Effective speech, Aristotle claimed, requires the speaker to demonstrate that a contention is worthy
of belief.210 Worthiness is exhibited through the persuasive pull of past agreements, decisions, or
actions. States appeal to precedent and commonality as they apply the law (that they interpret) to the
facts (that they frame). Precedent’s appeal is unaffected by its formal status. As per Article 59 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, decisions of the Court are held to have “no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”211 The Statute embodies the general legal
principle that “international courts are explicitly not bound by precedent.” 212 Judicial decisions are
recognized as “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”213
Notwithstanding precedent’s formal status, appeals to past decisions, established legal principles, and
existing patterns of behaviour foreground international legal contentions. By invoking precedent, an
actor implies that a legal contention is part of a tradition. It is an established tenet and not merely a
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self-serving claim. Harlan Grant Cohen explains that across international law, practitioners invoke,
and tribunals apply, precedent. Continuing, Cohen explains that “reports from international
investment arbitration, international criminal law, international human rights, and international trade
all testify to precedent’s apparent authority.”214
Precedent’s authoritativeness is, however, described as “informal.”215 States deny – often vehemently
– the binding force of past legal decisions.216 Within international affairs, states value flexibility.
Despite predictability’s appeal, states resist officially recognizing the lingering constraint of legal rules
derived from the decisions of international tribunals. Yet, states often appeal to precedent.
Individually, these legal appeals willingly recall supportive judicial decisions. Often, however, the use
of precedent is not confined by a formalist application of stare decisis. States exhibit a persuasive
tendency to recall legal measures that present as analogous to the contention or policy that the state
wishes to advance.
Precedent becomes a means of persuasion. An advantageous past decision by a judicial or appellate
body will be cited by a state that argues before that same body. Cross-fertilization occurs when a
persuasive entity is cited in an alternative forum. Cohen notes that “decisions by international courts
or tribunals with general jurisdiction over international law broadly or an area of international law
specifically might be invoked as precedential with regard to that area of law regardless of the forum
for the current argument.”217 Applied expansively, a state’s use of precedent may accentuate a prior or
similar interpretation of a legal rule.218 The pre-existing interpretation may have been offered by
another state or by a legal expert. Non-binding decisions by UN bodies are commonly invoked as a
form of precedent.219 States accentuate the interpretations of what Sandesh Sivakumaran terms “state
empowered entities.”220 These include the decisions, judgements, or reasoning of organizations and
bodies that include the International Law Commission, the ICRC, and the Human Rights Committee.
Understood broadly, precedent derives from a diversity of sources. Moving beyond the opinions of
decision-making entities, Cohen notes that state behaviour is amongst the oldest forms of international
precedent.221 By recalling past acts, a non-compliant state may defend a controversial event as
consistent with a pattern of state action. This lessens the potency of formal legal discourse. If a
majority view the controversial event as a violation, recalling past state behaviour alters the analysis.
Tangibility precedes abstraction, emphasizing what states do and not simply what the law requires. As
Michael Reisman explains, “inferences about what other actors think is acceptable behavior are not
derived from international judgments or from constitutional documents, statutes, or treaties. They are
almost entirely derived from the responses of key actors to a critical event.”222 If law is identified in
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the ways that states interpret and apply norms in particular cases, the persuading state will accentuate
those cases.223 A state bolsters the persuasiveness of its contention when it displays that analogous
actions have been undertaken and implicitly or explicitly received by the international community.
Similarly, the persuading state may accentuate the commonalty of a particular event. When a state
pursues a military action or proposes a particular policy it may draw upon a shared (sometimes
hypothetical) scenario. It challenges the target audience to consider how it has or would react in a
comparable setting. If a dangerous non-state armed group were amassed on your border – the
persuading state asserts – you too would be compelled to act in pre-emptive self-defense.224 If an
attack against a major urban centre caused thousands of deaths and altered a city’s landscape you too
would disregard legal formality.225 Appeals to commonality allow for variances in the analogy. Within
a formal system of stare decisis, precedent’s effectiveness is contingent on the similarity between the
past fact pattern and the current context.226 By illustrating commonalities, persuasion becomes a
thought-experiment. Legal texts that support the consensus view that a particular action is illegal are
presented as in tension with necessity. A particular incident becomes a “norm-indicator” or a “normgenerator.”227 Past actions and assumed responses provide persuasive licence to the non-compliant
state.
Appeals to precedent encourage a target audience to accept a counterattitudinal message. A
controversial military action, an expansive interpretation accentuates past practice to both illustrate a
pattern of similarity and imply a broader sense of international acceptance. Through the creation of a
common lifeworld, by positioning the state as a general norm-acceptor, in demonstrating the authority
to interpret, instilling the standard of the acceptable legal argument, and when drawing upon precedent
and commonality the non-compliant state applies law to fact. It engages in a persuasive process to lie,
to interpret, or to legitimize. Legal arguments follow familiar patterns. International law provides an
often-reiterated language and a set of discursive conventions. Mostly, states display a recognizable
argumentative structure. When a state addresses a broad audience, it relies upon lofty contentions and
recurrent themes. When the state targets its arguments narrowly, towards or within an interpretative
community, it becomes more technocratic. It references favoured sources and a hierarchy of legal
authority. However, persuasive engagements display idiosyncrasy. The phases discussed above are
non-exhaustive. A particular use of legal argument, by a non-compliant state, will not necessarily
invoke each of these phases or apply them in a linear fashion. These phases of engagement represent
an amalgamation of the persuasive practices that states undertake. Application is necessarily specific
to the context within which the non-compliant state wishes to persuade. This application will now be
described.
V. WHEN STATES PERSUADE: ACCOUNTS OF LEGAL ARGUMENT UPON THE USE OF FORCE
The Caroline affair began in 1837 when British forces suspected that a privately-owned steamship in
the Niagara River aided Canadian rebels in opposing British rule. Two British officers, leading a
Ibid, at 12.
See generally, Sean D. Murphy, “The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense” (2005) 50 Villanova Law Rev. 699.
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contingent of volunteers, seized the ship. They burned and then sank the vessel. The Caroline was
moored in American water and was owned by Buffalo native William Wells. During the raid a US
citizen was killed. Anglo-American relations deteriorated.228 Amidst calls for reparations, reprisals, and
the increasing prospect of war, a diplomatic discourse began between British and US officials. 229 Legal
explanations were offered in concurrence. The British argued that the Caroline’s destruction was a
public act justified under the law of nations.230 The US responded that the Caroline was not engaged in
piracy, operated as a freight and passenger ship, and had been flying the US flag. 231
Harold Koh identifies this discourse as initiating a tradition of public explanation.232 From the 19th
century, US officials increasingly coupled actions with international legal justifications. 233 Legal
reasoning, assertions of compliance, reveal much about how international law is understood. Also,
however, this conversive process provides opportunity for law to be formed, developed, or altered.
The Caroline affair is paradigmatic. Following a letter sent by the US Secretary of State, Daniel Webster,
to the British Ambassador, Henry Fox, a set of legal criteria were established. These required that the
“necessity of self-defense was instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no movement
of deliberations.”234 The requirements of imminence, necessity, and proportionality were identified
and now inform the classic definition of self-defence under international law. 235
The following case studies describe the discursive process accompanying the use and application of
force by states. Each considers the role that persuasion and legal argument assume within the resulting
discourse. The first study describes the use of international legal argument by the Russian Federation
following its annexation of Crimea. This provides an example of the use of persuasive legal appeals to
supplement a lie. The second study details the US and British advancement of the “unwilling or
unable” test within the context of the “war on terror.” This constitutes an example of a state employing
persuasive argument to establish a legal interpretation. A third case study describes the use of legal
argument by Israel both during and after the 2014 Gaza war. This illustrates how a state employs
international law to legitimize a particular action or event.
Despite the assigned motives – to lie; to interpret; to legitimize – I do not suggest that states use legal
argument for a singular purpose. States appeal to international law in multifaceted ways. They are
motivated, often simultaneously, by a diversity of reasons. The legal responses evoked by an incident
or series of incidents as broad and enduring as, for example, the “war on terror” facilitate myriad legal
engagements. These will overlap, contradict, and evolve. In one instance a state may employ
international law to supplement a lie. Later, that same state will recall law to advance a good-faith legal
interpretation. Whether a state is lying, whether it is offering a good-faith interpretation, or advancing
Howard Jones, “The Caroline Affair” (1976) 38 The Historian 485 at 485.
Ibid, at 485, 489, 495-496.
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a self-serving legal argument will evade agreement. Motives may be obviously transparent but are often
difficult to discern. The purpose of these categorizations is not to assess the validity of the particular
legal arguments. Instead, it is to demonstrate how the persuasive process is employed in a diversity of
scenarios to achieve generalizable purposes.
A. To Supplement a Lie: The Use of Persuasive Legal Argument following the Russian Annexation of Crimea
Almost without warning, Ukraine moved from the cusp of European integration and into Moscow’s
sphere of influence. President Viktor Yanukovych’s tenure on Bankova Street commenced with
familiar calls to ensure the requisite reforms necessary to facilitate EU membership.236 In early
September 2013, President Yanukovych chaired a fractious meeting amongst members of his political
party.237 The East-West divisions displayed by party loyalists became the harbinger of a tumultuous
year that altered Ukraine’s political trajectory. Following the suspension of a pending EU association
agreement, thousands of protestors gathered in Kiev’s Independence Square. The “Euromaidan”
protests spread across the country. To quell opposition, Yanukovych employed increasingly antidemocratic tactics. His support dwindled. Members of the Rada passed legislation stripping
Yanukovych’s legal powers. Police abandoned their guard of the Presidential offices and the Rada
voted to impeach.238
The disposed President called the events a coup.239 Pro-Russian, anti-government groups countered
the Euromaidan protests. Violent outbreaks and large demonstrations began in Donetsk and Luhansk
but attention soon turned to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. As protests mounted throughout
Ukraine, Sergei Aksyonov began forming a paramilitary force. Aksyonov led the Russian Unity party,
a minor political faction in the Crimean State Council that held three seats in the regional legislature.
Days after Yanukovych’s impeachment, the State Council was seized by two dozen armed militants.
Aksyonov mediated.240 Hours later, a quorum of parliamentarians was gathered and – under uncertain
circumstances – Aksyonov was appointed as Crimea’s Prime Minister.241
On 6 March, under Aksyonov’s stewardship, the State Council adopted a decree establishing the
parameters of an “All-Crimean Referendum.” Voters would indicate support for reunification of
Crimea with the Russian Federation or favour restoration of the 1992 Crimean Constitution.242 Five
days later, the Crimean legislature and the Sevastopol City Council passed a joint resolution. This
declared Crimea’s independence and stated that, if voters choose to succeed, the State Council would
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declare total autonomy from Ukraine and move to join the Russian Federation.243 The referendum
was held on 16 March 2014. The official results reported that 96.7% chose unification.244
Ukrainian officials denounced the events in Crimea.245 International observers added to the mounting
condemnation.246 The General Assembly pronounced that the referendum had no validity.”247 For a
single day Crimea claimed sovereign status. Then, on 18 March, President Vladimir Putin informed
the relevant Russian institutions that Crimean authorities sought accession into the Russian
Federation.248 Immediately, a treaty was drafted and signed to formalize the annexation of Crimea.249
The United States announced that Russian actions in Crimea constituted a “brazen military incursion”
and that annexation amounted to a “land grab.”250 Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Ukraine’s interim-Prime
Minister, stated that events had moved from the political to the military stage.251 The British held that
“it is completely unacceptable for Russia to use force to change borders on the basis of a sham
referendum held at the barrel of a Russian gun.” 252 A dominant narrative emerged.253 Crimea was
assumed by Russia in violation of the prohibition on the forceful acquisition of territory.
Moscow contended that Yanukovych’s impeachment was illegal. The succeeding interim government
was illegitimate.254 Russian officials claimed that Ukraine had come under the control of extremists
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who threatened the nation’s Russian population and disrupted regional stability.255 Kremlin officials
began building an international legal argument. A series of bilateral treaties – reached between Russia
and Ukraine to, inter alia, ensure Ukraine’s territorial integrity – were dismissed.256 Russia argued that
regime change in Kiev created a new state with which Russia had not concluded formal agreements.
Russian officials characterized Crimean “reunification” as the result of two independent legal acts.257
First, following a legitimate referendum, Crimea lawfully separated from Ukraine. Then, annexation
was realized through a bilateral treaty between Russia and Crimea. 258 Self-determination featured
prominently within the Russian narrative.259
Initially, Russia denied using force.260 Claims that Russian militants were operating in Crimea, to
bolster Aksyonov and to facilitate annexation, were rejected. In the weeks preceding the referendum,
President Putin insisted that “no Russian troops – apart from those already stationed at the Russian
Navy base in Sebastopol – were present anywhere in Crimea.”261 Substantiated reports that hundreds
of armed soldiers in “unmarked Russian uniforms” were positioned at military sites and government
buildings throughout Crimea were dismissed.262 Putin insisted that these individuals were “selforganized local forces” whose uniforms could have been “purchased at any store.”263 Information
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spread through media reports.264 In the lead up to the referendum, these groups – the members of
whom were dubbed “little green men” – began conducting military functions.265 NATO and American
officials insisted there was a definitive connection between Russia and the armed groups.266 President
Putin denied accusations that Russia acted in violation of international law, claiming “Russia’s Armed
Forces never entered Crimea.”267
Putin’s claim proved false.268 The discourse shifted from questioning whether Russia maintained a
presence in Crimea to interrogating the legality of that presence.269 In response to mounting
accusations of wrongfulness, Russia offered a series of international legal arguments concerning the
use of force. Broadly, Russia asserted that: (1) the interim Ukrainian government was illegitimate.
Russian forces only entered Crimea upon invitation by President Yanukovych and the local Crimean
authorities.270 (2) Intervention was justified in response to a mounting humanitarian crisis and to
ensure the human rights of Ukraine’s Russian minority.271 And, (3) the enduring political chaos posed
a threat to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and to Russian forces stationed in Sevastopol.272
Roy Allison contends that Russia’s legal appeals facilitated a “deniable intervention.”273 By appealing
to international law, Allison notes that Russia blurred “the legal and illegal, to create justificatory
smokescreens, in part by exploiting some areas of uncertainty in international law, while making
“unfounded assertions of facts.”274 The contours of Russia’s legal appeals are now well-known. They
have been dismissed and deconstructed by an array of international lawyers.275 Samantha Power, the
US Ambassador to the UN quipped that Moscow “had just become the rapid response arm of the
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Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights” and that the legal assertions presented by the
Russian Federation “are without basis in reality.”276 The British Ambassador told the Security Council
that Russian claims were “fabricated to justify Russian military action.”277 Also, however, the series of
legal arguments presented by Russia illuminate how legal discourse moves beyond assessments of
validity. These arguments illustrate how a non-compliant state employs international law to
supplement a lie as it works to persuade audiences about the acceptableness of a military action.
1. The Identification of a Common Lifeworld
Russia formulated a shared and relatable context in the weeks preceding the formal annexation of
Crimea. A lifeworld was identified. This was grounded in a historical narrative. Russian officials drew
upon the notion of national identity as they accentuated Russia’s deep connection to Crimea. In a
widely broadcast speech, President Putin announced that “in people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has
always been an inseparable part of Russia.”278 Putin presented a historical account. Following the
Bolshevik Revolution, large parts of Russia’s south were added to Ukraine. This occurred, Putin
claimed, without “consideration for the ethnic make-up of the population.”279 In 1954, Nikita
Khrushchev transferred Crimea and Sevastopol to Ukraine. The Communist Party, Putin continued,
violated constitutional norms. Naturally, “in a totalitarian state nobody bothered to ask the citizens of
Crimea and Sevastopol.”280
Following annexation, the Russian Ambassador to the UN furthered this narrative. Events in Crimea
were said to have “restored historical justice.”281 Vitaly Churkin told the General Assembly, “historical
justice has triumphed. For ages Crimea has been an integral part of our country, we share history,
culture, and the main thing, people. And only the voluntaristic decisions by the USSR leaders in 1954,
which transferred Crimea and Sevastopol to the Ukrainian Republic, although within one state, has
distorted this natural state of affairs.”282
The historical connection between Russia and Crimea, the conveyed sense of national identity,
established a foundation upon which a lifeworld would further be described. Allison explains that this
coupled a domestically-targeted, ethno-territorial evocation of the past with a statement of strategic
intent.283 Restoration of a historical injustice was presented as both a security necessity and an
expression of self-determination. Sevastopol was described as “a fortress that serves as the birthplace
of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.”284 Crimea was presented as a symbol of military glory and strategic

UNSC 7125th Meeting, supra note 270 at 4. See also, Nick O’Malley, “War of words at UN over Russia’s Crimea move”
The Sydney Morning Herald (4 March 2014), online: <https://www.smh.com.au/world/war-of-words-at-un-over-russiascrimea-move-20140304-hvg0c.html>.
277 UNSC 7125th Meeting, supra note 270 at 7. See also, Allison Deniable Intervention, supra note 270 at 1262.
278 Address 18 March, supra note 267. See also, Geiß Russia’s Annexation of Crimea, supra note 244 at 438.
279 Address 18 March, supra note 267.
280 Ibid.
281 See, Erika Leonaitė & Dainius Žalimas, “The Annexation of Crimea and Attempts to Justify It in the Context of
International Law” (2015-2016) 14 Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 11 at 49 [Leonaitė & Žalimas The Annexation of
Crimea].
282 UNGAOR, 68th Sess, 80th Mtg, UN Doc A/68/PV.80 at 3 [UNGA 80th Meeting].
283 This recalled the lost territories of “Novorossiya” which, in the 1920s were transferred from the Soviet Government
to the Ukrainian Social Soviet Republic See, Allison Deniable Intervention, supra note 270 at 1266, 1282.
284 Address 18 March, supra note 267.
276

223

necessity.285 Russia possessed a historical duty, Ambassador Churkin told the Security Council, to
guarantee regional stability and protect the ethnic population in the “near abroad.”286
Russia insisted that it was compelled to intervene. Appeals to the lifeworld told of universal values.
Within, liberal norms were displaced by fascist tendencies and Ukraine descended into anarchy.
President Putin framed events as a violent coup d’état. Those who perpetrated the events in Kiev, Putin
declared, “were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would
stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes
and anti-Semites executed this coup.”287 Russian officials documented alleged human rights violations
and disseminated reports depicting post-revolution Ukraine as lawless. 288 This facilitated subsequent
legal assertions that evoked the sentiment of the responsibility to protect, claimed that intervention
followed invitation, and asserted the right of states to protect nationals abroad. 289 Invocations of a
lifeworld – exhibiting an illiberal decline, marked by escalating violence and the persecution of a
vulnerable ethnic group – contextualized Russia’s substantive legal arguments.
Russia professed that intervention was required to realize legitimate legal aims, to provide protection,
and to ensure preservation of the threatened liberal norms. Legal arguments favouring selfdetermination were compromised by an anarchic society. Russian insistence that annexation was a
legitimate expression “of the people of Crimea” was built upon the identified lifeworld. Russia held
that:
“Following the unlawful and violent coup in Ukraine the possibility to exercise the right
to self-determination within the Ukrainian state was eliminated. There was a spate of
killings, mass violence, abductions, attacks on journalists and human rights activists,
politically motivated imprisonments, egregious incidents with racist motives (including
anti-Russian and anti-Semite), committed upon instructions or with the tacit approval of
the Kyiv authorities. Moreover, a group of people supposedly controlled by the illegal
authorities of Kyiv attempted to overthrow the legal government of Crimea. The
authorities in Kyiv do not represent the Ukrainian people as a whole, especially the
population of Crimea; they do not exercise effective control over the territory and do not
maintain law and order.”290
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When Yanukovych was deposed and Crimea voted to secede, Russia faced mounting condemnation.
This told of foreign interference, unlawful annexation, and the use of force in contradiction of the
most fundamental international norms.291 In response, Russia developed a legal narrative. Substantive
legal engagements were premised upon the identified lifeworld. This exhibited shared ideals and
relatable fears. Persuasive endeavours and the subsequent development of contrarian legal arguments
were built upon this context and would facilitate Russian insistence that its actions were reflective of
a general commitment to international law.
2. Establishing the State as a General Norm-Acceptor
Expressions of legal fidelity featured throughout the Russian discourse that accompanied events in
Crimea. Russian actions – the deployment of armed forces to facilitate annexation – were presented
as both consistent with and in furtherance of international law. Prior to acknowledging that Russian
forces were operating in Crimea, President Putin offered pre-emptive legal arguments. These insisted
that Russian involvement in Crimea would either constitute a “humanitarian intervention” or an
“intervention by invitation.”292 In forwarding these arguments, Russian officials accentuated their
general commitment to international law. President Putin declared:
“We proceed from the conviction that we always act legitimately. I have personally always
been an advocate of acting in compliance with international law. I would like to stress yet
again that if we do make the decision, if I do decide to use the Armed Forces, this will be
a legitimate decision in full compliance with both general norms of international law, since
we have the appeal of the legitimate President, and with our commitments...”293
Substantive legal arguments were coupled with general expressions of international legal alacrity.
Attempts by Russian officials, to persuade varied audiences, drew upon international law’s rhetorical
centrality in the foreign policies and strategy documents of the post-Soviet era.294 Since the mid-1980s,
international law was afforded a prominent position in the reformist discourse that marked
perestroika.295 Under the banner more international law, Mikhail Gorbachev recognized that expressions
of legal devotion facilitated the transition from autocracy.296 The pivot toward international law was
reflected in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Article 15 dictates that “the universallyrecognized norms of international law and international treaties and agreements of the Russian
Federation shall be a component part of its legal system.”297
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The centrality of Russia’s formal commitment to international law was offered in defense of Russian
actions in Crimea. These purported efforts – intervention by invitation, for humanitarian purposes, or
to facilitate self-determination – were not merely consistent with legal dictate.298 They were in defence
of legal norms, disregarded by Ukrainian actors and their western enablers. Speaking in Sochi,
President Putin announced that the international system had become “seriously weakened, fragmented
and deformed.”299 International relations, Putin continued, “must be based on international law, which
itself should rest on moral principles such as justice, equality and truth.”300 Russia recalled its enduring
commitment to law to impress that contemporary actions aligned with traditional commitments. This,
Putin suggested, positioned Russia to become a world leader in “asserting the norms of international
law.”301
A general milieu – of legal reverence – preceded Russian claims that its actions in Crimea were not an
unlawful use of force. On 3 March, Russia convened a meeting of the Security Council. Ambassador
Churkin announced that President Yanukovych had formally requested Russia to “use the armed
forces of the Russian Federation to establish legitimacy, peace, law and order and stability in defence
of the people of Ukraine.”302 Explicitly rejecting allegations of aggression, Churkin told the Security
Council that the events in Ukraine must be redressed “in accordance with international obligations,
including most importantly those related to international humanitarian law, in defence of human rights
and the rights of national minorities.”303
On the eve of the referendum, Ukraine’s interim-Prime Minister travelled to New York. Yatsenyuk
told the Security Council that Russian actions violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and asked the
Russian Federation whether it sought war.304 Churkin replied that Russia did not view events in
Ukraine as an armed conflict but as a means of ensuring “the fundamental norms of international
law.”305 Russia endorsed the scheduled referendum as an expression of equal rights. This, the Russian
Ambassador insisted, was an extraordinary measure that was reflective of Russia’s general
commitment to territorial integrity and the requirements of self-determination.306
3. Demonstrating the Authority to Interpret
The Russian narrative advanced controversial legal claims. Arguments that intervention followed
invitation, was motivated by humanitarianism, or that succession constituted a legitimate expression
of self-determination were factually contentious and relied upon uncertain legal assumptions. Russian
officials paired contrarian legal interpretations with expressions or displays of competence. The role
of legal experts was accentuated. Appeals to expertise are emblematic of the persuasive process. They
provide a means for the state to demonstrate interpretative authority.
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When Russian officials began building legal arguments justifying intervention, observers recalled the
series of agreements that Russia and Ukraine concluded during the 1990s. 307 A Russian incursion
would breach the resulting territorial assurances. 308 Facing such questions, President Putin
supplemented an inventive legal argument with an appeal to expertise. Asked whether Russian military
involvement would violate the Budapest Memorandum, Putin responded:
“In such a case it is hard not to agree with some of our experts who say that a new state
is now emerging on this territory. This is just like what happened when the Russian
Empire collapsed after the 1917 revolution and a new state emerged. And this would be
a new state with which we have signed no binding agreements.”309
Putin’s rejoinder drew upon Soviet-era legal scholarship. Leading international lawyers, from the
USSR, had developed a counterintuitive argument regarding revolution’s influence on statehood. 310
Putin recalled how legal experts coalesced around the notion that the Bolshevik revolution heralded
“a new subject of international law.”311 The absence of continuity, severed by revolutionary
transformation, implied that the emergent state was not subject to agreements formed under the
former (deposed) government.
Russia often invokes the expertise of its international lawyers. Foreign policy decisions are supported
through consensus legal pronouncements. These commonly adhere to the state’s position.312 This
process of reliance and adherence was exemplified during Russia’s opposition to the US led invasion
of Iraq. A symposium, convened at St. Petersburg State University, featured a meeting between
President Putin, President Chirac of France, and German Chancellor Schröder. The heads of state
met with leading members of the Russian legal academy. Putin told the gathering: “Now as never
before it is important to rely on the opinion of the expert community – lawyers, political scientists,
specialists in different fields of international relations…We, of course, will impatiently wait for the
results of your works, fresh ideas, suggestions.”313
As events in Crimea transpired, a series of professional documents were offered to support Russia’s
legal arguments. Purportedly independent, these supplementary avowals sought to accentuate the
speaker’s interpretative authority and, by association, the endorsed argument’s validity. The Russian
Association of International Law circulated a detailed letter.314 This was addressed to the worldwide
community of international lawyers and signed by Anatoly Kapustin, perhaps Russia’s foremost
international legal expert.315 The letter refuted allegations that Russian actions in Crimea breached
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See, Budapest Memorandum, supra note 256 at paragraph 1. See also, Treaty of Friendship, supra note 256 at Article 3.
309 Putin Press Conference 4 March, supra note 260. See also, Merezhko Crimea’s Annexation, supra note 292 at 63.
310 Merezhko Crimea’s Annexation, supra note 292 at 69.
311 Soviet lawyers had claimed that the absence of continuity between the Russian Empire and Soviet Russia meant that
the emergent Soviet Government was not responsible for the debts assumed by the Empire. See, Ibid.
312 See, Anthea Roberts, “Crimea and the South China Sea: Connections and Disconnects among Chinese, Russian, and
Western International Lawyers” in Anthea Roberts, et al., eds, Comparative International Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2018) 111 at 128 [Roberts Crimea and the South China Sea]. See also, Maria Issaeva, “The Case of Crimea in the
Light of International Law: Its Nature and Implications” (2015) 3 Russ. L.J. 158.
313 Mälksoo Russian Approaches, supra note 269 at 83-84.
314 Circular Letter from the Russian Association of International Law to the Executive Council of the International Law
Association (June 2014), online: <http://www.ilarb.ru/html/news/2014/5062014.pdf> [Russian Association Letter].
315 Leonaitė & Žalimas The Annexation of Crimea, supra note 281 at 37-38.
307
308

227

international law. It sought to clarify “the basic facts, history and legal foundations” of the Russian
incursion.316 It offered an account that closely aligned with official state discourse.317 In turn, this
would be cited in support of Russia’s varied legal positions.318 Elsewhere, Russian officials relied upon
the “White Book on violations of human rights and the rule of law in Ukraine.” 319 This was published
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, at least outwardly, shared stylistic similarities with the US State
Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Published in English, these Russian
documents sought to establish, endorse, and persuade. They advanced particular legal arguments while
associating authoritativeness and professional competence with what were widely-received as
contentious interpretative appeals.
4. Instilling the Standard of the Acceptable Legal Argument
Russia’s actions in Ukraine were certain to evoke a legal response. When Russian military forces
became active in Crimea, when annexation was formalized, officials in Moscow were accused of
violating a foundational tenet of the international legal order. The pervasive assumption that Russia
employed force to acquire territory fuelled condemnation.320 In reply, the legal narrative that Russia
presented was unlikely to sway a plurality of non-Russian international lawyers. It would not dislodge
the consensus western belief that Russia had acted unlawfully.321 However, as Christian Marxsen
acknowledged, “since Russia is powerful enough to pursue its interests anyway, it does not need an
ultimately convincing legal justification. A justification that is at least not totally absurd, but somehow
arguable, is already good enough for making a case in the international political sphere.”322
Russia’s legal contentions – while straining credibility – targeted diverse (often non-legal) audiences.323
Inherent in Russian claims were efforts to impose or expand evaluative legal standards. Broad
understandings of the use of force and aggression were advanced thus lessening the persuasive burden.
These assertions moved beyond existing doctrine and forwarded permissive standards that lent to
favourable legal assessments. Article 3(a) of the Definition of Aggression instructs that the unlawful
act includes “the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or
any military operation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation
by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof.”324 Russia equated the use of force
with active belligerency.325 The fact that Russia’s involvement in Crimea did not result in an exchange
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of hostilities was presented as lessening legal responsibility. This implied that an act of aggression was
contingent upon “a significant military confrontation or the actual use of arms.” 326 President Putin
dismissed the charge of aggression based upon this lessened standard of compliance. Putin noted:
“they keep talking of some Russian intervention in Crimea, some sort of aggression. This is strange to
hear. I cannot recall a single case in history of an intervention without a single shot being fired and
with no human casualties.”327
5. Drawing Upon Precedent and Commonality
Russia invoked the Kosovo precedent. Legal contentions – that framed events in Crimea as an
expression of self-determination and a lawful example of state succession – recalled western support
for the Kosovo Assembly’s 2008 Declaration of Independence. They referenced the ICJ’s resulting
Advisory Opinion that held the Declaration did not violate international law.328 Russia accentuated the
legal and factual similarities between events in Crimea and the reaction and legal reasoning offered by
various states and institutions in response to earlier occurrences in the Balkans. The Supreme Council
of Crimea invoked the Kosovo precedent in its Declaration of Independence. The document premised
succession on “the confirmation of the status of Kosovo by the [ICJ] …which says that [a] unilateral
declaration of independence by part of the country doesn’t violate any international norms.”329
President Putin made extensive use of the Kosovo precedent.330 In presenting the case that Crimean
succession was an expression of self-determination that accorded with democratic procedures, Putin
stated:
“the Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent – a precedent that
our western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, when they
agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is doing
now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country’s central
authorities. Pursuant to Article 2, Chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter, the UN
International Court agreed with this approach and made the following comment in its
ruling of July 22, 2010, and I quote: ‘No general prohibition may be inferred from the
practice of the Security Council with regard to declarations of independence’.”331
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Russia directly cited the US written submission to the ICJ which asserted that “declarations of
independence may, and often do, violate domestic legislation. However, this does not make them
violations of international law.”332
When Russia was accused of using force to unlawfully acquire territory, officials pivoted to the Kosovo
precedent. Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister, stated that when western nations reproach Russia
“we tell them that in Kosovo their policy was quite different.”333 Historical examples and instances of
state behaviour were presented as analogous with or justifying Crimea’s accession to the Russian
Federation. Putin likened the process of Crimean “reunification” to amalgamation of the Democratic
and Federal German Republics.334 When the Russian narrative forwarded humanitarian justifications,
officials linked Russia’s actions in Crimea with what they purported to be parallel state behaviour.335
Since its conflict with Georgia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia claimed it was the victim of a
legal double standard: “we can’t understand why those who are talking about the responsibility to
protect and about security of the person at every turn, forgot it when it came to the part of the former
Soviet space where the authorities began to kill innocent people, appealing to sovereignty and
territorial integrity.”336
Officials consciously “mimicked” the justificatory language that western states employed in defence
of the NATO-led interventions in Kosovo and Libya.337 Moscow reasoned that a “looming
humanitarian catastrophe” would cause 675,000 Russian-speakers to flee from Ukraine and into
Russia.338 Roy Allison explains that since the Georgian war, Russia has made strategic use of legal
arguments by “selectively mimicking western humanitarian discourses.”339 By drawing upon the
Kosovo precedent, by phrasing legal contentions in a humanitarian vernacular and through the
language of human rights, Russia insisted that it too was entitled to act in Crimea as the west had
elsewhere.340
6. Conclusion
The discursive process began with a Russian lie. Soon, however, the affirmation that Russian forces
were not active in Crimea was altered. Intricate legal justifications replaced factual dismissals. These
arguments constructed an environment, often unsubstantiated, in which chaos had replaced order.
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They accentuated Russia’s general commitment to international law and justified intervention as a
manifestation of that commitment. Legal arguments were doctrinally weak. Beyond Russia’s legal
community, they carried little sway. Understood singularly, Russia’s legal contentions were ineffective.
Falsehoods were exposed.341 International lawyers quickly deconstructed Russia’s substantive
assertions.342 Various European institutions insisted that Moscow’s formulations lacked legal
validity.343 Russia’s reasoning was rejected by numerous states as little more than efforts to sanitize a
land grab.344
A majority of states held that Russia’s territorial acquisition was unlawful and denied legal
recognition.345 It is, however, unlikely that Moscow sought or assumed acceptance from such states.
Persuasion’s effectiveness is contingent upon whether the intended audience is moved or the desired
objective is achieved. Innumerable legal and non-legal factors influence determinations of how the
non-compliant state’s persuasive appeals are received. Thomas Grant demonstrates that the responses
of states facing secessionist movements are guided by local experiences.346 Nigeria, which had settled
a boundary dispute with Biafra through adjudication, endorsed a similar process to address the
Crimean crisis.347 The Indonesian experiences with Aceh and Western New Guinea influenced its
strong affirmation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.348 Argentina, whose claim to the Falkland Islands
risked being undermined if a nexus was established between self-determination and referendum,
described the Crimean process as “worthless.”349
Russia did, however, achieve identifiable objectives. Beyond the particularities of Russia’s varied legal
contentions, Roy Allison explains that Moscow sought to position itself at the forefront of states that
sought differentiation from the western liberal order.350 Designed to increase global influence and
regional control, Russian officials followed events in Crimea by proposing an international conference
to reformulate international law since “there are no agreed rules and the world may become an
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increasingly unruly place.”351 Such developments are unlikely. But events in Crimea did allow Russian
officials to herald the end of US hegemony and tell regional partners and strategic allies that the
Russian Federation was pursuing a new world order that better reflected the interests of emergent
powers.352
Many of Russia’s legal contentions appear designed to appease China.353 Legal arguments, references
to process, and the historical connection between Russia and Crimea sought to pacify Beijing’s unease
with “territorial revisionism.”354 China was deferential. It, alongside several strategically significant
states including India, Brazil, and South Africa, abstained from the General Assembly Resolution that
affirmed “commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of
Ukraine.”355 Only 52% of UN membership favoured the resolution. This prompted Vitaly Churkin to
declare a “moral and political victory.”356
Russian actions in Ukraine received domestic support. Arguments that pulled upon national identity
and historical bonds increased popular sentiment. Contentions that Russia’s claim to Crimea would
ensure the safety and rights of a related ethnic group generated legitimacy in Russia, Crimea, and
amongst the Russian-speaking population in Eastern Ukraine.357 These elements of Russia’s legal
reasoning appealed to populist sentiments. They provided political consolidation as President Putin’s
approval rating reached its zenith.358 Within the near abroad, Russia’s desire to extend its sphere of
influence was reflected through its legal contentions. Appeals to humanitarian motives, democratic
process, and western hypocrisy targeted Russian speaking populations in the former Soviet states.
Russian efforts to position itself as a regional guardian, to ensure stability, and to protect vulnerable
groups may appeal to various demographics within the near abroad. It, however, received a mixed
reception from regional actors.359
The effectiveness of persuasion is most often intangible. Russia’s principle contention – that Westernled interventions in Kosovo and Iraq – have altered the international legal order was sympathetically
received by select states. However, the collective efficacy of these efforts can not be understood
episodically. As Roy Allison notes, while Russia will be unable to shift broad support for the
prohibition on the use of force, it will attempt to persuade strategic allies and challenge the “right of
the United States and other western powers to act as the privileged custodians and interpreters of core
principles of international order.”360 The effectiveness of Russia’s legal engagements is inseparable
from this broader context. It is contingent upon myriad factors, personalities, and interests. This is
perhaps best illustrated by what Allison identifies as a new tactical opportunity – unknown upon
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Crimea’s annexation – in which Russia may influence a US Administration that has received the
Atlantic Alliance skeptically, softened its condemnation of Russia, and may be amenable to a
transactional relationship that would further empower Moscow to pursue the objective of “compelling
Ukraine to accept a neutral status between Russia and NATO.”361
B. To Posit a Preferred Interpretation: The Use of Persuasive Legal Argument to Apply and Advance the Unwilling
or Unable Standard
President Obama declared that initial military action against ISIS would be limited to Iraq. The scope
and duration of the airstrikes, that would begin in August 2014, were intended to “protect American
personnel in Iraq by stopping the current advance on Erbil … and to help forces in Iraq as they fight
to break the siege of Mount Sinjar and protect the civilians trapped there.”362 The US rationale alluded
to self defence, intervention by invitation, and humanitarian motives. The preceding year’s events –
the rise of ISIS, the fall of Mosul – compelled a military response. In accompaniment, this required
legal justification.363 Strategically, the US would conduct airstrikes in Iraq, arm Syrian factions
combatting ISIS, and form an international coalition to continue counter-terror efforts.364 US officials
offered a firm legal basis for military action in Iraq. President Obama, in a nationally televised address,
insisted that the use of force was in response to a direct “request of the Iraqi government.”365 Formally,
intervention was predicated upon invitation.366
During the following month, ISIS militants increased their gains in Syria. Soon after, the US expanded
its scope of operations. President Obama announced that as part of a “comprehensive and sustained
counterterrorism strategy,” coalition forces would pursue ISIS within the Syrian theater.367 On 22
September, in the early morning hours, the US led a series of strikes against ISIS targets in Raqqa and
to the west of the Iraq border in Deir ez Zour and Al-Hasakah.
The Syrian expansion was presented as a necessary evolution of the international effort to combat
ISIS. However, where the Iraqi phase of operations claimed a firm legal basis, realpolitik and a
confluence of diplomatic and strategic considerations denied a similar extension of the intervention
by invitation justification. Syria, though consenting to a Russian and Iranian presence, insisted that an
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invitation was not extended to the US led coalition.368 Neither would US officials or members of the
coalition seek Syrian consent. Following the Syrian civil war – which began in 2011 when Bashar alAssad violently supressed anti-government protests – many western states viewed the Damascus
authorities as illegitimate. They supported al-Assad’s departure.369 The US plainly stated, “we’re not
going to ask for permission from the Syrian regime.”370
When Samantha Power, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, presented the Secretary General
with an Article 51 letter, military operations in Syria were predicated on an inventive legal justification.
The US stated:
“ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria are a threat not only to Iraq, but also to many
other countries, including the United States and our partners in the region and beyond.
States must be able to defend themselves, in accordance with the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense, as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, when as is the case here, the government of the State where the threat is located is
unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks.”371
The legal argument advanced by the US and select members of the coalition, had gained salience
amongst some international lawyers.372 The unwilling or unable test was not, however, grounded in
clear legal doctrine. Neither the relevant legal instruments or ICJ jurisprudence reference the test.373 It
is instead identified through a lineage of select state practice.374 Appeals to some variant of the
unwilling or unable test has long featured within US foreign policy though its prevalence increased in
the wake of the 11 September attacks.375 States – notably the US, Israel, Russia, and Turkey – have
explicitly invoked the unwilling or unable test to justify cross-border force against non-state actors.376
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As Monica Hakimi notes, “third states, for the most part did not endorse the legal claim, but they
tacitly condoned the actual operations.”377
Despite the test’s prevalence – and with several notable exceptions – states remain reluctant to legally
endorse the unwilling or unable test.378 The ICJ has declined to embrace broad interpretations of the
right to self-defence against non-state armed groups.379 And, proponents of the unwilling or unable
test concede its legal formulation is ill-defined and that it may not constitute customary international
law.380 Where the US and select coalition allies did not experience legal opposition to their military
operations against ISIS in Iraq, the legal rationale accompanying the use of force in Syria required a
persuasive account to posit their preferred legal interpretation.
1. The Identification of a Common Lifeworld
Ambassador Power’s Article 51 letter recalled the perils of terrorism.381 Advancement of the unwilling
or unable test – in justification of US operations in Syria – built upon a relatable context. The general
menace of international terrorism and the particular threat posed by ISIS were accentuated. A
common lifeworld was identified. This was premised upon three contentions. ISIS’s actions in Iraq
and Syria – around Mount Sinjar and toward the Yazidi population – were framed as genocide or
ethnic cleansing.382 ISIS’s existence – their origins and their contemporary function – were linked with
al-Qa’ida and the constant threat of transnational terrorism.383 And ISIS’s methods – the beheadings,
mass rape, crucifixions, and public floggings – were presented as uniquely brutal.384 Collectively, the
lifeworld evoked a conception of terrorism that was ever-present, extensive in reach, familiar yet novel,
and that warranted a military reply.
Articulation of the lifeworld began before operations against ISIS extended into Syria. In mid-August
2014, Ambassador Power addressed the Security Council. ISIS were defined as greater than a regional
issue. Power told the Council that ISIS and other al-Qa’ida affiliates threatened the people of Syria and
Iraq but also endangered the world-at-large.385 Power illustrated the humanitarian consequences of
ISIS’s advancement. Having seized Iraqi and Syrian infrastructure, ISIS possessed “the ability to block
Ibid.
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the flow of electricity and to control access to the water supplies on which people depend.”386 Recent
ISIS attacks, Power noted, “have displaced an estimated 200,000 people, bringing the total number of
internally displaced persons in Iraq since January to a staggering 1.4 million.” 387 ISIS sought to
eradicate the Yazidi population. “Yazidis have been buried alive, beheaded or killed in mass
executions. Thousands were forced to flee to Mount Sinjar, where many ultimately perished from
thirst or exposure to the elements.”388 Elsewhere in Syria, ISIS militants were evidenced to have
purposefully exacerbated a humanitarian catastrophe by confiscating aid destined for civilians in the
country’s east.389
President Obama furthered this theme in a national address. ISIS had “threatened a religious minority
with genocide.”390 The President continued that if ISIS’s advancement continued unabated, “these
terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond [the] region, including to the United States.”391 This
threat – ISIS’s ever-expanding capacity and global reach – recalled the war on terror. President Obama
referenced the 11 September attacks.392 Terrorism was identified as a global menace, the source of
collective fear, and the recipient of unconditional condemnation. The argumentative process,
embraced by US officials did not simply identify cause for defensive action. It acknowledged a
lifeworld, emphasizing that ISIS was an affront to universal values, had committed the most egregious
atrocity crimes, and sought departure from the shared ideals that coalition members would act to
uphold. Retrospection structured current debates as old threats and common fears were repurposed
as the “new front” in the global war against terrorism.393
These reflections did not preclude novel claims. Throughout the framing process, ISIS were
represented as uniquely brutal. Their methods were presented through anecdotes and conveyed to
various audiences. Ambassador Power described to the Security Council a meeting with a Bishop from
Mosul who witnessed ISIS attack a hospital: “a Christian patient who refused to convert was shot in
the head. Two who agreed to convert, denounced as infidels, had their throats slit.” 394 Ambassador
Power conveyed that 500 Yazidi women and children had been abducted, systematically raped,
trafficked, or killed. 395 President Obama would later note that “in a region that has known so much
bloodshed, these terrorists are unique in their brutality. They execute captured prisoners. They kill
children. They enslave, rape, and force women into marriage…” 396
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British Prime Minister David Cameron presented a similar narrative. When the British began airstrikes
late in 2015, ISIS’s devastating reach had been felt throughout Europe. Addressing Parliament, Prime
Minister Cameron referenced recent attacks in Berlin, Istanbul, and at the Bataclan and Stade de France
in Paris. The threat posed by ISIS became vicarious. It reached people in Europe and threatened those
across the UK as they wended their way through their daily routines. The Prime Minister explained
that ISIS “has already taken the lives of British hostages, and inspired the worst terrorist attack against
British people since 7/7, on the beaches of Tunisia—and, crucially, it has repeatedly tried to attack us
right here in Britain.”397
When the US (and later the UK) expanded operations into Syria, legal justifications were premised
upon the shared ideas and collective understandings evoked through this pre-established context. The
US was leading a global effort to combat terrorism. Regional and international actors were working to
ensure a “common security.”398 Following the 22 September airstrikes, President Obama convened a
Security Council meeting. The President emphasized terrorism’s commonality, its enduring threat:
“the tactic of terrorism is not new. So many nations represented here today, including my own, have
seen our citizens killed by terrorists who target innocents.”399 ISIS was presented as a unique
manifestation of a shared experience. Initially, broad appeals did not delineate a specific threat that
would amount to an armed attack.400 Instead, they exhibited a group whose cruelty was limitless and
whose potential displayed extensive reach.401 They appealed to the common fears and vulnerabilities
of a diverse collective of states that faced or perceived the threat of terrorism. Military force – formally
justified through an interpretative appeal to the unwilling or unable test – was a necessary response,
one that would reflect a general commitment to international law.
2. Establishing the State as a General Norm-Acceptor
Elucidation followed assuredness. Within a year, US officials provided a comprehensive legal account
of the unwilling or unable standard. State Department Legal Advisor Brian Egan, addressed the
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (ASIL). Before detailing the Obama
Administration’s legal rationale for the use of force in Syria, Egan began by presenting the US as a
general norm acceptor:
“the United States complies with the international law of armed conflict in our military
campaign against ISIL, as we do in all armed conflicts. We comply with the law of armed
conflict because it is the international legal obligation of the United States; because we
have a proud history of standing for the rule of law; because it is essential to building and
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maintaining our international coalition; because it enhances rather than compromises our
military effectiveness; and because it is the right thing to do.”402
The legal rules governing non-international armed conflicts (NIAC) were enumerated.403 Egan told
the gathered legal experts that these rules, regarded as customary international law, received close
scrutiny within the US Government and through domestic courts.404
Egan described the US as a leader in international legal compliance. Its general commitment to legal
norms ensures that coalition members, as well as US forces, exhibit the highest standards of
compliance. This commitment to legal order, Egan explained, “also extends to promoting law of
armed conflict compliance by our partners…When others seek our assistance with military operations,
we ensure that we understand their legal basis for acting. We also take a variety of measures to help
our partners comply with the law of armed conflict and to avoid facilitating violations through our
assistance…”405
Professions of legal fidelity were further bolstered. Egan explained that the US commitment to legal
compliance surpassed that which was formally required. As a matter of international law, Egan
insisted, the US is compelled to comply with IHL. In practice, however, the US “imposes standards
on its direct action operations that go beyond the requirements of the law of armed conflict.” 406 As
US officials furthered the interpretative assertions undergirding operations in Syria, they accentuated
the state’s reputation. From a position of legal fidelity and leadership, the US drew from a general
sense of norm acceptance to illustrate the credibility of a specific interpretative claim.
British officials exhibited a similar approach. Prime Minister David Cameron told Parliament that the
expansion of airstrikes into Syria constituted collective self-defence. They were legally permissible
because the “Assad regime is unwilling and/or unable to take action necessary to prevent ISIL’s
continuing attack on Iraq, or indeed attacks on us.”407 The ensuing process mirrored occurrences in
the US. The British Attorney General addressed an expert audience at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. In a speech titled “The Modern Law of Self-Defence”, the Rt.
Hon. Jeremy Wright expanded upon the Government’s invocation of the unwilling or unable test.408
The Attorney General began, asserting that the UK “is a world leader in promoting, defending and
shaping international law.”409 British legal contributions – to the slave trade’s eradication; to the
formation of the imminence requirement; to the founding of the League of Nations; and to the UN
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– were recounted. The UK’s role in drafting, and its willingness to sign, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the
Ottawa Treaty, and the Rome Statute were recalled.410 By engaging with the legal questions that
resulted following the use of force in Syria, the Attorney General pledged to continue the British
tradition of “advocating, celebrating and participating in a rules-based international order.”411 The UK
“should and will only use armed force, and will only act in self-defence, where it is consistent with
international law to do so.”412 These parallel persuasive appeals, offered by US and UK officials, would
next move to establish the credentials of the respective actors forwarding the inventive interpretative
claim.
3. Demonstrating the Authority to Interpret
Both speeches targeted a specific epistemic community. The venues for each address – the IISS and
at ASIL’s Annual Meeting – were indicative of a particular professional class. Interpretative appeals,
to the applicability of the unwilling or unable test, were directed toward influential communities of
international lawyers. They sought expert approval – that the justifications for the use of force in Syria
were legally tenable. As Peter Haas suggests, interpretative claims are efficaciously received when
directed towards a community from which the speaker derives credibility.413 By addressing academic
conferences, by emphasizing interpretative sources, and by accentuating the speaker’s reputation and
credentials the persuading entity bolsters its authoritativeness.414
Legal scholars initiated the interpretative advancement of the unwilling or unable test. 415 Academic
endorsements of the standard were, however, closely linked with state practice.416 The actions of states
informed scholarly articulations of an amended self-defence doctrine.417 States then emphasized
academic contributions supportive of interpretations that departed from a strict reading of Article
51.418 Most prominently, Sir Daniel Bethlehem published a list of principles intended to address the
“scope of a state’s right to self-defense against an imminent or actual armed attack by nonstate
actors.”419 When such attacks emanate from a third state, the victim state may intervene without
consent when the third state is, inter alia, “unwilling to effectively restrain the armed activities of the
non-state actor” or when there is a reasonable basis “for concluding that the third state is unable to
effectively restrain [these] armed activities…”420
Brian Egan’s interpretative endorsement of the unwilling or unable test drew heavily upon the
Bethlehem Principles. Egan told the ASIL Annual Meeting, “when considering whether an armed
attack is imminent under the jus ad bellum for purposes of the initial use of force against a particular
non-State actor, the United States analyzes a variety of factors, including those identified by Sir Daniel
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Bethlehem.”421 Similarly, Attorney General Wright extensively cited the Bethlehem Principles when
describing how the UK interprets “the long-standing rules of international law on self-defence to our
need to defend ourselves against new and evolving types of threats from non-state actors.”422 The
Attorney General recognized Sir Daniel’s role as the former Legal Adviser to the FCO and that his
principles were informed by “detailed official-level discussions between foreign ministry, defence
ministry, and military legal advisers from a number of states who have operational experience in these
matters.”423
Both the Legal Adviser and the Attorney General noted that the Principles were published in the
American Journal of International Law. Repeated references to the Bethlehem Principles, allusions to
the prestige of their author, exemplify authoritativeness. They, along with references to The Chatham
House Principles on International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defence and the Leiden Policy
Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism and International Law accentuate the role of expert opinion in the
drafting process of the respective documents. Invocations of these documents were both lauded as
professional sources supporting a particular interpretative position and as the work product of
influential epistemic communities. Appeals to the latter ensure that the documents’ source, their
associated esteem, become indirect efforts to influence the justificatory discourse.424
To advance the favoured interpretation of the unwilling or unable test’s applicability, US and British
officials conveyed their own professional competence. They noted their membership within the
interpretative community that they now sought to influence. Brian Egan offered professional
credentials. Egan told the Annual Meeting that prior to “my confirmation, I served as a Deputy White
House Counsel and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council for nearly three years. Based on
my experience in that position, I can tell you that the President, a lawyer himself, and his national
security team have been guided by international law in setting the strategy for counterterrorism
operations against ISIL.”425 The professional competence of the respective speakers, the
authoritativeness of the documents that they would cite, became factors that lent credence to the
particular interpretative claim.
4. Instilling the Standard of the Acceptable Legal Argument
The interpretative advancement of the unwilling or unable test is an effort to alter a legal standard. It
is an attempt to expand the strictures of Article 51. Acceptance of a novel formulation facilitates
subsequent legal arguments that accompany the use of force against non-state actors. The
persuasiveness of legal appeals, claims of legitimacy, are bolstered when evaluated in accordance with
this broad notion of legal compliance. Brian Egan explains that “if [a state] must rely on self-defense
to use force against a non-State actor on another State’s territory, [they must] determine that the
territorial State is “unable or unwilling” to address the threat posed by the non-State actor…”426
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Reconstructed as positive international law, the imposed reading was presented as a certain legal
standard. Egan continued:
“in some cases international law does not require a State to obtain the consent of the State
on whose territory force will be used. In particular, there will be cases in which there is a
reasonable and objective basis for concluding that the territorial State is unwilling or
unable to effectively confront the non-State actor in its territory so that it is necessary to
act in self-defense…”427
The Article 51 letter that Ambassador Power presented to the Secretary General was the outcome of
an ongoing attempt to amend the jus ad bellum.428 Transnational efforts, amongst aligned states,
advocated in accordance with Attorney General Wright’s contention that “international law is not
static and is capable of adapting to modern developments and new realities.” 429 Several states longfavoured reformulation of the law governing the use of force. These states interpreted the 11
September attacks as urgent demonstrations of the need for legal reform.430 The military response to
international terrorism featured numerous efforts to impose permissive legal standards.431
Articulations of pre-emptive self-defence, application of the unwilling or unable test, constituted
efforts to instil facilitatory legal standards.432 Appeals to these imposed standards, notwithstanding
their uncertain legal status and in several instances broad rejections, provided states the ability to
exhibit an, at least, plausible legal argument.
Formulations of reduced burdens identified legal ambiguity. They emphasized the lack of consensus
surrounding the legal standards relevant to the contemporary challenges posed by the use of force. A
particular legal interpretation may not be doctrinally entrenched but would constitute an acceptable
legal argument. John Bellinger, when serving as Legal Advisor, reminded European interlocuters that
legal rules governing conflict with non-state actors were uncertain. Bellinger insisted that the lack of
clarity regarding the relationship between international law, self-defence, and non-state actors
“provided impetus for cooperation in determining the appropriate legal framework.”433 US actions,
justified through inventive legal reasoning should not, Bellinger insisted, be construed as legal
disregard. The US was not “violating clear legal norms” as “legal experts differ on the interpretation and
implementation of [the] laws of war.”434 Ambiguity created potential. An array of feasible legal
arguments, offered as acceptable if not certain, justified uses of force that appeared to go beyond a
formalist reading of the UN Charter. These allowed the state to exhibit commitment to a legal process
and provided members of the international community with an argument that could be received in
satisfaction of a broad, but acceptable, legal standard.
5. Drawing Upon Precedent and Commonality
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Invocations of precedent featured throughout Brian Egan’s ASIL address. An expansive reading of
the self-defence criteria recalled a lineage of state behaviour. The use of force against non-state actors
was presented as a commonality that long pre-dates the global war on terror. Contemporary legal
arguments, preferred interpretations, were not inventive responses to a modern threat but instead
manifestations of familiar state practice. Egan noted:
“the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense recognized in the U.N. Charter
is not restricted to threats posed by States. Nor is the right of self-defense on the territory
of another State against non-State actors, such as ISIL, something that developed after
9/11. To the contrary, for at least the past two hundred years, States have invoked the
right of self-defense to justify taking action on the territory of another State against nonState actors. As but one example, the oft-cited Caroline incident involved the use of force
by the United Kingdom in self-defense against a non-State actor located in the United
States…”435
Two centuries of supportive state behaviour were emphasized. Appeals to the Caroline incident
associated applications of force against non-state actors operating on a third state’s territory with the
origins of the self-defence doctrine.
Advancement of the unwilling or unable test accentuated the prevalence of similar state practice. Egan
identified the increasing number of states that had offered legal justifications in support of the use of
force against ISIS in Syria. Egan demonstrated that, “the United States is not alone in providing such
public explanations. Over the last eighteen months, for example, nine of our coalition partners have
submitted public Article 51 notifications to the UN Security Council explaining and justifying their
military actions in Syria against ISIL.”436 While minimizing divergencies in legal reasoning, Egan
continued, “though the exact formulations vary from letter to letter, the consistent theme throughout
these reports to the Security Council is that the right of self-defense extend to using force to respond
to actual or imminent armed attacks by non-State armed groups like ISIL.”437 These instances of
similar state behaviour and the alike legal reasoning provided by a diversity of states were presented
as “the clearest evidence” of the unwilling or unable test’s relevancy.438
Earlier efforts to formalize the unwilling or unable test made similar use of precedent. John Bellinger
told an audience at the London School of Economics that “over a century of state practice supports
the conclusion that a state may respond with military force in self-defense to such attacks, at least
where the harboring state is unwilling or unable to take action to quell the attacks.” 439 Bellinger also
would trace the origins of this interpretative account to the Caroline incident. As Victor Kattan
identifies, Bellinger’s appeal to state practice evoked the language advanced in the 2002 National
Security Strategy.440 This too alluded to precedent, noting that “for centuries, international law
recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.” 441
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British appeals to precedent – in advancement of the unwilling or unable test – offered greater
specificity. Attorney General Wright noted that the UK’s interpretative approach was common
amongst several states who “have also confirmed their view that self-defence is available as a legal
basis where the state from whose territory the actual or imminent armed attack emanates is unable or
unwilling to prevent the attack…”442 In support, the Attorney General referenced a Lawfare post by
Elena Chachko and Ashley Deeks cataloging state articulations of the unwilling or unable test.443 The
published version of the Attorney General’s speech includes an annex that links readers to the Article
51 letters of ten states that provided legal justifications favouring the use of force against ISIS targets
in Syria.
6. Conclusion
The decision to use force in Syria demanded an innovative legal justification. The United States was
required to distinguish from the rationale that supported coalition efforts in Iraq. The persuasive
discourse accompanying operations in Syria advanced a preferred legal interpretation within a familiar
justificatory framework. Despite acknowledging legal ambiguity, the unable or unwilling test was
presented as a firm legal standard. This preferred interpretative position sought to both influence
understandings of the jus ad bellum and legitimize a particular use of force. Collectively, this advocated
approach derived persuasive value by positioning a legal interpretation as a necessary reformation
within the war on terror, a reflection and formalization of state practice, a direct response to the rise
of ISIS throughout the Levant, and a safeguard against an emergent threat that emanated from the
eastern Mediterranean and into the western world.
The effectiveness of a persuasive claim is influenced by the broader policy objective that the specific
legal argument wishes to further. Ambassador Power’s articulation of the unwilling or unable test is
inseparable from efforts to justify and advance the legal framework regulating the war on terror. It
must be considered alongside general, state-led efforts to expand the jus ad bellum to permit the use of
force against non-state armed groups.444 The multitudinous factors that influence evaluations of this
broad policy inevitably shape how the specific legal articulation is received. Accordingly, persuasion’s
effectiveness is best considered incrementally.
The Article 51 letter in which the United States justified its decision to use force in Syria was not the
first formal invocation of the unwilling or unable standard. While it has been periodically invoked
since the 1960s, the test, as noted, does not “appear as such in any legal instrument, including recent
ones, nor was it employed in relevant existing case-law, particularly by the ICJ.”445 Early articulations
of unwilling or unable – by Israel in response to attacks by armed groups operating within Lebanon –
were explicitly rejected by the Security Council and denounced throughout the international
community.446 From absolute rejection, articulations of an unwilling or unable standard received
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sequential support. As states identified the threat posed by transnational terrorist networks, legal
contentions expanding restrictive readings of the jus ad bellum gained salience.447
Within the post-9/11 context, following explicit Security Council recognition of the lawful use of
force against a non-state armed group, the unwilling or unable test became evermore prevalent.448
Appeals to the standard are increasingly accepted.449 They are not, however, universally endorsed.450 A
majority of states have rejected both a general articulation of the test and its specific application in
justification of US-led actions in Syria.451 Amongst international lawyers, the test’s formal legal status
remains controversial.452 Notwithstanding, the aforementioned persuasive appeals assuaged many
coalition partners. Though the US’s persuasive efforts have not altered the jus ad bellum, the United
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Turkey have each cited some variant of the test in justification of
the use of force (and in furtherance of US objectives) against ISIS in Syria.453
As with many persuasive contentions, the effectiveness of a particular claim is context dependant.
When the US offered the unwilling or unable test in justification of its military operations in Syria it
drew upon a cause many deemed just and a threat many believed visceral. A desired outcome, the
perceived utility of a particular policy, and a sense of moral certitude all influence the reception, and
thus effectiveness, of persuasive legal appeals. When, in 2002, Russia evoked the unwilling or unable
standard to justify military action against Chechen groups positioned in the Pankisi Valley, the United
States denounced the violation of Georgian sovereignty.454 Rwanda’s incursion into Eastern Congo
was justified in response to the DRC’s inability to disarm and disband the Interahamwe.455 The
international community’s response was mixed. The Security Council recognized that the Interahamwe,
perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, were “a source of instability, a threat to civilian populations
and an impediment to good neighbourly relations.”456 Sovereignty was, however, deemed sacrosanct
as the international community condemned Rwanda’s unauthorized cross-border forays.457
When the US invoked Article 51 and cited the unwilling or unable standard in justification of the use
of force against ISIS in Syria, the international response remained mixed. It had, however, moved
considerably from the near unanimous denunciations of the late 1960s, demonstrating greater
acquiescence to both the test’s utility and legal status. The effectiveness of these persuasive
engagements, whether the unwilling or unable standard has achieved legal status, remains unsettled.
However, as Olivier Corten notes, there is a sense amongst commentators that the test will be
“increasingly accepted in practice and [in] supporting statements of governments and international
organizations.”458 Determining whether and how US contentions influence the test’s formalization,
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requires a long-term perspective. It is nevertheless clear that the unwilling or unable standard has
entered the legal, political, and justificatory lexicon that states employ to use force in response to the
threat posed by non-state armed groups.
C. To Legitimize a General Situation or to Advance a Particular Policy: The 2014 Gaza War
In 2001, Hamas first aimed mortars beyond the Gaza Strip. They detonated in Nahal Oz, a kibbutz
near Sderot. On 10 February 2002, the first rockets were launched towards communities in Israel’s
south.459 These early attacks were limited. They did not garner the same level of attention as the suicide
bombings that had become the hallmark of the second Intifada. Still, Israel’s response was considerable
– striking Hamas and PA targets throughout Gaza.460 Israel framed its actions as a military necessity.
Since the commencement of the second Intifada, Israel altered the defensive legal paradigm used to
engage with non-state armed groups – from a law enforcement model to a military framework.461
Daniel Reisner, who oversaw this policy shift when head of the IDF’s ILD, recalled:
“when we started to define the confrontation with the Palestinians as an armed
confrontation, it was a dramatic switch, and we started to defend that position before the
Supreme Court. In April 2001, I met with American envoy George Mitchell and explained
that above a certain level, fighting terrorism is armed combat and not law enforcement.
His committee [which examined the circumstances of the confrontation in the territories]
rejected that approach. Its report called on the Israeli government to abandon the armed
confrontation definition and revert to the concept of law enforcement. It took four
months and four planes to change the opinion of the United States…”462
The rockets continued, summarily preceded by strong military actions.463 Following Israeli
disengagement from Gaza and the 2006 Palestinian elections – in which Hamas won 74 of the
Legislative Council’s 132 seats – inter-communal violence peaked. Hamas militants feuded with
Fatah’s security forces. In June 2007, Hamas assumed full control of the Gaza Strip.464 Within months,
Israel listed Gaza as a “hostile territory.”465 Sanctions against the Hamas-controlled territory were
instituted and so began the Israeli-Egyptian blockade of Gaza that continues to this day.466 A series of
large-scale military operations followed. Operation Cast Lead in 2008-09 and, with predictable
The IDF noted that this was the first time such rockets had been launched towards targets in Israel. See, Israel Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Palestinians launch rockets at Israel (10 February 2002), online: <http://www.
mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2002/pages/palestinians%20launch%20rockets%20at%20israel%20-%2010-feb-200.aspx>.
See also, Jean-Pierre Filiu, Gaza: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 264 [Filiu Gaza History].
460 Ibid, at 263-268.
461 See generally, Feldman & Blau Consent and Advise, supra note 28. See also, Amichai Cohen, “Legal Operational Advice
in the Israeli Defense Forces: The International Law Department and the Changing Nature of International Humanitarian
Law” (2011) 26 Conn. J. Int’l L. 367 at 400.
462 Feldman & Blau Consent and Advise, supra note 28. See also, Daniel Reisner, International Law and Military Operations in
Practice (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2009).
463 In response to the continued rocket attacks, the IDF engaged in several small-scale military operations during the mid2000s. See generally, Human Rights Watch, Razing Rafah: Mass Home Demolitions in the Gaza Strip (17 October 2004),
online: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/10/17/razing-rafah/mass-home-demolitions-gaza-strip>. See also, IDF
Spokesperson, Briefing: Gaza Division Commander, Brig. Gen. Shmuel Zakai” (23 May 2004), online: <http://www.
imra.org.il/story.php3?id=20933>.
464 Filiu Gaza History, supra note 459 at 302-303.
465 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Security Cabinet Declares Gaza Hostile Territory (19 September 2007), online:
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2007/pages/security%20cabinet%20declares%20gaza%20hostile%20territor
y%2019-sep-200.aspx.>.
466 See, James Kraska, “Rule Selection in the Case of Israel’s Naval Blockade of Gaza: Law of Naval Warfare or Law of
the Sea?” (2010) 13 Y. Int’l H.L. 367 at 375-379.
459

245

regularity, Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012. Israel presented the ensuing uses of force in Gaza as
direct responses to the cascade of rockets launched by Hamas. A familiar pattern of actions and
counteractions solidified what continues to resonate as Gazan rockets precede Israeli airstrikes which
precede Gazan rockets in a ferocious carrousel of violence and escalation buttressed by purported
legal justifications.
Operation Protective Edge, in 2014, was the third military offensive that Israel launched against
Hamas. The 2014 Gaza war was initiated by a series of events that began with the abduction and
murder of three Israeli yeshiva students – Eyal Yifrach, Gilad Shaar, and Naftali Fraenkel – and the
immolation of Mohammad Abu-Khdeir, a sixteen-year old Palestinian from East Jerusalem.467 Again,
Israel framed its military operation as a defensive response to the increase in rocket attacks emanating
from within Gaza.468 The war lasted for 51 days. It was of greater duration and brought higher
casualties than preceding escalations.469 The international community reverted to many of the habitual
postures assumed in response to violent outbreaks between Israel and Hamas. The right to selfdefence received familiar avowals. Calls for restraint resonated. And, as the conflict continued, Israel
would face mounting international criticism.470
Israel presented what it asserted to be a paradigmatic appeal to self-defence.471 It cited assurances by
world leaders that had spoken of Israel’s inherent right to protect itself from the threat of terrorism.472
However, Israel acknowledged that much of the ensuing criticism – that followed Operations Cast
Lead and Protective Edge – addressed the jus in bello. Pnina Sharvit Baruch, who headed the ILD
during the 2008-09 war, later noted: “the more significant claims concern the manner in which the
IDF used force in the operation and the application of the laws of warfare (that is, the area of jus in
bello).”473 An international legal discourse accompanied each conflict. Israel faced increasing
accusations of legal wrongdoing. In reply, Israeli officials harnessed the language of international law.
In an effort to persuade varied audiences of the military operations’ legitimacy, Israeli officials
presented detailed legal narratives. They engaged in ongoing efforts to, as Prime Minister Netanyahu
declared, “delegitimize the delegitimization.”474
1. The Identification of a Common Lifeworld
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Israeli officials referenced a lifeworld that was both general and specific. Situated on the frontline of
the war against terrorism, they described two relatable contexts. Each context correlated with a series
of arguments that appealed respectively to the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. The first told of the
threat of terrorism. The second conveyed the challenges of combatting this threat. During and in the
aftermath of the 2014 Gaza wars, Israel grounded its legal appeals within these contexts. The struggle
against Hamas, the realities of asymmetrical warfare, were positioned as reminiscent of the global war
against terrorism and as a particular challenge that Israel was forced to confront.
Protective Edge began on 8 July 2014. Israeli F-16s targeted 200 sites across Gaza. Hamas launched
upwards of 150 rockets into Israel.475 The operation’s commencement was accompanied by a legal
discourse. Initial appeals to Article 51 were supplemented. Officials conveyed a broader context.
Within, Israelis were subject to the prolonged barrage of rocket and mortar fire. Gaza was aggressively
consumed by Hamas, a designated terrorist organization that “violently seized control of the Gaza
Strip and transformed it into a terror fortress.”476 When hostilities commenced, the Israeli Permanent
Representative to the UN addressed the Security Council. Ambassador Prosor identified a lifeworld
besieged by terror:
“there is a storm of rockets being fired by the Hamas terrorist organization in Gaza.
Hamas is indiscriminately threatening the lives of 3.5 million innocent men, women and
children in Israel from the south to the north – from Beersheba to Tel Aviv and Haifa.
In the past three days, 442 rockets have been fired into Israel. That is one every 10
minutes. Fifteen seconds is how much time one has to run for one’s life. Imagine having
only 15 seconds to find a bomb shelter. Now imagine doing that with small children,
elderly parents or an ailing friend.”477
Terrorism’s threat was not limited. It was presented as an everlasting and inescapable reality predating
the current military operation. Gaza was described as raucous. A place where public squares and
hospitals took the names of terrorists. Where children dress as suicide bombers and chant death to
Israel.478 Ambassador Prosor explained that a “generation of Israeli children [are] growing up under
the shadow of that threat. Such an abnormal way of life has become the norm for many Israelis.” 479
Operation Protective Edge was presented within this context. It was a purely defensive exercise, a
struggle to alter the intolerable reality caused by the culminative effects of Hamas’ terror.
Efforts to control the international law-based narrative continued following the cessation of hostilities.
The discourse coalesced around a lengthy report published by a UN Fact Finding Commission. Israeli
and Palestinian officials were accused of significant legal violations.480 In response, the Israeli
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence prepared a series of reports.481 Reverting to a practice that
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began following Operation Cast Lead, Israeli officials presented a comprehensive “factual and legal
account” of the war. Legal analysis, assurances of IHL conformity, were posited upon a relatable
context. Hamas and the dangers emanating from Gaza were manifestations of the global threat posed
by terrorism. Since its inception, Hamas orchestrated countless attacks – suicide bombings,
abductions, rockets, and cross-border raids. The report continued, noting that Hamas “had killed at
least 1,265 Israelis, wounded thousands more, and terrorised millions.”482
The lifeworld told of vulnerability. Though the incessant rocket attacks were specific to Israel, the
report conveyed a relatable sense of susceptibility to what was framed as a common threat.483 In detail,
it described Israel’s long history of subjection to terrorism. Pictures of children seeking shelter from
rockets accentuated the report. The effects of the attacks were conveyed in a detailed chapter that
described “life under the threat of terrorist rockets and cross-border tunnel attacks.”484 The report
cited medical studies that “show that large percentages of Israeli citizens in range of Hamas fire suffer
from long-term symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and other impairments to personal, social,
and occupational functioning, including intense anxiety, flashbacks, feelings of powerlessness, and
hypervigilance.”485
Likened to ISIS and al-Qa’ida, Hamas sought “to impose an extreme version of Sharia law.”486 They
were presented as an affront to liberal values – the agents of gender-based oppression; an armed group
who had banned displays of Christian symbols, called for the execution of the LGBT community,
harassed journalists, and persecuted political opponents. Hamas were aligned with Syria, Iran, and
Hezbollah. They were not confined to Gaza. Hamas had planned “attacks out of Turkey and Qatar”
and viewed “Europe as a crucial arena for its jihadist movement.”487
Necessity demanded a military response. Additional aspects of the lifeworld were identified as Israeli
officials addressed specific claims of legal disregard. Required defensive actions were juxtaposed with
the challenges of asymmetrical conflict. A shared experience – albeit one that was limited to states or
militaries engaged in conflict against non-state armed groups – was recalled.488 Israel described the
environment in which it was required to confront Hamas. Identifiable challenges, long acknowledged
by states engaged in such forms of warfare, were offered.489 Hamas was described as having cultivated
an arena of belligerency within which increased civilian casualties became tragic inevitabilities but not
legal wrongs. Ambassador Prosor told the Security Council that, “Hamas exploits our concern for
human life by hiding in Palestinian homes, schools and mosques and by using the basement of a
hospital in Gaza as its headquarters. They are committing a double war crime, targeting Israeli civilians
while hiding behind Palestinian civilians.” 490 As the fighting continued, the Foreign Ministry attributed
civilian deaths in Gaza to Hamas’ legal disregard. They developed a narrative, drawing upon the shared
experiences of states that confront non-state armed groups in urban centres. Hamas were accused of
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willfully placing their own population in danger by launching attacks from densely populated areas, by
using human shields, and by transforming civilian sites into military targets.491
The post-war Israeli report documented this supplementary feature of the identified lifeworld. Hamas
were adjudged to have aggravated their own citizens’ suffering for political gain. Common operational
challenges, that resulted in heightened death tolls, property damage, and the optics of razed civilian
sites, were presented as inevitabilities: “despite the extensive precautions taken by the IDF to avoid
or minimise damage to civilian life and property, the strategy of conducting hostilities from denselypopulated civilian areas significantly exacerbated damage.”492 The report recalled the challenges of
urban warfare. It evidenced Hamas’ strategy. A combat manual recovered from the al-Qassam Brigade
was replicated to illustrate that Hamas militants embedded within civilian populations to, as the manual
stated, “raise the hatred of our citizens towards the [IDF] and increase their support [for Hamas].”493
Specific incidents were described. Satellite images showed Hamas conducting operations from
protected sites. These familiar challenges of asymmetrical warfare were presented throughout the
report. In great detail, Israel purported, that the war took place within a context, manufactured by
Hamas, that was “directly responsible for the scale of the civilian casualties and property damage.”494
Evaluations of the war’s legitimacy were to be situated within this context. Notwithstanding the
described challenges, Israeli officials claimed that the resulting military response was guided by
international law.
2. Establishing the State as a General Norm-Acceptor
“No other country and no other army in history have gone to greater lengths to avoid casualties among
the civilian population of their enemies,” said Prime Minister Netanyahu.495 Having traveled to New
York to address the General Assembly following the conclusion of Operation Protective Edge, the
Prime Minister told the gathered dignitaries, “this concern for Palestinian life was all the more
remarkable given that Israeli civilians were being bombarded by rockets day after day, night after night.
And as their families were being rocketed by Hamas, Israel’s citizen army…upheld the highest moral
values of any army in the world.”496
Israel’s efforts to assert legitimacy were premised upon claims that the IDF’s actions throughout the
Gaza war reflected Israel’s commitment to international law. Affronts to this supposed commitment
were subject to investigation and presented as anomalies. 497 While Israeli officials acknowledged that
Protective Edge’s legitimacy would be contested, the subject of intense legal scrutiny, Israel’s intricate
legal arguments, interpretative contentions, and assertions of compliance were preceded by claims of
general legal fidelity. During the war, the Foreign Ministry disseminated real-time accounts of the
IDF’s legal conduct. These asserted that Israel was bound by IHL and “committed to limiting itself
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to a lawful response.”498 Continuing, the Foreign Ministry described Israel’s dedication to the
principles of distinction, proportionality, humanity, and precaution. These legal tenets guide
operational decisions. Israeli officials conveyed, that in accordance with these requirements, the IDF
uses “the most sophisticated weapons…in order to pinpoint and target only legitimate military
objectives and minimize collateral damage to civilians; advance notice is given to the civilian
population located in the vicinity of military targets; [and] attacks are called off in cases in which a
sudden civilian movement [occurs] in the targeted areas…”499
General claims of legal compliance featured throughout the conflict. Ambassador Prosor told the
Security Council: “throughout Operation Protective Edge, Israel has been committed to upholding
international law. Our army is a moral army like no other in the world. It does not aspire to harm any
innocent person. We are operating only against terrorist targets and genuinely regret any civilian
loss.”500 Defence Minister Moshe Ya’alon – in response to the publication of the Fact-Finding
Commission report – accused the UN body of delegitimizing Israel. The IDF had “acted in accordance
with international law in Operation Protective Edge, and did all it could to prevent harm to
civilians.”501
Public justifications became declarations of legal intention. These affirmations of Israel’s commitment
to both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello were conveyed through the Foreign and Defence Ministries
report. Presentation of intricate legal arguments, direct responses to varied legal accusations, began by
recounting Israel’s general commitment to international law. The report signalled acceptance of the
norms governing the use of force and the conduct of hostilities. The IDF, “maintains binding policies,
procedures and directives that implement Israel’s legal obligations…[and] ensures that its forces
receive adequate training on these obligations.”502 Legal accountability, officials claimed, demanded
that, “the IDF sought to achieve the goals set by the Government of Israel [during Operation
Protective Edge] while adhering to the Law of Armed Conflict.”503 Efforts and policies, presented in
accordance with Israel’s legal commitments were described throughout the report.504
The use of force was designated as a last resort. The report conveyed what officials claimed were
efforts to deescalate and employ diplomacy to avoid military confrontation.505 Detailing the threat
posed by Hamas, the report tells of a general commitment to the jus ad bellum process. Only when such
efforts were exhausted, Israel asserted that it was left with “no choice but to launch a broader military
operation in order to protect Israel’s civilian population.”506 Upon reaching this conclusion, Israel
announced its commitment to the rules regulating the conduct of warfare.
A detailed chapter of the Israeli report – professing legitimacy through case-specific accounts and
describing the IDF’s actualization of IHL – begins with a generalized avowal: “Israel conducted its
military operations during the 2014 Gaza Conflict in accordance with the rules of the Law of Armed
Conflict governing both international and non-international armed conflicts, including the rules
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relating to distinction, precautions and proportionality.”507 The report continues to describe Israel’s
commitment to the international conventions governing armed conflict and its compliance with “all
rules of customary international law, including rules embodied in conventions to which [Israel] is not
party.”508 The report attempts to persuade audiences, that Israel exhibits a general sense of legal
fidelity, through further substantiation. It details “strict procedures and oversight for compliance with
the Law of Armed Conflict.”509 The IDF’s training procedures are explained over several pages.510 A
sub-section of the report recounts how “IDF military lawyers regularly provide advice on international
law at all levels of command.”511 Operational regulations, directives, and orders – that “implement
applicable rules of the Law of Armed Conflict” – are extensively cited.512
3. Demonstrating the Authority to Interpret
Post-war legal contentions were coupled with displays of competence and authoritativeness. The style
and presentation of the Foreign and Defence Ministries report; accentuation of the contribution made
by military lawyers in the planning, conduct, and justification of Protective Edge; and the role
attributed to independent experts supplemented Israel’s interpretative avowals. These persuasive
appeals recall Charlotte Peevers’ suggestion that professional expertise is conveyed to influence the
legal justifications offered upon the use of force.513
The legal contentions – both general and specific – made throughout the Foreign and Defence
Ministries report present in a “quasi-academic” style. The report is published in English. It contains
extensive footnoting and elaborate legal reasoning.514 Particular legal arguments, interpretative
positions, are supported in a familiar manner. Experts are cited. Affirming legal materials are
displayed.515 The report itself is presented as the authoritative account of the war. It is framed as an
“unprecedented effort to present the factual and legal aspects concerning the 2014 Gaza Conflict.”516
The report’s thoroughness, the ability of its authors to draw upon intelligence briefings, access satellite
images and interview witnesses, and to receive experiential accounts from decision-makers purport to
lend credence to the report’s legal and factual contentions. Officials claim that the Israeli report is “far
more comprehensive than reports issued by other organisations, including international organisations
and non-governmental organisations, and is also unparalleled in its access to information from Israel,
including information regarding the conduct of the terrorist organisations and the reasoning and
details behind Israel’s conduct.”517 The report’s professional composition, access, and substantiation,
each demonstrate what Israeli officials present as authoritative accounts of legal legitimacy.
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The role of legal expertise is accentuated. A chapter of the report – describing the IDF’s internalization
of international law – details the influence of lawyers. Military commanders receive IHL training from
the IDF’s legal experts. Legal advice is available when operations are planned, in real-time, and upon
their conclusion.518 The report prefaces its legal defense of Operation Protective Edge by informing
that “the Military Advocate General [MAG] Corps deploys specially trained military lawyers at various
levels of command in order to improve access to legal advice and enhance the implementation of
international law during operations, as well as to assist with [the] ‘lessons-learned’ process following
operations.”519 Legal trainings are described, suggesting interpretative expertise. The resulting legal
advice, the report notes, receives elevated status:
“IDF military lawyers regularly provide advice on international law at all levels of
command. These lawyers…are not subordinate to the commanders they advise, because
the [MAG] has an independent status outside the military hierarchy in relation to all legal
issues…By positioning military lawyers in this manner within the IDF, Israel ensures that
they can provide frank and professional advice. Legal opinions of the MAG Corps are
binding upon the IDF, including with regard to the legality of individual attacks.” 520
The ILD, upon the commencement of hostilities, is staffed by “dozens of additional Law of Armed
Conflict experts.”521 Functioning independently from the military command, the report explains that
the legal experts advise the General Staff Command. They are deployed to provide IHL advise at the
regional and divisional levels by assessing the “legality of decisions regarding rules of engagement,
targeting, use of weapons, detainee treatment, and humanitarian efforts.” 522
The endorsements of independent legal experts are accentuated. The capacity of Israel’s post-conflict
accountability mechanisms is described and corroborated with reference to recommendations offered
by the Turkel Commission – the independent expert body that evaluated Israel’s investigatory
procedures.523 Prominent experts, having endorsed Israel’s legal capacity or proffered comparable legal
interpretations were listed, their credentials provided in accompaniment.524 The IDF extended
“unprecedented access” to Michael Schmitt and John Merriam to evaluate whether Israel’s “systems
and processes for engaging in attacks promote compliance with the [Law of Armed Conflict]. 525
Schmitt, a prominent IHL expert, and Merriam, a Major in the US Judge Advocate General’s Corps,
were accompanied by IDF officials on a “staff ride” of the Gaza Strip. They were permitted to inspect
an Israeli operations center that oversees combat missions, to see a “Hamas infiltration tunnel,” and
to review “IDF doctrine and other targeting guidance… [they received] briefings by IDF operators
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and legal personnel who have participated in targeting.”526 Schmitt and Merriam published a law review
article, in the University of Pennsylvania’s Journal of International Law, conveying the IDF’s targeting
procedures and associated legal positions.527 This was presented as the “first look inside Israeli
targeting.”528 Schmitt and Merriam continued, evaluating Israel’s contentions, and concluding that in
many instances, “the IDF imposes policy restrictions that go above and beyond the requirements of
the [law of armed conflict].529 Israel’s interpretative contentions are deemed conventional. However,
as with many states that forward persuasive appeals of legal legitimacy upon the use of force, these
contentions often appeal to permissively construed legal standards.
4. Instilling the Standard of the Acceptable Legal Argument
Much of the international community denounced Israel’s conduct during the 2014 Gaza war.
Mounting civilian casualties, the damage and displacement incurred from constant bombardment,
caused significant segments of the international community to replace calls for restraint with
accusations of legal violations.530 The UN Fact Finding Commission report charged that Israel’s
targeting selection “did not take into account the requirement to avoid, or at the very least minimize,
incidental loss of civilian life.”531 Illustrating the sentiment – that states rarely dismiss law’s relevancy
but instead make interpretative contentions – Israeli officials promoted permissive readings of IHL in
response to accusations of legal violations.
Efforts to alter international law’s application accompanied formal affirmations of law’s relevancy.532
Prime Minister Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, when serving as Minister of Defence, endorsed
restructuring the legal standards that regulate hostilities between states and non-state armed groups.
Barak noted that while Israel cannot change international law it could advantageously develop it.533
Following Operation Protective Edge, contestations of legitimacy were displayed through assertions
that IDF conduct complied with broadly constructed legal standards. Favoured interpretations of IHL
principles were offered. Premised upon expansive conceptions of reasonableness, Israeli officials
sought to instill and then satisfy these faciliatory legal standards.
Israel asserts that it “scrupulously observed the principle of distinction.”534 Grounded in
reasonableness, adherence and legitimacy were professed. The report claimed that the IDF limited
targeting to “persons where there was reasonable certainty that they were members of organised armed
groups or civilians directly participating in hostilities, and only [targeted] structures where there was
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reasonable certainty that they qualified as military objectives.” 535 Accentuating IHL’s most permissive
features, an attack, the report noted, against an intended military target but which unintentionally
struck a civilian object did not render the action unlawful. 536 Israel professed that its precautionary
measures were unprecedented in scale and rigor.537 Roof knocking – a method devised by the IDF
during Operation Cast Lead to provide final warning of an impending attack – was described as
exceeding the requirements of international law. It was deemed highly effective and would later be
employed by US forces in Syria.538 The practice – the legal status of which remains contentious (even
legally dubious) – imposed an uncertain legal standard in substantiation of an Israeli narrative of
compliance and legitimacy.539
Proportionality is presented as an operational mandate.540 The Foreign and Defence Ministries report
stresses that proportionality does not “forbid incidental harm to civilians and civilian property. Rather,
under customary international law, this principle prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects…that would be excessive
in relation to the military advantage anticipated.”541 Determinations, assessments of whether an attack
meets this standard, could not be made in hindsight. Israel claimed that proportionality analysis was
adjudged against the standard of the “reasonable military commander.”542 The excessiveness of
collateral damage and the anticipated military advantage are assessed in accordance with “the
information reasonably available to [the military commander] at the time of the attack.” 543 If the
damage incurred becomes excessive, “the attack is nevertheless lawful as long as, when the attack was
launched, the commander reasonably expected the collateral damage to be proportionate.”544
The Israeli report alters the burden of the proportionality assessment. Contending that because “third
parties lack information about the aims, intelligence, operational circumstances and means of an
attack,” they are ill-suited to discern “the military advantage anticipated by an individual
commander…”545 The acceptableness of legal arguments – grounded in unattainable information – is
altered.546 Plausibility replaces validity. Assessments of proportionality, corresponding assertions of
legitimacy, become reliant upon particular valuations. This suggests that “only a military commander
can properly make proportionality assessments.”547 An acceptable legal standard is imposed.
Lieutenant Colonel Roni Katzir, in a paper presented to the IDF International Conference on the Law
of Armed Conflict and published in a special issue of the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,
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states that reasonableness implies that “the law accepts that assessing excessiveness is not a matter of
reaching the one and only answer to a determination. It would be a mistake to think that in each and
every case of a proportionality assessment there is a single point on a scale where each and every
reasonable military commander agrees that a proportionate attack becomes excessive.” 548 This
evaluative standard – that of the reasonable military commander – is not found in the First Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.549 It is not deduced from international case law.550 Instead, Israeli
officials draw upon select international precedent to persuade audiences that IDF actions in Gaza
should be evaluated through this permissive legal standard.
5. Drawing Upon Precedent and Commonality
Israeli officials appealed to precedent and commonality. Efforts to legitimize Operation Protective
Edge drew upon analogous legal interpretations to persuade varied audiences. The standard of the
reasonable military commander – the imposed means of assessing (and subsequently asserting)
conformity with IHL – derives from the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.551 Israel’s initial efforts to establish
this evaluative standard began before the 2008-09 Gaza war and drew heavily upon the ICTY
Prosecutor’s report.552 Following Operation Cast Lead, Israeli officials extensively cited the report.553
The Prosecutor’s report, Israel contended, provided credence to the claim that “international law
confirms the need to assess proportionality from the standpoint of a reasonable military commander,
possessed of such information as was available at the time of the targeting decision and considering
the military advantage of the attack as a whole.”554
Further attempts to impose an expansive notion of proportionality can again be traced to the
discursive exchanges that followed the 2008-09 Gaza war. State practice was cited. The military
manuals of various nations referenced. Statements by individuals who inhabited select epistemic
communities were recalled. Israel recounted that Australia’s Defence Force Manual holds that
“collateral damage may be the result of military attacks. This fact is recognised by [the Law of Armed
Conflict] and, accordingly, it is not unlawful to cause such injury or damage.”555 Canada’s Law of
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Armed Conflict Manual and the US Naval Handbook were referenced in substantiation.556 General
A.P.V. Rogers, the former Director of British Army Legal Services, was cited at length. Israeli officials
noted a lecture, delivered at the Lauterpacht Center for International Law, during which General
Rogers stated that: “civilians and civilian objects are subject to the general dangers of war in the sense
that attacks on military personnel and military objectives may cause incidental damage…Members of
the Armed Forces are not liable for such incidental damage, provided it is proportionate to the military
gain expected of the attack.”557
Writing after Operation Protective Edge in a publication by the Institute for National Security
Services, Pnina Sharvit Baruch again recalled the reasonable military commander. With reference to
the ICTY Prosecutor’s report, Sharvit Baruch reiterated that: “the laws of warfare state that the
standard [to assess proportionality] is that of a reasonable military commander.”558 This preferred
standard was referenced within a discussion regarding the challenges Israel would face when asserting
legal legitimacy.559
6. Conclusion
The Foreign and Defence Ministries report, published following Operation Protective Edge, made
extensive use of precedent. Legal contentions and factual assertions were supplemented with
supportive materials. Israel’s responses, the series of reports, the diplomatic interactions, public
declarations, and targeted addresses, are demonstrative of the ways that states appeal to international
law to legitimize and to persuade. Persuasive appeals will, however, become fragmented.
Considerations of effectiveness must account for the constitutive parts of an overall legal strategy.
They must evaluate the varied receptions that correspond to a particular legal assertion or
argumentative objective.
Israel’s legal narrative contained appeals to both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. Initial contentions
– of defence against a persistent barrage of rockets and terror – received broad support. Partially, these
familiar reactions were guided by ideology and partisanship. Reliable allies including the US, the UK,
Australia, France, and Canada indicated their support of Israel’s military initiative.560 Israel’s staunchest
critics denounced IDF aggression in Gaza.561 Unexpected reactions featured alongside these
predictable diplomatic postures. Egypt and Saudi Arabia condemned Hamas’ actions, accusing the
Gazan group of exacerbating Palestinian suffering. 562 Following several meetings, the Security Council
issued a balanced statement that called for an immediate ceasefire. This neither endorsed or denounced
Israel’s actions.563
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Certain states were influenced by Israel’s legal appeals. Canadian officials accepted a near verbatim
account of the jus ad bellum arguments that Israel presented through its public pronouncements.564
Often, however, strategic and non-legal considerations affect the reception of a legal narrative.
Egyptian and Saudi officials, offering unprecedented criticisms of Hamas’ actions and aberrant silence
in response to Israel’s use of force, sought tactical benefit. Officials in Cairo and Riyadh viewed Hamas
as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood, a beneficiary of Turkey and Qatar, and as acting in the
furtherance of Iranian interests.565 Political calculations, ever-present, affected the reception of the
Israeli narrative and guided the responses of key regional actors.566
Support for or indifference towards Operation Protective Edge was not, however, absolute.
Considerations of the cause of war were replaced by deliberations regarding military conduct. The jus
in bello arguments presented by Israel were less impactful. Acquiescence dwindled. As the campaign
continued, regional leaders and key allies altered their endorsements.567 King Abdullah claimed that
Israeli actions in Gaza constituted war crimes. Jordan stated that mounting civilian casualties
contradicted Israel’s claim that the war was justified. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry denounced the
inhumane blockade of Gaza.568 US officials would also adjust their often-steadfast support. While
reaffirming Israel’s right to use force against Hamas attacks, US officials became increasingly critical
of particular Israeli actions.569
The war’s optics – the scores of dead, the seemingly heedless destruction that marked Gaza’s
landscape – drove sentiment. Many critics remained unmoved by Israel’s legal contentions. Others,
however, accepted varying aspects of the Israeli narrative. Evaluations of persuasiveness must attempt
to reconcile the fragmentation of both legal contentions and diplomatic receptions. Audiences will
pick and choose which aspects of a broad legal appeal that they accept, that they understand as morally
imperative, as strategically advantageous, as plausibly acceptable, or as materially insignificant.
Assessments of persuasion’s effectiveness, or whether legal argument influenced the perceived
legitimacy of a particular military operation often evades a singular response. It necessitates long-term
perspective, acknowledgement of sought objectives, and identification of the conspicuous and
inconspicuous ways that legal discourse can affect non-legal considerations as a state contends that a
particular use of force was, in fact and in law, legitimate.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Persuasion is a means to induce change.570 Whether employed by a non-compliant state seeking
legitimacy, an international lawyer furthering her client’s interest, a norm entrepreneur that desires
social adaptation, or a non-governmental organization promoting a favoured interpretation,
persuasion exemplifies international law’s function. The relationship between persuasion and
international law is often framed around questions of compliance. How can a non-compliant state be
persuaded to act in accordance with legal dictate? The importance of this question is clear. Successful
efforts to ensure compliance enable international law’s ability to reform, to protect, to limit the use of
force, to promote human rights, and to contribute to a stable world order. The preceding pages
attempt to move considerations of persuasion beyond its common affiliation with compliance. They
do not dismiss the relevancy of these questions or the view, assumed by many lawyers, that persuasion
is an essential element of the trade. I instead offer a broader conception of international law’s purpose.
Within, persuasion becomes a two-way discourse between the non-compliant entity and a wider
audience. It is both a means to promote compliance and to define what compliance means.
Compliance serves as a marker of international law’s success. Yet compliance is a limited measure of
international law’s relevancy.571 Persuasion’s effectiveness is not only assessed by adjudging legal
fidelity. While evaluating effectiveness is a natural corollary to understanding the methods of legal
change, ruminations must consider a host of legal and non-legal factors. Multitudinous considerations
– beyond the merits of a legal contention and the skill with which an argument is delivered – affect
the reception of an international legal claim. Such factors will include: (i) economic considerations; (ii)
strategic and/or security alliances; (iii) the value or desirability of precedent; (iv) effects on regional
stability; (v) self-interest; (vi) political personalities and leadership; (vii) domestic political
considerations; (viii) the anticipated reactions of other states; (ix) values that the state wishes to
project/believes it represents; (x) whether the proposed legal action affects states or non-state actors;
(xi) implications for sovereignty; (xii) emotional appeal; (xiii) framing and context; (xiv) whether the
appeal facilitates a ‘winning’ approach; (xv) available information; (xvi) public perception; (xvii) media
portrayal; (xviii) lobbying and private influence; (xix) history and the state’s sense of its place within
the global order; (xx) power politics and whether the persuading entity can pressure the state to accept
its legal contention.
It is difficult to discern the effectiveness of a legal contention. Yet questions regarding factors, both
legal and non-legal, that influence the reception of a persuasive appeal are unavoidable. In certain
instances where multiple considerations interject and a decisionmaking process lacks transparency,
considering how an international legal argument motivates responses and contributes towards
outcomes will be an arduous, even improbable, task.572 Such ambiguity is unavoidable even when a
particular persuasive episode is articulated through a legal vernacular. The preceding case studies have
only touched on the question of effectiveness. In concluding, each case study alludes to different
factors that affect the reception of the respective persuasive appeals.
The legal arguments offered by Russian officials tell of the strategic significance of non-legal objectives
and differentiated audiences. The demonstrable falsity and legal flaws in Russia’s contentions resulted
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in their broad dismissal. However, evaluations of these appeals must consider more than their legal
cogency. Assessments of persuasiveness must understand what the desired outcome of a legal appeal
is and whether the associated appeal achieves or furthers this objective. The effectiveness of Russia’s
legal approach may be dismissed by the legal academy or international bodies but is also contingent
on how it is received by BRIC nations, key allies such as China, and certain demographics within the
near abroad.
Legal contentions, offered by US and British officials in justification of military action in Syria, tell of
the influence of context and the necessity of incrementalism. Direct legal considerations ask whether
the unwilling or unable test has achieved legal status. Did US and British arguments contribute towards
the test’s legal standing? Yet the extent to which the described arguments are effective, the manner by
which they are received and contribute to the sought objective is inseparable from the war on terror
and the motives, sentiments, and policies that it induces. Equally, evaluations of the argument’s
effectiveness cannot only be understood in relation to a specific military action. While the response
of states in the Security Council and General Assembly are important indicators of an argument’s
effectiveness, full evaluation requires long-term perspective. It is necessary to understand how the
particularities of one argumentative episode contribute to the gradual acceptance of a persuasive
contention’s political legitimacy as well as legal certainty.
Israel’s attempts to justify its actions during the 2014 Gaza War tell of fragmentation. Assessments of
persuasion’s influence must consider how the component parts of a cohesive legal argument will
pursue varying objectives, target disparate audiences, and be selectively received. The surety of an ad
bellum contention will not necessarily equate to in bello acceptance. A state’s argumentative strategy will
pursue multiple objectives. Israel’s efforts to legitimize its military actions in Gaza sought legal
affirmation but also intended to maintain and develop diplomatic relations, shape a media narrative,
and avoid scrutiny by the International Criminal Court.573
Further questions need to be asked. The purpose here has been to identify and map persuasive
techniques. I suggest that international law matters. However, within deliberative environments
understandings of persuasion and legal argument must look beyond conceptions of compliance and
towards notions of effectiveness to further comprehend international law’s influence and potential.
Though this paper describes particular forms of legal argument, these core claims are generalizable
beyond the contexts of the use of force and IHL. Questions regarding the successes and failures of
persuasive appeals, though alluded to, require additional attention. This exceeds the current scope. A
fuller understanding of international legal argument’s ability to persuade should move to consider how
persuasive efforts can be evaluated, what constitutes success, how to adjudge influence, and how to
differentiate between the many factors that influence a legal appeal’s reception. By asking such
questions and observing such processes we can further our understanding of international law’s
broader function while better harnessing its strongest potentials and resisting its worst impulses.
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